Sustainable forest management

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The Development of Local Community Institutions for Community-Based Forest Management


This dissertation focuses on the implementation of Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) in Indonesia especially on the issue of development of the local community institutions for implementing sustainable forest management. Developing local institutions is considered to be an appropriate way to solve the problems on resources management (Agrawal 2001; Ostrom et al. 1999). Many scholars argue that resources users who create institutional regime can help to re-allocate the resources and conserve them in a sustainable way (Agrawal 2005; Quinn et al. 2007; Tachibana and Adhikari 2009). Many evidences, the utilisation of resources usually marginalises local communities and only supports either the private or state needs (FAO 2007; Suwarno et al. 2009). Consequently, for many countries, how to manage and encourage local community to access the natural resources is the most important issue.

There are several data relating the forest resources in the world. Forestry contributes valuable resources into all parts of the worlds but the progress towards sustainable forest management has been uneven. The forest has covered 30 percent of the world's land which is equal 4 billion hectares (FAO 2007). From 1990 to 2005 the world lost 3 percent of the total forest in the world where the average decrease of some 0.2 percent per year (FAO 2007). On the other hand, the forest industries contribute approximately US $ 4.8 Billion or only 1 percent of the Global gross value added whilst between 1990 and 2006 the share forestry has declined continuously from 1.48 % to 1% (FAO 2007). The same situation also has been occurred in Indonesia. The greatest forest lost compared with the other South East Asian, almost 1.9 million hectare disappear per year(FAO 2007)

Besides many Asian countries have got many obstacles on forest management resources such as illegal logging, deforestation and forestry fires that happened because the formal government institutions in the forest sector are not strong to control the resources (McAllister et al. 2007). In Indonesia, the forest also is significantly decline not only in term of the coverage area but also in term of the revenue (Casson and Obidzinski 2002; Suwarno et al. 2009; Wollenberg et al. 2006). The problems of exploitation on forest management in Indonesia are sophisticated and complex where there are lots of reasons that lead to the forest exploitation. First of all, an economic reason, increasing gross national product leads to the Indonesian government to exploit the forest for gaining foreign exchange. The government gives lots of opportunities to Multinational industries to use and occupy the forest for several times. It is called Hak penguasaan Hutan (HPH/Rights to exploit forest). An industry who receives a HPH rights has an authority to fell the forest trees and use the land as long as the contract term (Casson and Obidzinski 2002). Secondly, social and cultural reasons, forest has been utilised by either local community or any stakeholders for social and cultural purpose such as the phenomena of slash and burn farmer where the farmer burn the forest and the they live in the area for several years after that they will move out to other area when the area is infertile (Lawrence et al. 2010; Schulte and Sah 2000). The last one is struggle of life reason where the people exploit the forest just because they want to survive and provide their basic needs (Lawrence et al. 2010; Schulte and Sah 2000).

As a result, there are several problems that occur on deforestation in Indonesia. In terms of economic issue, Human Rights Watch said that Indonesia government lost income nearly 2 billion dollars per year in 2006 because of illegal logging activities ( 2010) while the deforestation occurred whole Indonesian area including Kalimantan and Java as a major island. The other example is the increasing of illegal logging in Indonesia that had damaged 1,6 million ha of forest from January to July 2000 (Casson and Obidzinski 2002). In terms of share of benefit issue, the deforestation as the result of traditional way of forest exploitation tends to force out surrounding communities and gives rise to polemics for example, people who live near the forest state area are very poor. They just get income less than $ 1 a day (Awang 2004).The forest policies are only sensitive to industry and less aware to local community. In conclusion, the forest operations in Indonesia marginalise the local community and eliminate local initiative to utilise the forest resources (Nevins et al. 2008; Suwarno et al. 2009). Also, in the last decade the Indonesian government's policies have supported only to market needs (Purnomo et al. 2005; Suwarno et al. 2009; Yasmi et al. 2009). These circumstances need urgent response how to save the forest and the other side how to re-allocate and re-distribute the forest resources.

As a solution, the government, demanded by civil society, has created a forest policy which is the Community-based forest management (CBFM) (Suwarno et al.). The CBFM contexts are not only to distribute the resources but also to share of power between the state and local community (Suwarno et al. 2009). The program has been implemented in Indonesia 2002. The program has been implemented in the state forest area and local communities can use the land for long term contract such as 25 years. The community should establish a group and then the group send a proposal to the local government that they want to use the state forest near their life. As an idea of the decentralisation of resources, it could be better to distribute the resources and provide local community revenue (Nygren 2005). However, the involvement of local uses and institutions is more complicated than just promoting decentralisation of forest resources and also the main difficulties is how to develop a system that is effective, equitable and efficient (Barrett et al. 2005; Hanna 2005; Nygren 2005). For instances, if the community fail and they just extract the tree, it can be destroy the forest sustainability. If the community does not have enough power to bargain with buyers, they will either sell or lend the forest resources to the buyers. Therefore the idea that re-allocate the reseouces and give a chance for the community will fail. Moreover, it is suggested that development of sustainable local community institutions could answer the obstacles for maintaining the resources on community (Ostrom 2009). This is an important issue to look at the development of local community institutions on the CBF Indonesia.

For that reason, the main idea of this research that focuses on CBFM in Indonesia describes the local institutions capacity and examines its performance on CBFM's implementation in Indonesia. The main issue is the institutional arrangements specifically how the community monitor and enforce the rules they set. The research conducted in the Gunung Kidul Region (GKR) and then there are some arguments why this site is suitable for this research. First of all and foremost is rationale reason. The Gunung Kidul Regency (GKR) has implemented the Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) and established some local institutions. Secondly is Social access reason. The researcher can gain the trust and the confidence of the local community. Thirdly is ecosystem problems reason. Soils are highly eroded, dry and hilly so there are several issues that arise such as, landslide and water scarcity. The last one is social and political contexts reason, the land boundary between state and society is firm and interestingly it has cooperation on forest management implementation amongst them.

The focus on the institutional arrangements is relied on the common property regime, so the theoretical framework that has been used is the institutional approach. The institutional approach can be solve the common property rights problems between private, community and state (Agrawal 2005). The second approach is developing and understanding of local community institution with understating the local contexts can create a concept that difference institutional process can leads the variation how the local people use the natural resources (Agrawal 2005; Ostrom et al. 1999; Elinor Ostrom and National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change. 2002). It seems that understating on local community institution in GKR can help to create its forest management sustainable and also it relates to the Foucaultian view that knowledge and belief are discourses which are anti hegemonic and heterogenic perspective. It can be clear that even using lots of scientists opinion, this dissertation can be changed depends on the data and the contexts reached.

The Qualitative method is the main umbrella of this research which uses several methods to carry out the data such as ethnography and a participatory method. A combination between the ethnography and participatory approach is a good way for understanding the social contexts deeply. The ethnography can be used to carry out the social and cultural contexts and the participatory can help to find the best person or the key actors as research's participants. Even providing interview guide, it can be changed on the research's field. Beside, the observation would be performed at the local community who implement CBFM, Local and district government. The in-depth interviews could be conducted for some participants such as the local farmer, local and district government officer, NGO activist and university who involve in the CBFM in GKR. The purpose random sample has been chosen to find the interviewees or the farmers. The farmers have been divided two categories between the farmers who involved in and the farmers who do not involve in the CBFM. And then they were classified by wealth ranking. The wealth ranking is poor for those who has land less than 0.5 ha, middle for those who has land from 3 to 5 ha and rich for those has land more than 5 ha (Behera and Engel 2006). In addition, several data could be found both secondary data such as the books and journals about institution, local community and forest management, the policy papers of the local and district government about CBFM in both Indonesia and GKR.

In terms of the limitation of the research, there are several issues. First and foremost, generalisation, the result cannot make a generalisation for the CBFM implementation in Indonesia. Second, Objectivity, a participatory research has subjectivity issue. Because the researcher is involved in the community, they can be interfered by local belief or values. In terms of documentations, because the policy is locality and has been implemented a few years, it would be difficult to find out more information. However, even if it can raise our self-objectification and sometimes our involvement in the community can make our research biased, the researcher understands it and attempts to minimise a conflict of interest.

Overall, this dissertation that aims to develop the theoretical framework on the development of local community institutions sustainable on the implementation CBFM in Indonesia, would be divided several parts, firstly is the introduction part that explain abut the research background, goals and questions. Secondly is the theoretical framework that explains the idea of Institutional approaches on resources management and also illustrates the research method both to carry out the data and answer the question. Fourthly is anaylisi data that describe the implementation of CBFM in Indonesia and it has been looked with institutional approach. The last one is the conclusion and recommendation of the implementation of local community institution on the CBDM in Indonesia

The Aims and Objectives

  1. To understand the local community institutions on the implementation of CBFM.
  2. To investigate the community's implementation of CBFM in the area of study.
  3. To develop a theory about successful community institution development on forest management.
  4. To recommend a policy for local and national government levels which strengthens successful institution strategies that have the potential to support CBFM sustainability and articulate local institutions strategies.

The Research Questions

  1. How do the local community institutions monitor and enforce the rules on the CBFM implementation that they set?
  2. What do the local community institutions act to implement the CBFM?
  3. To what extent the local institution supports for the forest resources sustainable?


Literature review

The main idea of this essay that focuses on CBFM in Indonesia describes the local institutions capacity and examines its performance on CBFM's implementation in Indonesia. Therefore, this essay that aims to develop the theoretical framework on a developing of local community institution sustainability, is divided several parts, firstly is the idea of Institutions on resources management, and secondly is the root of commons property regimes. And the last one is the development of forest resources management approach.

Institutionalism approaches on Resources Management

The terms of institutions are widely definition and many approaches that can explain it. Institution is a concept that arrange all the member behaviour by rules, norms, strategies (Ostrom et al. 1999). It can reveal both a formal institution that is adopted by a government law and implemented for control the society activities and an informal institution that realises to keep the society behaviour such as code of conducts and norms (Quinn et al. 2007; Smajgl and Larson 2007). Besides, the human behaviours can be driven by formal institutional orders such as, constitution and statutes, and informal institution orders such as relationships and social expectation Figure 1.

In terms of institutionalism on resources management, scientists argues that local institutions can effectively to control, maintain and manage the resources sustain (Agrawal 2001; Behera and Engel 2006; Bischoff 2007; Futemma et al. 2002; Smajgl and Larson 2007). In other words, this argument has been supported by Ostrom's opinion that institutionalism approach can be a solution of the tragedy of common where the group of users develops a regulation how much, what manner and when the users can produce and use the resources. It means that stakeholders can be successful for using and managing their resources if they can meet their institutions with its contexts. This solution also could be created a better setting for using commons (E. Ostrom 2008a). In the other words, different contexts and cultures can create different institutions because the same rule cannot be implemented in different social context (Agrawal 2001) so developing of effective local institutions should rely on the local contexts and cultures. A specific institution with precise context is the best way to deal with resources environmental issues.

There are several issues why the local institutions are required for developing resources sustainable. Firstly, government policies are failure because they lack of resources such as money and human resources for supporting their goals money (FAO 2007).

Secondly, a local self organisation is more precise and conductive to solve the common resources dilemma and create natural resources sustainable (Agrawal 2001; Ostrom et al. 1999). Thirdly, most of the policies are base on textbook and they do not down to earth so the best one to solve is understanding the local context (Fairhead and Leach 1996). Fourthly, Participation is the major issue that has been spread in the world as a solution to re-distribute and re-allocate the resources (McAllister et al. 2007; Nygren 2005).

Improving the local institution that supports for decentralisation and participation on natural resource management is the best way to re-allocate the resources but it cannot guarantee the resources sustainable. It cannot arrange the community behaviour alone and it needs several requirements (Barrett et al. 2005; Nygren 2005). First of all, a legal mechanism that can establish rule and law enforcement. Secondly, capacity building that makes the local community can build an equal relationship with other stakeholders. Thirdly is the institutional transparency that supports an information equality system amongst stakeholders in the community. The last one is flexibility and adaptive on cooperative partnership.

In other words, natural resources management should build a good system that requires effective, equitable and efficient management (S. Hanna and Munasinghe 1995). Effective management should deal with short-term interest of individual and long-term objectives for sustainable resources. Equitable management should meet the diverse of interests and values of the stakeholders. And then, efficient management should provide rational cost on gathering information, implementation plan, and monitoring and enforcement policy.

A good natural resources management is a combination of several indicators and requirements that each other are linkage and compliment. Therefore, the institution on natural resources will be described by several criteria and indicators.

Institutional approach indicator

Adopted from Agrawal (Ostrom 2002)

1. Resources system characteristic

  • Small size
  • Well-defined boundaries

2. Group characteristic

  • Small size member
  • Shared of norms
  • Participant, number of participant, position and attributes of the participant.
  • Social capital

3. Institution arrangements

  • Rules are simple and easy to understand
  • Law enforcement (incentives and disincentives)
  • Accountable and transparent
  • Benefit and cost, outcome and contribution.
  • Meeting (formal and informal)
  • Communication flow (downward and upward communication model)
  • Bottom up policy

External environment

  • Technology, low cost exclusion technology.
  • Adaptable institution, open and close organisation
  • Government should not undermine local community
  • Networking with other stakeholders

It seems that there are large numbers of variables on sustainable institutions. Furthermore, each variable can relate with others and also depend on the others as well. So, when the number of variables is huge, and the absence of well-prepared research happen, it almost impossible to be sure that the research result deals with the research hypothesis (Ostrom 2002). It is also the limitation of the institutional approaches that we have to consider. The researcher should count precisely the number of variables and cases that relevant with their goals (Ostrom 2002). Because of an incorrect emphasis of the important variables, it can lead unpredictable the research result itself.

The focus of institutional arrangements

Community-Based Forest Management

There are several issues that relate to community forest participation and conservation of resources. One of the most issues is how to maintain and improve local community to access natural resources because most of government policy marginalises the local community. Economic approaches drive to the governments for putting the natural resources under increasing demand for market (Tachibana and Adhikari 2009). Besides, the idea of protected area for biodiversity conservation has pushed practitioners and government for implementation this idea (Ellis and Porter-Bolland 2008) and according to this idea, protected areas will be successful if the local community does not involve in the natural resources. Moreover, to understand the discourses on community based forest management, it is useful if we understand the terms of common property regimes and the theoretical review on forest management.

Commons property regimes

To solve these problems, we have to understand the root of its problem. The economic approaches rely on the paradigm of property rights. It considers to how the state and society look for their property ownership (picture 1). As a result, understanding of property rights leads to understand a concept of common property regime and a regime relates to a system of regulation, rules and law for administration (APA). Therefore, common property regime is a rule or belief that arranges how to use the resources, what have the stakeholders do and who are the stakeholders or the owner of the resources (Lu ; Elinor Ostrom ; Pavri and Deshmukh ; Quinn et al.). The first perspective is a state property regime when a government as a representative of a whole society think that natural resources have to belonging them and they can manage and use as much as they want. This assumption is mono-interpretative and debatable but this assumption has been used by most of the government (Awang).

Moreover, this assumption has been supported by Hardin's view when he looked at the Sherman phenomena in the field and this argument supports for state or government regime on resources management. There are some key arguments that Hardin proposes. Firstly, he argues that problems in the world which occur cannot be solved by technical solutions (Hardin 1968). For instance, the question of population and a lack of food cannot be answered by producing a new wheal strain. Hardin also emphasizes that only a finite population can solve the problem of a finite world but it could not happen (Hardin 1968). Therefore, we have to produce fundamental action to solve the world's problems. Secondly, everyone has a personal interest that leads to them maximizing their own interests. He explains that in the pasture locale where the field is free and nobody is an owner, as a result every herdsman will maximise their advantage by adding more sheep into the land. If this has been done by each herdsman, the pasture field will decrease and the resource will be eroded (Hardin 1968). Thirdly, he states that freedom in commons leads to ruin for all. Hardin also says that the herdsman as individuals, they are individualistic, rational and just utility-maximizing (Hardin 1968). Obviously, there are several solutions that Hardin suggested (Hardin 1968). First of all, ethical solution, which can assist us to understand what we can do and cannot do. In the name of conscience, people have self-eliminating control over their attitudes and activities. It can be used to eliminate human desire for exploiting resources. However, Hardin says that people cannot reduce their needs and no one can deal with this problem and everyone always fails to solve their problems (Hardin 1968). Even in the community or groups, they are not able to manage their needs. For example, if the legal system of private property is suggested as a solution, it can fail again. The private property is unfair and people who have freedom always ruin the resources. Therefore, Hardin suggests a government law could be a solution to this problem (Hardin 1968).

Government regulations could solve the tragedy of common where government can be involved in the input and output process to bring the land usage in line with community and social needs. Hardin suggest that government can act as a public representative to create effective regulation and also tax policy (Hardin 1968). This hypothesis assumes that the government is transparent and effective in allocating resources where people can receive incentive and disincentive depending on their contribution. Government should create incentive based-policy where this policy will motivate voluntary research, action and conservation to stake holders or landowners.

In other words, government policy has a social function as well that can be used to distribute the resources by balancing social cost, optimum production and sustainability of resources. There are several characteristics of Government policies, which are centralized-regulation, standardised and limited use of technology. The law is formal and has a coercion element which can enforce the rule. However, the ideal condition is quite far from the reality, with some evidence that governments are ineffective, inefficient and irresponsible because government policies usually are uniform and centralised (Benson 1988; Libecap 2009). For instance, abuse of power and less use of discretion could be revealed in several ways such as corruption. Corruption makes the circumstances of both resources and the community worse. Benson, who has conducted research on the common pool utilities, says that state apparatuses are less commitment to allocating resources and then they are on law enforcement (Benson 1988).

In conclusion, government can create policy to solve and reduce the tragedy of commons because the government has rights and powers to implement it. Hardin's assumption could be true if the government policies are transparent, efficient, effective and adaptive. Nevertheless, in reality this is not always existed and succeeded because many governments fail to create and implement their policies.

In the other words, there are some criticisms on the Hardin's view. In terms of individualistic and economic actors, Angus suggests that Hardin's argument started with the unproven argument which is that every herdsman always wants to enlarge their herds, but even if the herdsman wanted to behave like Hardin's assumption, he could not do it unless certain conditions existed (Angus 2008). Also, Angus said that Hardin mistreated the term of self-regulation by the communities involved (Angus 2008). In addition, self-regulation processes such as those that occur in the community can reduce the overuse of land (Angus 2008). Besides, all stake holders can create an internal rule which makes clear what, when and how to produce the best crops. By cooperating with each other they can manage to provide for the public good (Libecap 2009). It seems that even if people are rational and have an economic perspective, they have to consider their belief and those of others.

In terms of cooperation, Barclay, who conducted an experiment where people played some games and models using resources, argues that cooperation and coalition in reciprocal altruism are integrated in human relations and it can lead to immense benefit and reduce costs (Barclay 2004). In the other words, human behaviour responds appropriately to prevailing conditions in the social and environment. So, herdsman will use commons property in ways that lead either to overuse or sustainability depending on the circumstances. Neither Hardin's conclusions nor management is inevitable (Berkes and International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. 1989). As humankind people depend on others and need to cooperate with each other.

In term of communication, a community who uses communication effectively can create several conditions such as reaching higher benefits and developing their goals faster than communities which are less good at communication (Bischoff 2007). It is clear that each people in the community who wants to use the commons property should ask and communicate with each other. For example, in Indonesian society it is well-known a hak ulayat. The hak ulayat is a statute or local norms that every community member would follow the rule if they want to plant, seed or cultivate anything in some community area. According to this term (Hak ulayat), the land belongs to the community but every member can utilises as much as appropriate to the community (Hak ulayat). As a result, the resources can be managed in sustainable ways and the community can utilise the field as well.

In terms of institutionalism, Hardin does not clear that either community or individual can create organisation and institution where this regulate the individual and community act and behaviour. Scientist argues that a local institution can effectively to control, maintain and manage the resources sustain (Bischoff 2007). In other words, this argument has been supported by Ostrom's opinion that institutionalism approach can be a solution of the tragedy of common where the group of users make a regulation how much, what manner and when the users can produce and use the resources. It also could be created a better setting for using commons (Elinor Ostrom 2008b).

In conclusion, communities and individual as a resources user have characteristic faiths which create people and community more aware to maintain resources with sustainable ways. Besides, collective action can lead to successful managing resources and allocating of resources (Mukhija 2005). However, we should consider that community rights will be managed properly that could minimise anarchism on commons. It is clear that community can involve in the resources as much as they can manage their institution.

The development of Forest Resources Management (FRM)

The development of forest resources management (FRM) theory may be divided into two approaches which are the conversional theory and the modern theory or social forestry approach (Simon 1999). On the other words, if it relates to those who are the main actors, it can be broken down between the state-based forest management and the community-based forest management (Suwarno et al. 2009). In terms of the conventional approach, there are several ideas which are a timber extraction and timber management approach. In terms of the social forestry approach, there are several ideas that are a forest resources management approach (FRM) and sustainable forest management approach (SFM). All the approaches has been developing gradually and simulating (picture 2).

The Timber extraction (TE) is the oldest approach on FRM and bases on an assumption that forest looks like a mining so the forest can be exploited and all the trees can be felled. In addition, this approach has been divided into two categories, firstly, 1-TE that is implemented in the wild forest and without any plan or technology or just felled down the trees(Simon 1999). And then, the second is 2-TE that is implemented on not only the wild forest but also the planted-forest and it uses a system culture but less a planning and a technology. Besides there are several characteristics that lead to TE activities such as, the area of wild forest is so wide, the number of wood consumption is small and the number of population or density is petite as well (Simon 1999).

Timber management (TM) is the second step of FRM evolution. It reveals with the assumption that the forest is look like a farm so it need for maintenance and a good planning. The development of TM is more complex and requires several indicators. First, it needs a robust system culture and management. Second, a good administration of the product is compulsory. Third, the forest product orientation is wood(Simon 1999). Therefore, all resources on this industry just pay attention for increasing wood production.

The Sustainable forest management (SFM) or Forest resource management (FRM) has been established when the number of population the world is huge and the number of consumption is so big but the resources is so rare especially the forest resources. In the fourth world forestry congress in 1960 has a theme Multiple Use of Forest Land and then in the seven world forestry congress in Indonesia in 1978 has discussed some issues about agro forestry, social forestry and tree farming (Simon 1999). And then this idea has been spread and implemented cross the world. It has been discussed not only as discourses in the academic field but also in the government policy.

There are also several phenomena that lead to the concept of SFM. Firstly, the number of degradation and deforestation is significant improve for example, from 1990 to 97, 5.8 ± 1.4 million ha of humid tropical forests were lost each year and 2.3 ± 0.7 million ha of forests degrade (World-Bank 2003). Secondly, distribution of resources is unequal as a result the number of poverty in the world rise dramatically for instance, two hundred and forty million people live in forested areas, representing 18.5% of the 1.3 billion people living on environmentally fragile area (World-Bank 2003). Thirdly, spreading the idea of decentralisation on common-pool resources that support for local community to access the forest is so massive (Agrawal 2001; Elinor Ostrom 1990).

Therefore, implementing of SFM needs a radical change of point of view from sate base to community base, from competition to cooperation, from top down policy to bottom up policy (Gilmour and Fisher 1991). The sifting of paradigm is necessary if the SFM will be implemented properly. The paradigm that the state is the main actor should be changed to the community paradigm that the community is the main actor. To implement this idea require strong political will and commitment from all of the stakeholders. Moreover, Campbell creates several indicators for developing SFM or CBFM sustainable (Suharjito 2000).

In addition, in the first time SFM and CMBM in Indonesia implemented in 1995 as a resolution on forest management (Sepsiaji and Fuadi 2004). Ministry of Forestry (MF) wants to re-distribute forest resources and encourage local participation so they develop Hutan Kemasyarakatan (Sepsiaji and Fuadi) or Community based-forest management (CBFM). Luckily, political changing happened in Indonesia during 1997-1998. Indonesian political system has been transformed from the authoritarian state to democratic state when the Soeharto who led for 32 years stepped down. This situation was a trigger for decentralisation of power. The decentralisation also occurs on the resources management especially forestry. As a result, some of heads of district got an authority from the central government to permit small-forest conversion licenses and this license can be used by local community and also small industry (Engel and Palmer 2006). In 2000, this policy was prohibited by central government but the local government and local community continued to occupy the forest (Engel and Palmer 2006). Compromising has been dealt the central government agree that districts governments can give a permit take advantage of the forest but this permit only for a local community when the local community has a group.

In conclusion, the CBFM policy has been implemented in the state forest and the local community in a group can occupy for 25 years. The idea of CBFM for re-allocate resources, reduce poverty and encourage community participation could be a best way to bring prosperity and sustainability as well. However, it can be dangerous not only for the forest but also the local community if they cannot manage properly. To manage this opportunity needs a well institution that able to support and guide the community behaviour.

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