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The Stakes Played by President John F. Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis Constituted Recklessness.
The argument that President John F. Kennedy acted recklessly during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is one forwarded by revisionist historians. Writers such as Barton Bernstein have argued that the actions of Kennedy were based upon his assumption that he viewed the missiles placed in Cuba as an offensive military threat. The argument seeking to apportion blame to Kennedy claims he resorted to a public and military response to the crisis rather than using private, diplomatic channels. However, the charge of recklessness can ignore the influences of domestic pressures, the motives of the Soviets, the influence Kennedy’s advisers and the perception of the crisis at the time. This essay will argue that while the above argument can be substantiated and sustained, the charge of recklessness is unfair on Kennedy and places undue emphasis on his actions alone.
The dictionary definition of recklessness is ‘the trait of giving little thought to danger’. The evidence of the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates that President Kennedy was aware of the danger and deliberated between the alternative avenues of action presented to him by his advisers. In this respect alone his actions cannot be said to have been reached with ‘little thought to danger’. Furthermore, Kennedy was not acting in a political vacuum; his actions both prompted responses and reacted to external stimulus.
There is some evidence to substantiate the view that Kennedy acted for reasons other than a primary concern for the security of the nation. Cuba had been a troublesome political issue prior to the onset of the missile crisis in 1962. Since Castro’s rise to power in 1959 politicians of the United States (Hereafter US) had faced the uncomfortable reality of a communist state off the coast of Florida. In addition to the obvious military and strategic ramifications of a communist satellite so close to US soil the issue provided political ammunition for critics of the Administration. While in power Dwight Eisenhower had faced criticism from Democrats over the issue and his concerns meant that Kennedy inherited the problem and the doomed invasion plan leading to the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961. The discovery of the construction of missile launch sites in October 1962, just weeks before the Congressional elections, heaped further gravitas onto an already prominent predicament.
Cuba was already a consideration for the Kennedy Administration before 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis cannot, for the historian, be viewed in isolation. Those that charge that Kennedy acted rashly appear to focus upon Kennedy’s public method of announcement as evidence of his excessive brinkmanship. Revisionist writers such as Ronald Steel and James Nathan emphasize the national security implications of the crisis in their analysis and claim the resolution was only possible due to the moderation of the Soviets. Their arguments claim the President was driven by political considerations and a desire to enhance his prestige before the Congressional elections. This presumption leads Steel to ask did ‘we, then, nearly go up in radioactive dust to shore up the Kennedy Administration’s fading image before the November, 1962, elections?’ If one looks at Kennedy’s handling of the crisis in these terms his actions could indeed be considered reckless.
Steel’s argument appears to be borne out by the Kennedy Administration’s record up to the discovery of the missiles. By the 1962 mid-term elections Kennedy’s foreign affairs record was not enviable. In June 1961, at the Vienna Summit, Khrushchev had made it clear that he intended to sign a peace treaty with the East German communist regime. The construction of the Berlin Wall in August and the Soviet announcement that they were breaking the three-year voluntary moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons, combined to undermine the Kennedy’s prestige. In light of this, Kennedy’s resort to a public, televised, revelation of the crisis could be seen as an effort to publicly boost his prestige and seize the initiative from the Soviets. Indeed, Steel claims that Kennedy ‘was acutely conscious of any questioning of his courage, and with the ashes of the Vienna encounter with Khrushchev still in his mouth and another Berlin Crisis brewing, he had to get missiles out of Cuba’.
The political considerations and personal prestige argument appears also to be strengthened by Kennedy’s actions after being informed of the impending crisis. On the 14th October 1962 American U-2 spy planes photographed a launch pad under construction in Cuba. The revelation came to light just three weeks before the commencement of the Congressional elections. However, even at the height of the decision making process, Kennedy decided to continue with a scheduled campaign commitment in Connecticut after his morning briefing from aides about the Cuban situation. Vice President Johnson, the second in command, also followed suit. Kennedy believed that to cancel such obligations would be to ‘arouse suspicion’. In a time of crisis within the administration, Kennedy preferred to maintain a façade on the domestic scene rather than allow the American public to deliberate on the pressing international issue ahead. Moreover, Kennedy’s need to ‘continue as normal’ reflected his failure to immediately initiate a decisive course of action. However, his actions have the aura of a man waiting to deliberate the evidence presented to him and seek time to ponder a suitable response. A more reckless attitude would have elicited a knee-jerk reaction.
When Kennedy did go public on 22nd October 1962 he used the medium of television to tell the American public. His broadcast announcing, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment was also news to the Soviets. Kennedy’s statement declared, ‘I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations’. If the Soviet’s policy had struck a ball into the US playing field then Kennedy’s speech lobbed it publicly right back to Kremlin.
The problem with this course of action was immediately evident. Khrushchev’s first reaction was a belligerent letter declaring that the Soviet Union would not observe the illegal blockade. Kennedy’s delivery of an ultimatum to the Soviets had seemingly raised the stakes. After initially demanding a guarantee not to invade Cuba the Soviets raised the price for the removal of the missiles by including the removal of US missiles from Turkey. Khrushchev’s retort matched the American stakes, as Stephen Ambrose commented, the return ultimatum from the Soviets ‘urged Kennedy to untie the knot rather than pull it tighter’. But if Kennedy had provoked a stand-off it was because he had sought to untie the knot rather than increase the military stakes. Kennedy had decided upon a less belligerent plan of action than the majority of his advisers recommended to him.
The interpretation of events that asserts Kennedy’s recklessness ignores the influences upon Kennedy and the decisions he faced. Governments, to this day, do not release information instantaneously and require analysis before submitting policy to the nation. Upon being notified about the existence of the missile sites Kennedy sought not independent action but established the Executive Committee (Hereafter ExComm) to foster alternate opinions, a leader member of whom was his brother, Robert Kennedy. The committee debated a wide range of alternatives, which were soon narrowed down to launching a nuclear strike against the sites, launching a conventional strike followed by an invasion, or initiating a naval blockade. Opinion gravitated towards a conventional strike and concrete plans were instigated.
While the overwhelming opinion in ExComm favoured this approach, Robert Kennedy forwarded the suggestion of a less belligerent initial response and refused to countenance a surprise attack. Instead, he wanted to begin with a partial naval cordon, with the opportunity to step up pressure at a later date if necessary. Dean Acheson vigorously opposed the blockade and voted for the air strike, as did the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but in the end Kennedy chose the blockade. John F. Kennedy’s actions do not therefore constitute recklessness. He sought opinion from a group of experts and chose a less belligerent, slower response to the crisis. He was also careful enough to pursue a policy conducive to international law. The use of the term ‘quarantine’ as opposed to ‘blockade’ was chosen as a naval blockade was deemed to be illegal. Furthermore, a surprise attack was also deemed to be illegal under Article Two of the United Nations’ Charter. The Cuban Missile Crisis may well have been ended through diplomacy and Soviet reasonableness but once more their actions were not fostered in a political vacuum and the crisis was averted after Kennedy had played his cards.
According to those historical writers, categorised as ‘participants’ by William Medland, Kennedy’s action were considered and careful. Arthur Schlesinger claims the crisis displayed to the world ‘the ripening of American leadership unsurpassed in responsible management of power’. In the opinion of Kennedy’s proponents the crisis in fact relieved Cold War tensions, through the installation of a Moscow-Washington ‘hotline’ and the subsequent weapons testing agreements.
In contrast to the participants revisionists have emphasized Kennedy’s public response. These critics claim that Kennedy rejected a political solution to a political problem and instead instituted a military response. He could, they argue, have used private modes of communication with Khrushchev before going to the nation, yet this is in contrast to the very way in which Khrushchev had acted in placing the missiles on Cuba in the first place. Revisionists also allege that the aftermath of the crisis brought ‘not victory, but arrogance; it brought forth a new nuclear arms race’. Kennedy’s decision to resort to a public or military response would appear to relate to his desire to recoup prestige, prestige damaged for one example by criticism over Cuba. However, according to Paterson and Brophy, political concerns rarely entered the discussion of ExComm and the President during the Missile Crisis. If political considerations had been uppermost in his mind, to the detriment of security, his actions could be considered reckless.
Kennedy’s did not blatantly exploit the situation for political gain. During the Congressional campaign Kennedy did not attempt to entice the Republicans into issuing statements they would later regret. During the deliberations of ExComm Kennedy did not have the luxury of time to afford consistent and deliberate thought to potential propaganda victories. Yet, the decisions that were made, such as the choice of a naval cordon over invasion, demonstrated considered restraint and an appreciation of world opinion and world law, considerations that belie the accusation of recklessness and disregard to consequence and danger.
Recklessness in its truest form would have resulted in military action, action that the Cuban Missile Crisis avoided. Conduct is also comparative and Kennedy perceived himself to be responding to an aggressive Soviet act, rather than personally upping the stakes and forcing the issue. In his speech to the nation Kennedy claimed the placing of missiles on Cuba was ‘a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitment are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe’. He felt betrayed by Khrushchev who had agreed to do nothing in the run-up to the US elections to raise world tensions. As Theodore Sorensen, Presidential Counsel to Kennedy at the time reveals, Khrushchev had stated that nothing would ‘be undertaken before the American Congressional elections that could complicate the international situation’.
As a participant writer, as Medland categorises him, Sorensen’s account can be expected to defend Kennedy’s stance in the crisis. Whether or not Kennedy believed Khrushchev’s pledge at the time, a pledge described by Sorensen as ‘hollow and tardy’, Kennedy felt the Soviets had acted in an underhand fashion. His response was to out Khrushchev publicly and regain the political initiative.
The claims of Kennedy’s recklessness appear to rest primarily upon his approach to the crisis in forcing the issue into the public domain. However, his reservations about pursuing offensive courses of action counter the accusation of recklessness. He played a diplomatic game in refusing to back down publicly but acquiesced with Khrushchev’s demands to remove the Turkish missiles, through the use of the very private and domestic channels that opponents claim he ignored by choosing the televised address. ‘Reckless’ implies no consideration to danger whatsoever, Kennedy’s actions fall far short of this. The policies were deliberated, considered and essentially effective.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
The Times, London, 24th October 1962.
The Times, London, 25th October 1962.
Articles
Bernstein, B, ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis’, in Miller, L and Pruessen, R (eds), Reflections on the Cold War: A Quarter Century of American Foreign Policy, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1974, pp.121-125.
Medland, W, ‘Cuban Missile Crisis. Evolving Historical Perspectives’, The History Teacher, Vol. 23, No. 4, August 1990, pp. 433-447.
Nathan, J, ‘The Missile Crisis’, World Politics, No. 27, 1974-5.
Paterson, T and Brophy, W, ‘October Missiles and November Elections: The Cuban Missile Crisis and American Politics, 1962’, The Journal of American History, Vol. 73, No. 1, June 1986, pp. 87-119.
Steel, R ‘Review of Thirteen Days’ in New York Review of Books, No. 13, March 1969.
Online Resources
Hyper Dictionary, www.hyperdictionary.com/search.aspx?define=recklessness, (Accessed 19th February 2005).
Kennedy, J, Speech of October 22, 1962, http://www.jfklibrary.org/j102262.htm, (Accessed 20th February 2005).
Books
Allison, G, Essence of Decision, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1971.
Ambrose, S, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938, Penguin, New York, 1978.
Chayes, A, The Cuban Missile Crisis, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1974.
Divine, R, Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, New Viewpoints, New York, 1974.
Garthoff, R, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, The Brookings Institute, Washington, 1989.
Mayer, G, The Republican Party 1854-1964, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1964.
Paterson, T (ed.), Kennedy’s Quest for Victory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.
Schlesinger, A, Robert Kennedy and his Times, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1978.
Sorenson, T, Kennedy, Harper and Row, New York, 1965.
Watson, M, The Expanding Vista, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990.
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