Effect of the Collapse of the Soviet Union on Freedom of Speech

Investigation
into media freedom of speech in post-Soviet Russia and its effects on MH17
Ukraine plane crash reporting

The effect of the collapse of the Soviet Union on the post-Soviet journalism in Russia

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 has undoubtedly had major ramifications on the media landscape in Russia. During the Soviet era the target audience of the majority if not all of the media outlets were the members of the Communist Party, the so-called ‘party cadres’ (Tarschys, 1979, p.42). However, in the lead up to the fall of the Soviet Union, in 1985 perestroika movement was introduced in order to encourage the much needed democratic change in the political system and the mentality of the Russians. Thus, in turn, as von Seth argues (2013, p.215) this movement along with the glasnost policy of openness (especially among the journalists) provided the press with the opportunity to exercise much wider freedom of speech.

In 1990 new media law set the legal
framework for media practices and established the abolition of censorship of
the press. The law was re-introduced again in 1991. Consequently, since the aim
of the media was gradually shifting towards addressing the issues of the public
rather than conveying ideas of the state, as von Seth continues, the freedom of
the press dramatically increased right after 1991. Brenton (2011, p.33) goes even further to add on the idea of possible liberation of the Russian
press after 1990 stating that journalists found themselves not only being able
to report on hard-pressing issues within the society but also criticise the status-quo of the Russian authorities.
Surprisingly, some openly expressed anti-Communist views in the media, which
was never allowed during the Soviet period of tight state-controlled media
censorship.

Nevertheless,
the law was not always enforced. In the lead up to the referendum in 1993 a few
newspapers sharing different views rather than the state‘s propagated
standpoint faced the ban from the Russian Ministry for the Press and Information
(Benn,
1996, p.471), as opposed to the 1991 media law which stated that only courts
were legally allowed to close papers. Some of the newspapers were granted the
permission to continue journalistic work only if the title and editors were
changed. Hence, the imposed media freedom was more of an illusion than the
reality Russian journalists lived in.  

Whereas in the early days after the
collapse of the Soviet Bloc journalists enjoyed greater freedom of speech, this
period of transformation did not last long. Even though the mass media
officially became independent, the economic climate in Russia gradually
deteriorated and reached the state of crisis in 1992. As a result, editors
started looking for the source of income thus becoming increasingly dependent
on private businessmen; e.g. oligarchs and their financial contributions
(Roudakova, 2009, p.418). As a matter of fact, most of the latter were running
for a seat in the parliament, as Roudakova explains, since this meant access to
influential contacts and growth of their business. In this way, the issue of
media freedom of speech was extended further and the situation of potential
improvement in Russian media landscape was quickly reversed from there on.

Nevertheless, the comparison drawn in
this dissertation is not between the pre- and post-Soviet media language but
between the core journalism values defined by the BBC (2017) and how Russia in
its post-Soviet state has managed to meet these fundamental requirements. These
keys principals (truth, accuracy, impartiality, accountability, public interest,
and independence) are considered the industry standard all journalists must
follow. Indeed, these are prevalent in the West, thus raising the issue of the
pressures journalists face on a daily basis if choosing to follow these
standards.

Factors influencing post-Soviet journalism

A broad range of factors is of
significance when discussing the state of the post-Soviet media landscape. As
von Seth argues (2011, p.55), after the fall of the Soviet Union the media
became progressively deprived of its initial power to make an impact in terms
of the mentality of the masses. Nevertheless, the government promoted and even
enforced the role of a journalist not as a neutral messenger but rather a teacher, guiding the members of the public towards a
particular direction (De Smaele, 2004,
p.69). These two contradictory statements only demonstrate the continuous
propaganda the Russian state employs when communicating and most importantly
controlling the public with the help of the media. Moreover, it has only
aggravated already difficult working conditions under which the press has to
operate in Russia up to the current day.

In
fact, the general public mostly agrees with Russian policies and the state
leaders, thus leaving journalists with no other option than report on issues of
interest to the audience, otherwise, they risk losing their readership. This
was evident throughout the history and has not changed since the Soviet era. The
fact that the majority of Russians use words “World War II” and “Great War of
the Fatherland” interchangeably (Dougherty, 2014) speaks volumes about the
prevailing attitude of the public. Another example of this, as Dougherty
presents, is the 2002 poll in which Russians were asked to choose one event they
are particularly proud of in Russia’s history. 41% of the participants have
chosen Russia’s triumph in World
War II. In fact, a staggering 87%
of Russians support the country’s leader Vladimir Putin, whose ratings rocketed
sky-high right after the annexation of Crimea during Ukraine crisis (Nardelli,
Rankin, Arnett, 2015).

However, Roudakova (2009) argues that
it came to no surprise for the Russian public when the Soviet Bloc collapsed
since the public was aware of the deep separation between the private and
public life. Hence, the public might not be as clueless as one might be
inclined to believe. Nevertheless, the
society‘s mentality, in general, illustrates the significance of the opinions
predominant within the Russian public and its impact on the reporting of the
current affairs.

Another
crucial factor which determines how freedom of speech is exercised within the
media industry is the extremely high rate of missing or dead journalists, thus intensifying the
fear among the members of the press. Evidently, Russia is deemed one of the
most dangerous places to be a journalist (Chazan, 2006). Indeed, 56 journalists
were killed between the period of 1992 and 2014 in Russia with a motive
confirmed, according to Committee to Protect Journalists figures (2014). This
is the official data, however, the numbers of murders without the confirmed
motive or missing journalists are not included on this list, suggesting that
the actual figures could be much worse.

Arguably
one of the most prominent cases of journalist’s murder was Anna Politkovskaya’s
killing in 2006 in the elevator next to the flat complex where she lived. As
she was critical about Chechen War and president Putin in her publications, her
murder stands as a horrific example of dangers journalists face in post-Soviet Russia,
thus making it extremely hard to follow Western journalistic standards. “No
profession was worth dying for’’ said Dmitry Muratov (Chazan, 2006), the editor of the Novaya Gazeta, the newspaper where Anna
Politkovskaya worked at the time of her murder. Indeed, three journalists were
killed between 2000 and 2006 and, naturally, he feared for the lives of his
reporters since the newspaper was well-known for its criticism towards the
government political affairs and president’s policies.

Furthermore,
nowadays journalists have to deal with online attacks and threats, adding to the
already long list of dangers of modern day media industry in Russia. This situation, in turn, prohibits the members of the
press from questioning the authorities and publishing anything which might not
be a popular opinion. In this way, the aforementioned fear factor hinders with
the implementation of the core element of any democracy which is free speech.

Media
privatisation along with continuous state interference with journalistic work adds
to the mix of struggles of the press in Russia. These two factors are closely
intertwined, as De Smaele discusses (2015, p.19), underlining the close “symbiosis of private capital, politics, and media’’.
Even though officially just two key media institutions are under close
supervision of the government, the ownership of the majority of media
organisations is in the hands of oligarchs. For instance, Yury
Kovalchuk, a close friend of the president Putin and media tycoon, privately
owns the vast majority of the media institutions, namely National Media Group
with a quarter of stakes in Channel One as well as huge stakes in Gazprom
Media, the largest media business in the country, and the majority of
advertising revenue in Russian television (The Economist, 2014, p.45).

The state’s influence on media was very much
evident during parliament elections in 1999 and 2000 presidential campaign,
when the NTV had to undergo the change of management and TV6 was closed down
(von Seth, 2013, p.217) due to criticism towards the state. These examples only
further illustrate the limitations the press face when reporting on government
affairs. Thus, the conclusion can be drawn that the state rather than the
private owners is the most powerful factor regulating how much freedom the
media is allowed to possess in Russia. Whereas the oligarchs nowadays only play
the mechanic role, as it is evident from Mr.Kovalchuk’s case, the mastermind
behind them still remains the state. In this way, it is clear that journalists
were never actually provided with the opportunity to freely express themselves
and only operate as a tool of the government, “educating” the masses and expressing
the state-friendly views.

References

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• Brenton, T. (2011) Russia’s media: freedom isn’t dead. British Journalism Review. 22(1), pp.33-39.
• Chazan, G. (2006) Written Off: As Journalists Die, A Russian Paper Faces Grim Future. Wall Street Journal. 8 December, p.1
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• Tarschys, D. (1979) Soviet political agenda. London: Macmillan.
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