The Reality Behind Japan’s Pilot Refugee Resettlement Program

In 2010, twenty seven Karen refugees, who all fled to Mae La Camp in Thailand in 1984, were chosen to put Japan’s pilot resettlement program to the test. Finally receiving a chance to resettle, these eighteen individuals arrived to Japan with a sense of hope and freedom in the next step of their lives. However, after months of resettling, they finally realized harsh reality of the pilot resettlement program.^[1] Before the implementation of Japan’s pilot resettlement program, Japan, with a refugee recognition rate of less than 1%, was notorious for keeping a closed door on asylum seekers.^[2] Because of their severely low recognition rate, the international community pressured the country into starting a resettlement program as a means to fulfill their burden-sharing for the international community. Thus, in 2008, Japan introduced a pilot resettlement program for Karen refugees in Mae La Camp as a means to complete their burden sharing, as well as create a humanitarian image for Japan.^[3] However, the three-year pilot resettlement program contained many flaws, which ultimately led to the program’s failure. In order for the program to have succeeded, Japan needed to confront the jurisdictional gap, the participation gap, and the incentive gap in the program itself.^[4] Because Japan failed to improve those gaps, Japan’s pilot refugee resettlement program faced difficulties throughout the implementation process, as well as destruct their humanitarian image in the international community.

 Prior to Japan’s pilot refugee resettlement program in 2010, the country was always reluctant to recognize asylum seekers. In 1978, Japan began accepting refugees from Indochina. Because of this, Japan joined the international system on refugees and acceded to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as well as the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.^[5] Since then, only 20-30 asylum seekers are recognized out of thousands of applicants.^[6] For example, in 2011, there were 1,867 applicants and 21 cases were recognized as refugees, making the recognition rate less than 1%.^[7] The reasons of why the recognition rate is so low are that Japan’s geographical barriers force asylum seekers to arrive in Japan by aircraft, which is expensive. Additionally, Japan does not have any strong ties or alliances with refugees’ countries of origin, which then does not provide a strong incentive for Japan to accept refugees. Other reasons why Japan is reluctant to open their doors to asylum seekers are the language barriers, as well as Japan’s attitude towards refugees.^[8] Japan is a monolithic society, where citizens are not open to foreigners. For example, only 24% of Japanese citizens were in favor of supporting refugees. Thus, many refugees do not come to Japan to seek asylum, branding it as “refugee Japan passing”.^[9]

 Because Japan’s recognition rate for refugees is so low, the international community began to criticize the country for failing to share the burden regarding the refugee crisis. Even though Japan is the second highest donor to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there was still a sense of unfulfillment of burden-sharing from the country. However, since Japan is a highly industrialized country, the international community wanted Japan to contribute more to the Global Refugee Regime. In 2002, UNHCR created an “Agenda for Protection”, calling for Japan to be a part of the resettlement expansion for refugees.^[10] Years after the “Agenda for Protection”, the UNHCR office decided to promote resettlement by public advocacy and informal meetings with officials from the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). Director-General of the immigration bureau of MOJ, Toshio Inami, collaborated and researched program development with MOJ, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Cabinet Secretariat.^[11] Establishing a consultation group in 2008, MOFA would work with the budget, MOJ would make their refugee status determination process more flexible for the program, and the Cabinet Secretariat would physically implement the plan.^[12] Although there was extensive backlash, especially from the National Police Agency and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Cabinet Secretariat succeeded by comprising with different interests.

Therefore, in 2008, following a cabinet agreement, the Japanese government announced that they were starting a 3-year pilot refugee resettlement program. The program would begin in 2010, where Japan would admit 30 Karen refugees per year from Mae La Camp in western Thailand.^[13] On a global standpoint, the program would be the fulfillment of Japan’s burden sharing. On a domestic standpoint, Japan would be seen as the first country in Asia to implement a resettlement program, as the country that changed their selective refugee policy, and as a means to promote their humanitarian image.^[14] Thus, the decision to implement a refugee resettlement program ignited a turning point for Japan’s past history with asylum seekers.

In order to be successful, Japan needed to understand the theoretical framework of what yields a complete refugee resettlement program. According to Alistair Agar and Alison Strang, there are ten factors under four headlines that make up a resettlement program.^[15] The first headline is labeled “markers and means” with four factors: education, housing, employment, and health. These four domains act as the main purpose of integration in a host country, as well as what the public eye and media focus on. Next, the second headline is deemed “social connection” with three factors: social bridges, social bonds, and social links.^[16] All resettled refugees should have intimate and psychological links with their host community, citizens within their new community, and the host state and its services. The third headline emphasizes the “facilitators”, where language and cultural knowledge, as well as safety and stability are domains within the headline.^[17] It is crucial for refugees to break the language and cultural barrier, as well as receive human security from the host country, especially with the difficult barriers in Japan. Lastly, rights and citizenships is the sole factor in the last headline: “Foundations”. Refugees flee their countries to seek basic human rights and needs, as well as find a new home for themselves and their families.^[18] All four headlines are interconnected, and host countries should focus on the means to achieve all of those factors in order to implement a resettlement program. Hence, host countries should analyze a theoretical framework of a refugee resettlement program before beginning implementation.

Japan’s refugee resettlement program’s primary goal was to take Karen refugees from Mae La Camp in western Thailand. The Karen refugees are an ethnic group primarily from Myanmar, formally known as Burma. The Karen people feared the government policy, Four Cuts, which called for the genocide of individuals from certain ethnic groups. Thus, in 1984, the Karen people fled and escaped eastern Burma due to armed conflict, human rights abuse, and persecution by the Burmese military and government.^[19] They arrived at Mae La camp in western Thailand, which serves as the biggest refugee camp on the Thailand-Burma border. However, their life is not free in the camp, since it is required for them to be confined in the camp borders. For instance, a Karen refugee claimed, “I am not allowed to go outside the camp. There is no job, no work. So much stress and depression. I feel that I am going to go crazy here.”^[20] As Japan started to come up with the details of their resettlement program, the Japanese government ultimately chose to take in Karen refugees from Mae La camp, since they were 90% of the camp’s population. Additionally, Japan believed that the Karen group would integrate well into the Japanese culture and traditions, because the Karens were thought to be engaged with agriculture.^[21] Along with the agriculture aspect, Japan only wanted to take families more than individuals, because families would be able to adapt to society faster.^[22] Overall, Japan assumed that Karen families from Mae La Camp would be the best option for the program because of their ability to integrate well into their agriculture field and Japanese culture.

Japan’s pilot resettlement program was implemented with twenty seven Karen refugees arriving in September and October of 2010. The program primarily starts as a three-year program with a quota of 30 individuals per year. UNHCR High Commissioner António Guterres commented on the resettlement program, stating, “Quality comes before quantity. Success is essential.”^[23] Once all individuals arrived, they are required to participate in a six month integration program. Administered by the Refugee Assistance Headquarters (RHQ), the program in Tokyo includes 430 hours of Japanese language classes, 90 hours of information on the Japanese lifestyle, and vocational support. RHQ also provided a daily allowance of 1,500 yen ($13.49), transportation, and medical expenses.^[24] After completing the six month integration program, refugees were relocated to different cities or towns and participated in a six month training program for their jobs. RHQ provided all the refugees with a daily allowance of 3,530-4,310 yen, training enrollment, transportation ,and accomodation costs for employment and relocation.^[25] Along with financial allocations, RHQ also assisted the refugees with job searches. Overall, RHQ, an organization part of the Japanese government, was the sole actor to actively implement the program.^[26]

Because the government was the sole active actor of the program, there were many flaws and setbacks to the resettlement program itself. First, RHQ had difficulties with finding employment for resettlement refugees because employers did not want to hire foreign workers who might not be able to adapt to the Japanese work environment and language barrier.^[27] This obstacle caused refugees to work in limited locations with long and poor working conditions. For instance, a family in Togane, Chiba had to work six days a week from morning to evening in a greenhouse under massive heat and humidity. The work experience was vastly different than their work experience in Mae La camp, where they worked only in the morning.^[28] Along with the work experience, the distance between one’s workplace, school, and home was too much to bear for families. For instance, a family in Togane, complained about the distance, stating that the mother had to spend four hours a day between their home and her children’s school.^[29] The two families complaints and criticisms reached national media, which forced the government to improve the resettlement program. For instance, the government started information campaigns for local governments and consultation meetings with NGOs. They also attempted outreach programs, which assessed situations on resettlement on the towns and communities, such as China.^[30] Nevertheless, there were still no huge improvements to long term development planning for the resettlers.

Along with poor working and living conditions, there were also many factors that contributed to the failure to the pilot refugee resettlement program. First, the Japanese government constantly withheld information from other actors and would refuse to collaborate with other actors, such as local governments, civil society, NGOs, ethnic communities, and most importantly, refugees.^[31] Because Japan was the first country in Asia to start a resettlement program for refugees, they were filled with pride and confidence, leading the program to its downfall. The government took absolute power in the program and took advantage of their total control, even after recognizing their weaknesses in finding employment for resettled refugees.^[32] Additionally, the government failed to listen to the needs and desires of the refugees. This problem caused resettled refugees to call their family and friends back in Mae La camp, persuading the rest not to seek asylum in Japan.^[33] The program was so flawed that by the third year, no refugees resettled because the sixteen individuals that were supposed to come in 2012 declined resettlement. Although Japan attempted to expand the program for another two years to attract refugees, they still never reached their ultimate quota of ninety refugees.^[34] Thus, the refugee resettlement program had many faults that were caused by the central government.

For Japan’s pilot refugee resettlement program to succeed, the program needs to fill three gaps: the jurisdictional gap, the participation gap, and the incentive gap. The resettlement process is a national public good, since it is developed within the national border. Since a resettlement program is a public good, it needs to fulfill the jurisdictional gap, the participation gap, and the incentive gap in order for the program to be at its fullest potential.^[35] The jurisdictional gap is the gap between national interests and local interests. The participation gap is the absence of local actors and non-state actors because the program is ultimately decided by the national government. Lastly, the incentive gap analyzes the financial contributions in exchange for support.^[36] These three gaps demonstrate that the application of the Japanese pilot refugee resettlement is harder to domestically implement.

The jurisdictional gap is the inconsistency between the national interests and the local interests between the communities. Japan’s primary goal was on a national level, rather than a global or local level. Japan merely wanted to boost their humanitarian image and identity to the international community by starting a resettlement program. When the Japanese government, such as MOJ and MOFA, developed the details of the program, they did not assess refugees’ needs and motivating factors.^[37] Japan assumed that there were going to be many applicants for their program, which was a fault in the development process.^[38] In Mae La Camp, refugees can apply for thirteen resettlement countries, and Japan is the least optimal because of their strict selection criteria and other barriers. Japan’s selection criteria did not meet the guidelines of UNHCR’s selection criteria noted in the Resettlement Handbook. In UNHCR’s guidelines, the criteria includes a person seeking legal and/or physical needs, a survivor of violence and torture, a person needing medical needs, women and girls at risk, family reunification, children and adolescents at risk, and lack of foreseeable alternative durable solutions.^[39] However, Japan’s restrictive selection criteria include criteria that was recommended by UNHCR, as well as a person who has the capacity to adapt to Japanese society and is able to earn a living by employment.^[40] Japan’s need for integration potential, which could be implied as rapid assimilation to the host country, does not fall into the same intentions as UNHCR.  Professor at Toyo Eiwa University, Saburo Tazikawa, states, “A resettlement policy that strongly focuses on domestic concerns and lacks global perspective (including target refugees’ needs and expectations) is flawed.”^[41] Thus, Japan needs to internalize global guidelines, along with their national intentions, in order to further succeed in the program.

Along with jurisdicional gap, the participation gap also needs to be fulfilled in order to succeed with a resettlement program. Seen in the Japan’s refugee resettlement program, the central government cannot be the only actor in the program. In fact, since the program is implemented at a national level, local actors, such as the local government, local communities, ethnic communities are required for the integration process of refugees.^[42] All actors must distribute control and power amongst one another and cooperate with one another to ensure efficiency during the integration process. During the first three years of Japan’s resettlement program, the only active actor was RHQ, a semi-governmental organization. Non-governmental organizations, the Karen community, and refugees were intentionally left out and had no voice on the implementation plan.^[43] However, to close the participation gap, the national government had to coordinate with those at the local level. Saburo Takizawa states, “At the local level, communities must be prepared to welcome and support resettled refugees and opportunities to bring newcomers and their new community members together to build relations and identify issues that are critical to the program’s success.”^[44] Nevertheless, Japan’s government failed to work with others, allowing the program to fail because of the lack of state and non-state actors.

In terms of the participation gap, there are realistic solutions to the gap that are applicable to Japan’s pilot refugee resettlement program. For example, the Japanese government should have allowed the local Karen community to help the Karen refugees integrate into Japan at the start of the program. In Japan, there is an estimate of one hundred Karen that make up the Karen community. In 2000, they created the Karen National League to address their issues with the Burmese military and government.^[45] From then, the community also began to participate in resettlement issues, especially on the Thailand-Myanmar border. In 2008, after hearing about the pilot resettlement program, the Karen community desired to play a role directly with the refugees through the program. However, they were not allowed to since the government believed that the Karen community was a political organization that would badly influence the incoming refugees.^[46] Nonetheless, Saw Myo Tha, the leader of Karen National League, began assisting refugees with employment, education, and scholarship programs, especially after the complaints from the families in Togane, Chiba. In fact, NGOs and the media outlet started supporting the community, even collaborating with their efforts to find suitable living and work conditions for the refugees.^[47] The Karen community’s role as a stakeholder was a turning point for the program. The Karen community had an advantage with an intimate and psychological relationship with the Karen refugees. Quickly, the refugees trusted them because they were from the same ethnic group, they could speak the same language, and they understood the difficulties of integrating into a new environment.^[48] Their relationship improved the program vastly that by 2010, Saw Myo Tha formed the Refugee Coordination Committee Japan, which finally allowed the community to be recognized as a legitimate actor in the program. Overall, the Karen community developed an intimate partnership with the refugees, improving the resettlement program.

In addition to the partnership with the Karen community and the Karen refugees, implementing a pilot match, or preference matching, between the local government and refugees would also be a possible solution in improving the resettlement program. Alvin Roth, an economics professor and Nobel Peace Prize receiver, came up from an idea called preference matching, which is “the allocation of resources where both parties to the transaction need to agree to the match in order for it to take place”.^[49] Furthermore, Will Jones and Alex Teytelboym, two academic professors, suggested that Roth’s idea could be applied to a refugee resettlement program. They believed that refugees could have a voice on their preferences in terms of working and living conditions, and local communities could analyze which refugees would best integrate into their community.^[50] This hypothetical preference match theory was already successfully applied in the United Kingdom between Syrian refugees and local communities.^[51] All in all, a preference match would potentially close the participation gap because refugees and local communities’ viewpoints and interests are heard through the preference match theory.
 Lastly, the incentive gap needs to be satisfied on a local level for the success of the resettlement program. Each year, MOFA gave 162 million yen only towards RHQ for the thirty refugees’ short-term training. On the contrary, local communities that had to host the refugees barely received any financial aid.^[52] This caused host communities and civil society to back out of the program because they could not afford to provide services to the refugees, nor had the incentive to do so. Also, the refugees would become frustrated and angry because the government would not give them enough financial aid and suitable conditions to live in. Additionally, MOFA only budgets for the short-term training, as well as six-month local support and extra language program costs.^[53] MOFA’s budget, along with the financial contribution Japan gives to UNHCR annually should be dispersed into different sections: short term, mid-term, and long term development. The financial distribution would allow the program to improve better in the long run, especially if there is financial aid for refugees who are learning to be self-reliant long term.^[54] Additionally, it would provide incentives for local communities to help refugees if they are provided compensation for their actions. Thus, the distribution would balance between asylum, financial contributions, and resettlement, which would not only benefit the program, but also benefit UNHCR, asylum seekers, refugees, and Japan’s humanitarian image.^[55] Altogether, financial compensation should be dispersed between different actors in order to ensure long-term development for the program.

 Because Japan failed to improve the jurisdictional gap, the participation gap, and the incentive gap, Japan’s pilot refugee resettlement program faced massive difficulties throughout the implementation process, which caused their image to be criticized in the international community. Before Japan’s pilot resettlement program, Japan consistently closed their doors on asylum seekers, only accepting less than 1% of asylum seekers.^[56] Due to their notoriously low recognition rate, the international community criticized Japan as a free-rider on the Global Refugee Regime, as they merely contributed financially to UNHCR. Thus, the international community pressured Japan into starting a resettlement program as a means to fulfill their burden-sharing. Thus, in 2008, Japan introduced a pilot resettlement program for Karen refugees in Mae La Camp as a means to complete their burden sharing, as well as create a humanitarian image for Japan.^[57] However, the three-year pilot resettlement program contained many flaws. Because they did not fulfill the three gaps when they established the program, Japan was not able to offer human security for refugees, which ultimately led to the program’s failure.

Works Cited

• “About Implementation of Pilot Case about Acceptance of Refugee by Resettlement.” Cas. December 16, 2008. Accessed May 02, 2019. http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/nanmin/081216ryoukai.html.
• Ager, A., and A. Strang. “Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework.” Journal of Refugee Studies, 21, no. 2 (2008): (166-91).
• Betts, Alexander, and Paul Collier. Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017.
• “Japan: First Myanmar refugees arrive for resettlement.” UNHCR. Last modified 28 September 2010. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2010/9/4ca1c5899/japan-first-myanmar-refugees-arrive-resettlement.html
• Lee, Sang Kook. “The State, Ethnic Community, and Refugee Resettlement in Japan.” Journal of Asian and African Studies, 53 no. 8 (2018): (1219-1231).
• Natsuki, Yamashita. (2013). “The Pilot Refugee Resettlement Program in Japan: What Is Needed for the Successful Integration of Resettled Refugees?” Master’s Thesis, The Graduate School of Toyo Eiwa University. Retrieved from https://toyoeiwa.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_action…item…: (68-85).
• Takizawa, Saburo. “Japan’s Refugee Policy: Issues and Outlook” International Affairs No. 662 (2017): (1-8).
• Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.” Urban Refugees, 2015: (206-40).
• Umeda, and Sayuri. “Refugee Law and Policy: Japan.” Law of Congress. March 01, 2016. Accessed April 30, 2019. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/japan.php.

^[1] “Japan: First Myanmar refugees arrive for resettlement.” UNHCR. Last modified 28 September 2010. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2010/9/4ca1c5899/japan-first-myanmar-refugees-arrive-resettlement.html

^[2] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.” Urban Refugees, 2015, 206-40: 210

^[3] Natsuki, Yamashita. (2013). “The Pilot Refugee Resettlement Program in Japan: What Is Needed for the Successful Integration of Resettled Refugees?” Master’s Thesis, The Graduate School of Toyo Eiwa University. Retrieved from https://toyoeiwa.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_action…item…: 2

^[4] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.”: 209

^[5] Umeda, and Sayuri. “Refugee Law and Policy: Japan.” Law of Congress. March 01, 2016. Accessed April 30, 2019. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/japan.php., 2

^[6] Takizawa, Saburo. “Japan’s Refugee Policy: Issues and Outlook” International Affairs No. 662 (2017): 1

^[7] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.”: 210

^[8] Umeda, and Sayuri. “Refugee Law and Policy: Japan.” Law of Congress. March 01, 2016. Accessed April 30, 2019. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/japan.php., 1

^[9] Takizawa, Saburo. “Japan’s Refugee Policy: Issues and Outlook” : 4

^[10] Lee, Sang Kook. “The State, Ethnic Community, and Refugee Resettlement in Japan.” Journal of Asian and African Studies, 53 no. 8 (2018): 1223

^[11] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.”: 214

^[12] Ibid, 215

^[13] Lee, Sang Kook. “The State, Ethnic Community, and Refugee Resettlement in Japan.” Journal of Asian and African Studies, 53 no. 8 (2018): 1224

^[14] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.”: 215

^[15] Ager, A., and A. Strang. “Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework.” Journal of Refugee Studies, 21, no. 2 (2008): 166-91: 169

^[16] Ibid, 170

^[17] Natsuki, Yamashita. (2013). “The Pilot Refugee Resettlement Program in Japan: What Is Needed for the Successful Integration of Resettled Refugees?”: 71

^[18] Ibid

^[19] “Refugee Camps.” Burma Link. Accessed May 01, 2019. https://www.burmalink.org/background/thailand-burma-border/displaced-in-thailand/refugee-camps/., 3

^[20] Ibid, 1-2

^[21]  Lee, Sang Kook. “The State, Ethnic Community, and Refugee Resettlement in Japan.”: 1224

^[22] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.”: 217

^[23] “Japan to Start a Pilot Resettlement Programme.” UNHCR. Accessed May 01, 2019. https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2008/12/494b7e3011/japan-start-pilot-resettlement-programme.html., 1

^[24]  Natsuki, Yamashita. (2013). “The Pilot Refugee Resettlement Program in Japan: What Is Needed for the Successful Integration of Resettled Refugees?”: 72

^[25] Lee, Sang Kook. “The State, Ethnic Community, and Refugee Resettlement in Japan.”: 1225-1226

^[26] Ibid

^[27]  Natsuki, Yamashita. (2013). “The Pilot Refugee Resettlement Program in Japan: What Is Needed for the Successful Integration of Resettled Refugees?”: 73

^[28] Lee, Sang Kook. “The State, Ethnic Community, and Refugee Resettlement in Japan.”: 1226

^[29] Ibid

^[30] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.”: 221

^[31] Natsuki, Yamashita. (2013). “The Pilot Refugee Resettlement Program in Japan: What Is Needed for the Successful Integration of Resettled Refugees?”: 83

^[32] Lee, Sang Kook. “The State, Ethnic Community, and Refugee Resettlement in Japan.”: 1226

^[33] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.”: 221

^[34] Lee, Sang Kook. “The State, Ethnic Community, and Refugee Resettlement in Japan.”: 1224

^[35] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.”: 208

^[36] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.”: 209

^[37] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.”: 227

^[38] Natsuki, Yamashita. (2013). “The Pilot Refugee Resettlement Program in Japan: What Is Needed for the Successful Integration of Resettled Refugees?”: 84

^[39] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.”: 227

^[40] “About Implementation of Pilot Case about Acceptance of Refugee by Resettlement.” Cas. December 16, 2008. Accessed May 02, 2019. http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/nanmin/081216ryoukai.html.

^[41] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.”: 227

^[42] Ibid, 228

^[43] Natsuki, Yamashita. (2013). “The Pilot Refugee Resettlement Program in Japan: What Is Needed for the Successful Integration of Resettled Refugees?”: 83

^[44] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.”: 231

^[45] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.”: 232

^[46] Ibid, 1228

^[47] Ibid, 1229

^[48] Lee, Sang Kook. “The State, Ethnic Community, and Refugee Resettlement in Japan.”: 1228

^[49] Betts, Alexander, and Paul Collier. Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017., 217

^[50] Ibid

^[51] Ibid, 218

^[52] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.”: 233

^[53] Natsuki, Yamashita. (2013). “The Pilot Refugee Resettlement Program in Japan: What Is Needed for the Successful Integration of Resettled Refugees?”: 84

^[54] Ibid

^[55] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.”: 232

^[56] Takizawa, Saburo. “The Japanese Pilot Resettlement Programme.” Urban Refugees, 2015, 206-40: 210

^[57] Natsuki, Yamashita. (2013). “The Pilot Refugee Resettlement Program in Japan: What Is Needed for the Successful Integration of Resettled Refugees?” Master’s Thesis, The Graduate School of Toyo Eiwa University. Retrieved from https://toyoeiwa.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_action…item…: 2