To What Extent Did the American Bombing in 1970 Impact the Rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in 1975?

9941 words (40 pages) Essay

18th May 2020 History Reference this

Disclaimer: This work has been submitted by a university student. This is not an example of the work produced by our Essay Writing Service. You can view samples of our professional work here.

Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of UKEssays.com.

Intro

The Khmer Rouge were a cruel regime, rising to power in 1975 until their defeat in 1979[1]. Before this, Cambodia was ruled by a French colony from 1863 for 90 years[2] since then there always was a constant struggle for power, although, through peace talks, France would soon agree to leave South Asia.   Cambodia now became independent, but a monarchy was put in place with Prince Sihanouk in 1941 who was inexperienced and came from a weak Cambodian house[3]. Brought in to be used as a French political puppet, he would listen and take orders from the French [4]. However, some still disagreed with this new government and thus, Cambodia’s communist movement was created in 1951, under the guidance of the Viet Minh of Vietnam[5].  Pol Pot who would later become the leader of the group in 1963, studied in Paris, where he was introduced to European Marxism and Stalinist communism[6], returning to Cambodia in 1953. During the late 1950s, the membership grew, and members participated in activities against Prince Sihanouk and the monarchy[7]. During the 1960’s, Pol Pot and younger French-educated Cambodian communist took over leadership, of the more orthodox worker’s party of Kampuchea[8]. The party consisted off mostly French-educated Marxists and in 1966 the party’s name changed to “Communist Party of Kampuchea” CPK and set out on their path to power, staging an uprising against Prince Sihanouk’s neutralist government.[9] Their efforts moved to Prime minister Lon Nol after the prince was forcibly removed[10].  The Khmer rouge operated in remote jungle and mountain areas in the countryside, near the Vietnamese border, who experienced a civil war, at first the Khmer rouge did not have much support, gained most support from the countryside[11].  Cambodia quickly became destabilized as the Khmer Rouge grip widened through the countryside, and eventually reaching cities[12]. After years of guerrilla warfare, the communist party of Kampuchea known as the Khmer rouge, marched in Phnom Phen on April 17 of 1975, becoming the ruling party of Cambodia[13]. Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge military leader, became the new prime minister[14]along with other leaders Nuon Chea, Leng Sary, Son Sen and Khieu Samphan. Together they re-named the state the Democratic Kampuchea[15].  This essay will analyse the extent to which, the Khmer Rouge mainly rose to power in April of 1975 due to American involvement in Cambodia. However, Vietnamese influence and Chinese support to the Khmer Rouge did play a role on the outcome. The counterclaims will explore the internal problems in Cambodia without foreign influence, Success of the Khmer Rouge, Khmer Rouge political tactics, Lon Nol failures and Ideological factors which may have also played a role.  

Get Help With Your Essay

If you need assistance with writing your essay, our professional essay writing service is here to help!

Find out more

External influence

American Involvement

American involvement, especially the bombing throughout the countryside of Cambodia during the 1970’s, enabled the Khmer Rouge to grow bigger and more supported by Cambodian’s. While Prince Sihanoux was out of the country in 1970 Lon Nol overthrow him, vowing to get rid of the Vietnamese communist that were in the Cambodian countryside[16]using the support of America to aid him. The United States main focus was to remove all Vietnamese communist within the region, therefore the South Vietnamese and United States decided to invade the Cambodian countryside [17]. In May 1970 they proceeded to launch an offensive in Cambodia with the aim to cut off North Vietnamese Supply Routes.[18] After the failed United States ground invasion to get rid of the Communist Vietnamese  from the countryside, President Nixon in December of 1970 instructed his secretary of state to instruct the air force to expand the bombing areas, launching air bombings to destroy the mobile headquarters of the Viet-Cong and North Vietnamese army [19]. However, the Bombings forced the Vietnamese and Cambodian communist further into the west, deeper into Cambodia. This radicalized Cambodian citizens against the government [20]

In addition, an alliance of royalists, Cambodian and communist forces fought the Lon Nol government, United States and South Vietnam forces, expanded their control quickly[21].   The Khmer Rouge used the bombings as propaganda to get even more support, telling the people that the government ordered the B-52 airstrikes and were responsible for the damages, with the only way to stop the carnage being to join the Khmer Rouge and overthrow Lon-Nol and returning Prince Sihanoux to the throne. This was very successful and encouraged many to join the Khmer Rouge movement [22] Historian Matthew Edwards argues that  the bombings gave an upper hand to the Khmer Rouge “pol pot would not have won without the economic and political destabilization due to the American bombing, as they brought a lot of support to the Khmer Rouge”[23] In 1972, both B-25s and tactical fighter bombers had dropped 53,000 tons of bombs in Cambodia, in 1973  this increased to 275,000 tons to spread over east and southern provinces [24].  During the course of the bombings, American bombers dropped 539,129 tons of explosives on Cambodian soil, leading to economic destabilization, death of 150,000 people and displacement of thousands of people, leading to many peasants going on to join the Khmer Rouge out of anger.[25]  The constant bombings in Cambodia also gave the upper hand to the Khmer Rouge. The CPK took advantage of what was out of their control, appealing to the people of Cambodia and convincing them that joining the army of the Khmer Rouge would lead to theirs and their families survival[26] The bombings prompted a massive rise in anti-American and anti-Lon Nol regime, causing a shift in support from the Lon-Nol government to the Khmer Rouge as they were “angry at the Americans” [27].  During the final phase of the U.S bombing campaign, from January to august 1973, aiming to stop the Khmer Rouge fast advance to Phnom Penh, the U.S upped their military air raids with B-25 bombardment campaigned heavily focused on populated areas around Phnom Penh. Although the takeover of Phnom Penh was delayed, the CPK grew and strengthened as the popular opinion turned against the Lon Nol government, and the Khmer rouge were able to recruit many more[28]. The air raids finally stopped in August of 1973 as The United States congress legistaged the end, after the peace agreement between the United States and North Vietnam[29]. The Khmer rouge grew to around 12,000 soldiers at the end of 1970, end of bombings[30]. The American involvement played a role in allowing the Khmer Rouge to take control of more land and support, in addition, Vietnamese influence played a role.  

Vietnamese influence

The Vietnamese communist known as the Viet Minh allowed the Khmer Rouge to make advancement throughout the Cambodian countryside. With support from North Vietnamese, the Khmer rouge who were already fighting in the countryside, started to take control of territory from the Lon Nol government. Other renegade groups of Cambodian fighters were also engaged in the struggle for control of the country[31]. Pol Pot did not trust the Vietnamese communist with fear that one day they would turn on them[32]. Pol pot’s message to the assembly leaders was clear. The CPK had to maintain good relations with the Vietnamese “because we are fighting a common enemy” [33] Eventually as the Khmer Rouge started to gain control of more territory[34]. As professor Alexander Hinton says, they tried to win over the Khmer soldiers who were fighting with the Vietnamese, to force them out of Cambodia[35]. This led to fighting between both communist parties [36].  The Khmer Rouge and the communist Vietnamese alliance led to anti-Vietnamese feelings, this was a vital part of the ideology for the guerrilla forces. Promotion the hatred of an external enemy but also internal – linked the Khmer rouge to tactics usually used by totalitarian regimes. Historian Matthew Edwards agrees that the Khmer Rouge could target an enemy which could be blamed for the problems of Cambodia, this gained the Khmer Rouge support[37].In the 25th region people were encouraged to protest against the Vietnamese in 1973, other zones experience similar experience[38].  When the Vietnamese finally left, this allowed the Khmer radicals to begin executing their plan to work on domestic policy towards “the cultural revolution”, a transition towards socialization and re-organization in the villages controlled by the Khmer Rouge [39]. After this withdraw the Khmer Rouge position was strengthened once again, their attack at the end of January 1973 Pol Pot declared that the Vietnamese “betrayal” worked in their favour[40]. Unlike previously suggested by the Vietnamese to negotiate with Lon Nol government, the Khmer Rouge were now cable of militarily independent victory in the countryside [41].

Chinese support

During 1958, Norodom Sihanouk formally established ties with communist China[42], which would later prove to be very helpful to the Khmer Rouge in order to take control in 1975. By 1975 China saw Cambodia as a country where they could spread their ideology [43]. Therefore, after Prince Sihanouk was exiled in May of 1970, Sihanouk’ allied with the communist forces of China along with The Khmer rouge[44]. China provided a lot to the Khmer rouge to support them in gaining control; including at least 90% of the foreign aid given to the Khmer Rouge, from food, construction, tanks, planes and artillery [45]. From 1970 to 1974 China was essential to the Khmer Rouge valued at 316 million yuan[46]. For China, Cambodia was a stable base to develop their influence in Southeast Asia [47]. Historian Phillip Short argues that China would provide economic aid, military supplies, and technical support[48]. Deng Xiaoping told Pol Pot that China’s aid was free, some supplies included: one-hundred and eight pieces of artillery equipment, thirteen thousand shells, equipment for signals regiment, seventy-two light tanks, thirty-two amphibious tanks, twenty sets of search and guide raiders, thirty fighter aircraft with six trainers, twelve high speed tornado boat and much more[49].  Andrew Mertha, author of “Brothers in Arms: China’s Aid to the Khmer Rouge 1975-1979 said that “Without China’s assistance, the Khmer Rouge regime would not have lasted a week” [50]. Ronnie Yimsut, survivor off the regime says “it was common knowledge” that the Chinese backed up the Khmer Rouge, sending supplies throughout the 1970’s [51]. In addition, Chinese ideology was a big influence to Pol Pot and the way he formed the party. Part of the educated elite, Pol Pot studied in Paris, where he was introduced to European Marxism and Stalinist communism[52]. He also travelled to China during the beginning of the Cultural Revolution which would influence the way he saw politics[53].  In Beijing he was exposed to the processes of the red guards, the countryside, as well as attempts of collectivization and moving people to the countryside. Although this may have inspired him, he knew he could do better[54]. The Khmer Rouge leadership was influenced by Maoist ideas and practices, demonstrated in the thousands of Chinese advisers and technicians who were attached to the regime leadership[55].Historian Matthew Edwards argues that “main ideological influences of Pol Pot were Chinese and Vietnamese”[56]

Internal problem

Political turmoil

Lon Nol poor leadership

 Despite the many successes of the regime, there were also countless internal problems within the Cambodian political party, heavily enabling the rise of the Khmer Rouge. One of these issues was the poor leadership of Lon Nol in Cambodia, which would give a critical upper hand to the Khmer Rouge. The biggest failure for Lon Nol was that Prince Sihanouk was respected amongst much of the population, especially in rural areas, showing in the detrimental lack of support during Lon Nol’s new regime, sparking a crisis of legitimacy in the new government[57].  In addition, Lon Nol had ineffective leadership and his military methods were far from efficient, “unlike the Communists, Lon Nol did not understand the need for greater discipline and control of corruption in order to gain support from the populace”[58]. The Khmer rouge needed a mix of political, economic, diplomatic and military wins over the Lon Nol government to be able to take power[59] Lon Nol was a general with limited military experience, which became visible with a disastrous series of attempts at offensives and military actions against the Khmer rouge. The trained Khmer republic forces, even with superior members and weapons, were not able to fight the gorilla forces[60]. One prime example of the weakness of the Lon Nol military was at Chelna II in late 1971. Chelna II lead to the death of 3000 government troops[61]. Despite the tragic campaigns of Lon Nol, the military would continue to worsen, practically handing the Khmer Rouge more supporters[62]. In addition, Lon Nol would also make the fateful mistake of taking no action to help the Cambodian people compared to the Khmer Rouge after the fatal bombing, stripping him even more of the dwindling supporters he had left[63].  As well as military failures, there was political destabilization as the “Cambodia 1974: Government on trial” shown, before the assassinations of the students who marched in protest. In May of 1973 four ministers allied with Sirik Matak one of the main participants of Sihanoux overthrow, offered their resignations and in the next few days more cabinet members did the same. Even Long Boret, who had served Lon Nol only years earlier as minister of information and foreign affairs resigned on June 13. This shows that even within the government they did not support Lon Nol’s actions[64]. Lon Nol also failed to recognize the peasants or help them, the division between the urban areas and the countryside became more apparent[65]. While cities became modern cosmopolitan areas, offering education and opportunities, life in the countryside for the peasants was unchanged [66]. The social splits were clearly demonstrated by the rural peasant Samlaut Rebellion from 1967 to 1968, a split between the right and left-wing groups, resulting in the right strengthen its position within the government and the left being driven underground, this created even more unrest and shifted peasant support for the Khmer Rouge, which kept increasing even when Lon Nol came to power[67] . Studies have shown that the poorest 52 percent of the Cambodian population only owned 6 percent of the land, whereas the richest 6 percent owned 39 percent, this created a lot of conflict for the peasants [68]. In addition, the government demands in the form of increased taxes for the war and a poor economic situation created resentment for the peasants and a shift in support[69] This lost Lon Nol the countryside support as the government was doing nothing for them. Although the failures of the Lon Nol government played a role in the Khmer Rouge’s uprising, the Khmer Rouge had their own strengths.

Khmer rouge military strengths

The Khmer Rouge were very successful militarily compared to the Lon Nol government, allowing them to gain much support in villages and make advancement to Phnom Phen which they would eventually take over in 1975.  One of the main reasons that the Guerrilla army was so successful was the absence of corruption, as well as strict rules against theft, rape, drunkenness, and gambling. These laws would prevent any disorderly conduct and maintain order between all the members[70]. The Khmer Rouge began recruiting in 1968 or even earlier according to the CIA documents[71] The Khmer Rouge were also able to expand their membership  through the use of propaganda, it was becoming more successful, a prime example of propaganda was the copies of the Khmer Rouge regional paper “eastern light”  supplied around villages, encouraging their cause and motivate people to join[72]. Since March 1971 transmitted via radio which broadcasted from North Vietnam and ran 35 hours a week[73].  Their successes were witnessed by the expansion of the guerrilla movements from small group of 2500 in 1967 to 200,000 by 1973 due to success appeal to peasants [74]. The Khmer Rouge named their army the “revolutionary army” or “the people’s national liberation army” starting raids in 1968[75]. The revolutionary army expanded rapidly, and by 1970 it would already have about 50,0000 soldiers [76]. the army was tacitly divided in different battalion levels, such as a red female, special forces, infantry and artillery battalion[77]. In addition, there were three levels in the army: regional forces, district forces and village militia, this made them very organized and effective[78]. The army was very successful in making advances by having their units in the countryside close to the people, whereas the governmental army kept their units in larger towns and cities or along the main roads[79].  By 1971 the Lon Nol government was only secured in towns and the outskirts [80]. By being in the countryside this gave them an advantage, allowing them to use the local knowledge of the area to hide or attack, using their surroundings to gain the upper hand on their enemies[81]. The guerrilla warfare also allowed them to break up in smaller groups and meet up somewhere else if needed, by being close to the people they could spread their propaganda more effectively. As Historian Patrick O’Sullivan argues, the Khmer rouge used the countryside to their advantage to slowly make their advance to the capital[82]An example of the successful Guerrilla tactics was in 1973 the 126th commandment attacked Lon Nol forces and allowed them advancement across the Mekong moving towards the southwest towards the Capital[83].. he Khmer Rouge maximize their potential by using women as part of the effort, women were part of the combat, medical teams, destroying communication and voluntary work, women were top level[84]. Some whole guerrilla groups were made up entirely of women[85].In 1974, recruitment of every youth and sixteen-year-old or older started getting recruited into the army [86]. The Khmer Rouge also had members infiltrate the Lon Nol military such as Heng Samrin who became the chief of his village platoon in 1968, this gave them a military advantage[87].  In a final offensive at the start of 1975, the Khmer Rouge cut off traffic on national road at Neak Loeung, forty kilometres from the capital[88]. The airport was under constant bombardment, Historian Broaden Nhem argues, this made it more difficult for the U.S to help weaken the Khmer rouge as they could not land and supply[89]. This led to Lon Nol resignment on April 1st, 1975 and allowed the Khmer Rouge to take over April 17th 1975[90]. Military tactics was effective; however, they would keep a tight control over the peasants by using violent political tactics[91]

Khmer rouge Political strength

The Khmer were political successful with their tactics. After Prince Sihanouk was overthrown by Lon Nol, the Khmer Rouge saw it as an opportunity. “The downfall of Sihanouk…offered the Party [CPK] a unique tactical opportunity to declare their struggle for ‘national liberation’ in Sihanouk’s name”[92].  Later in 1973 the CPK was now willing to join publicly with Sihanouk and taken advantage of is recognized following.[93] As many Cambodian’s would follow the movement of the Prince was a part of it. Sihanoux joined the Khmer Rouge from exile in China and, through a radio broadcast called for Cambodians to join him. He had a widespread influence and appeal, especially from the countryside, answered his call encouraging the rise[94]. The use of Sihanouk gave a wave off support to the Khmer rouge as many now joined the cause. Historian Ben Kiernan agrees that this led to the Khmer Rouge having the upper hand,  saying that two day after Sihanoux call for a general uprising , large scale popular demonstrations in his favour began in Kompong Cham and other on march 28th in Takeo-Kampot[95]. The documents published by the CIA in May of 1972 shows that there was an upward trend of membership since Prince Sihanouk was overthrown and joined the Khmer Rouge which levelled up in 1971 at around four million[96].  The Khmer Rouge political strategies were becoming very effective, mainly in villages and the countryside machinery of control were improving mane places that the Cambodian government had failed to do[97]. The main political advancement for the Khmer Rouge was in 1972, with their double-barrel campaign which was an effort to draw member of the khmer vitanmese units to have them under direct Khmer Rouge command[98]. There were also separate bureaucracies of finance and economy and security as in Vietnam, each level of the party structure controls a military headquarters, this made the Khmer Rouge more organized and effective[99] .

Strength of the Khmer Rouge social                                        

In addition, the way the Khmer rouge treated the peasants who were oppressed by the Lon Nol government gained them lots of support from the countryside. The Khmer Rouge understood and exploited the peasant dissatisfaction with the corruption, arrogance, cruelty and incompetence of the government[100], this allowed them to gain more support from the peasants.  The reason why the Khmer Rouge got so much peasant support was due to the inequality there was in Cambodia, peasants were treated differently by the government [101]. Between 1950 and 1970 there was an increase of landless peasants, meaning that Pol Pot could target the poor peasant and children, Historian Ben Kiernan agrees that this gave them an advantage [102]. The Khmer Rouge would help around in the different zones, one Tan Hao, an ethnic chinses woman who lived in region 11 and 37, under Khmer control, said that the Khmer Rouge would “help in the fields” this was very effective in gaining more support according to Ben Kiernan[103]. In some regions the Khmer Rouge were stricter than others, they started executing, anyone who did anything seen as wrong were shot, this created fear for everyone and allowed the Khmer rouge to maintain a tight control over their areas[104].  The Khmer rouge gave peasants extra land[105], which gained them support, as well as, opening stores   for household necessities, clothes and medicine, this eliminated the Sino-Khmer’s merchants who dominated the market before[106]. An example of loyal followers was when local purges started, answering pol pot call on being extremely vigilant, they thought this was the answer[107] As Historian David Chandler argues that he set up off communist political schools as early as 1947  was very effective in influencing young Cambodians [108]. Behind the lines women were also important, taking charge of task as men left to fight, village defence, traps, agricultural production, planting, medical work and much more becoming very effective for the home front [109].The success of the Khmer Rouge was because they were able to exploit the social tensions within the rural and countryside and address the problems to get more support.  In addition to the social appeal, the ideology of the Khmer Rouge was very appealing to the peasants.

Ideological factors

The Khmer Rouge ideology was very appealing to the lower classes and allowing the Khmer rouge to gain more support. The Khmer Rouge ideology was simple everyone should be treated the same.  The Khmer Rouge sought to establish an agrarian, communist utopia where inequalities were decreased, private property would not exist, and everyone would benefit from the country’s wealth- all to be achieved within five years [110]. The lifestyle that the Khmer Rouge were proposing was very appealing to the peasants, with the Khmer Rouge they were no longer treated like coolies, everyone would be treated the same no matter their ranking, this appealed to the peasants [111]. The Khmer rouge promised to secure more rice and to alleviate taxation and other burdens and limitations imposed on them this lead to more Cambodian’s joining the Khmer Rouge[112]. The absence of corruption, strict rules against theft, rape, drunkenness and gambling was appealing to peasants[113]. Historian Matthew Edwards argues that the Khmer Rouge acted against the towns and cities which were seen as ideological target. “It could thus be argued that the civil war, exacerbated by ideology and the contemporary political situation”[114]. The Khmer Rouge had zones, in 1972 people living within zone 13 and 35 were not allowed to wear the traditional multi-colour sarong; all were to wear plain black shirts and trousers usually worn by peasants at work [115]. In zone 33 guerrillas were taught a song which was about the oppression of the peasants within society and how they should fight against this, by being a part of the movement[116]. The Khmer Rouge gained support in rural areas leading to gain more support for their war efforts[117]. The movement rose from 2,500 to 200,000 by 1973 [118].

Conclusion

It is clear that the Khmer Rouge were able to gain control in April of 1975 due to the destabilizing effects of the American Bombings from 1970 to 1973, this allowed the Khmer Rouge to gain support from the impacted Cambodian’s within the countryside which proved to be very effective. However, the influence of the communist Vietnamese which allowed the CPK to make advances through the countryside. The aid of the Chinese allowed them to gain access to resources, the internal problems within Cambodia such as; the poor leadership of the Lon Nol government and strength of the Khmer Rouge. Both the internal and external influences allowed the Khmer Rouge to eventually take over Cambodia on April 17th, 1975.

Bibliography

  • “CAMBODIA: The Rise and Fall of the Khmer Rouge Regime.” Accessed May 25, 2019. https://asiapacificcurriculum.ca/sites/default/files/2019-02/The%20Rise%20and%20Fall%20of%20the%20Khmer%20Rouge%20Regime%20-%20Background%20Reading.pdf.
  • Central Intelligence Agency, INTELLIGENCE REPORT – COMMUNISM AND CAMBODIA, MAY 1972, H.R. Doc. (May 1972). Accessed June 12, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/esau-54.pdf.
  • Chandler, David P. “Cambodia clouds over 1963-1966.” In The Tragedy Of Cambodian History. N.p., 1999.
  • Deth, Sok Udom. “The Rise and Fall of Democratic Kampuchea.” Asia in World History: The Twentieth Century. Last modified 2009. Accessed June 12, 2019. http://aas2.asian-studies.org/EAA/EAA-Archives/14/3/849.pdf.
  • Edwards, Matthew. “The rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia: internal or external origins?” Asian Affairs. Accessed March 2, 2019. https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy2.londonlibrary.co.uk/doi/pdf/10.1080/0306837042000184266?needAccess=true.
  • Etcheson, Craig. The rise and demise of democratic Kampuchea. N.p., 1984.
  • Frieson, Kate Grace. The Impact of Revolution on Cambodian Peasants: 1970-1975. N.p.: Monash University,, 1991.
  • Grant, Hilary. “Manipulations
of
Cambodian
Nationalism:
From
French
Colonial
Rule
to
Current
Polity.” Mapping politics 1 (2009). https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/11700705.pdf.
  •    The Guardian, July 25, 1973. https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy2.londonlibrary.co.uk/docview/185695908?rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo.
  • Hay, Jeff, ed. Cambodia. N.p., 2013.
  • ———. Genocide and persecution: Cambodia. N.p.: Greenhaven Press, 2013.
  • Hinton, Alexander L. Truth, representation and the politics of memory after genocide. N.p., 2008.
  • Hinton, Alexander Laban. Why did they kill? N.p., 2004.
  • ———. “Why Did You Kill?: The Cambodian Genocide and the Dark Side of Face and Honor.” The journal of Asian studies 57, no. 1 (February 1988). Accessed April 1, 2019. https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy2.londonlibrary.co.uk/stable/2659025?origin=crossref&sid=primo&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
  • History. “Khmer Rouge.” History. Last modified September 12, 2017. Accessed August 16, 2019. https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/the-khmer-rouge.
  • Hutt, David. “How China Came to Dominate Cambodia.” The Diplomat, September 1, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/how-china-came-to-dominate-cambodia/.
  • Khmer Rouge, May 23, 2019. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Khmer-Rouge.
  • “Khmer Rouge.” Hsitory. Last modified August 21, 2018. Accessed September 1, 2019. https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/the-khmer-rouge.
  • Kiernan, Ben. “The Cambodian Genocide, 1975-1979.” JSTOR. Accessed June 12, 2019. https://www.niod.nl/sites/niod.nl/files/Cambodian%20genocide.pdf.
  • ———. “The Cambodian Genocide, 1975-1979.” Accessed June 12, 2019. https://www.niod.nl/sites/niod.nl/files/Cambodian%20genocide.pdf.
  • ———. “Cleansing the Countryside.” In The Pol Pot Regime. N.p., 1996.
  • ———. “External and Indigenous Sources of Khmer Rouge Ideology.” 8 to External and Indigenous Sources of Khmer Rouge Ideology,” in TheThird Indochina War: Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1-27. N.p., 2006. https://gsp.yale.edu/external-and-indigenous-sources-khmer-rouge-ideology-thethird-indochina-war-conflict-between-china.
  • ———. “The First Civil War.” In How Pol Pot Came To Power, 249-88. N.p., 2004.
  • ———. “The Second Civil War.” In How Pol Pot Came To Power. N.p., 1985.
  • Kiernan, Ben, and Taylor Owen. “Bombs Over Cambodia.” The Walrus. https://thewalrus.ca/2006-10-history/.
  • Kiernan, Ben (1989) “The American Bombardment of Kampuchea, 1969-1973,”Vietnam Generation: Vol. 1 : No. 1 , Article 3.
  • Levin, Dan. “China Is Urged to Confront Its Own History.” The New York Times, March 30, 2015. Accessed April 27, 2019. https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/30/cambodian-historians-call-for-china-to-confront-its-own-past/.
  • Matak, Sirik. Letter, “Sirik Matak’s Open Letter to Prince Sihanouk,” August 23, 1974. Accessed June 12, 2019. https://app.box.com/s/vftf15h9hhpc6bosg6rs.
  • Mosyakov, Dmitry. “The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists: A History of Their Relations as Told in the Soviet Archives.” Working paper, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, n.d. Accessed September 1, 2019. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46645/GS20.pdf.
  • Nhem, Boraden. The Khmer Rouge: Ideology, Militarism, and the Revolution That Consumed a Generation. N.p., 2013. https://www.questiaschool.com/read/123939400/the-khmer-rouge-ideology-militarism-and-the-revolution.
  • O’Sullivan, Patrick. Terrain and Tactics. N.p., 1991.
  • “Searching for the truth.” Magazine of Documentation Center of Cambodia, June 30, 2002. http://Report Zebra 100: Interrogation of Chea Sarat, called Peou, Documentation Center of Cambodia catalogue number L00691, page 2. At age 22, Peou was a commander in the 2nd Company, 132nd Battalion stationed in Koh Thom district. He defected to the Khmer Republic on April 7, 1974.
  • Sheehan, Sean, and Barbara Cooke. Culture of the world: Cambodia. N.p., 2007.
  • Short, Phillip. “Fires of Purgation.” In Pol Pot, 215-65. N.p., 2004.
  • ———. “Future Perfect.” In Pol Pot. N.p., 2004.
  • “Transcript of President’s Address to the Nation on Military Action in Cambodia.” The New York Times, May 1, 1970. Accessed June 12, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/1970/05/01/archives/transcript-of-presidents-address-to-the-nation-on-military-action.html.
  • “Tyrants and Dictators – Pol Pot.” Video file. Posted May 22, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZH11GctMLGw.
  • Vannak, Huy. THE KHMER ROUGE DIVISION 703: From Victory to Self-destruction. Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2003. Accessed August 16, 2019. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.139.6706&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
  • Yimsut, Ronnie. Facing the Khmer Rouge: A Cambodian Journey. N.p., 2011. https://www.questiaschool.com/library/120090492/facing-the-khmer-rouge-a-cambodian-journey.
  • Zucker, Eve Monique. “THE RISE AND FALL OF THE KHMER ROUGE REGIME.” ASIA PACIFIC CURRICULUM. Accessed June 12, 2019. https://asiapacificcurriculum.ca/sites/default/files/2019-02/The%20Rise%20and%20Fall%20of%20the%20Khmer%20Rouge%20Regime%20-%20Background%20Reading.pdf.

[1] “Khmer Rouge,” History, last modified August 21, 2018, accessed September 1, 2019, https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/the-khmer-rouge.

[2]Sean Sheehan and Barbara Cooke, Culture of the world: Cambodia (n.p., 2007), [Page 1].

[3] Sheehan and Cooke, Culture of the world, [Page 1].

[4] Sheehan and Cooke, Culture of the world, [Page 1].

[5]  Britannica, Khmer Rouge, May 23, 2019, [Page #], https://www.britannica.com/topic/Khmer-Rouge.

[6] “Tyrants and Dictators – Pol Pot,” video file, posted May 22, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZH11GctMLGw.

[7] Britannica, Khmer Rouge  

[8] Ben Kiernan, “The Cambodian Genocide, 1975-1979,” JSTOR, accessed June 12, 2019, https://www.niod.nl/sites/niod.nl/files/Cambodian%20genocide.pdf.

[9] Ben Kiernan, “The Cambodian Genocide, 1975-1979,” JSTOR, accessed June 12, 2019, https://www.niod.nl/sites/niod.nl/files/Cambodian%20genocide.pdf.

[10]  Khmer Rouge,” History.

[11] Khmer Rouge,” History.

[12]  Britannica, Khmer Rouge , [Page 1].

[13]“Khmer Rouge,” History, last modified August 21, 2018, accessed September 1, 2019, https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/the-khmer-rouge.

[14] Britannica, Khmer Rouge , [Page 1].

[15] Britannica, Khmer Rouge , [Page 2].

[16] “Tyrants and Dictators,” video file.

[17]  ”Tyrants and Dictators,” video file.

[18]Alexander L. Hinton, Truth, representation and the politics of memory after genocide (n.p., 2008), [Page 63].

[19] . Ben Kiernan and Taylor Owen, “Bombs Over Cambodia,” The Walrus, [Page #], https://thewalrus.ca/2006-10-history/.

[20] . Ben Kiernan and Taylor Owen, “Bombs Over Cambodia,” The Walrus, [Page #], https://thewalrus.ca/2006-10-history/.

[21] Matthew Edwards, “The rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia: internal or external origins?,” Asian Affairs, [Page 57], accessed March 2, 2019,

[22] Jeff Hay, Genocide and persecution: Cambodia (n.p.: Greenhaven Press, 2013), [Page 31].

[23] Matthew Edwards, “The rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia: internal or external origins?,” Asian Affairs, [Page 63], accessed March 2, 2019, https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy2.londonlibrary.co.uk/doi/pdf/10.1080/0306837042000184266?needAccess=true.

[24] Edwards, “The rise,” 63.

[25] The Guardian, July 25, 1973,  https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy2.londonlibrary.co.uk/docview/185695908?rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo.

[26] CAMBODIA: The Rise and Fall of the Khmer Rouge Regime,” accessed May 25, 2019, https://asiapacificcurriculum.ca/sites/default/files/2019-02/The%20Rise%20and%20Fall%20of%20the%20Khmer%20Rouge%20Regime%20-%20Background%20Reading.pdf.

[27]  Edwards, “The rise,” 64.

[28] Craig Etcheson, The rise and demise of democratic Kampuchea (n.p., 1984), 119.

[29] Craig Etcheson, The rise and demise of democratic Kampuchea (n.p., 1984), 119.

[30]Phillip Short, “Fires of Purgation,” in Pol Pot (n.p., 2004), [Page 218].

[31]  Zucker, “THE RISE,” ASIA PACIFIC CURRICULUM

[32]  CAMBODIA: The Rise.”

[33] . Phillip Short, “Fires of Purgation,” in Pol Pot (n.p., 2004), 226.

[34] Kiernan, “The Second,” [Page 342].

[35]Alexander L. Hinton, Truth, representation and the politics of memory after genocide (n.p., 2008), (Page 63)

[36] Kiernan, “The Second,” [Page 342]..

[37]  Edwards, “The rise,” [Page 62].

[38]Boraden Nhem, The Khmer Rouge: Ideology, Militarism, and the Revolution That Consumed a Generation (n.p., 2013), [Page 34], https://www.questiaschool.com/read/123939400/the-khmer-rouge-ideology-militarism-and-the-revolution.

[39] Dmitry Mosyakov, “The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists: A History of Their Relations as Told in the Soviet Archives” (working paper, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, n.d.), 58, accessed September 1, 2019, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46645/GS20.pdf.

[40]Mosyakov, “The Khmer,” 58.

[41]Mosyakov, “The Khmer,” 58.

[42] David Hutt, “How China Came to Dominate Cambodia,” The Diplomat, September 1, 2016, [Page 2], https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/how-china-came-to-dominate-cambodia/.

[43] Philip Short

[44]     Central Intelligence Agency, INTELLIGENCE REPORT – COMMUNISM AND CAMBODIA, MAY 1972, H.R. Doc. (May 1972). Accessed June 12, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/esau-54.pdf.

[45] Levin, “China Is Urged,”

[46]Mosyakov, “The Khmer,” 58.

[47]David Hutt, “How China Came to Dominate Cambodia,” The Diplomat, September 1, 2016, 1, https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/how-china-came-to-dominate-cambodia/.

[48]Phillip Short, “Future Perfect,” in Pol Pot (n.p., 2004), 301.

[49] Short, “Future Perfect,” 301.

[50]  Levin, “China Is Urged,” 

[51] Ronnie Yimsut, Facing the Khmer Rouge: A Cambodian Journey (n.p., 2011), 39, https://www.questiaschool.com/library/120090492/facing-the-khmer-rouge-a-cambodian-journey.

[52] “Tyrants and Dictators – Pol Pot,” video file, posted May 22, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZH11GctMLGw.

[53] “Tyrants and Dictators – Pol Pot,” video file, posted May 22, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZH11GctMLGw.

[54]  Ben Kiernan, “The Cambodian Genocide, 1975-1979,” JSTOR, accessed June 12, 2019, https://www.niod.nl/sites/niod.nl/files/Cambodian%20genocide.pdf.

[55] “Tyrants and Dictators – Pol Pot,” video file, posted May 22, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZH11GctMLGw.

[56] Edwards, “The rise,” [Page #].

[57]   ”Tyrants and Dictators – Pol Pot,” video file, posted May 22, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZH11GctMLGw.

[58]Edwards, “The rise,”

[59] Matthew Edwards, “The rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia: internal or external origins?,” Asian Affairs, [Page 58], accessed March 2, 2019, https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy2.londonlibrary.co.uk/doi/pdf/10.1080/0306837042000184266?needAccess=true.

[60]  Edwards, “The rise,” [Page 58].

[61] Edwards, “The rise,” [Page 58].

[62]  Edwards, “The rise,” [Page 58].

[63]  Central Intelligence Agency, INTELLIGENCE REPORT – COMMUNISM AND CAMBODIA, MAY 1972, H.R. Doc. (May 1972). Accessed June 12, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/esau-54.pdf.

[64]Kirk, Donald. “Cambodia 1974: Governments on Trial.” Asian Survey 15, no. 1 (1975): 53-60. doi:10.2307/2643430.

[65]  Zucker, “THE RISE,” ASIA PACIFIC CURRICULUM

[66]  Zucker, “THE RISE,” ASIA PACIFIC CURRICULUM

[67] Edwards, “The rise,” 59.

[68] Edwards, “The rise,” 59.

[69]  Edwards, “The rise,” 59.

[70] Edwards, “The rise,” 59.

[71] Central Intelligence Agency, INTELLIGENCE REPORT – COMMUNISM AND CAMBODIA, MAY 1972, H.R. Doc. (page 77) (May 1972). Accessed June 12, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/esau-54.pdf.

[72] Central Intelligence Agency, INTELLIGENCE REPORT – COMMUNISM AND CAMBODIA, MAY 1972, H.R. Doc. (May 1972). Accessed June 12, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/esau-54.pdf.

[73] Central Intelligence Agency, INTELLIGENCE REPORT – COMMUNISM AND CAMBODIA, MAY 1972, H.R. Doc. (May 1972). Accessed June 12, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/esau-54.pdf.

[74]Edwards, “The rise,” 61.

[75] History, “Khmer Rouge,” History, last modified September 12, 2017, accessed August 16, 2019, https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/the-khmer-rouge.

[76]Huy Vannak, THE KHMER ROUGE DIVISION 703: From Victory to Self-destruction (Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2003), 702, accessed August 16, 2019, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.139.6706&rep=rep1&type=pdf.

[77] “Searching for the truth.,” Magazine of Documentation Center of Cambodia, June 30, 2002, 44, http://Report Zebra 100: Interrogation of Chea Sarat, called Peou, Documentation Center of Cambodia catalogue number L00691, page 2. At age 22, Peou was a commander in the 2nd Company, 132nd Battalion stationed in Koh Thom district. He defected to the Khmer Republic on April 7, 1974

[78] Ben Kiernan, “Cleansing the Countryside,” in The Pol Pot Regime (n.p., 1996), 70.

[79] n

[80]Ben Kiernan, “The Second Civil War,” in How Pol Pot Came To Power (n.p., 1985), 322.

[81] Patrick O’Sullivan, Terrain and Tactics (n.p., 1991), 62.

[82] O’Sullivan, Terrain and Tactics, 62.

[83] Kiernan, “Cleansing the Countryside,” 65.

[84]Jeff Hay, ed., Cambodia (n.p., 2013), 51.

[85]Hay, Cambodia, 51.

[86]Ben Kiernan, “Cleansing the Countryside,” in The Pol Pot Regime (n.p., 1996), 75.

[87] Kiernan, “Cleansing the Countryside,” 67.

[88] Boraden Nhem, The Khmer Rouge: Ideology, Militarism, and the Revolution That Consumed a Generation (n.p., 2013), 36, https://www.questiaschool.com/read/123939400/the-khmer-rouge-ideology-militarism-and-the-revolution.

[89] Nhem, The Khmer, 36.

[90] Nhem, The Khmer, 36.

[91] Kirk, Donald. “Cambodia 1974: Governments on Trial.” Asian Survey 15, no. 1 (1975): 53-60. doi:10.2307/2643430.

[92] Edwards, “The rise,” 60.

[93] Ben Kiernan, “The First Civil War,” in How Pol Pot Came To Power (n.p., 2004), 287

[94]  Zucker, “THE RISE,” ASIA PACIFIC CURRICULUM

[95] Pol pot came to power ben kiernan

[96] Central Intelligence Agency, INTELLIGENCE REPORT – COMMUNISM AND CAMBODIA, MAY 1972, H.R. Doc. (May 1972). Accessed June 12, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/esau-54.pdf.

[97]   Central Intelligence Agency, INTELLIGENCE REPORT – COMMUNISM AND CAMBODIA, MAY 1972, H.R. Doc. (May 1972). Accessed June 12, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/esau-54.pdf.

[98] kiernan

[99] Central Intelligence Agency, INTELLIGENCE REPORT – COMMUNISM AND CAMBODIA, MAY 1972, H.R. Doc. (May 1972). Accessed June 12, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/esau-54.pdf.

[100]  Edwards, “The rise,” (page 59)

[101] Edwards, “The rise,” 58.

[102] kiernant

[103] Kiernan, “Cleansing the Countryside,” 71.

[104] Kiernan, “Cleansing the Countryside,” 71.

[105]Phillip Short, “Fires of Purgation,” in Pol Pot (n.p., 2004), 231.

[106]Short, “Fires of Purgation,” 231.

[107]Short, “Fires of Purgation,” 253.

[108]Kiernan, “Cleansing the Countryside,” 71.

[109]Hay, Cambodia, 51.

[110] “Tyrants and Dictators,” video file.

[111]  Edwards, “The rise,” 59.

[112] CAMBODIA: The Rise.”

[113] Edwards, “The rise,” 59.

[114] Edwards, “The rise,” 59.

[115] Kiernan, “The Second,” [Page 337].

[116]  Kiernan, “The Second,” [Page 338].

[117] Edwards, “The rise,” 59.

[118] Edwards, “The rise,”

Cite This Work

To export a reference to this article please select a referencing stye below:

Reference Copied to Clipboard.
Reference Copied to Clipboard.
Reference Copied to Clipboard.
Reference Copied to Clipboard.
Reference Copied to Clipboard.
Reference Copied to Clipboard.
Reference Copied to Clipboard.

Related Services

View all

DMCA / Removal Request

If you are the original writer of this essay and no longer wish to have your work published on the UKDiss.com website then please: