This assignment will explore many interesting questions considering criminal liability of Jane, Francine, Sam and Allan, actus reus, mens rea and the circumstances when a person is liable for the criminal acts of another.
Every criminal offense has two components: one of these is objective, the other is subjective; one is physical, the other is mental; one is the actus reus, the other is the mens rea. The actus reus generally differs from crime to crime. In murder it is homicide; in burglary it is the nocturnal breaking into the dwelling of another; in uttering a forged instrument it is the act of offering as good an instrument which is actually false. In like manner the mens rea differs from crime to crime. In murder it is malice aforethought; in burglary it is the intent to commit a felony; in uttering a forged instrument it is “knowledge” that the instrument is false plus an intent to defraud. Perkins & Boyce Criminal Law 830-831 (3rd ed. 1982). The actus reus must be causally related to the mens rea for a crime to occur: “An evil intention and an unlawful action must concur in order to constitute a crime. ” 93 N. E. 249. Although it is frequently said that no mens rea is required for a strict liability offense, the actus reus alone being sufficient (see e. g. , 361 U. S. 147, 150 and 342 U. S. 246, 256), it is more useful to identify a special mens rea for the civil offense that recognizes the low level of culpability connected with a strict or civil offense. As to the act being sufficient even in the strict liability setting, a “guilty act” (as opposed to a coerced act for example) would seem required. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 222-27 (2d ed. 1960). corpus delicti.
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Latin: a mind to be accused; a guilty mind. In many systems of law, criminal guilt requires not only that an act was performed (actus reus) but also that it was performed with an appropriate mind-set. Having the intention to perform a crime is sufficient, but not necessary to mens rea.
Foreseeing a side-effect such as a death could count, even if the death is not intended, and reckless negligence could also constitute mens rea. As an element of criminal responsibility, a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal intent. Guilty knowledge and willfulness.
A fundamental principle of criminal law is that a crime consists of both a mental and a physical element. Mens rea, a person’s awareness of the fact that his or her conduct is criminal, is the mental element, and actus reus, the act itself, is the physical element mostly crimes, including common-law crimes, are defined by statutes that usually contain a word or phrase indicating the mens rea requirement. A typical statute, for example, may require that a person act knowingly, purposely, or recklessly.
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Sometimes a statute creates criminal liability for the commission or omission of a particular act without designating a mens rea. These are called strict liability statutes. If such a statute is construed to purposely omit criminal intent, a person who commits the crime may be guilty even though he or she had no knowledge that his or her act was criminal and had no thought of committing a crime. All that is required under such statutes is that the act itself is voluntary, since involuntary acts are not criminal.
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Jane’s criminal liability for the injuries lina
An examination of Jane’s liability of he harm caused Lina must start by considering the harm done. The expression badly Burt is suggestive grievous harm bodily harm , so opening up the possibility of offences contrary to both s. 18 and s. 20 of Offences Against the Person Act 1861.  Under s. 18 there would have to be proof that Jane had caused grievous bodily harm, which these purpose would be satisfied by evidence that the burns constituted serious harm Rv sanderts 1985 crime Lr230) there are no causation issues. The throwing of fireworks causes the harm in fact and there is no evidence of any novus acuts intervenient.
The problem for prosecution would be regarded as the mens rea, did Jane intend to cause grievous bodily harm to any person? Unless there is evidence that Jane foresaw such harm as virtually certain Rv wolling(1998)A ALL ER103) . There will no basis for a s. 18 charge. Proof of such forsight seems unlikely, especially if the throwing of the firework was meant as a prank, further problems would arise under s18 in respect of Jane’s alcohol consumption. The offence is one of specific intent so Jane was intoxicated therefore she cannot be guilty of the s 18 offence see DPPv Majewski (1976) All ER42, . Whether or not Jane was intoxicated will be question of fact for the jury.
Above mentioned points in a mind a charge under is s20 of the Offence Against the Person Act 1861 would seen more promising. The prosecution will have to prove that Jane maliciously inflicted grievous bodily harms on the lina. The harm will be made out as can be regarded as synonymous with causing Rv Burstow Rv Ireland 1997AC 147. The mental element here requires proof that Jane farsaw the possibility of some Diolock LJ in mowatt (1967) 3 ALLER 47. On the fact is it possible that Jane did not foresee any physical harm, especially if she gave no thought to the possibility of there being anyone on the other side of the hedge. If Jane was intoxicated she could still incur liability unders s20. a (basic intent crime) if there is evidence that she was reckless in becoming intoxicated and, as a result, was unaware of a risk of physical harm being caused that she would have been aware of had she been sober. DPPV Majewski  and subsequent decisions such as Rv Rivhardson and Irwin (1999)  crime LR 494 and Rv hardie (1984) 3 ALL ER 848. 
If the harm done does not amount to grievous bodily harm, or the mens rea for s 20. cannot be established, Jane may be charged under s47 of the Offence Against the Person Act 1961 the she assaulted lina and thereby occasional actual bodily harm The burns would undoubtedly satisfy the definition of actual bodily harm Rv Miller (1954)) 2. QB 282. The only mens rea required would be intension to assault or reckless, but the subjective recklessness Rv cunninghum (1957). 2 QB 396. Jane must therefore, be proved to have been aware if risk that another person might be assaulted or battered by her actions, so there would be no need to show that she foresaw any actual bodily harm Rv savage. Rv parameter (1992) 1 AC 699 again s 47 is basic intend crime that comments regarding the significance of intoxication in relation to s 20 apply here.
Francine’s criminal liability accomplice Jane.
Francine encourage Jane to throw the fire work and can be described as someone who a betted to offence by Jane. Francine was the scene of the crime and spurred Jane on Francine will argue that she did not think that anyone would be avail her. Accomplice will be party to all the unforeseen or accidental consequences of the agreed course of conduct carried out by the principal offender. In the present cane Jane dose precisely what Francine tells . she should do, so Francine will be a party to resulting offences Rv Betts and Ridley (1930) 22 Cr App R148 and Rv Baldessare (1930) 22 Cr App R 70. It is possible that Francine as an accomplice may be charged with and found guilty of a more serious offence than that which Jane is charged with. Note of the Francine is sober so she may be capable of greater foresight of harm occurring to another. There is nothing in principle to prevent Francine being charged with a more serious offences than that charged against Jane.
Sam’s criminal liability against regarding the milk
Sam may be guilty of theft milk. It is clearly property belonging to another s. 4(1) and s. 5(1) of the Theft Act 1968. He appropriates the milk by hiding it s. 3(1) of the 1968 Act. Any assumption of any right of the owner can amount an appropriation of property. It is hard to see any argument by which he could claim not to dishonest. The only issue is intension to permanently deprive. Sam will argue that he had no such intension, but s 6(1) of the Theft Act 1968 provides that even if he did not actually intend Jane to permanently lose the milk, his dealing with it can be regarded as evidence id his having the intension of permanently depriving her of it. Because sam chose to treat the milk as his own to dispose of regardless of Jane’s right. Rv cahill (1993) Crime LR141, suggest the removing another’s property to another palce as a prank falls outside s. 6(1) but the courts are likely to fallow DPP v Lavender (1993) Crime LR 297, which suggests that such action can be theft. The perishable nature of the commodity will strengthen the prosecution case on this point in the event. Milk could also provide the basis for criminal damage charge contrary s 1(1) of the Criminal Damages Act 1971.
Sam’s criminal liability regarding the deflated tyres
Deliberately deflating the tyres could be criminal damage to s 1(1) of the Criminal Damages Act 1971 the point to note here is that the tyres can be damaged simply by being altered. The mens rea is evident. A charge of aggravated criminal damage contrary to s. 1(2) might also be considered, but if the car cannot be driven because the tyres are flat it would be difficult for the prosecution to prove that sam intended to endanger life or was reckless as to whether his action would have that effect. Tempering with the brakes, by contrast, would support as s. (2) offence. It should be noted that, following Rv G (2003) 4 ALL ER 765, the recklessness involved in the offence of criminal damages is subjective so assuming his intension to damage property can be taken as evident from the fact. The prosecution would have to prove that sam was aware of the risk that like would be endangered as result of the damage to the property, and that the circumstances known to him, it had been unreasonable for him to take risk.
Allan’s liability regarding the telephone calls.
Lord steyen in R v burtow , R v Ireland (1998) AC 147, held that both grievous bodily harm and actual bodily harm could take the form of neurotic disorder induced by a defendant’s conduct. It was also accepted in that case that such harm could be caused without any direct assault on the victim by the defended. Whether a case involved grievous bodily harm or actual bodily harm would simply be a matter of degree. The House of Lords also held in that case that although in s. 47 actual bodily harm cases as assault had to proven, it could be committed by the use of words alone, by a telephone call, even by silent telephone call. The prosecution would have to prove however, that the victim apprehended immediate physical violence as result the telephone calls. On the basis Allan could be charged s. 47 in respect of the harm he causes to Pauline. There is no problem in relation to causation. As to mens rea , the fact that telephones the wrong victim by accident is irrelevant. The principle of transferred malice would apply, the identity of the victim being irrelevant. Rv Latimer (1886) 17 QBD 359. Problems might arise under s20. in establishing that Allen acted maliciously Rv Mowatt) as above mentioned. He might not have foreseen the risk of any physical harm occurring to anyone . On the basis of s. 47charge seems more likely. The only mens rea required would be evidence that Allen foresaw the risk of another person apprehending immediate physical violence as result of his telephone calls. Whether or not this could be establish would depend to a large extent on the evidence of that he said when making the calls. The statement ‘I am coming to fire bomb your house in tow min’ would be an example of a threat the required intent would probably be made out.
Sam liability as an accomplice to Allen
Sam’s counsels Allen in the commission of the offences against Pauline in the sense that persuades him to make calls, there is a connection between sam’s requests and the actions of Allen. Allen acted within the scope of the authority given by Sam Rv Calhaem(1985) 2 ALL ER 266. That Allen hurts Pauline. Not Jane, is irrelevant. Only if Allen had deliberately chosen a different victim would sam have escaped liability as an accomplice Rv saunders and Archer(1573) 2 plowed 473, as an applied in Rv Leaby (1985)Crim LR99. Sam has the mens rea to be accomplice. There is no deliberate departure from the common design by Allan.
The issue in above question is with regards to criminal liabilities of Jane, Francine, Sam, Allan the likelihood of they will be charged for Offences Against Person Act 1861, Theft Act .s18, s20, Jane throw fire on lina’s garden which causes badly burnt, grievous badly harm, Thus the Offences contrary comes under s18 or s20, Francine was the scene of the crime and spurred Jane on, Francine accomplice will be a party to all the unforeseen or accidental consequences of the of the agreed course of conduct carried by the principal offender. Sam’s liability comes under Theft Act 1968 he appropriates the milk by hiding it by assumption of property even if he did not actually intend Jane to permanently depraving her of it, also deflating the tyres could be Criminal Damages Act (1971). A charge of aggravated criminal damage contrary to s. 1(2), if the car cannot be driven, intended to endangered, like same way Allan foresaw the risk of another person apprehending immediate physical violence as a result of his telephone calls Thus Allan could be change under s 20 s 47 in respect of the harm he causes to Pauline even if the principal of transfer malice would apply and even If sam console in the commission of the offence against Pauline that he persuades him to make the cause. The men rea required would be the intension to assault or subjective recklessness.
 Perkins & Boyce Criminal Law 830-831 (3rd ed. 1982).
 Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 222-27 (2d ed. 1960)
 Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
 Rv sanderts 1985 crime Lr230)
 Rv wolling(1998)A ALL ER103)
 DPPv Majewski (1976) All ER42,
 Rv Burstow Rv Ireland 1997AC 147
 Diolock LJ in mowatt (1967) 3 ALLER 47
 Diolock LJ in mowatt (1967) 3 ALLER 47
 Rv Rivhardson and Irwin (1999)
 Rv Rivhardson and Irwin (1999)
 Rv Rivhardson and Irwin (1999)
 Rv Rivhardson and Irwin (1999)
 Rv Betts and Ridley (1930) 22 Cr App R148 and Rv Baldessare (1930) 22 Cr App R 70
 Rv cahill (1993) Crime LR141
 fallow DPP v Lavender (1993) Crime LR 297,
 Rv G (2003) 4 ALL ER 765,
 Rv Latimer (1886) 17 QBD 359.
 Rv Calhaem(1985) 2 ALL ER 266
 Rv saunders and Archer(1573) 2 plowed 473
 Rv Leaby (1985)Crim LR99
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