History of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)

Choice of Group

I chose the PIRA primarily because the organisation is fascinating from a historical and dynamic point of view. The relationship that the splinter groups have with one another and the reasoning behind why the splinter groups formed is highly unique, as the splinter groups still maintain a highly similar focus, however the methodologies that are applied within each group to achieve the objectives differ and there are smaller idiosyncrasies that become apparent each highlighting the reasoning behind the split^[1].

The IRA is also highly complex and has found successes in the political arena that other organisations could only dream of, with Sinn Fein now a fixture in the Northern Ireland political scene^[2]. This was all achieved without a significant military victory going the way of the IRA or any subsidiary/splinter groups of the Old IRA.

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While the PIRA no longer considers itself an armed force (as a result of it disarming under international supervision)^[3]. It still opposes foreign occupation, something that speaks to the capacity and potential volatility of remaining splinter groups – something that makes for an interesting dynamic to analyse.

Finally, the fact that Ireland is similar in culture and stance on many things to my home country makes it interesting to analyse, as it could have been applicable in a place like Australia.

The PIRA is classified as a terrorist organisation under the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK). However, the group themselves prefer terminology aligned to a military organisation, such as soldier or freedom fighter. The clear majority of Northern Irish political parties also consider the IRA to be a terrorist organisation, however the Sinn Fein says it is not one. This may be tinged with a degree of bias however as the Sinn Fein is considered the political wing of the IRA^[4].

Overview of group and its history

Any exploration of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) must begin with exploring the modus operandi of the original Irish Republican Army, formed in the early 20th century.

The Irish Republican Army is an organisation with a very rich and varied history, with the originating group spawning a wide range of groups that all carry the Irish Republican Army name but differ some part of the name to reflect that the group holds beliefs that are idiosyncratic to the ‘parent’ entity^[5]. Depending on which side of the adage ‘one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter’ someone sits, the IRA and its derivatives and subsidiaries are considered either paramilitary groups or terrorist organisations. The fundamental aim of the IRA was achieving a holistic Irish republic – that is, all of Ireland becoming independent from British rule through the formation of their own government.

The Irish Republican Army was originally formed in 1917. It originally consisted of volunteers and trained members of the military that opted out of enlistment within the British army during the conflicts of the first world war. Irish soldiers that had participated in the war as members of the British Army returned to Ireland and fought in the Irish War of Independence^[6].

The Irish War of Independence was quite successful for the clear majority of Ireland, however after the dust settled on the war at the end of 1922, Ireland had been partitioned under British law, creating both the republic of Ireland, but leaving a region – Northern Ireland – with wounds that would continue to fester^[7]. Tensions in Northern Ireland continued, with violent occurrences continuing frequently, with skirmishes and incidents escalating into the Irish Civil War, a conflict that lasted for 11 months. Northern Ireland remained a part of the United Kingdom despite all these events, leaving many Northern Irish people aligned to the fundamental beliefs of the Irish Republican Army interested in seeing action to obtain meaningful outcomes reflective of those beliefs^[8].

With the civil war finishing around 1922, much of the remaining members of the IRA saw themselves as a protectorate organisation that was safeguarding the proclamation of independence that was made to the British during the Easter Rising event of 1916. The IRA’s relationship with Sinn Fein was strained during the years after the civil war, and once Eamon de Valera failed in his attempt at persuading the Sinn Fein to actively engage as a political entity in free state matters, he quit the party and stood up Fianna Fail^[9].

This was a significant moment for the IRA as they saw the existing government as an artificial entity, with governmental decisions being either heavily influenced, or made entirely by the British. Fianna Fail was the lifeline for the IRA in their struggle for self-determination, as Sinn Fein’s reluctance to engage with issues of government meant it was highly unlikely it would ever form a functioning government^[10].

It took until 1932 for Fianna Fail to win government, and the IRA was prepared to support the victory via an insurrection if the outgoing government failed to recognise the new government as such, however this was not required, and the transition was a peaceful one. Fianna Fail removed the ban that had been applied to the IRA in 1932 however this only lasted 3 years to 1935 until it was banned again^[11].

In the late 30s, the catalyst for a range of activities that nearly ended the IRA as an organisation was the Christmas Raid, where IRA members stole nearly a complete ammunition reserve from the Irish Army. This caused a huge ripple effect, including the creation of the Emergency Powers Act – something that reinstated internment, military tribunal and execution for IRA members^[12]. This legislation was used to execute at least 5 members of the IRA between 1940 and 1944. During World War II, members of the IRA were pursued relentlessly on all sides. It has been suggested that this increase in the intensity and more hardline approach from both sides of the border was based around the interests of security during a period of intense conflict with Germany^[13].

From the late 40s, the IRA entered a rebuilding phase, ultimately drawing in a recruit by the name of Sean Cronin, an ex-soldier who had considerable experience in a military setting. Cronin assisted in the development of operation harvest, a border operation that was focused on guerilla warfare striking critical infrastructure in an effort to hinder troop responses and exert superiority^[14]. The legislation – the ever-present thorn in the IRAs side – that enabled internment without trial, proved once more to be the death knell for success, and saw the momentum and morale associated with the operation break in 1962.

Emergence

Enablers and Triggers

In the mid-late 1960s, the IRAs leadership was anchored in a left-wing view of the world. This view led them to taking a Marxist view of its operations. This lead to the first significant split of the group, creating the Provisional Irish Republican Army (‘PIRA’) in late 1969. The split occurred as the PIRA wanted to remain focused on the traditional approach to its republican goals. The use of the word provisional was to signify that it was a period of reorganisation for the IRA^[15].

Intent

Both the goals and the strategic initiatives of the PIRA were shaped and informed by the historical experiences and fundamental philosophy of its parent organisation, the Old IRA. Many interviews and references associated with PIRA’s strategy show that its motivations and intent remain highly similar, if not the same, to those of the Old IRA in the late 1910s and early 1920s – that being the unification of Ireland under an Irish government.^[16]

One area that the PIRA had to be careful of in the new Marxist era of the IRA organisation during the 1960s, where the Official IRA (or OIRA) was against any sectarian allegiances, was that they needed to maintain strong ties to the catholic community, particularly in Northern Ireland, as the community in that region was a great enabler of their activities and a strong support network for the carrying out of initiatives.^[17]

The other prong that PIRA had to manage effectively was maintaining its image as a successful and effective military organisation even though at times it was anything but. This keeping up of appearances was useful for propaganda and for contributing to the achievement of the strategic objectives of the group.^[18]

The leaders of the PIRA in the 60s and 70s had a strong understanding of their capabilities from a conventional warfare standpoint – it was simply an impossibility to face the English in the field in a conventional sense. This meant that the methods that were used were guerilla tactics with the end goals and the means to achieve them being outlined in a publication known as “The Green Book” which is a PIRA policy and training manual.

When looking at the document, there are 5 core objectives that the PIRA sets out which directly correlate to the historical beliefs of the organisation and, one could deduce, the organisational intent at the time. These objectives included:

-          A war of attrition against enemy personnel that is aimed at causing as many casualties and deaths as possible to create a level of demand from the British public to withdraw their troops from Northern Ireland;

-          A bombing campaign aimed at making the enemy’s interest in Northern Ireland unprofitable or economically unstable during the present and sustaining the campaign to an extent that discourages any opportunity for long term investment in the region;

-          To make the occupied region so unstable to be ungovernable except by Colonial Military rule

-          To sustain the war and gain support via national and international media and publicity; and

-          Punishing criminals, collaborators and informers to maintain the war for liberation^[19].

All the above points to the groups intent being firmly grounded in a protectionist agenda. The Irish Republican Army as a group has descriptors as to its intent in the name. All the above objectives, implied and explicitly documented intents associated with the group are streamlined towards achieving one overarching goal – the full reunification of Ireland under one socialist democracy.

Evolution & Drivers

It is a fair comment to say that conflict is not an enjoyable endeavour. This carries the implication that people involved themselves in PIRA’s confrontations or conflict to further not only the overarching agenda but to receive something beneficial for themselves or for their community^[20].

If a terrorist organisation believes that the attainment or achievement of their strategic initiatives and objectives are a byproduct of violence, crime or war, then that is the path that they will tread. The flip side of this coin is if a group sees themselves as the protector of a group or group of people, the operations carried out are aligned to maintaining support and showing the region that they “protect” that they are achieving measurable outcomes.^[21]

The evolution of the IRA is a strange and fascinating beast in that, when a way of thinking arose that differed significantly to the status quo in some ways, but remained stable in others, it would generally be the catalyst for a splinter group. This is illustrated in various splits that the organisation experienced throughout its history and perhaps most easily illustrated through the split between the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA, with the split being between staying true to the traditional methodologies of the group as opposed to adopting a more Marxist approach to operations.^[22]

The above factors, motivations and issues however, are associated with the strategic direction of the group and fail to encompass all the events and issues that contributed to the evolution, development and growth of the IRA in its various incarnations^[23].

Perhaps the most prominent driver to be found at the coal face of IRA operations was anger, hatred and resentment, particularly after Operation Demetrius and the Bloody Sunday of the 1970s. When British military first arrived in Northern Ireland, the Catholics living there saw the force as a positive, believing they would assist in keeping the peace between protestants and Catholics. However, Operation Demetrius put paid to these beliefs, the internment without trial of over 300 Catholics – many of them arrested on faulty evidence supplied by protestant informants, highlighted the fact that the British occupational forces were not friends of the Catholic population. It is noteworthy that internment without trial had been used in the past, but this was the first instance of it being used since the commencement of the Troubles^[24].

The fact that so many people were arrested, and the British played such a key role in the arrest led people to resenting them. The PIRA offered an outlet for their rage and, better yet, the outlet was in direct retaliation to English forces.

There has been research undertaken where a solid empirical foundation was sought by the author to get a holistic and unbiased insight into the machinations of the PIRA from 1969 (when the PIRA first emerged) through to the late 1970s. This research adds another dynamic to the evolution/development/growth equation – that being part of the PIRA was a way one could earn honor, respect and pride.^[25]

Catholics were exposed to a bleak living situation from a young age and as such were keen to make a name for themselves in the quest for a unified Ireland under a socialist democracy. The PIRA was the perfect platform for this as the strategic objectives of the organisation aligned to the catholic community desires.

One of the interesting things to note is that the drivers, motivations and issues that the PIRA was looking to address were not placing their beliefs or ideals onto others and attacking them for not altering their beliefs to match the PIRAs, but rather the group was fighting for the autonomy of its country and the people of that country. When looking at terrorist groups throughout history, this is a rare specimen.^[26]

Counteractions taken against PIRA

Counter terrorism approaches that were used against the PIRA all had varying degrees of efficacy. These ranged from internment without trial, which was effective for starving the organisation of manpower and nearly led to the complete wipe out of the group.

Other approaches included the killing of IRA members, in some instances discriminately and in other instances indiscriminately, a study undertaken by Paul Gill, titled Counterterrorism Killings and Provisional IRA Bombings -1970-1998 found that these methods were nowhere near as effective as internment without trial, as the killing of IRA members in a discriminate manner were used as fuel for the propaganda fire and the indiscriminate killing of both IRA members and the general public caused extreme backlash in the terrorist actions taken by the IRA, drastically increasing their bombing operations against civilian targets.^[27]

This increase in terrorist activity is known as the defiance effect, and was explored in even greater detail by Gary LaFree, Raven Korte and Laura Dugan in the publication Efficacy of Counterterrorism Approaches: Examining Northern Ireland. Where violent strategies are utilised, the group will the strategies are being used against have scope to increase their capacity through propaganda, whilst the loss of comrades can harden their resolve.

An interesting thing to note around the counteractions taken by Irish and English governments is that, whilst PIRA was considered a terrorist entity, the word and any words similar – terror, terrorist, terrorism – were not widely used when referring to the PIRA or its operations^[28].

The ramifications associated with the liberal use of certain terms would have shown total condemnation of PIRA’s campaign, which had the potential to ignite further violence if members of PIRA saw that the end solutions for open and frank dialogue were constrained by the biased perspective of adversarial institutions.^[29]

As mentioned above, countermeasures that were effective were ones where the capacity of the group was significantly impacted without escalating to significant amounts of violence. The measures used certainly proved significant in the containment of the PIRA’s operations, however the flipside to this was creating an extremely volatile space where the operations were contained. This volatility led to a range of events that have a legacy throughout the region including hunger strikes, Bloody Sunday and shoot to kill orders.

Cessation

The achievement of peace in Northern Ireland was a multi-faceted, multi layered approach that took many years to finalise. Reviewing it retrospectively, there was three central flashpoints that occurred that ultimately led to the peace that exists in the region today. The event that initiated peace occurred between the late 1980s to the early 1990s and was focused around the development and implementation of a suite of principles and agreements that would support an absolute ceasefire.

The secondary flashpoint occurred when the US government got involved to assist in brokering peace agreements and strengthening ceasefires, including the fundamental disarmament of the IRA. The third and final flashpoint centres around the development and widespread implementation of the Good Friday Agreement.^[30]

The Good Friday Agreement acknowledged that that the people of Northern Ireland were in two minds about the United Kingdom. With significant amounts of people wanting a united Ireland and significant amounts of people wishing to remain a part of the United Kingdom. Both approaches were acknowledged as being legitimate and for the first time, an Irish government agreed to the fact that Northern Ireland was part of the United Kingdom.^[31]

The IRA is a unique organisation in that, the fundamental premise or objective of the original group is maintained at the heart of its various splinter groups. As has been mentioned above, splinter groups of the IRA generally form when there is a disagreement or change that is suitably minor for the splinter group to remain connected to the fundamental premise of the Old IRA, although large enough to trigger the formation of a new group.^[32]

Looking back over the history of the group, the most common cause for a split or emergence of a new group is a change of perspective – being right to left, left to right or central and quite even keeled to one of the extremes. The new group then attracts members from the existing group that believe in the fundamental approach, however feel more comfortable operating within a framework that suits their political and general worldview.

Other instances of splinter groups were due to the parent group changing significantly in its proposed scope – the prime example being the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA in the late 60s. Those who would eventually form/join PIRA wished to tread the same path that the IRA had always followed (defending catholic communities and pushing for a socialist democratic republic), however the OIRA wanted to apply Marxist methodologies to the operations, which ultimately was the catalyst for the split. All of this however, feeds into the groups continued prospects and capability^[33].

Future Prospects

It is imperative to look at the history of the group, the way in which the cessation occurred and the fundamental premise or objective of the IRA from a holistic perspective to appropriately gauge its prospects.

The group itself, as mentioned above, has fixated itself and operations on a core objective of a united Ireland for nearly the entire history, nearly all splinter groups maintain this view and associated objectives, with the splinter being triggered through some idiosyncrasy that was incompatible with the approach of the existing group.^[34]

Although PIRA disarmed under international supervision, there are two groups that splintered that are considered still active, however to a far lesser extent than PIRA was at the height of the troubles.

The two groups include the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA, with the Continuity IRA openly refuting the contents of the Good Friday Agreement. This stance stems from the groups perception that PIRA embraced a ceasefire under international scrutiny when the objectives of the group had not been achieved, therefore the splinter group named themselves the continuity IRA to ensure the continuity of the Old IRA’s objectives.^[35]

The political wing of the IRA – Sinn Féin – are an oddity in terms of an entity that furthered a political agenda off the back of an insurgency and found success. The party has transitioned away from associations with the insurgency to operating as a legitimate democratic party, with all of this being achieved with no significant military victories being won by the IRA against the British forces.

Through all of this calm and stabilisation and even the legitimate transition of Sinn Fein, the threat of extreme violence remains. Although not demonstrated by the PIRA, the groups splinter groups, such as the RIRA (Real IRA) continue to cause havoc due to their disagreement with the Good Friday Agreement and other peace talk initiatives.^[36]

Additional Observations, Insights and Precedent

The PIRA and indeed all other incarnations of the IRA are seen largely as violent dissident organisations which can be treated similarly to similar organisations in how they are managed and contained. The PIRA has been compared to organisations like the Red Army Faction (RAF), that is, seen as a fringe group that could be effectively managed without any significant negotiations. Governments, in dealing with terrorist organisations have been exposed to enough differing scenarios to know that their engagement with organisations should be limited to necessity to avoid legitimising an organisations cause unintentionally^[37].

The difficulty in this space comes from managing interaction to an extent where the public are satisfied whilst the response is appropriate to deal with events that have transpired, rather than commencing a witch hunt for the terrorists that could be utilised as the new vehicle that reaffirms the groups cause and strengthens their resolve in the utilisation of violence.^[38]

References

• Alonso, Rogelio. “Terrorist Skin, Peace-Party Mask: The Political Communication Strategy of Sinn Féin and the PIRA.” Terrorism and Political Violence 28, no. 3 (2016): 520-540.
• Alonso, Rogelio. “The modernization in Irish Republican thinking toward the utility of violence.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24, no. 2 (2001): 131-144.
• Bell, J. Bowyer. The secret army: the IRA, 1916-1979. Dublin: Academy Press, 1979.
• Bosi, L. (2012). Explaining pathways to armed activism in the Provisional Irish Republican Army, 1969–1972. Social Science History, 36(3), 347-390.
• Buckland, Patrick. A history of Northern Ireland. Holmes & Meier Pub, 1981.
• Cairns, Ed, and John Darby. “The conflict in Northern Ireland: Causes, consequences, and controls.” American psychologist53, no. 7 (1998): 754.
• Collins, Stephen. The Power Game: Ireland under Fianna Fáil. O’Brien Press, 2001.
• Donohue, Laura K. Counter-terrorist law and emergency powers in the United Kingdom, 1922-2000. Vol. 259. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2001.
• Dunphy, Richard. The making of Fianna Fáil power in Ireland, 1923-1948. Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press, 1995.
• Eubank, W. and Weinberg, L., 2001. Terrorism and democracy: Perpetrators and victims. Terrorism and political violence, 13(1), pp.155-164.
• Field, Antony. “The ‘New Terrorism’: Revolution or Evolution?.” Political Studies Review 7, no. 2 (2009): 195-207.
• Flemming, Peter A., Michael Stohl, and Alex P. Schmid. “The theoretical utility of typologies of terrorism: Lessons and opportunities.” The Politics of Terrorism. 3d ed. New York: Marcel Dekker (1988): 153-95.
• Gallagher, Frank. The indivisible island: the history of the partition of Ireland. London: Gollancz, 1957.
• Garfield, Andrew. “PIRA lessons learned: A model of terrorist leadership succession.” Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 11, no. 2-3 (2002): 271-284.
• Horgan, John, and Max Taylor. “The provisional Irish Republican army: Command and functional structure.” Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 3 (1997): 1-32.
• Jackson, Brian A. “Training for Urban Resistance: The Case Of the Provisional Irish Republican Army.” (2005).
• Klabbers, Jan. “Rebel with a cause? Terrorists and humanitarian law.” European journal of international law 14, no. 2 (2003): 299-312.
• LaFree, Gary, and Raven Korte, Laura Dugan. 2006. “Efficacy of Counterterrorism Approaches: Examining Northern Ireland.” December 20. www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/research_briefs/20061017_lafree.pdf
• Leeson, David M. The Black and Tans: British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence, 1920-1921. Oxford University Press on Demand, 2011.
• Mac Ginty, Roger, Orla T. Muldoon, and Neil Ferguson. “No war, no peace: Northern Ireland after the agreement.” Political psychology 28, no. 1 (2007): 1-11.
• McGarry, John, and Brendan O’Leary. The Northern Ireland conflict: consociational engagements. Oxford University Press on Demand, 2004.
• McGladdery, Gary. The Provisional IRA in England: the bombing campaign, 1973-1997. Irish Academic Pr, 2006.
• Morrison, John F. “Trust in me: Allegiance choices in a post-split terrorist movement.” Aggression and violent behavior 28 (2016): 47-56.
• Neumann, Peter R. “Negotiating with terrorists.” In Democratic Responses To Terrorism, pp. 103-112. Routledge, 2007.
• Piazza, James A. “Rooted in poverty?: Terrorism, poor economic development, and social cleavages.” Terrorism and political Violence 18, no. 1 (2006): 159-177.
• Richards, Anthony. “Terrorist groups and political fronts: the IRA, Sinn Fein, the peace process and democracy.” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 4 (2001): 72-89.
• Sanchez-Cuenca, Ignacio. “The dynamics of nationalist terrorism: ETA and the IRA.” Terrorism and Political Violence19, no. 3 (2007): 289-306.
• Shirlow, Peter, and Mark McGovern. “Language, discourse and dialogue: Sinn Fein and the Irish peace process.” Political Geography 17, no. 2 (1998): 171-186.
• Silke, Andrew. “Rebel’s dilemma: The changing relationship between the IRA, Sinn Féin and paramilitary vigilantism in Northern Ireland.” Terrorism and Political Violence 11, no. 1 (1999): 55-93.
• Smith, Michael Lawrence Rowan. Fighting for Ireland?: the military strategy of the Irish Republican movement. Routledge, 2002.
• Tonge, Jonathan. “They haven’t gone away, you know’. Irish Republican Dissidents and armed struggle.” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 3 (2004): 671-693.
• Tugwell, Maurice. “Politics and Propaganda of the Provisional IRA.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 5, no. 1-2 (1981): 13-40.
• White, Robert W. “From peaceful protest to guerrilla war: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army.” American journal of sociology 94, no. 6 (1989): 1277-1302.
• White, R. W. (1997). The Irish republican army: An assessment of sectarianism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 9(1), 20-55.
• Wright, Joanne. “PIRA propaganda: The construction of legitimacy.” Journal of Conflict Studies 10, no. 3 (1990).

^[1] Buckland, Patrick. A history of Northern Ireland. Holmes & Meier Pub, 1981.

^[2] Richards, Anthony. “Terrorist groups and political fronts: the IRA, Sinn Fein, the peace process and democracy.” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 4 (2001): 72-89.

^[3] Alonso, Rogelio. “Terrorist Skin, Peace-Party Mask: The Political Communication Strategy of Sinn Féin and the PIRA.” Terrorism and Political Violence 28, no. 3 (2016): 520-540.

^[4] Flemming, Peter A., Michael Stohl, and Alex P. Schmid. “The theoretical utility of typologies of terrorism: Lessons and opportunities.” The Politics of Terrorism. 3d ed. New York: Marcel Dekker (1988): 153-95.

^[5] Bell, J. Bowyer. The secret army: the IRA, 1916-1979. Dublin: Academy Press, 1979.

^[6] Leeson, David M. The Black and Tans: British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence, 1920-1921. Oxford University Press on Demand, 2011.

^[7] McGarry, John, and Brendan O’Leary. The Northern Ireland conflict: consociational engagements. Oxford University Press on Demand, 2004.

^[8] Gallagher, Frank. The indivisible island: the history of the partition of Ireland. London: Gollancz, 1957.

^[9] Dunphy, Richard. The making of Fianna Fáil power in Ireland, 1923-1948. Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press, 1995.

^[10] Silke, Andrew. “Rebel’s dilemma: The changing relationship between the IRA, Sinn Féin and paramilitary vigilantism in Northern Ireland.” Terrorism and Political Violence 11, no. 1 (1999): 55-93.

^[11] Collins, Stephen. The Power Game: Ireland under Fianna Fáil. O’Brien Press, 2001.

^[12] Donohue, Laura K. Counter-terrorist law and emergency powers in the United Kingdom, 1922-2000. Vol. 259. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2001.

^[13] Alonso, Rogelio. “The modernization in Irish Republican thinking toward the utility of violence.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24, no. 2 (2001): 131-144.

^[14] Smith, Michael Lawrence Rowan. Fighting for Ireland?: the military strategy of the Irish Republican movement. Routledge, 2002.

^[15] Horgan, John, and Max Taylor. “The provisional Irish Republican army: Command and functional structure.” Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 3 (1997): 1-32.

^[16] Ibid.

^[17] Morrison, John F. “Trust in me: Allegiance choices in a post-split terrorist movement.” Aggression and violent behavior 28 (2016): 47-56.

^[18] Wright, Joanne. “PIRA propaganda: The construction of legitimacy.” Journal of Conflict Studies 10, no. 3 (1990).

^[19] Jackson, Brian A. “Training for Urban Resistance: The Case Of the Provisional Irish Republican Army.” (2005).

^[20] Field, Antony. “The ‘New Terrorism’: Revolution or Evolution?.” Political Studies Review 7, no. 2 (2009): 195-207.

^[21] Piazza, James A. “Rooted in poverty?: Terrorism, poor economic development, and social cleavages.” Terrorism and political Violence 18, no. 1 (2006): 159-177.

^[22] Sanchez-Cuenca, Ignacio. “The dynamics of nationalist terrorism: ETA and the IRA.” Terrorism and Political Violence19, no. 3 (2007): 289-306.

^[23] Cairns, Ed, and John Darby. “The conflict in Northern Ireland: Causes, consequences, and controls.” American psychologist53, no. 7 (1998): 754.

^[24] Ibid.

^[25] Bosi, L. (2012). Explaining pathways to armed activism in the Provisional Irish Republican Army, 1969–1972. Social Science History, 36(3), 347-390.

^[26] Tugwell, Maurice. “Politics and Propaganda of the Provisional IRA.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 5, no. 1-2 (1981): 13-40.

^[27] McGladdery, Gary. The Provisional IRA in England: the bombing campaign, 1973-1997. Irish Academic Pr, 2006.

^[28] Klabbers, Jan. “Rebel with a cause? Terrorists and humanitarian law.” European journal of international law 14, no. 2 (2003): 299-312.

^[29] Neumann, Peter R. “Negotiating with terrorists.” In Democratic Responses To Terrorism, pp. 103-112. Routledge, 2007.

^[30] Mac Ginty, Roger, Orla T. Muldoon, and Neil Ferguson. “No war, no peace: Northern Ireland after the agreement.” Political psychology 28, no. 1 (2007): 1-11.

^[31] Morrissey, Mike, and Marie Breen Smyth. “Northern Ireland after the good friday agreement: Victims, grievance and blame.” (2002).

^[32] White, Robert W. “From peaceful protest to guerrilla war: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army.” American journal of sociology 94, no. 6 (1989): 1277-1302.

^[33] Hennessey, Thomas. The Northern Ireland peace process: Ending the troubles?. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2000.

^[34] White, R. W. (1997). The Irish republican army: An assessment of sectarianism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 9(1), 20-55.

^[35] Tonge, Jonathan. “They haven’t gone away, you know’. Irish Republican Dissidents and armed struggle.” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 3 (2004): 671-693.

^[36] Shirlow, Peter, and Mark McGovern. “Language, discourse and dialogue: Sinn Fein and the Irish peace process.” Political Geography 17, no. 2 (1998): 171-186.

^[37] Garfield, Andrew. “PIRA lessons learned: A model of terrorist leadership succession.” Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 11, no. 2-3 (2002): 271-284.

^[38] Eubank, W. and Weinberg, L., 2001. Terrorism and democracy: Perpetrators and victims. Terrorism and political violence, 13(1), pp.155-164.