Canada’s Approach Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Introduction

Opinions regarding the Arab – Israeli conflict can be complex and multidimensional. Just within a country there exists varying levels of opinion. These include individual sentiments, institutional views, and normally an official foreign policy. Moreover, opinions on the conflict may be influenced by numerous factors such as; economics, religious/ethnic background, or morals.

In a case such as the Arab – Israeli conflict, a significant question a country ponders when determining their foreign policy includes: what is there to gain or lose from taking a certain position? Further, they may ask: what position can be taken to maximize beneficial outcomes for our country? The term for this theoretical approach to foreign policy making is called “realism.” A core tenant of realism is concerned with achieving national interests, which essentially are a country’s goals and ambitions whether economic, military, increased influence, etc.[1]

In this paper, my aim is to examine the many approaches Canada has taken towards the Arab – Israeli conflict. To specify, this paper chronologically observes Canada’s evolving foreign policy from 1939 to 2014. Further, I argue that for the majority of this time, Canada’s foreign policy towards the conflict has been dictated by realism, or achieving Canadian national interests. There was a distinct shift in foreign policy during the years Paul Martin and Stephen Harper stood as Prime Minister. Rather than following Canada’s official position, they allowed personal values to dictate the Canadian approach; ultimately to the detriment of national interests. The paper concludes with my take on how the current Liberal should approach the conflict given the current turbulent state of affairs.

Structure

First however, it is important for contextual purposes to understand the structure of this paper. In addition to being chronological, the paper follows another pattern that methodically illustrates Canada’s approaches towards the conflict. In each section, a particular time period is specified. Each time period represents a new approach, in which the particular national interest(s) of that time are defined. In conjunction with the definition, the paper shows how each approach, in practice, served the national interest. There are three of these sections: 1939 – 1947, 1948 – 1967, and 1968 – 2003.

While remaining explanatory in nature, the paper deviates slightly from the pattern starting with the shift in foreign policy during the Martin – Harper years (2004 – 2015). In the fourth section, the suspected reasoning for the change in approach is explained, followed by how it negatively affected the country. The final section consists of normative analysis. I briefly outline the current state of the Arab – Israeli conflict, while offering the reader how I believe the Canadian government should approach it.

1939 – 1947: Canadian Hesitancy

During the Second World War, Canada displayed its effectiveness as a middle power ally of Western forces. The existing superpower of Britain, as well as the emerging superpower United States, recognized Canadian war efforts. As a result, their international standing began to rise. Using this reputable status, Canada dedicated itself to the United Nations (UN).[2] Even as a middle power, the UN allowed Canada to have above average influence in the international sphere. Furthermore, it was Prime Minster (PM) Mackenzie King’s belief that it was in the Canadian national interest to maintain good relations with both the United States and Great Britain.[3] So how does this relate to the Arab – Israeli conflict?

Shortly after the Second World War ended, Britain, who had largely been handling the ongoing Arab – Israeli conflict, handed control over to the United Nations.[4] In doing so, this created the first instance whereby Canada was obliged to have an opinion regarding the conflict. Meanwhile. the post-war government considered the conflict to be insignificant in terms of directly affecting Canadian foreign policy. During this time, Canada had little economic or strategic ties to the Israeli’s and Arab countries. Moreover, Canada’s economy, while budding, was not particularly robust; making any commitments to the conflict an unnecessary financial burden.

Nevertheless, Canada had a vested interest in appeasing the UN. When the UN called upon Canada to be an active participant in solving the crisis, Canada was hesitant, but eventually agreed to be a part of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP).[5] Canada believed that if the UN was unable to resolve this conflict, it would damage the credibility of the institution. By proxy, this would be detrimental to the Canadian national interest. As mentioned, their status at the UN allowed them to maintain their above average influence in the international sphere. Additionally, Canada’s participation in UNSCOP pleased the British. Joining UNSCOP relieved Britain of much responsibility in resolving a conflict that had cost them a significant amount of resources in the preceding decades.

Seemingly, the cost of being a participant in UNSCOP was outweighed by the perceived benefits. The national interest, according to Mackenzie King was served during this time period. This shows how Canada was thrust into the conflict. Next, we look at their original approach of impartiality.

1948 – 1967: Canada’s Impartiality

By 1948, the UN partition plan had taken effect. Palestine had been divided and the state of Israel officially created. Unfortunately, the resolution was largely unsuccessful, as violent conflict between the two parties continued to occur. This conflict created issues that influenced Cold War spheres of influence. The West and East Bloc were taking sides on the Israel – Palestine conflict. Once again, Canada’s approach towards these issues was consistent with achieving their national interest.

Canada’s national interests did not change much from the previous time period. They remained committed to maintaining good relations with the United States and Great Britain. Along with being Canada’s largest economic partners, they also represented Canada’s greatest security alliance. Counterbalancing the perceived threat of the Soviet Union was crucial to Canada’s existence, although it came at a cost.

The rising tensions between the West and East bloc had a negative impact on Canada, mainly financially. Defence spending in Canada at the end of World War Two was roughly 3 percent of the GDP, whereas during the 1950s it averaged around 6 percent.[6] Thus, it was important for Canada to lesson the Cold War tensions and contribute to global peace to minimize the financial burden.

Canada was in a tough position. To achieve their national interests, they had to demonstrate full support of their Western allies while simultaneously preserving or reducing Cold War tensions. Intrinsically, those goals seemed opposite; however, Canada utilised its previously mentioned high standing with the UN to achieve their interests. They accomplished their goals through adhering to a policy of impartiality, which ultimately shaped Canada’s perception as “an honest broker” for the conflict.[7] The following paragraphs detail examples of how Canada achieved their interests through impartiality.

The first example of impartiality is Canada’s handling of the Suez crisis, which requires some background information. The conflict began in July 1956 when Soviet backed Egypt, seized control and nationalized the canal. This had adverse economic effects on much of the Western Bloc, as well as Israel. Joined by the British and the French, Israeli armed forces pushed into Egypt toward the Suez Canal in October of that year. The Suez crisis became a hostile standoff, with international security at stake.[8]

Canada’s adherence to impartiality played a leading role in de-escalating the conflict. Lester Pearson who then was the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, proposed that a multinational peacekeeping force act as a buffer between the opposing sides. After being approved by the UN, Canada led a United Nations Emergency Force to ensure both sides remained separate. This allowed for both sides to withdraw their troops without having to admit defeat, which greatly diminished the tensions. Lester Pearson later won a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in mediating the Suez Crisis. More importantly perhaps, this served the Canadian national interest of reducing Cold War tensions without disrupting their current alliances.

Unfortunately, this was not the only time Canada was called upon to be impartial when it came to violent or potentially violent conflict. As mentioned, international peace and security aligned with the Canadian national interest. Through the Suez crisis, the world saw Canada as being the honest broker in the region. Thus, if Canada was to be a meaningful contributor to international peace, and thus achieve their national interest, they had to remain impartial to maintain “honest broker” status.

When the 6 Day War began, which saw Israel launch pre-emptive strikes against Egypt, Canada declined Israel’s request to send aid. The requested aid did not consist of offensive weaponry; nevertheless, Canada remained impartial for the fear of being perceived as favouring Israel. A related example revolves around nuclear weapons. While Canada did not produce nuclear weapons for themselves, they were a leading nation in nuclear technology. To remain impartial, Canada did not provide either the Arab nations or Israel with nuclear reactors.[9] In either case, if Canada had favoured one side, their advantageous perception as an honest broker would be compromised.

A final example of impartiality displayed by Canada exists in a decision to place the Canadian-Israeli embassy in Tel Aviv rather than Jerusalem. Placing the embassy in Jerusalem would be perceived internationally as Canada legitimizing Israel’s claim such contentious, holy land. Before John Diefenbaker became Prime Minister, he expressed interest in moving the embassy to Jerusalem. Facing opposition from the bureaucracy, this move never occurred as it was considered unnecessarily controversial. Rather, External Affairs convinced the eventual PM that impartiality was the best approach. [10] Thus, Canada continued to contribute to the peace process as an effective mediator through the UN.

As seen through the various forms of impartiality, Canada was able to effectively balance its commitment to the Western Bloc, while simultaneously contributing to the peace process. Particularly with the Suez Crisis, Canada reduced Cold War tensions which further advanced their national interest.

1968 – 2003

At this time, the Arab – Israeli conflict was a deadlock. Despite the ongoing efforts of the UN, peace negotiations were unsuccessful. Arab leaders had reached a consensus that there should be no recognition, no peace, and no negotiations with the State of Israel.[11] This set the context for PM Pierre Trudeau to establish a new approach towards Canada’s gradually changing national interests.

Much like the previous time period, maintaining relatively balanced relations between both the Arab nations and Israel was an advantageous position for Canada. The difference however, exists in the way Canada went about achieving said balance. Rather than be consciously impartial, Canada opened relations with both the Arab states and the Israeli’s. Trudeau wished to “extend its domestic interests abroad.”[12] This paper calls this new approach “active relations.” Let us first examine the slight changes in national interests, followed by examples of how active relations pursued these goals.

First off, it was in this time period that Canada began considering economic relations as being a factor in foreign policy making. This required fostering ties with both sides of the conflict. Second, appeasing the United States remained a priority in any foreign policy decision. Keeping the United States happy meant stability for both Canada’s economy and security. Lastly, regardless of the improbability of bringing peace to the region, making such efforts remained beneficial to Canada. It allowed Canada to maintain its good standing with the UN, and its reputability as a middle power with above average influence.

It is important to note that in achieving these national interests, they overlap when illustrating active relations. They are not concretely separate interests. With that in mind, let us begin by illustrating active relations through economic ties and it will segue into other interests.

In 1973, Canada held its first ever meetings with various Arab representatives to officially develop relations with their countries.[13] This was in response to the effects of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Egypt and Syria led fellow Arab nations in an attack against Israel in hopes of regaining territory lost during the 1967 Six-days war. To reduce potential support for Israel, Arab members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) initiated an oil embargo on Western states. As a result, Canadians were negatively affected by the steep rise in oil prices, making good relations with Arab nations increasingly important.[14] While taking part in meetings exemplifies active relations, what truly solidified the approach was Canada’s recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) during these meetings.

In similar fashion, Canada sought to establish stronger economic ties with Israel. In 1976, Canada and Israel formed the Joint Economic Commission (JEC). Details on the original JEC are limited because in 1993, the Canadian government renewed and revamped the agreement. The JEC consists of three economic goals. First, increased cooperation between Canadian and Israeli private sectors; second, facilitating specific projects or partnerships between companies that may lead to research and development; third, greater commercial and industrial relations.[15]

These examples of economic ties show that Canada maintained their balanced position in the conflict. Moreover, Canada did so not through impartiality, but through active relations with both sides. This balance was threatened in 1979 when Joe Clark became PM. Like John Diefenbaker, Clark wanted to move Canada’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Canada’s foreign policy makers were no longer the only one’s critical of Clark’s intention. There was backlash from Canadian businesses, as now they had significant economic ties with Arab countries. Furthermore, U.S President Jimmy Carter opposed the move as he believed it could disrupt the recent Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement signed during the Camp David summit.[16]

By once again deciding not moving the embassy, Canada benefitted from the stability in the region, kept the United States happy, and maintained good relations with both the Arab’s and Israeli’s.

To further illustrate how Canada used active relations, one can look at Canada’s involvement with the Refugee Working Group (RWG). Canada was assigned to this role due to its previously mentioned honest broker status. Israel stated that the only way it would participate in the RWG was if Canada organized it. As the Chair of the RWP, Canada actively led discussions between both the PLO and Israel to discuss the scope of the refugee issue. Unfortunately, the PLO and the state of Israel held staunchly opposed views over the right of refugees to return to their homes. Thus, the goal of the RWG was to determine how best to alleviate the anguish suffered by people displaced because of the Arab – Israeli conflict. [17] Despite the deteriorating relationship between Arab’s and Israeli’s throughout the 1990s, the RWG was the only working group that continued to meet. This speaks volumes to the Canadian reputation, and provides a segue into how this served the national interest. 

The RWG shows how Canada used active relations as an approach to peacemaking efforts, which serves the national interest by providing some sense of stability to the region. Moreover, by organizing the RWG, Canada was looked upon favourably by many facets of the international community. To restate, Canada’s reputation as a diplomatically balanced country with strong negotiation skills, allowed for it to have more influence in the international sphere than it otherwise would have. The active relations approach also pleased both pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian groups within Canada. Most importantly to the Canadian national interest, the United States viewed Canada’s handling of the RWG as a doing them a favour.[18] Much like how joining UNSCOP appeased Great Britain because it relieved them of some responsibilities, handling the RWG allowed the United States to focus on other aspects of the conflict.

2004 – 2015

With the election of Paul Martin as PM, this marked the end of Canada’s balanced approach towards the conflict. In the words of foreign affairs minister John Baird, “there is no better friend to Israel than Canada.”[19] I argue that the change in approach towards becoming an unconditional supporter of Israel disrupted the pursuit of national interests. We look at how this change in approach was detrimental to Canada’s national interests in more detail later. For now, let us examine how and why this change in approach occurred.

As mentioned, the shift began when Prime Minister Paul Martin became PM, and he appointed his cabinet ministers. Six members of a group called “Liberals for Israel” became Federal Cabinet ministers in 2004. Their greatest impact was on Canada’s UN voting patterns towards the conflict. Canada would now consistently criticize Palestine, while abstaining from votes that condemned Israeli actions. This is unlike the previous time period whereby Canada would vote on a case-by-case basis. ^[20] This norm defying behaviour continued to intensify under Stephen Harper’s time as Prime Minister.

In 2006, the balance in foreign aid shifted drastically. Canada was the first country to cut off aid to the Palestinians after Hamas came to power in the Gaza Strip in 2006.^[21] Unlike previously, where both Israel and the PLO’s were considered equal entities, Harper became Israel’s most supportive and unconditional ally. With that, Canada lost the United Nation’s trust in being an effective negotiator, which had become a part of the Canadian identity. This was acceptable to Harper as he wished to be less involved with the UN.

As for the effect this had on Canada, mainly it lessened their influence in the international sphere. With this new one-sided approach, Canada lost the ability to be an effective participant in the peace process, much less a welcomed one. This likely played a part in Canada losing their bid for a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Lastly, Canada did not receive the UN voting support that it had received from Arab countries in the past, effectively ending Canada’s above average influence within the UN. So why change an approach that was beneficial for Canada?

The probable reasoning behind the change is twofold. It likely comes down to personal ideology and domestic politics. Harper believed Canada’s foreign policy should be based on his morals rather than neutrality. In a 2003 speech, he stated, “We need to rediscover Burkean conservatism because the emerging debates on foreign affairs should be fought on moral grounds.”^[22]

Perhaps this was personal policymaking; however, there is also the argument that the shift displays efforts to win the Jewish Canadian vote. Showing support for Israel was a particularly important issue whereby Harper could win over much of the previously Liberal voting Jewish Canadians without changing laws such as gay marriage or abortion. While Canada has a substantial Arab population as well, they do not have as many powerful interest groups and are less organized by comparison.^[23] The domestic benefits Harper and Martin received, in their minds, outweigh the benefits Canada had received internationally for numerous years.

Current State of Affairs

There is a lack of scholarly publication regarding the current Liberal governments approach towards the Arab – Israeli conflict. Thus, this paper does not aim to illustrate their position; rather, I wish to conclude by offering the reader how I think the government should approach the conflict given the current state of affairs. Let us begin with a brief examination of the conflict.

Per the United States Institute of Peace, tensions have increased markedly between Israeli and Palestinian societies since the collapse of another round of peace negotiations in 2014. Violent incidents have sparked retaliatory attacks in both directions, including over access to the Jerusalem religious site known as the Temple Mount or Haram al-Sharif. Notably, Palestine remains divided both politically and territorially. With the Hamas regime controlling the Gaza Strip and Fatah controlling the West Bank, the risk of more widespread and sustained violent conflict looms. Israel on the other hand, continues to build what are considered illegal settlements according to international law, expanding both their hard and soft power. These political and social dynamics in both societies make orchestrating effective negotiations a challenge. So where should Canada position itself?

Based on the brief historical analysis of the Canadian experience within the conflict, I believe realism should be Canada’s approach. To reinstate realism, one has to understand what is in the best interest of Canada. In my interpretation, I think Canada should revert to the “active relations” form of balance. Let us look at the pros and cons.

During the 1968 – 2004 section, Canada benefitted from increased reputability on the international sphere. Due to their neutrality on the Arab-Palestine conflict, Canada received favourable voting patterns from the Arab states, as well as support from Israel during other UN votes. This allows Canada to punch above its weight in terms of international influence based on its reputation as an honest country.^[24] More so than ever, Canada needs the support of OPEC. With the oil prices being as volatile as they are, Canada’s economy which is heavily reliant on consistent oil exports is left vulnerable. Active relations may help regain the support of Arab countries for both oil related and other international interests.  

Secondly, Canada should consider taking over peace efforts to please the United States, Canada’s most important alliance. In alleviating the pressure put on the Americans to lead mediation, this may lead to more prosperous trade relations, which in turn benefit Canada’s economy. Leading any peace efforts is currently impossible, especially given Canada’s status as Israel’s best friend. Palestine would likely perceive Canada as a biased third party during any form of negotiations. Since the current regimes are unwilling to negotiate, this allows Canada ample time to resituate itself as an effective and willing broker of peace.

The cons of this plan are that it will be difficult to reduce aid to Israel without causing turmoil. Some would argue that this would irritate the United States; however, I believe my previous argument would outweigh any negative sentiments felt by the US. In my view, reducing aid must be done because aid tends to maintain the status quo,^[25] and currently, Israel is as uncompromising as ever. Losing Israel’s support, hopefully just temporarily, is a small price to pay to regain positive international recognition.

Conclusion

Hopefully this paper has given the reader insight as to how Canada has approached the Arab – Israeli conflict throughout history. From being reluctant to take a position; to a balanced approach; to being an unconditional ally of Israel; Canada’s foreign policy has undoubtedly evolved. Along with the change in position comes ramifications for Canada’s national interests. The most notable shift in my view is the shift from realism to moral based foreign policy making. Based on Canada’s history of pursuing their national interests in foreign affairs, it is clear to me that Martin-Harper policies were imposed for personal, rather than Canadian gain. But what good is keeping your job, if it is to Canada’s disadvantage? In short, I think that if Canada wants to work this conflict to their advantage, and to contribute positively to global peace, it must recapture its sense of balance.

References

• Bercuson, David. 1985. Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
• Brynen, Rex. 2007. Canada’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
• Cavell, Janice. 2007. “Suez and After: Canada and British Policy in the Middle East, 1956-1960.” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 157-177.
• Donald, Barry. 2010. “Canada and the Middle East Today: Electoral Politics and Foreign Policy.” Arab Studies Quarterly 191-217.
• Flicker, Charles. 2003. “Next Year in Jerusalem: Joe Clark and the Jerusalem Embassy Affair.” International Journal 115-138.
• Government of Canada. n.d. “National Archives of Canada.” Department of External Affairs Records.
• Heinbecker, Paul. 2007. Canada and the Middle East: Ambivalence or Engagement. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
• Hibbard, Steve. 2012. “Canada’s Middle East Policy: The End of Fair-Minded Idealism or a New Beginning?” Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East 1-13.
• Holmes, John. 1982. The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943 – 1957. Toronto: Toronto University Press.
• Jacoby, Tami, and Brett Sasley. 2007. Canada’s Jewish and Arab Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press.
• Kay, Zachariah. 2010. The Diplomacy of Impartiality: Canada and Israel 1958-1968. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
• Kennedy, Mark. 2014. “The Harper Doctrine: Why Canada’s Prime Minister Supports Israel.” Ottawa Citizen, August 3.
• League of Arab States. 1967. “Khartoum Resolution.” Council on Foreign Policy Relations. September 1.
• Mackenzie, Hector. 2016. “Antony Anderson, The DiplomatL Lester Pearson and the Suez Crisis.” British Journal of Canadian Studies 273-296.
• Mallakh, Ragaei El. 1982. OPEC: Twenty Years and Beyond. London: Westview Press.
• Miller, Ronnie. 1991. From Lebanon to the Intifada: The Jewish Lobby and Canadian Middle East. Maryland: University Press of America.
• Morgenthau, Hans. 1978. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
• Peters, Joel. 1996. Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
• QMI Agency. 2012. “Canada is Israel’s Best Friend: Baird.” Toronto Sun, May 5.
• Riddell-Dixon, Elizabeth. 2006. “Canada at the United Nations 1945-1989.” International Journal 145–160.
• Robinson, Andrew. 2011. “Canada’s credibility as an actor in the Middle East peace process.” International Journal 698-715.
• Robinson, Andrew. 2011. “Canada’s Credibility as an Actor in the Middle East Peace Process: The Refugee Working Group, 1992-2000.” International Journal 695-718.
• Robinson, Bill, and Peter Ibbott. 2003. Canadian military spending: How does the current level compare to historical levels? to allied spending? to potential threats? Working Paper, London: Project Ploughshares.
• Robinson, Jacob. 1971. Palestine and the United Nations: Prelude to Solution. Washington: Westport.
• Tauber, Eliezer. 2002. Personal Policy Making: Canada’s Role in the Adoption of the Palestine Partition Resolution. Greenwood: Westport.

[1] Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978)

[2] John Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943 – 1957, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982)

[3] John Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943 – 1957, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982)

[4] Eliezer Tauber, Personal Policy Making: Canada’s Role in the Adoption of the Palestine Partition Resolution, (Greenwood: Westport, 2002)

[5] Jacob Robinson, Palestine and the United Nations: Prelude to Solution, (Washington: Westport, 1971)

[6] Bill Robinson and Peter Ibbott, “Canadian military spending: How does the current level compare to historical levels? to allied spending? to potential threats?” Project Ploughshares (2003): 9.

[7] David Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy, (Toronto:

University of Toronto Press, 1985)

[8] Hector Mackenzie, “Antony Anderson, The Diplomat: Lester Pearson and the Suez Crisis,” British Journal of Canadian studies (2016): 275.

[9] Zachariah Kay, The Diplomacy of Impartiality: Canada and Israel 1958-1968, (Waterloo: Wilfrid

Laurier University Press, 2010)

[10] National Archives of Canada (NAC), Department of External Affairs Records.

[11] League of Arab States, “Khartoum Resolution,” Council on Foreign Policy Relations (1 September 1967)

[12] Ronnie Miller, From Lebanon to the Intifada: The Jewish Lobby and Canadian Middle East

Policy, (Maryland: University Press of America, 1991)

[13] Ronnie Miller, From Lebanon to the Intifada: The Jewish Lobby and Canadian Middle East

Policy (Maryland: University Press of America, 1991)

[14] Steve Hibbard, “Canada’s Middle East Policy: The End of Fair-Minded Idealism or a New

Beginning?” Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East (2012).

[15] Treaty E105063, last modified 3 March 2014, accessed 9 December 2016, http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=105063

[16] Rex Brynen, “Canada’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process.” In Canada and the Middle East: In Theory and Practice edited by Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007

[17] Joel Peters, Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks, (London: Royal Institute

of International Affairs, 1996)

[18] Andrew Robinson. “Canada’s credibility as an actor in the Middle East peace process: The

refugee working group, 1992 – 2000.” International Journal (2011): 702

[19] “Canada is Israel’s Best Friend: Baird,” Toronto Sun, last modified 5 May 2012, accessed 10 December 2016, http://www.torontosun.com/2012/05/05/canada-is-israels-best-friend-baird

[20] Donald Barry, “Canada and the Middle East Today: Electoral Politics and Foreign Policy.” Arab Studies Quarterly (2010): 200

[21] Paul Heinbecker, “Canada and the Middle East: Ambivalence or Engagement,” In Canada and the Middle East: In Theory and Practice edited by Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007

[22] Mark Kennedy, “The Harper Doctrine: Why Canada’s Prime Minister Supports Israel.” The Ottawa Citizen 3 Aug. 2014, Politics sec. Web. http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/theharper-doctrine-why-canadas-prime-minister-supports-israel

[23] Brett Sasley and Tami Amanda Jacoby, “Canada’s Jewish and Arab Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy.” In Canada and the Middle East: In Theory and Practice edited by Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007

[24] Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, “Canada at the United Nations 1945-1989,” International Journal (Sage Publications, 2006): 146

[25] Rex Brynen, “Canada’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process.” In Canada and the Middle East: In Theory and Practice edited by Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007