Philosophical Concept of the Identity of an Object

Philosophers over the decades have often discussed continuity of identity. Continuity of identity is ‘the question of whether a person at time T1 is the same person as person at time T2’ (DiGeovanna 2012, p. 1). Personal identity is also challenging to define as there are many different senses of identity. This is why there are many different conclusions that can be drawn from thought experiments such as The Ship of Theseus, because of the philosophical complexity of continuity of personal identity. Answers would wary based on both physical and psychological aspects. Each scenario would have slightly different criteria to what its personal identity would be. This means that when discussing the continuity of identity of a renovated house in contrast to a face transplant in a thought experiment, it would have different set of criteria applied to each by different philosophers.

This essay will argue that the identity of an object, in the case of a face transplant, is not preserved after it has been altered in some way by exploring Locke’s definition of a person and principles of individualization, and Nietzsche’s senses of identity.

After a face transplant, the identity of the original object is not persevered because of Locke’s definition of a person. Locke had his own definition of what a person was. “Person” is at times referring to the literal term of a human being and can be noted as person₁. Personality is often times associated with a creature, and the personality of that creature is connected to that creature being a “person” and can be noted as person₂ (Strawson 2014, p. 6). Even though an individual’s personality can change, they are still considered the same “person”. When an individual says, “he isn’t the same person anymore”, they often times refer to a personality change in the individual rather than a physical change. Locke uses person₂ in his works and refers to human beings as “man” (Strawson 2014, p. 7). Strawson (2014, p. 78) states on Locke’s use of person that ‘It’s a human being considered as a thing of such a kind that same human being doesn’t immediately entail same Person’. Locke (1689, cited in Strawson 2014, p. 7) once stated that ‘the body, as well as the soul, goes to the making of a man’. Locke (1690, cited in Weinberg 2011, p. 400) mentions on consciousness that if one was to remember a thought or action in the past that it would be defining to that one’s identity, saying it would be the same self then as it is now. This specific notion has some errors as memory can be faulty and events may be remembered differently or with error.

The face transplant would mean that a level of the identity is preserved as they are still essentially the same Person (person₂) as only their physical appearance has changed. However, a change in physical appearance would then influence the psychology of that individual (to an extent) therefore changing both personality and physical aspects which would mean it’s a new identity. For example, an individual with working eyes at t­_1­ and the same individual with a blinded left eye at t_{­2 ­}would act differently_­. So, it cannot be said that the same individual has the same identity at both points as both body and soul would have a change. This is further supported by Locke’s principles of individuation.

Locke has 3 principles which can be referred to as L1, L2, and L3 (Kaufman 2016, p. 238). L1 is that it is impossible for two (or more things) of the same kind to be in place, p, at a time, t (Kaufman 2016, p. 238). L2 is that it is impossible for one thing to have more than one beginning (Kaufman 2016, p. 238). L3 is that It is impossible for two or more things (of the same kind) to have one beginning (Kaufman 2016, p. 238).

When these principles are applied to the preservation of identity after a face transplant then it is evident from the principles that Locke has stated, that the face at t₂ cannot have the same beginning as face at t_1. When the process of the face transplant was completed, the individual now would have an altered identity.

Furthermore, the identity of an individual is not preserved after a face transplant because of Nietzsche’s work on the senses of identity. There are many senses of identity like substance, materiality, and being (Steinhart 2005, p. 2). Nietzsche denied the basis of most of the senses stating most were errors. Eric Steinhart (2005, p. 2) stated based on Nietzsche’s work that there are two primary senses of identity: identity as endurance, and identity as equality.

Identity as endurance is identity through time, involving temporal difference (Steinhart 2005, p. 2). Another common term for it being a diachronic identity (identity of something existing between one point in time and another). There are two logical forms, one being that x at time t­­_­1­ is the same as y at t­₂ (Steinhart 2005, p. 2)_­. An example being that Arnold Schwarzenegger was a bodybuilder in 1970 and also the Governor of California in the 2000s. The second is that x at t­_1­ is the same F as y at t­_2­. F is a sortal term, a sortal is what the essence of a thing is (Grandy 2006, p.1). For example, a man says the little girl in a picture is the same person who is now married to. Steinhart (2005, p. 2) states that it is important to have details restricted to F as it can become complicated, using the example that material in the human body is always being replaced so it is possible to be the same organism an individual was 10 years ago but not the same material construct the individual was 10 years ago (Steinhart 2005, p. 2). But in the case of a face transplant, the process of change in physical appearance is sudden in contrast to a gradual 10-year cell replacement, this means that there would be a drastic change in the F variable, supporting the statement that after a face transplant, the identity of the individual is not preserved.

Identity as equality is when objects can be simultaneous or timeless (Steinhart 2005, p. 2). This sense of identity has 3 main logical forms that Steinhart (2005, p. 2) states:

1. x is one and the same as y;
2. x is one and the same F as y;
3. x is the same F as y.

The first means x is literally and absolutely the same as y. The second is a numerical identity relative to the sortal, an example of a sortal-relative being that two ships may be the same but use different wood (Grandy 2006, p. 1). Steinhart (2005, p. 2) uses the example that Cicero is the same man as Tully, the morning star is same star as the evening star. ‘x is one and the same F as y means that x is an F, y is an F, and x is one and the same as y’ Steinhart (2005, p. 2) explains. Therefore, Cicero is not one and the same man as the morning star. The third logical form is type-identity, and also a sortal-relative. If an individual holds The Communist Manifesto in one’s left hand and another copy in the other, both the books are the same, however the book in the right hand is not one and the same in the left.

If all logical forms of Nietzsche’s sense of identity as equality is applied to the face transplant thought experiment, then the identity of the individual is still not preserved. With logical form 1, the face before and after surgery in not one and the same, form 2 doesn’t really apply to the situation, and form 3, although the individual is the same biostructure, the applied material neither resembles the old face nor is it of the same material construct, therefore the identity through logical form 3 is not preserved.

This essay argued that through a face transplant an individual identity is not preserved through philosophical principles set by Locke and Nietzsche. When Locke’s definition of a person is applied to a face transplant, the parameters within Locke’s definition does not account for the psychological change the individual would have. The principles of individualization further supporting this statement, as through a face transplant the individual would have a ‘new’ face. Meaning the individual would have two different faces in their lifespan, but two different objects cannot have one beginning therefore the identity is not preserved. Nietzsche’s two primary senses of identity were then presented, endurance and equality. In the first sense, there is a drastic physical change in the individual so the logical terms presented by Nietzsche would be invalidate the continuation of identity. In the second sense, preservation of an identity after the face transplant is simply proved wrong when the logical terms are applied. The presented evidence in the form of notes shows that there are substantial events related to a face transplant that would alter an individual’s identity and therefore the preservation of the old identity is not possible. Under different parameters by different philosophers, the answer may be different.

References

• DiGiovanna, J 2012, ‘You are and are not the person I once knew: eclecticism and context in the continuity of identity’, Appraisal, vol 9, no. 1, viewed 20 April 2019,
• Grandy, E 2006, ‘sortals’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, viewed 25 April 2019,
• Kaufman, D 2015, ‘Locke’s theory of identity’, in M Stuart (ed.), A companion to locke, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp. 236-57.
• Steinhart, E 2005, ‘Nietzsche on identity’ Revista di Estetica, vol 28, no. 1, viewed 28 April 2019,
• Strawson, G 2011, ‘Locke on personal identity: consciousness and concernment’, Princeton Monographs in Philosophy, vol 42, no. 1, pp. 5- 78, viewed 20 April 2019, < https://ebookcentral-proquest-com>
• Weinberg, S 2011, ‘Locke on personal identity’, Philosophy Compass, vol 6, no. 6, viewed 23 April 2019, < https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com>