The objective of this syndicate research work is to find out that. “Has police ordinance 2002 fulfilled its objectives? What are the missing and gaps in its conceptual framework and implementation process? Why community policing system has been left out of the ordinance? And will it contribute negatively or positively?This is basically aimed at analyzing the success or failure if the ordinance with special reference to its stated objectives.Further,this research work digs out the gaps between the real concept of the ordinance and its implementation?Besides,this study also finds out that for what reasons,one of the important policing systems-community policing system-has not been focused upon in the ordinance?More importantly and lastly,this research work analysis whether the ordinance has been story of success or failure by ignoring the essential element of community policing system in the police ordinance 2002?
Intelligence-led policing (ILP) is a policing model that has emerged in recent years which is “built around risk assessment and risk management.”
Although there is no universally accepted understanding of what intelligence-led policing entails the leading definition is that ILP is “a strategic, future-oriented and targeted approach to crime control, focusing upon the identification, analysis and ‘management’ of persisting and developing ‘problems’ or ‘risks.” In simpler terms, “it is a model of policing in which intelligence serves as a guide to operations, rather than the reverse.
Calls for intelligence-led policing originated in the 1990s, both in Britain and in the United States. In the U.S. Mark Riebling’s 1994 book Wedge – The Secret War between the FBI and CIA spotlighted the conflict between law enforcement and intelligence, and urged cops to become “more like spies.” Intelligence-led policing gained considerable momentum globally following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. It is now advocated by the leading police associations in North America and the UK.
Although claimed as a policing framework that builds on earlier paradigms, including community policing, problem-oriented policing, and continuous improvement or partnership models of policing, it originated as a rejection of the reactive, crime focus of community policing with calls for police to spend more time employing informants and surveillance to combat recidivist offenders.
Recently, intelligence-led policing has undergone a ‘revisionist’ expansion to allow incorporation of reassurance and neighbourhood policing.
Intelligence-led policing in the UK has been applied as a specialized police practice involving the identification and targeting of high-rate, chronic offenders and devising strategic interventions based on that intelligence.ILP originated as a problem-oriented strategy in the Kent and Northumbria Constabularies in combating motor vehicle theft and other property crime.
Kent prioritized its calls for service, placing less priority on minor service calls and referring them to other agencies, which in turn provided police with more time to focus on the property crimes. Rather than reactively responding to individual incidents, a systematic analysis was conducted of offenses that identified a pattern showing that a small number of offenders were responsible for a disproportionately large number of motor vehicle thefts in the area.
Also identified were repeat victims and problem areas. Using this knowledge to formulate a response, police could soon boast a significant drop in the automobile theft rate. Since 2000, ILP has been enshrined in Britain as the philosophy underpinning the National Intelligence Model.
The post-9/11 environment in the US, the “era of Homeland Security” for American policing, has increased demands for law enforcement to build global partnerships and to work more closely with local agencies to expand the capacity of the state to fight both crime and terrorism. Given the belief that 9/11 and other terrorist attacks could have been prevented if not for intelligence failures, a key difference with intelligence-led policing from earlier strategies is that intelligence is no longer considered a specialized function for crime analysts or intelligence units.
Investigations following bombings of the rail systems in Madrid and London and the arrest of suspected terrorists in Canada, Britain, and Florida suggested that intelligence culled from a variety of sources and through strengthened inter-agency cooperation may be the key to identifying suspects and successfully intervening to prevent attacks.
On March 16, 2005, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff outlined a risk-based approach to homeland security threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences when he said,
“Risk management must guide our decision-making as we examine how we can best organize to prevent, respond, and recover from an attack . . . . Our strategy is, in essence, to manage risk in terms of these three variables – threat, vulnerability, consequence. We seek to prioritize according to these variables, to fashion a series of preventive and protective steps that increase security at multiple levels.”
In 2006 Mark Riebling of the Center for Policing Terrorism published a doctrine on Intelligence-Led Policing. Riebling’s model leverages both Israeli counter-terrorist tactics, and the NYPD’s “Broken Windows” policing theories. Among the Broken-Windows mechanisms, Riebling’s doctrine blends problem solving, environmental design, community policing, and public-private partnerships. Analyzing the operations of the Israeli National Police in Tel Aviv, Riebling notes approvingly that “investigation of the incident, even a traffic accident, is secondary to the number one goal-which is gathering intelligence. “For instance, when they raided a bordello, where the patrons were primarily Arabs from different parts of the region, Israeli police were less concerned about the criminal activity, than with preparing intelligence reports on who these people were, and how they got into Israel.”
Intelligence-led policing is still in its early stages and therefore lacks a universal conceptual framework that can be applied to disparate contexts as the new policing paradigm. Implementation can also be difficult, because it requires police managers to “have faith in the intelligence process and in the judgments and recommendations of their intelligence staff.”
Some have also questioned whether the foundational ingredient – intelligence – has been properly considered, pointing out there is already “information overload” that police and security professionals have to contend with from the huge databanks that have been built up in the intelligence process, and that increasing raw data is not the same as generating “knowledge” or actionable intelligence.
Finally, intelligence-led policing is part of the larger trend of blurring the distinction between national security and domestic policing, or the state’s military and police functions, and risks the same perils that have tarnished policing in the past, such as political interference, violating civil liberties, and a greater potential for the abuse of police power with the increased secrecy that intelligence work entails.
The Community Policing
Ideally, community policing should be adopted organization-wide and be reflected through department participation at all levels as well as through the organization’s mission, goals, objectives, performance evaluations, hiring and promotion practices, training, and all other systems that define organizational culture and activities. One of the most important specific aspects of organizational change relevant to community policing is a flattened organizational structure. Community policing departments are often less hierarchical, supporting management’s dispersion of decision-making authority to the lowest organizational level and holding those individuals accountable for the outcomes. A second important element of organizational change is fixed geographic responsibility. Officers or deputies are assigned to fixed geographic areas for extended periods, based on social and cultural considerations and on the assumption that this fosters better communication with residents; increases the police officers’ ability to understand, prevent, and respond to community problems; and enhances accountability to the citizens in that area.
Community policing departments also actively address the underlying conditions that give rise to or facilitate crime or disorder in an effort to prevent future problems by identifying and analyzing problems and by developing tailored strategies that may include traditional and nontraditional responses that focus on deterring offenders, protecting likely victims, and making locations less conducive to crime and disorder. Departments should use a wide array of relevant traditional and nontraditional data sources to better understand and evaluate the nature of problems and work in conjunction with the community and other organizations to develop effective long-term solutions. Problem solving often manifests itself in the “scanning, analysis, response and assessment” problem-solving model. Departments first identify relevant or perceived crime problems (scanning), determine the nature and underlying conditions that give rise to those problems (analysis), craft and implement interventions that are linked to that analysis (response), and evaluate its effectiveness (assessment). The process is understood as continually involving feedback among the components. For instance, through in-depth analysis, agencies may come to define problems differently, effectively returning to the scanning phase. Likewise, an assessment may determine that a response was ineffective and that the problem requires additional analysis.
Under a community policing philosophy, departments partner with other government, social service, and community agencies in attempts to identify and address persistent problems in the community. They form external partnerships in recognition of other agencies’ unique strengths, tools, and expertise that can be leveraged when addressing community problems. The police are only one of a host of local government agencies responsible for responding to community problems. Under community policing, coordination with other government agencies in developing comprehensive and effective solutions is essential. In addition, the police are encouraged to develop working partnerships with civic and community groups to accurately survey community needs and priorities and to use the public as a resource in problem solving and in developing and implementing interventions.
Community Policing and Terrorism Prevention and Response
A flat organizational structure may ensure more effective terrorist prevention and response. It has been demonstrated that local law enforcement officers are likely to come into contact with those who may be directly or indirectly involved in terrorist activities and most certainly will be among the first responders to any future terrorist attack. Empowering officers at lower levels with decision-making authority and familiarizing them with making (and taking responsibility for) important decisions could be of value in any crisis. In a terrorist event, there may be little time for decisions to move up the chain of command. Officers who are accustomed to making decisions and retaining authority may be better prepared to respond quickly and decisively to any event. In addition, in terms of prevention, developing a flat organizational structure can help lower-level officers feel free to pursue leads or suspected terrorist activity. In addition, having fixed geographic responsibility may assist officers in identifying possible terrorist threats. Officers who work in a community or neighborhood for an extended time can develop specific intelligence concerning resident and community activities. This street-level knowledge is a vital part of counter-intelligence efforts.
Problem-solving models are well suited to preventing and responding to terrorist activity. Departments can use many existing data sources ahead of time to develop detailed risk management and crisis plans. Identifying potential terrorist targets in local jurisdictions is an important first step. Police can determine what in their jurisdictions (dams, electric grids, chemical warehouses, large-scale public gatherings) are potential terrorist targets. Community policing encourages agencies to conduct complex analyses of the possible threats and of their relative likelihood of occurring. Finally, agencies in conjunction with other government, social, and community entities can develop detailed crisis prevention and response plans. Finally, the community policing model encourages continual refinement of these plans to suit changing conditions and threat levels.
The threat of terrorism provides a unique opportunity to create partnerships with citizens, other government organizations, and other law enforcement agencies. Prior apathy toward these partnerships that may have existed is often reduced by the presence of terrorist targets and threats. Recent terrorist events and associated concerns may have created a sense of uneasiness and urgency in many communities. The specter of additional terrorist activity has created an opportunity to galvanize local police to work with their communities, other law enforcement agencies, and local, state, and federal entities. The community policing model encourages the development of such ongoing and effective partnerships, which can be invaluable in preventing terrorist activity because of increased opportunities for intelligence gathering and sharing. They can also be central to developing coordinated responses to any actual terrorist events.
Community policing encourages agencies to establish and expand upon existing partnerships with a goal of developing model crisis plans and processes to deal with the aftermath of terrorist incidents. These plans and processes would consider the needs and concerns of all community stakeholders. Law enforcement and local government can come together with community partners to develop a plan on how to prepare for such a crisis, what to do in the event of such a crisis, and how to cope with its aftermath.
Community Policing and Fear of Terrorism
By definition, the primary goal of terrorism is to create fear and an atmosphere of uncertainty. This fear can greatly affect the quality of life of many individuals, extending far beyond those who are directly affected by a terrorist event. In the United States the police have increasingly been asked to address the fear of crime generally. The expansion of their role to include quality of life and partnerships with citizens, as emphasized by the community policing philosophy, has increasingly brought fear of crime under the purview of police professionals. As A. Steven Dietz stated in “Evaluating Community Policing,” “Reduction of fear of crime has been associated with community policing programs since their inception.” It is clear that reducing fear of crime has become an essential element and an often explicitly articulated goal of community policing. Thus, community policing finds itself well positioned to deal with issues of fear that can arise as a direct result of terrorist activity. In addition, dealing directly with citizen fear of crime is important, as unchecked fear of terrorism (or feelings of revenge) can manifest itself in hate crimes and illegal bigotry targeted particularly at people who are Muslim and of Middle Eastern descent. These are important social problems that law enforcement should be prepared to respond to and prevent.
Adoption of the community policing philosophy partly involves reengineering department processes and resources away from randomness and reactivity and toward information- and service-driven community-based approaches. Police officers are often assigned to specific geographic areas to foster communication with residents and are accountable to those residents and their superiors for the safety and well-being of that area. Other aspects of the agency are realigned to support the most fundamental focus of all activities, the beat.
As a result of this emphasis, police officers should be more attuned to rising levels of community concern and fear and, by virtue of the relationships they have established within the community, be in a position to respond effectively to those needs and concerns. Community policing has been found to engender trust and increased satisfaction among residents for the police, which in periods of heightened unrest can be parlayed into dealing more effectively with community fear that can be based on both rational and irrational concerns.
Community policing encourages a deeper understanding of the fear that may result from terrorist events. The first step is to determine whether fear is a problem in the community and to determine the extent of the problem. Police can conduct citizen interviews, surveys, and face-to-face interactions to determine levels of citizen fear. Then they can analyze the underlying conditions that give rise to or encourage fear. Perhaps it is a result of a specific terrorist-related fear such as living near what is perceived to be a potential terrorist target, or the fear may involve fear for loved ones who reside in high-threat areas. Finally, perhaps the fear is a more general fear of terrorism. In any event, law enforcement should work to understand the extent and nature of fear in their community if they want to develop effective responses.
Law enforcement should then work in partnership with other community groups to develop responses aimed at decreasing levels of fear if they are negatively affecting quality of life and are determined to be highly exaggerated. Community policing efforts to deal with citizen fear of crime have included foot and vehicle patrols in high-crime neighborhoods, as well as community meetings, citizen patrols, neighborhood cleanup programs, opening neighborhood substations, and citizen awareness campaigns. Clearly, citizen fear of terrorist events is somewhat different than fear of crime generally. However, some of the same techniques may also be useful for reducing this type of fear. For example, citizen awareness campaigns can inform citizens about what the local police and city government are doing to prevent and prepare for possible terrorist events. Crisis response plans can be discussed in addition to general prevention activities. Citizens can be informed about what they themselves can do-such as preparing emergency survival kits for their own homes-to prepare for possible terrorist events and can be informed of evacuation routes to use in the event of a large-scale disaster. Finally, law enforcement agencies should assess the effectiveness of any fear-reduction efforts and modify their responses accordingly.
The emphasis on building strong community partnerships encouraged by a community policing philosophy may also help reduce citizen fear of terrorist events. These partnerships may be able to directly reduce fear by increasing citizen feelings of efficacy, increasing the bond among neighbors themselves, and involving citizens in prevention and preparedness activities. Encouraging citizen involvement in neighborhood watch, youth education, and cleanup programs can increase social cohesion among citizens and has been found to result in decreased fear of crime. It is likely that these increasing feelings of efficacy in response to terrorist events may have similar effects. Citizens can be involved to differing degrees in prevention and preparedness discussions.
Historically, local law enforcement in the 1930s and 1940s was characterized by the “beat cop,” who knew every resident and business owner in an assigned area. Likewise, this officer became aware almost immediately when a crime occurred and generally found out quickly from members of the community who committed it. This timely apportionment of justice helped to create a strong bond between members of the community and the officers who patrolled their districts.
However, this policing model harbored significant drawbacks. Officers often gained appointments through corrupt political deals, were poorly trained, and rarely displayed a professional appearance or demeanor.
PROFESSIONAL POLICING MODEL
As a result, the 1960s and 1970s saw the dawn of the “professional policing model.” These new officers used the most up-to-date technology–such as high-speed cruisers, forensic laboratories, mobile radios, and 911 emergency systems–to serve the sprawling suburban environment that came to characterize much of the American landscape. Considering the vast areas covered by a limited number of officers, response times were exceptionally quick. Such areas as recruiting practices, training, and professionalism were vastly improved.
But the professional policing model possessed its own inherent shortcomings. Officers became less a part of the communities they served. In fact, they were intentionally placed “outside” of the community as a reaction to the potential for corruption that existed in prior policing models. And, even though response times were exceptional, calls for police service still brought officers to the scene after a crime had been committed. This “incident-oriented” policing model placed an impressive array of resources at officers’ disposal to locate offenders, but made little attempt to reduce actual crime numbers.
COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING MODEL
Community-oriented policing combines the familiarity, trust, and sense of ownership characterized by the “beat cop” with the professionalism and expertise of the professional policing model. Officers working in this mode conduct their patrols from a problem-oriented, rather than incident-oriented, perspective. Accordingly, the focus becomes preventive–rather than reactive–police work.
Officers involved in community-oriented policing have access to residents on a personal level, which helps to build a better relationship between the community and the police department. Residents see the police as more than just anonymous blue suits driving down the street in patrol cars. The community is more involved with the officers, and in turn, becomes the eyes and ears of the department in the neighborhood.
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