Developing a theory of mind at four years

Theory of Mind is a term introduced by Premack and Woodruff, (1978) it is considered “the ability to infer the current mental state of others, their beliefs and desires” (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2009). Theory of mind is vital in our understanding that others knowledge may differ from our own, it allows one to manipulate and interpret the actions and contemplations of another in terms of theoretical and intentional states. As such, we are able to surmise the mental states of others although they may not communicate them with visible cues, such as what they may be thinking or feeling, as well as the ability to distinguish between reality and belief. One of the major ongoing debates within developmental psychology is centred around the claim that a theory of mind does not develop until the age of 4. Although many agree with the claim there are countless theorists who believe that a theory of mind is innate therefore it must be present at birth (Fodor, 1992). This essay will be assessing contributing research towards this debate by looking at evidence for and against the claim in order to make an informed decision according to supporting research.

One of the most effective ways to test for a theory of mind in young children is through the false-belief task, as passing the task indicates that the child is aware that others may have incorrect beliefs about the world. Wimmer and Perner (1983) found, from their unexpected transfer test, that a fully developed theory of mind does not appear before the age of 3 to 4 years. In this test infants were told to watch a scene in which a character, Maxi places chocolate in a drawer and walks away. While he is away his mother takes out the chocolate and grates some of it onto a cake, places it elsewhere then leaves. Maxi then returns and the experimenter asks “where will Maxi look for the chocolate?” Results found that children above the age of 5 had no problem attributing to Maxi a false belief. The study was later repeated to children under the age of 4, when it was found that children under the age of around 3.7 years failed to answer questions correctly. Thus this provides strong evidence that a theory of mind does not develop until around 4 years of age.

Another classic experiment by Baron-Cohen et al (1985) was the ‘Sally-Anne’ task where the experimenter had adopted similar characteristics used originally by Wimmer and Perner (1983) and tested Autistic children, normal children and those suffering from Down’s syndrome for the presence of a Theory of Mind. It was found that the majority of normal and Down’s syndrome children answered all questions correctly whereas autistic children found it difficult to comprehend what had happened and tended to answer incorrectly. Although Baron- Cohen et al were testing for a theory of mind in Down’s syndrome and Autistic children, it should be noted that normal children and Down’s syndrome children both appear to have a theory of mind; hence they would pass the task at 4 years old. An autistic person however would not have a theory of mind as their minds do not function in the same way as a normal child, therefore one may suggest that a theory of mind does appear at 4 years but not for people with autism.

A further piece of evidence lies with Avis & Harris’ who tested the universality of the false-belief task in their study of the Baka children of Cameroon. The Baka is a traditional, hunting and gathering, non literate society where none of the adults or children can read or have been schooled. Using the original false-belief task, Avis & Harris tested 34 children aged between 3-5 years. Findings were similar to those in Western countries. However the results of this study shows flexibility in the age in which theory of mind develops. It is not necessarily 4 years within the Baka community which implies that there may not be universality in the age at which theory of mind appears to be present; the age is not 4 years it is in fact between 3 and 5.

Another researcher who has tested for universality in theory of mind is Astington (1996) who gave the false-belief test to Quechua children in Peru, and Tainae children of New Guinea. The results were very incompatible with those from Western countries. Young children and even adolescents could not recognise false-beliefs in others, hence no theory of mind at the age of 4. This provides strong evidence of cultural variation, as the task has consistently proved that children aged 4 are able to answer correctly within most Western countries and this is still likely to be the case if ever replicated.

It may however, be considered inappropriate to impose our Western false-belief task on people who have their own practises and teachings within their societies. This does not mean other cultures have no understanding of the mind, they may simply have their own means of perceiving others minds. Hence, children of other cultures and countries may have a theory of mind at the age of 4; we perhaps need to conduct research of a different method in such societies rather than the false-belief task.

Due to the volume of research in support of the claim that theory of mind appears around the age of 4, psychologists have come up with theories to explain why this the happens to be the case. The Representational Deficit theory, also known as the ‘theory-theory’ suggests that children develop beliefs or ‘theories’ about other people, revise them and use them in a similar to manner to how we use scientific theories. As such, by using these theories, children are able to make predictions about new evidence, to interpret evidence, and to explain evidence (Gopnik, 2003).

The theory-theory explanation is essentially a constructivist account as a rational understanding of the mind occurs by means of everyday theoretical constructs. Infants instigate with an initial primitive understanding of the mind, they accumulate data through interaction with the world and others around them which leads to a theory change and thus the development of a mature theory of mind at the age of 4 (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994).

Now looking at evidence against the claim, we must firstly take a look at theories and research which suggests that theory of mind does not in fact develop at 4 years. Problems with evidence for the claim are pointed out by researchers and are noted below.

‘Theory of mind module’ is a theory which essentially goes against the claim that children do not develop a theory of mind until the age of 4. Fodor (1983) originally mentioned innate mental modules thus, in contrast to the theory-theory approach, many theorists have agreed with Fodor and argue that a psychological understanding of the mind is achieved via the computations of an innate mental module (Wellman, 2002). Researchers such as Fodor (1992) and Leslie (1987) have all come to a similar accord that there is an individual theory of mind module which creates depictions of human activity in terms of mental attitudes toward specific events (domain specific cognition).

Evidence for the theory of mind module and against the theory theory is when researchers conducted theory of mind research on individuals with autism. They proposed that autistic children have impairment on their theory of mind module leading to inability to construe people in terms of mental states i.e. mind blindness (Leslie, 1987; Baron-Cohen et al 1985). However, as we established earlier, this may be due to the fact that autistic people do not have the same functioning of the mind as normal people and thus may have nothing to do with a module.

Theory-theory has also been challenged by many researchers as there is over-reliance on false-belief tests. Lewis & Osborne (1990), for example made the point that children can misunderstand the question being posed. Furthermore, Lewis, Freeman, Hagestadt & Douglas (1994) stated that children may fail to understand and integrate key elements of the story.

Another critique of the theory-theory is that there have been vast amounts of research of a theory of mind before the age of four. Early theorists, argue that children perform better in naturalistic environment for example Dunn (1988) provided a clear analysis of young children’s understanding of other family members’ desires, intentions and emotions. However one may argue that this is not actually evidence of a theory of mind, rather it is linked with developmental abilities, it does not mean that a theory of mind is acquired at this stage.

It has also been found that children have other early (before the age of 4) abilities such as deception (Lewis, Stanger & Sullivan, 1989), communicative abilities (Butterworth & Jarrett, 1991) and pretence (Leslie, 1987).

Numerous researchers have criticised tests such as the false-belief test. De Gelder (1987), for example pointed out that it is known that autistic children have difficulty with pretend play. Therefore, using dolls to represent real people may cause them some difficulties. However Leslie and Frith (1987) repeated the same study using real children and obtained similar findings. Furthermore, despite criticisms, false-belief tests have been replicated and the findings supported by many other researchers (Perner, Leekam & Wimmer 1987; Gopnik & Astington 1988).

Mitchell (1996) agreed with the traditional nativist account of theory of mind. He believed theory of mind had to be present at birth. Mitchell’s view was that everybody is born with a theory of mind and a reality criterion and young children fail theory of mind tasks as they are guided by the reality criterion. He also emphasised on the reliance of reality with false belief tasks when making judgments. It does not mean young people are incapable of false belief, it simply suggests that the reality criterion is more dominant. Evidence for Mitchell’s theory takes form in a modified version of the deceptive box test (Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991) originally created by Perner, Leekam & Wimmer (1987). In the modified version, 63% of children answered correctly compared with 23% in the standard version.

Both of the above theories have been deemed as plausible accounts of the theory of mind in children. However there does not seem to be adequate evidence against the claim. As theory of mind has been defined as the ability to understand others beliefs, this has not been seen to occur until the age of 4 (Perner, 1991). Another significant point is that although early abilities may be precursors to a real theory of mind, it does not mean that the change after 4 years does not exist. Gopnik, Slaughter & Meltzoff (1994) named four conceptual changes in the development of a theory of mind which provided evidence that a fully developed theory of mind does not appear until the age of 4.

A child showing signs of deception, communicative abilities and pretence should even be considered as irrelevant information when studying the theory of mind. Perner (1991) went on to say that pretence, deception etc may be over interpreted. After all, other developmental abilities are each to their own, their presence does not necessarily have to relate to a theory of mind.

On balance it would be fair to state that a fully developed mature theory of mind does not appear before the age of 4 and there is not sufficient evidence to backup claims that say otherwise. Although, the majority of evidence relies heavily upon false-belief tasks, the task has been proven to be accurate and reliable. Additionally, Wellman, Cross & Watson’s meta-analysis (2001) showed that children around 4 years 0 months performed above chance on the false-belief task. They also found that the results were consistent across the period analysed and were not any different for earlier studies than later ones. This provides extremely strong evidence of a theory of mind at the age of 4 compared with nil evidence against the claim. It would therefore be appropriate to accept the claim that a theory of mind appears around the age of 4 years and this is extremely strong evidence in support of this claim.

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