Impact of Arthur Scargill on the Failure of the Miners' Strike

Assess the view that the main reason for the failure of the miners’ strike in 1984 was the leadership of Arthur Scargill

The failure of the miner’s strike in 1984 has been seen by many as the result of bad leadership of the head of the NUM, Arthur Scargill, the lack of support for the strike as well as giving credit to the government’s preparations. Thatcher, herself, advances this view in her memoirs ‘The Downing Street Years’ and echoed by many other Thatcherites such as Nigel Lawson, Shirley Letwin and historians such as John Campbell. This ‘Mainstream media’ view holds that the strike failed because of Scargill’s extreme beliefs and bad decisions. Because of Scargill’s actions, the strike was illegal, poorly supported and doomed to failure given the level of government preparations. On the other hand, the ‘Marxist/Left Wing’ view suggests that the strike was part of Thatcher’s wider attack on political consensus and suggest that the miners could have won the strike had it not been for the concerted, illegal government campaign to smash the miner’s union, something they had been planning for some time. This view is supported to some extent by Labour minister Tony Benn, one of Thatcher’s fiercest critics, and historian, Seumas Milne who argued that the government’s extensive preparations and actions during the strike led to its failure in 1984. Both the Marxist view and the mainstream media view gives credit to government preparations showing this was definitely an important factor in the failure of the strike. 

Arguably, one of the most important factors in the failure of the Miner’s Strike in 1984 was the leadership of the head of NUM, Arthur Scargill. Many people blame him for the failure of Miner’s Strike due to his poor leadership skills and bad judgement. Scargill’s first mistake was refusing to call a National Ballot after the strike started to gain support. The view that the failure to call a National Ballot, by Scargill, cost him valuable support is advocated by Shirley Letwin; “Nor did he bother to abide by his own unions rules which required that ‘a strike shall be entered upon as the result of a ballot vote of the members.’[1] This led to the miners losing the support of many, including Labour Party’s- Neil Kinnock, who felt emotionally disposed to support the miner’s but aware that it would be political suicide to do so[2]. Neil Kinnock even compared Scargill with a general who wanted ‘another Gallipoli’[3]. Kim Howells discusses how Neil Kinnock argued that “real power lay at the ballot box”[4]. This only reinforces the idea that it was Scargill’s decision not to call a ballot that lost him valuable support. This source is reliable as Kim Howell’s was a member of the NUM at the time of the strike but still discredits Scargill’s tactics. Shirley Letwin takes the mainstream media view that Arthur Scargill’s incompetence as a leader caused the miner’s strike to fail. She makes some bold accusations about “when Scargill and his cohorts were accused of serious irregularities in the handling of union funds” but this is unconvincing as it has never been proven true. However, Letwin also blames Scargill for the timing of the strike; “Scargill, for his part, had timed his attack poorly, attacking in the spring when the demand for coal was decreasing”. This is unfair as after the NCB accidently announced pit closures, the strike gained momentum very quickly forcing Scargill to just go along with it. Letwin’s Thatcherite view is also discredited by Tony Benn who says “The issue of a national ballot was really irrelevant”. This is because had the NUM come out nationally in favour of the strike, Nottinghamshire area would have won permission for its own ballot and remained at work. However, if it had gone the other way the Yorkshire area would have come out and other areas would have to decide whether to give support.[5] However, we have to keep in mind that Tony Benn opposed the “radical restrictions” put on the striking miner’s as he thought they were unfair. He was also on the hard-left of the Labour Party, often disagreeing with Neil Kinnock who couldn’t support the strike due to its illegitimacy after Scargill’s failure to call a ballot. Therefore, when considering both sources, Letwin’s Thatcherite view isn’t very convincing as the argument that the failure of the miner’s strike was due to Scargill’s bad leadership is based on factors out of his control like the timing of the strike and accusations that haven’t been proven. However, another reason that many people blame Scargill for the downfall of the miners is due to the fact that Scargill authorised the flying picket strategy in order to stop miners going to work. This was seen as violent and was deemed illegal. Therefore, the argument that Scargill’s leadership could have been one of the reasons that the miner’s strike failed is partly true as we know that due to Scargill’s decision to not call a national ballot he ended up losing key supporters such as the Labour party and many members of the public who couldn’t support the strike as it was unofficial and didn’t favour Scargill’s violent tactics.

However, Scargill was well known for being “a formidable organiser and conference-hall speaker”[6]. He had a powerful speaking capability which garnered much passionate support from those who watched or saw his speeches. Andrew Marr’s view on why the Miner’s strike failed is much more convincing as it gives credit to Scargill’s leadership skills while also saying “not even he would be able to persuade every part of the industry to strike” showing that Marr believes that Scargill was the best man for the job. By not calling a National Ballot the strike rapidly gained support. Scargill said himself that “the real reason that the NUM areas such as Nottinghamshire, South Derbyshire and Leicestershire wanted a national strike ballot was that they wanted the strike called off, believing naively that their pits were safe”[7]. The strike gained momentum quickly and calling a ballot may have broken down this early support. However, we have to be careful when using this source as evidence as Scargill may have been trying to justify his actions to save himself criticism. Scargill also cleverly manipulated the NUM rule book creating a serious constitutional debate. The strike was called under Rule 41 of the NUM rule book, which said that local strikes can be made official by the National Executive without a ballot. But Rule 43 said that a national strike can only be called if there was a ballot. Was this national or local?[8] Nigel Lawson, who takes a clear mainstream media view on the Miner’s strike and even admits “the left-wing majority on the NUM executive insisted, however dubiously, that Rule 43 of the union allowed for a strike without a ballot”[9] showing that although many people didn’t agree with it, including him, it was actually permissible.  However, Lawson then goes on to say “The violent tactics used by the NUM pickets reopened the issue of ‘Who governs Britain?’”. This is given credence by the fact that Scargill authorised these violent tactics, which decreased public sympathy for the Miners which was actually their greatest asset[10]. However, we have to question Lawson’s motives behind this, as he may have naturally blamed Scargill for the failure of the strike to protect his political reputation as it legitimises his role in opposing the strike. Therefore, the fact that Scargill didn’t call a National Ballot was “irrelevant”[11] as Tony Benn says, but the fact that Scargill authorised violent tactics that reduced public sympathy and misjudged situations may have been a factor in the failure of the miner’s strike.

Another important factor in the failure of the miner’s strike is the amount of support that it had. The striking miners didn’t have the support of the Nottinghamshire miners, dock workers or even the Labour Party, including Neil Kinnock, and many historians believe that the strikes’ failure was down to the fact that it was so poorly supported; such as Eric Evans who takes the mainstream media view and believed “the appearance of a much more conciliatory breakaway union representing the profitable East Midlands mining area…led to collapse of the strike”[12] This we know to be true as the Nottinghamshire miners alone produced 25% of the Nation’s coal. Without their support, victory for the miners looked uncertain as they were the best paid, with better conditions promised by Thatcher[13]. However, Evans fails to mention how campaigning in Nottinghamshire was successful and how the pickets won over many workers until the police eventually intervened. Tony Benn opposes Evans’ view by saying “the extent of the support in the NUM as a whole was evidenced by the overwhelming majority of miners who remained on strike until it ended in 1985”[14]. However, he does give credit to the harsh tactics taken by the miners that may have cut out any support for the Nottinghamshire miners; “The only legitimate question that may be raised about the tactics of the NUM nationally was whether the Yorkshire miners, by picketing Nottinghamshire so early and so vigorously, alienated those they were seeking to influence”. Therefore, Tony Benn’s argument is more convincing than Eric Evans’ as he takes into account the failures of the miners’ as well as giving credit to the amount of support the strike had as well. The miners also failed to gain the support of the dock workers in strike effort. Their support would have been vital if they were to win the strike; this is presented by Cabinet minutes which show that Thatcher’s priority was to “settle the dock strike as quickly as possible in order to allow the government to concentrate on winning the miners’ strike”[15].  Therefore, without support from key groups such as the Nottinghamshire miners and the dock workers, the striking miners were isolated which may have led to the failure of the strike itself.

However, many people argue that there was a lot of support for the strike so therefore it couldn’t have been such an important factor in its failure in 1985. Arthur Wakefield, a striking miner, presents the Marxist view that the failure of the strike couldn’t have been down to the lack of support and instead must have been due to other factors. In his diary he documents the battle at Orgreave on Monday 18^th of June, 1984; “I’ve never seen so many of our lads altogether, it brought tears to my eyes”[16]. However, Wakefield also mentions the betrayal he felt by the Nottinghamshire miners who continued to work by saying “The lads are in good spirits even if the majority of scabs are working”. Therefore, this portrays the feelings of the majority of the miners who were on strike as they realised that this lack of support could determine the outcome of the strike. Regardless, we have to be careful when using Arthur Wakefield as a source as his diary entries will reflect his heightened emotions after a day of striking that may not truly reflect the real situation. We also know that lots of support groups popped up to encourage the miner’s on in their fight. The most notable of these being the ‘Women Against Pit Closures’ (WAPC) mainly made up of miner’s wives or women that grew up in mining communities. One source described them as the “iron ladies of the coal fields”[17]. Thatcher disregarded how much of an impact the WAPC would have on the strike as many of the striking ladies figured out that if they went out picketing then they would less likely be targeted by police. Soup kitchens were set up to save miners and their families from starvation in nearly every small village[18]. The students, lesbian and gay rights’ movements also supported the miners as they could relate to their struggle. Therefore, the overwhelming support for the strike could not be denied. This is portrayed by Kenneth O’Morgan, who takes a clear mainstream media view. He says “Support for the strike was virtually solid not only in old militant areas…but also (at first) in traditionally moderate Lancashire, Durham and Northumberland”[19]. He then went on to say: “The deep disillusion of the mining community…was spontaneous and genuine”. This shows that even someone who takes the traditional mainstream media view, that because of Scargill’s actions the strike was poorly supported and doomed to fail, you can’t deny the amount of support that the miners had. However, Kenneth O’Morgan may be overemphasising the amount of support that the miner’s had as we know that Thatcher continuously demonised the miners in the media calling them “the enemy within” and this reduced a lot of public support for the strike. Nevertheless, this shows that the strike didn’t fail from the lack of support in general, but rather the lack of support from key figures such as the Neil Kinnock from the Labour Party, as well as the Nottinghamshire miners who, if they had supported the miners, would have guaranteed a different outcome for the strike. This lack of support can be blamed on the leadership of Arthur Scargill; therefore, the leadership of Arthur Scargill is a more important factor in the failure of the miner’s strike in 1985.

Another factor in the failure of the miner’s strike, in 1984, is government involvement. Many people argue that government preparations led to the failure of the strike. These preparations included the Ridley Plan, stockpiling coal, the appointment of Ian McGregor as head of NCB, the involvement of MI5 and MI6 and the introduction of the new trade union laws. Nicholas Ridley conveys the mainstream media view that the failure of the strike was due to sufficient preparations for the strike by the government and out rightly says “He might have won at Orgreave if it hadn’t been for the preparations that the Government had made. The coal stocks at power stations held out”[20]. This is true as we know that Thatcher’s government backed down from a confrontation with the trade unions in its first parliament in 1979-83 as the government felt like it needed more time in order to stock pile coal in preparation for the next inevitable strike. However, we have to be careful when taking Nicholas Ridley’s account at face value as he was a known Thatcherite and also came up with the Ridley Plan that outlined how to deal and prepare for a potential strike; “Perhaps my ‘confidential annexe’ had been worthwhile after all. In the event, it turned out to be the exact blueprint that the government followed”[21]. Ridley may have been trying to take credit for the failure of the strike by saying that the strike failed due to the government’s preparations that included the plan he came up with. Seumas Milne portrays the Marxist view that the government went over the top with the preparations in order to see the miner’s strike fail and bring down the unions altogether. Milne explains how the strike was a last-ditch fight to defend jobs, mining communities and the NUM itself against a government prepared to bring into play unlimited resources and it’s “entire panoply of coercive powers” as and where necessary to break the union and its backbone of support[22]. Therefore, Milne’s interpretation is supported by Ridley’s in the fact that government preparations led to the downfall of the miners. However, they have conflicting views on to what extent these preparations were made in order to bring down the unions. The strict trade union laws have also been credited for the failure of the strike with Norman Tebbit, who introduced the trade union law reforms, saying “because of my reforms, if these other unions had joined an illegal strike, the Coal Board could have asked the court to confiscate their funds”[23]. However, we have to be careful when using this as evidence as Tebbit may have been trying to take credit for the failure of the strike. The appointment of Ian McGregor as head of the NCB can also be argued as a factor in the failure of the strike as he was known to be “notoriously formidable… had no pity for the poor miners, and was determined to keep them working and living in conditions that no human being should be made to endure”[24]. Therefore government preparations was definitely a factor in the failure of the miner’s strike but to what extent, can be argued.

However, it can be argued that government preparations weren’t sufficient enough in order to bring down the miners. The appointment of Ian McGregor as head of the NCB can be seen as a failure on Thatcher’s behalf showing that the government’s preparations were insufficient to cause the strike to fail. Margaret Thatcher even described McGregor as “lacking in guile” as he was used to dealing with financial difficulties and hard bargaining and had no experience with dealing with trade union leaders[25]. This confirms the fact that Thatcher and Ian McGregor often didn’t see eye-to-eye, an example of this is the issue with the NACODs strike. However, we have to be careful when using Thatcher as a source as she may be trying to give more credit to her successes and deflecting her failures onto other people such as Ian McGregor. Seumas Milne, who takes the Marxist view, supports Thatcher’s argument that government preparations weren’t sufficient enough to cause the failure of the strike. He mentions how the strikers “overtime ban was biting deep into power-station coal stocks” and goes on to say “If it was allowed to continue until the autumn, managers warned, a twelve-week strike would be enough to put the country’s lights out”[26]. However, Thatcher, herself, has discredited this view saying “He (Arthur Scargill) was making wild claims that the CEGB had only eight weeks of coal stocks. In fact, stocks were much higher”[27]. It can be argued that both Marxist and Mainstream Media view give credit to the fact that government preparations were a factor in the failure of the miners’ strike but they have opposing views on to what extent. Therefore, government preparations are more important than other factors, such as Arthur Scargill’s leadership and support for the strike, in the failure of the miner’s strike. 

On the 20^th of July 1984, Thatcher gave a speech to the 1922 committee where she deemed the miners as the “enemy within” going on to say “We had to fight the enemy without, in the Falklands. We always have to be aware of the enemy within, which is much more difficult to fight and more dangerous to liberty”[28]. This was to begin the argument of whether the actions of Thatcher and the state during the strike led to its failure. Margaret Thatcher began a media campaign in order to win over the public and demonise the miners. She even admitted to appointing Peter Walker as Secretary of State for Energy because of his negotiating skills and said “he was also a skilled communicator, something in which I knew would be important if we were to retain public support in the coal strike”[29]. Thatcher deliberately chose to make the miners who continued to work look like heroes and make the striking miners look like the public enemy. Nigel Lawson describes how the government were able to persuade the working miners to cross the violent picket lines; “Those who continued to work were portrayed as heroes (and behind the scenes a considerable amount of private money was raised to help them resist the Scargillite intimidation…)”[30]. John Campbell sums up the mainstream media view by saying “The Governments only role was to uphold the liberty of those miners – and others – who wanted to work”[31].   Lawson also takes the mainstream media view that everything Thatcher did during the strike was to maintain law and order. Lawson takes an objective view of the events as his book was published in 1993 after a very public dispute with Thatcher where he eventually resigned. Yet he still gives credit to Thatcher and her government for their actions during the strike which legitimises his view. Another controversial action that Thatcher took was giving the police ultimate power during the strike. It is reported that the police were getting between £600 and £1000 a week and many people believed that ‘there just aren’t that many police available to move about. The authorities must be using the army”[32]. Seumas Milne argues that “the miners had sued the police for assault, wrongful arrest, malicious persecution and false imprisonment” and then went on to describe the battle of Orgreaves as an “8,000 riot police staged medieval-style mounted charges of unprecedented ferocity”[33]. This is given credence by striking miner, Arthur Wakefield; “This time the police go berserk and the Riot Squad charge up the field with the ‘Calvary’ … they turn to where we are standing peacefully picketing and start hitting whoever they come across”[34]. This strengthens Milne’s argument that the police brutality, authorised by Thatcher, was unjustified. Therefore, Thatcher and her governments actions could have caused the failure of the strike but to what extent these actions can be justified is still widely argued. 

However, it can be argued that the government limited its role in upholding law and order in a dispute between the NUM and the NCB. An example of this is the NACODs strike whereby Ian McGregor ordered colliery overmen to cross violent picket lines if they were to get paid. This sparked an individual ballot of members, in the autumn of 1984, whereby the ballot obtained an 80% plus vote for strike action, a decision which, if implemented, would have been sufficient to save pits and jobs, and win the dispute which had been brought by the National Coal Board[35]. Following these results, Thatcher urged Ian McGregor to fix the problem, she describes how “time and time again he (Ian McGregor) and his colleagues were outmanoeuvred by Arthur Scargill and the NUM leadership”[36]. This led to McGregor and the NCB negotiating a settlement with NACODS in order for them to call off the strike which could have seriously affected the outcome of the miner’s strike. Many people also argue that the police weren’t as brutal as some other accounts made them out to be and that they were just doing their jobs in maintaining law and order. John Campbell argues that “It was the job of the police to protect the freedom to work, and the job of the government to support the police”[37]. This is supported by Margaret Thatcher herself; “His (Ian McGregor) impression was that the police were failing to uphold criminal law and that the pickets had been able to prevent people going to work”[38]. However, Margaret Thatcher’s intentions in this source have to be questioned as this book was published in 1993 after Thatcher resigned as Prime Minister in 1990, therefore she may have been trying to justify her actions and downplay the use of police in the miner’s strike. Therefore, the argument that the government limited its role to upholding law and order in the dispute is faulty as many of the people who were downplaying the government’s actions are known Thatcherites and consequently had ulterior motives.

Having examined a range of factors which led to the failure of the miner’s strike in 1984, it has become clear that it was easy to just blame the leadership of Arthur Scargill as the ultimate factor that led to the strikes’ failure. In fact, other factors such as the governments intense preparations came into play. This included Norman Tebbit’s “radical reforms”[39] as put by Tony Benn, who was newly elected to the mining seat and a clear supporter of the 1984-85 Miner’s strike[40]. Another important factor in the failure of the miner’s strike was Thatcher and her government’s actions during the strike such as using the police force. Historian, John Campbell, described the battle at Orgreave; “They were beaten back by even greater numbers of mounted and heavily armoured police”[41]. He then goes on to say “with incidents of appalling violence on both sides” showing that even Campbell who takes the mainstream media view is forced to acknowledge the unnecessary violence of the police force when facing the miners. Nevertheless, Government intervention such as the use of police and the actions of Ian McGregor was not the most important factor in the failure of the strike as many people openly criticised McGregor, including Thatcher herself. Eric Evans described him as “aggressive and charismatic, but vain and politically limited”[42], therefore showing his limitations as the head of NCB. However, one of the most important factors in the failure of the miner’s strike has to be the lack of support especially from the Nottinghamshire miner’s and the falling through of the NACODs strike. Andrew Marr is one of many historians who support this view and believed that “The Nottinghamshire miner’s turned out to be critical. Without them the power stations, even with the mix of nuclear and oil and the careful stockpiling, might have begun to run short and the government would have been in deep trouble”[43] Therefore, showing that the lack of support from the Nottinghamshire miners was a more important factor in the failure of the Miner’s strike than government preparations. The issue of Scargill’s leadership is argued as the main reason that the miner’s strike failed. However, the people that argue this are clear Thatcherites such as Shirley Letwin, John Campbell and even Thatcher herself who blamed Scargill for the violence at the picket line “mass pickets led by Arthur Scargill forced the closure of the Saltley Coke Depot in Birmingham”[44] contradicting this, Seumas Milne who takes a clear Marxist view that the standard fairy tale, still routinely recycled by media and politicians alike, has it that Scargill ‘called’ the action in spring in a classic example of his poor generalship and tactical sense[45]. After looking at the evidence, I believe that the Marxist view is more valid than the Mainstream media view in the fact that it is clear that Thatcher and her government went above and beyond in order to bring down Scargill and the miner’s. If it wasn’t for Thatcher’s continued support for the Nottinghamshire miner’s, the strike would have had their support which may have been vital in the success of the strike. Therefore, we must conclude that whilst Arthur Scargill’s leadership was an important factor in the failure of the strike, it would be wrong to assume that this was the main reason as without the lack of support, especially from the Nottinghamshire miners, as well as the governments preparations, such as the stockpiling of coal, the miner’s strike might not have failed.

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Bibliography

Primary Sources

• Benn, Tony, and Ruth Winstone. The End of an Era: Diaries 1980-90. London: Cornerstone
• Digital, 2012.
• Lawson, Nigel. The View from No. 11: Britains Longest-serving Cabinet Member Recalls the
• Triumphs and Disappointments of the Thatcher Era.
• Ridley, Nicholas. My Style of Government: The Thatcher Years. London: Fontana, 1992.
• Scargill, Arthur. “Arthur Scargill: ‘We Could Surrender – or Stand and Fight’.” The Guardian. March 07, 2009. Accessed January 06, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/mar/07/arthur-scargill-miners-strike.
• Thatcher, Margaret. Margaret Thatcher: The Downing Street Years. London: Harper Collins
• Publishers, 1995.
• “BATTLE FOR BRITAIN; on the 25th Anniversary of the Miners Strike, NORMAN TEBBIT
• Reveals Why He Believes Defeat Would Have Been the Death of Democracy.” Daily Mail
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Interpretations

• Beckett, Francis, and David Hencke. Marching to the Fault Line: The 1984 Miners Strike and the Battle for Industrial Britain. London: Constable, 2009.
• Campbell, John. Margaret Thatcher. London: Vintage, 2008.
• Evans, Eric J. Thatcher and Thatcherism. London: Routledge, 2019.
• Harris, Robert. The Making of Neil Kinnock. London, 1984.
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• Letwin, Shirley Robin. The Anatomy of Thatcherism. Somerset: Routledge, 2018.
• Marr, Andrew. A History of Modern Britain. London: Pan Books, an Imprint of Pan Macmillan, 2017.
• Milne, Seumas. The Enemy Within: MI5, Maxwell and the Scargill Affair. London: Verso, 1995.
• Milne, Seumas. The Enemy Within: The Secret War against the Miners. London: Verso, 2014.
• Morgan, Kenneth O. Britain since 1945: The Peoples Peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
• Seldon, Anthony, and Daniel Collings. Britain under Thatcher. Harlow: Longman, 2000.
• “Still the Enemy Within (2014).” IMDb. Accessed October 12, 2018. https://www.imdb.com/title/tt3815426/.
• “The Truth of Nacods’ Shameful Sell-out.” The Guardian. January 07, 2000. Accessed October 11, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2000/jan/07/guardianletters4.
• “Tony Benn.” Wikipedia. September 09, 2018. Accessed October 12, 2018. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tony_Benn.
• Travis, Alan. “National Archives: Margaret Thatcher Wanted to Crush Power of Trade Unions.”
• The Guardian. July 31, 2013. Accessed October 11, 2018.
• Woods, Alan. “”Strike: When Britain Went to War”.” In Defence of Marxism. January 26,
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[1] Letwin, Shirley Robin. The Anatomy of Thatcherism. Somerset: Routledge, 2018. Page 150-152

[2] Campbell, John. Margaret Thatcher: From Grocer’s Daughter to Iron Lady. London: Vintage, 2008. Page 316

[3] Harris, Robert. The Making of Neil Kinnock. London, 1984. Page 164

[4] “UK | Politics | Head to Head: The Miners’ Strike.” BBC News. March 10, 2004. Accessed January 06, 2019. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3503545.stm.

[5] Benn, Tony. The End of an Era Diaries 1980-90. Arrow, 1994. Page 341.

[6] Marr, Andrew. A History of Modern Britain. London: Pan Books, an Imprint of Pan Macmillan, 2017.

[7] Scargill, Arthur. “Arthur Scargill: ‘We Could Surrender – or Stand and Fight’.” The Guardian. March 07, 2009. Accessed January 06, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/mar/07/arthur-scargill-miners-strike.

[8] Beckett, Francis, and David Hencke. Marching to the Fault Line: The 1984 Miners Strike and the Battle for Industrial Britain. London: Constable, 2009. Page 51

[9] Lawson, Nigel. The View from No. 11: Britains Longest-serving Cabinet Member Recalls the Triumphs and Disappointments of the Thatcher Era. Page 158

[10] “Still the Enemy Within (2014).” IMDb. Accessed September 16, 2018. https://www.imdb.com/title/tt3815426/.

[11] Benn, Tony. The End of an Era Diaries 1980-90. Arrow, 1994. Page 341.

[12] Evans, Eric J. Thatcher and Thatcherism. Routledge, 1997. Page 39.

[13] “Still the Enemy Within (2014).” IMDb. Accessed October 10, 2018. https://www.imdb.com/title/tt3815426/.

[14] Benn, Tony. The End of an Era Diaries 1980-90. Arrow, 1994. Page 341.

[15] “How the Miners’ Strike Could Have Won.” Socialist Worker (Britain). Accessed October 10, 2018. https://socialistworker.co.uk/art/37592/How the Miners Strike could have won.

[16] Wakefield, Arthur, and Brian Elliot. The Miners Strike Day by Day: The Illustrated 1984-85 Diary of Yorkshire Miner Arthur Wakefield. Barnsley: Wharncliffe, 2002. Page 57.

[17] “Still the Enemy Within (2014).” IMDb. Accessed October 10, 2018. https://www.imdb.com/title/tt3815426/.

[18] “Still the Enemy Within (2014).” IMDb. Accessed October 10, 2018. https://www.imdb.com/title/tt3815426/.

[19] Morgan, Kenneth O. Britain since 1945: The Peoples Peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Page 473.

[20] Ridley, Nicholas. My Style of Government: The Thatcher Years. London: Fontana, 1992. Page 70.

[21] Ridley, Nicholas. My Style of Government: The Thatcher Years. London: Fontana, 1992. Page 70.

[22] Milne, Seumas. The Enemy Within: The Secret War against the Miners. London: Verso, 2014. Page 18.

[23] “BATTLE FOR BRITAIN; on the 25th Anniversary of the Miners Strike, NORMAN TEBBIT Reveals Why He Believes Defeat Would Have Been the Death of Democracy.” Daily Mail (London), March 6, 2009. Accessed October 11, 2018.

[24] Letwin, Shirley Robin. The Anatomy of Thatcherism. Somerset: Routledge, 2018. Page 151.

[25] Thatcher, Margaret. Downing Street Years. Harpercollins Publishers, 2012. Page 342.

[26] Milne, Seumas. The Enemy Within: M15, Maxwell and the Scargill Affair. S.l.: S.n., 1996. Page 13

[27] Thatcher, Margaret. Downing Street Years. Harpercollins Publishers, 2012. Page 343-344.

[28] Travis, Alan. “National Archives: Margaret Thatcher Wanted to Crush Power of Trade Unions.” The Guardian. July 31, 2013. Accessed October 11, 2018.

[29] Thatcher, Margaret. Downing Street Years. Harpercollins Publishers, 2012. Page 341.

[30] Lawson, Nigel. The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical. London: Corgi Books, 1993. Page 161.

[31] Campbell, John. Margaret Thatcher: Volume Two – The Iron Lady. London: Vintage Books, 2008. Page 317.

[32] Benn, Tony. The End of an Era Diaries 1980-90. Arrow, 1994. Page 346.

[33] Milne, Seumas. The Enemy Within: The Secret War against the Miners. London: Verso, 2014. Page 22.

[34] Wakefield, Arthur, and Brian Elliot. The Miners Strike Day by Day: The Illustrated 1984-85 Diary of Yorkshire Miner Arthur Wakefield. Barnsley: Wharncliffe, 2002. Page 57-59.

[35] “The Truth of Nacods’ Shameful Sell-out.” The Guardian. January 07, 2000. Accessed October 11, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2000/jan/07/guardianletters4.

[36] Thatcher, Margaret. Downing Street Years. Harpercollins Publishers, 2012. Page 342.

[37] Campbell, John. Margaret Thatcher. London: Vintage, 2008. Page 317.

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