Foreign Relations Between the United States and Venezuela: 1890-1950

Venezuela and the United States have been known to associate with one another regarding foreign affairs. Within foreign relations, these two nations have seen individuals make choices for them and having a great impact towards the present. They have also had major events shape their current relationship.

The Start of Relations

The United States began their foreign affairs with Venezuela in 1835, the year in which Venezuela was recognized by the U.S. as a nation when they separated from the Colombian Empire. The United States recognizes Venezuela as a major Oil Exporter Globally, but in 1841 the Boundary Dispute of Venezuela began. Essentially, the British were taking land from Venezuela moving more towards the land that they believed to contain gold. This land reached “33,000 miles west of the Schomburgk Line.” [1] In retaliation, Venezuela protested this dispute of land, causing them to break ties with Britain. When they broke relations with Britain, the Venezuelan government looked for assistance from the United States. For the justification of U.S. assistance, the Venezuelan government used the Monroe Doctrine.[2] From there on, a span of nineteen years, Venezuela constantly petitioned for the U.S. to intervene by one of two options: they could sponsor arbitration, such as a conference, or they could use forces as support. They felt a third party to decide the solution to the issue was best suitable for this conflict. It is said that the United States “responded by expressing concern but did little to facilitate a resolution.”[3] The Monroe Doctrine was to warn off European Countries from interfering with the Western Hemisphere Nations.[4]

Occurring in 1895, Richard Olney had become the newest Secretary of State. He took the idea of the Monroe Doctrine and ran with it. Olney invoked the Monroe Doctrine, whilst sending “a strongly-worded note to British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury.”[5] The note highlighted the key point in favor of Venezuela, demanding that the British settle the Boundary Dispute with an arbitration. In response to this letter, Lord Salisbury decided that the Monroe Doctrine had no power in International Law. The United States did not approve of this action by the British, leading President Grover towards action. On December 1895, President Grover took initiative with a proposal to congress by attempting to receive authorization to appoint a boundary commission. If his proposal was forwarded, he stated that the commission’s findings be “enforced by every means.”[6] This consideration was soon granted by congress, furthermore, this led to talks of war starting between the United States and Great Britain.

At that time of events, Great Britain had been dealing with issues involving their entrance into South Africa and the annexation of the Boers Republics. Each nation, Great Britain and South Africa were at war with one another, known as the Boers War. Lord Salisbury knew that another conflict should be avoided at all costs, making him agree with the submission of the dispute to the American Boundary Commission. Venezuela, soon to react, also submitted to the arbitrary counsel. On October 3, 1899, the Commision decided it best to follow the original Schomburgk Line; a decision that the Venezuelan Government ratified the findings.

The Presidents involved at the time of the Venezuelan Border Crisis which lasted from 1895 to 1899 were Joaquín Crespo and Ignacio Andrade of Venezuela, as well as, Grover Cleveland and William McKinley of the United States. Each President had their own viewpoints about this major dispute. For example, President Grover Cleveland decided it best to try and better the foreign relations with both countries. Meaning that, when he offered the arbitration, it was to act as a signal towards a more peaceful confrontational solution, rather than war. Along with this decision, President Cleveland knew that there were going to be unsettled individuals considering certain choices made. For example, when the United States decided to side with Venezuela, they knew that diplomatically their relationship with one another would become stronger. On the other hand, the decision to offer arbitration instead of war would signal to the government of Great Britain that there is only a simple solution with civil rules, rather than using brute force to solve the problem. Not only would the decision to stand with a Latin American nation against a European power be beneficial, but it provided a better understanding for the United States Southern Neighbors. This decision of partnership would prove that their relations could be improved.

The final approach towards a solution for the Boundary Dispute of 1895[7] would upset the Venezuelan argument and prove more beneficial towards the British. The arbitration followed the original 1835 demarcation of the land. With this, the Venezuelan governing body turn towards ratification of the arbitration so that they could show that they were in support of the final decision; essentially to bring the confrontation to a close.

After this, there came the next Venezuelan crisis of 1902 to 1903. This all began because of an economic issue with the Venezuelan President, Cipriano Castro. The event was a naval blockade that began in December of 1902 and concluded in February 1903. It had been forced upon Venezuela by three nations: United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy. President Cipriano Castro withheld to pay the debts owed to those three nations for the damages of suffering European cities and structures from the time of the Venezuelan civil war. President Castro took for granted that power of the Monroe Doctrine. He figured the United States would help to “prevent European military intervention”, but that decision was mistaken, because president Theodore Roosevelt and the United States Department of State saw the Doctrine to pertain only towards the taking over of a body of foreign land, rather than acting as a peace offering. With earlier guarantees that no such seizure would happen, the U.S. enabled the activity to proceed without complaint. The bar saw Venezuela’s little naval force immediately handicapped, however Castro declined to give in, and rather concurred on a fundamental level to present a portion of the cases to global discretion, which he had recently dismissed. Germany at first questioned this, especially as it felt a few cases ought to be acknowledged by Venezuela without mediation.

President Roosevelt constrained the Germans to withdraw by sending his own bigger armada under Chief of naval operations George Dewey and compromising war if the Germans landed.[8] With Castro neglecting to withdraw, United States weight and progressively negative English and American press response to the undertaking, the barricading countries consented to a tradeoff, yet kept up the bar amid transactions over the points of interest. This prompted the consenting to of an arrangement on February 13, 1903 which saw the barricade lifted, and Venezuela submit thirty percent of its traditions obligations to settling claims.[9] At the point when the Perpetual Court of Discretion in The Hague along these lines granted special treatment to the barricading powers against the cases of different countries, the United States feared for this would empower future European mediation decisions. The scene added to the improvement of the Roosevelt Result to the Monroe Teaching, attesting a privilege of the Assembled States to intercede to settle the financial issues of little states in the Caribbean and Latin America on the off chance that they were not able pay their worldwide obligations, with the end goal to block European intercession to do as such.

Current Foreign Relation Status

U.S. help to Venezuela bolsters the safeguard of human rights, the advancement of common society, and the fortifying of law-based establishments. Venezuela is right now subject to specific confinements on U.S. remote help. The United States stands prepared to give crisis nourishment help, including sustenance and sustenance items or help, to influenced populaces in Venezuela, if the Government of Venezuela would acknowledge worldwide compassionate help. Since 2005, the President has decided yearly that Venezuela has “flopped evidently” to stick to its commitments under global counter-opiates understandings and to take certain counter-opiates measures. The President has postponed these limitations regarding programs that are crucial to the national interests of the United States, for example, human rights and common society programs. In accordance with area 40A of the Arms Export Control Act[10], the Department of State, since 2006, has confirmed that ”Venezuela was not collaborating completely with U.S. counterterrorism intrigues.“[11] Under this arrangement, resistance articles and administrations may not be sold or authorized for fare to Venezuela amid the applicable monetary year.
 

Bibliography

• https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/venezuela
• https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=23
• https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/gp/17463.htm
• https://www.revolvy.com/page/Venezuelan-crisis-of-1902%E2%80%931903
• https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm
• https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/venezuela
• https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-idUSKCN1B225P

[1] This can be found at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/venezuela

[2] The Monroe Doctrine information was received through https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/venezuela

[3] https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/venezuela

[4] https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=23

[5] https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/venezuela

[6] https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/venezuela

[7] https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/gp/17463.htm

[8] https://www.revolvy.com/page/Venezuelan-crisis-of-1902%E2%80%931903

[9] https://www.revolvy.com/page/Venezuelan-crisis-of-1902%E2%80%931903

[10] https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm

[11] https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm