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Issues with Modern Intangible Assets and the Matrimonal Clauses Act

7707 words (31 pages) Essay in Law

18/05/20 Law Reference this

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Identify the difficulties with dividing modern intangible assets such as the BitCoin using the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Family Procedure Rules 2010.

Critically evaluate possible methods for dealing with dividing these assets fairly and discuss whether they should be viewed by the courts in the same way as more traditional intangible assets such as stocks and shares.

Introduction

Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are “increasingly part of the matrimonial asset make-up”[1] in the UK, bringing with them difficulties concerning their division in divorce cases. Investing into cryptocurrencies allows divorcing spouses to hide marital assets, exclude them from the disclosure process, and the fluctuating value, anonymity and rapid transfer of Bitcoin poses significant problems for the practical division of this asset class[2].

This essay will argue that investigating evolving issues surrounding the division of these modern intangible assets reveals two main practical difficulties. Firstly, there are numerous problems surrounding the disclosure of cryptocurrencies in financial orders, and secondly, it is difficult to accurately value and subsequently divide these types of assets. This essay will also propose various solutions to counteract the difficulties posed by cryptocurrencies, which are compatible with both the MCA 1973 and the FPR 2010. It will essentially adopt Ffion Greenfield’s view in Cryptocurrencies in Divorce Settlements: that relevant protections are available using the flexibility of the MCA 1973 and FPR 2010, to “deal with the new and creative ways that people invest and hide their money”[3].

In particular, to deal with non-disclosure, it will highlight the importance of enforcing consequences that act as deterrents, using Rule 28.3(6) of the FPR 2010 and s.25 of the MCA 1973, as well as existing case law. This is preferable to instructing experts to trace hidden assets using Part 25 of the FPR 2010, as it avoids undue costs and delay.

Further, it will suggest that dividing modern intangible assets at the source or forcing a sale of the assets, rather than offsetting them against other matrimonial assets is a good solution to evade inaccurate valuation of crypto-assets. This is also a better solution than instructing experts to value modern intangible assets as it avoids the risk of inaccurate valuations.

Finally, it will suggest that although cryptocurrencies can be dealt with similarly to stock and shares in terms of valuing and dividing the asset, that cryptocurrencies cannot be dealt with analogously to stocks and shares under the MCA 1973 and FPR 2010 when it comes to disclosure. This is because the aforementioned problems with cryptocurrencies do not translate to more traditional intangible assets such as stocks and shares, as modern intangible assets are more difficult to trace than more traditional intangible assets. The same clauses of the MCA 1973 and FPR 2010 that are used by the courts to penalise non-disclosure, however, can be mirrored in cases that involve cryptocurrencies.

This essay will firstly define modern intangible assets i.e. cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, and the general rules surrounding the division of assets in divorce cases, before exploring the main relevant provision of the MCA 1973 and FPR 2010. It will then move on to discuss the difficulties with dividing these assets and possible solutions.

§1 Tangible, Intangible Assets and Assumptions

Under the UK GAAP, which sets out the definition of intangible assets for accounting purposes, and will be more than enough for the purposes of this essay, “intangible assets other than goodwill are an identifiable non-monetary asset without physical substance”[4]. This is in contrast to tangible assets which have physical forms, such as machinery, buildings and land[5]. The crucial difference between these different types of assets for the purposes of this essay are that intangible assets have no physical substance.

Cryptocurrencies – such as Bitcoin – are a type of modern intangible asset in that they do not have any physical substance. Cryptocurrencies are a subset of virtual or digital currency that is predominantly generated and exchanged through the use of blockchain[6]. Cryptocurrency is decentralised and not created by a single entity.

Stocks and shares, similarly, are intangible assets in that they do not have physical substance. Stocks and shares are a stake in the ownership of a company or security issued by a company that represents an ownership right in the assets of the company and a right to a proportionate share of profits[7]. They represent the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a sum of money, for the purposes of liability in the first place, and of interest in the second.

It is enough, for the purposes of this essay, to note that the key difference between intangible and tangible assets is that tangible assets have physical substance. Additionally, the key differences between stocks and shares (traditional intangible assets) and cryptocurrencies (modern intangible assets) include firstly, that the value of cryptocurrencies is more volatile than that of stocks and shares, and secondly, that because cryptocurrencies are traded through blockchain, that it is difficult to gain access to identifying information about the users making transactions. Although blockchain transactions are not completely anonymous, personal information about users is “limited to their digital signature or username”[8]. Conversely, shareholder information is listed at Companies House, which displays the names and shareholdings of all company owners on public record.

For the purposes of this essay, it will be assumed that (a) cryptocurrency can be considered property under s.24(1)(a) MCA 1973, as there is no definition of property in respect of which jurisdiction may be exercised and so long as the property is sufficiently identifiable to be specified in the order it may be subject to a property adjustment order[9]; and (b) that the cryptocurrency is a matrimonial asset and each party is entitled to 50% of that asset when considering the factors in s.25 of the MCA 1973.

The court has a great deal of discretion and flexibility when deciding on the appropriate division of matrimonial assets on divorce[10]. This essay will assume that under s.25 of the MCA 1973, the division of assets will be equitable between the two parties i.e. all assets should be divided equally between the parties. This follows the general rule stated by Lord Nicholls in White v White (2000), that “as a general guide, equality should be departed from only if, and to the extent that, there is good reason for doing so”[11]. This assumption is made as the core question in this essay is about difficulties in dividing the asset practically, rather than how much each party should receive with regard to the s.25 considerations.

§2 The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Family Procedure Rules 2010

The difficulties with dividing modern intangible assets such as Bitcoin that we will discuss below arise in relation to whether we are well equipped to deal with such intangible assets using the tools available under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) and the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010).

The MCA 1973 sets out the law within England and Wales that governs divorce[12]. The main provisions of the MCA 1973 which this essay will focus on in its discussion of difficulties surrounding dividing modern intangible assets such as Bitcoin are:

(1)    Ss.23 and 24 MCA 1973 grant the judiciary broad discretionary powers when reallocating assets on divorce, through financial provision order[13][14][15].

(2)    S. 25 MCA 1973 sets out the factors of the parties’ marriage and matrimonial assets that the courts will consider when making financial orders under ss. 23 and 24 MCA 1973[16].

The FPR 2010 govern the procedures used in family courts in England and Wales. The main provisions of the FPR 2010 which this essay will focus on are:

(1)    Part 1 FPR 2010 sets out the overriding objective of the court being to deal with cases justly, having regard to any welfare issues involved[17].

(2)    Part 25 of the FPR 2010 sets out the rules regarding the instruction and restriction of experts and expert evidence as well as the duties of experts to the courts[18].

(3)    Part 28 FPR 2010 sets out the general ‘no order as to costs’ rule and the costs principles that apply to applications that are not subject to this rule[19].

Although it is likely that numerous sections of the MCA 1973 and FPR 2010 have bearing on the issues discussed, the above sections are sufficient to provide us with the tools to deal with issues of disclosure, valuation and division. Each section mentioned above will be expanded on in relation to each difficulty discussed below.

§3 Difficulties with Dividing Modern Intangible Assets and their Relationship with Stocks and Shares

This section will assess two difficulties surrounding the division of modern intangible assets such as Bitcoin. Law firm Royds Withy King acted on three separate high value divorce cases in February 2018 where spouses were seeking the disclosure and a potential share of cryptocurrency assets. The three cases involve a partner who has invested in or purchased cryptocurrency including Bitcoin[20]. These developments in divorce cases that involve the division of modern intangible assets provides us with the basis for the two difficulties discussed in this essay. Firstly, the difficulty in ensuring full disclosure of crypto-assets, and secondly, the unreliability of valuating such a volatile asset.

§3(a) Non-disclosure

It is a fundamental requirement that parties to a divorce owe a duty of “full and frank disclosure”[21], or a duty to provide information that would “(a) result in the removal of uncertainty as to the value of assets…or (b) inform the assessment of the income or earning capacity of a party to the marriage or the value of his or her assets”[22]. This process enables the courts to achieve their overriding objective of fairness within the procedure, set out in the FPR 20101 Rule 1.1, “enabling the court to deal with cases justly”[23], and enables the courts to consider “all the circumstances of the case”[24] under s.25 of the MCA 1973. Rule 1.3 requires the parties to “help the court to further the overriding objective”[25], through full and frank disclosure. If an asset isn’t disclosed, it is known as a ‘hidden asset’.

Unless a cryptocurrency is fully disclosed under this duty, it may be difficult to establish that a party has invested or owns the asset[26]. As mentioned above, personal information about users who invest in cryptocurrencies is limited to their digital signature or username, and security is afforded to cryptocurrencies through online ledgers such as Bitcoins, and being traded through blockchain. Although the asset may be easy to trace if the initial investment was made from a bank account, following beyond that initial investment can be difficult without the investor’s passwords or a regulatory body to track the asset. 

In this section, it will be argued firstly, that cryptocurrencies cannot be viewed by the courts in the same way as more traditional intangible assets, due to the anonymity of modern intangible assets. However, the same penalties for non-disclosure of modern intangible assets can be mirrored in cases of non-disclosure of cryptocurrencies. Secondly, it will be proposed that the MCA 1973 and FPR 2010 are sufficiently flexible to allow us to deal with the issues of disclosure, although the success of each approach is tenuous. To begin, the MCA 1973 and FPR 2010 allow for the appointment of special forensic investigators. This essay will argue that this approach is not preferable as is adds unnecessary costs and undue delay. Further, the MCA 1973 and FPR 2010 allow for the implementation of harsh consequences if the duty of full and frank disclosure is breached, which could act as a successful deterrent from hiding modern intangible assets.

As stated briefly in the introduction, cryptocurrencies carry with them the property of being quasi-anonymous, and only provide details of the owner’s digital signature or username. This, unlike stocks and shares, which are publicly available and require a Stock Transfer Form every time the legal title to them is transferred, means that crypto-assets are difficult to trace, and can be a prime source of non-disclosure for a party to a divorce.

The first solution that could be adopted to circumvent this issue is to instruct special forensic investigators[27], by relying on Part 25 of the FPR 2010, who would be able to trace non-disclosed crypto-assets such as Bitcoin.

This option, however, has its limitations. Under Rule 25.1 FPR, the court is under a duty to control expert evidence and can limit such evidence if it considers it is not ‘necessary’ to resolve the proceedings[28], and the courts must consider the impact on delays to the case and how much it will cost to instruct experts. Further, in Young v Young[29], Moor J stated that litigation costs would be extremely high in cases of financial non-disclosure, and that this was ‘completely unacceptable’, prompting the suggestion that there should be “‘rigorous control’ on the amount spent on expert evidence”[30]. This limitation is likely to have strong bearing on cases involving the non-disclosure of cryptocurrencies, as – due to their anonymous nature – tracing these assets is a more complex and lengthy process compared to traditional intangible assets and tangible assets[31].

This essay therefore proposes that the preferable option to deal with financial non-disclosure is to make use of clauses in the MCA 1973 and FPR 2010 and principles set out in existing case law that would deter parties from not disclosing their modern intangible assets such as Bitcoin. These are clauses and cases that pertain to all kinds of assets, and suggests therefore that cryptocurrencies can be dealt with similarly to stocks and shares.

The first available clause to deter parties from hiding crypto-assets is Rule 28.3(6) of the FPR 2010[32]. This rule provides that the court may make a costs order at any stage of the proceedings where it considers it appropriate, as a result of the conduct of a party in relation to the proceedings, whether before or during them[33]. Therefore, parties that engage in litigation misconduct – which is likely to include non-disclosure – may be liable to pay the costs that arise from this misconduct and/or the other sides’ costs. This may arguably not be sufficient as costs orders are limited to the costs incurred as a result of non-disclosure, because, as stated in M v M, costs orders are not intended to be used as punishment[34]. There are cases, however, such as in Young v Young[35], where the total costs of £6.4 million are enough to deter a party from failing to disclose assets accurately.

Secondly, under s.25 MCA 1973, the courts can take into consideration the parties’ conduct during the divorce proceedings when determining a financial order between the parties. Failing to disclose crypto-assets purposefully can be taken into consideration, and may lead to a departure from equality when distributing the matrimonial assets, to the detriment of the ‘non-discloser’.

If these clauses are insufficient to deter parties from hiding assets, then if there is failure to provide full disclosure, the practical effect of setting aside an original order and varying it may deter a breach of full and frank disclosure. Under Livesey v Jenkins[36], the courts stated the test for setting aside an original order comprised of two questions; firstly, whether there was indeed material non-disclosure, and secondly, whether it was so important that the original order should be set aside. This was recently confirmed as a legitimate approach in Sharland, where the main asset was the husband’s shareholding in a company called AppSense. The husband failed to disclose arrangements that were being realised to float AppSense by way of an IPO, leading to the Supreme Court deciding that Mr. Sharland’s misrepresentation and non-disclosure about the company’s shares were material, and led to the original order being set aside[37]. This approach from recent decisions acts as a deterrent to those who do not abide by their duty of full and frank disclosure, as parties risk having orders and agreements re-opened. Where an agreement to compromise an ancillary relief application in a divorce case has been reached on the basis of a failure to provide full and frank disclosure, it will be automatically unravelled.

Although the consequences of non-disclosure may not be enough to deter parties from hiding assets, it is probable that enforcing and applying the above clauses and rules of the MCA 1973 and FPR 2010, will be sufficient to appease the number of cases in which parties hide crypto-assets due to their anonymous nature. If successful these strategies will also avoid the unnecessary costs and delay associated with instructing forensic investigators to trace modern intangible assets, and the difficulties that costs and delay bring when initially deciding whether an expert instruction is ‘necessary’.

§3(b) Valuing and Dividing the Asset

The second difficulty discussed in this essay arises after determining whether a spouse actually possesses modern intangible assets such as Bitcoin. The value of the cryptocurrency must be determined to be distributed according to the shares of matrimonial assets allocated to each party.

After discussing the issues with valuing modern intangible assets, this section will propose two main thoughts. Firstly, the MCA 1973 and the FPR 2010 provide us with adequate resources to deal with the issues in valuing cryptocurrencies, insofar as they provide us with the tools to (a) instruct an expert to value the asset; (b) be flexible about how to distribute the asset. It will suggest that the latter is the most effective way to deal with valuing modern intangible assets. Secondly, when ascertaining the value of cryptocurrencies, they can be dealt with and potentially would be dealt with by the courts in a similar manner to more traditional intangible assets such as stocks and shares in divorce proceedings, as they share similar properties, such as varying naturally with price fluctuations.

Unlike most tangible matrimonial assets, for example, the matrimonial home, the value of cryptocurrency is highly speculative and volatile, making it difficult to ascertain the value. This is because cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are not centralised or created and controlled by a single central entity. For example, “in December 2017, the cost of one Bitcoin went from $10,859 to $19,343 and back down to $13,860 by the end of the month”[38]. This distinction was drawn in Well v Wells[39] where property and tangible assets were described as ‘copper-bottomed assets’ and shares in a business or intangible assets were described as ‘risk-laden assets’.

This creates two main problems in dividing modern intangible assets such as Bitcoin. Firstly, due to the volatility, if divorce proceedings become protracted, updating valuations may be necessary as the value of the asset could change throughout the proceedings. Secondly, there could also be a significant change in the value of the asset soon after the final order is made, leading to a substantial increase or decrease in the marital estate, leaving one party with substantially less or more of the estate.

Given that under ss.23 and 24 of the MCA 1973, financial provision orders and property adjustment orders are final[40], and cannot be varied subsequently, it is important to accurately value modern intangible assets at the time of making the order, and to consider “the property and other financial resources that each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future”[41]. In Cornick v Cornick[42], an appeal based on a significant change in the value of an asset soon after a final order was made was unsuccessful, and it was decided that an asset which was correctly valued at the date of the hearing and changed “owing to natural processes of price fluctuation”[43] should not give rise to leave to set aside. In Myerson v Myerson[44], similarly, the Court of Appeal rejected a similar ‘Barder appeal’ brought by the husband when his shares in an AIM company fell by 90% of their value during the year after the original order was made[45]. Cryptocurrencies are likely to be viewed by the courts in the same way as stocks and shares with respect to appealing for leave to set aside, and variations on their orders are unlikely to be made even if there is a dramatic increase or decrease in their value, as this will be due to ‘natural processes of price fluctuations’.

To deal with this issue, therefore, this essay will propose two solutions under the MCA 1973 and FPR 2010.

The first is that expert valuations should be obtained to establish the asset’s true value, and these valuations should be updated throughout protracted proceedings. The approach of using up-to-date valuations where the value of assets or shares in a business is necessary for proceedings for a financial remedy is usual as stated in Marano v Marano. This is available for cryptocurrencies or modern intangible assets in the same way as it is available for more traditional intangible assets such as stocks and shares under Part 25 of the FPR 2010. Under Part 25.4(2), the court may give permission as mentioned…only if the court is of the opinion that the expert evidence is necessary to assist the court to resolve the proceedings[46]. The grant of permission seems likely, as it is often granted to cases where shares and stocks need to be valued according to present market value, and the cryptocurrencies can be valued in a similar way. For example, in

This solution, however, is not satisfactory. As mentioned above, modern intangible assets are likely to be treated by the courts in a similar manner to stocks and shares when it comes to valuing them, as they share the property of fluctuating naturally with price fluctuations. Expert valuations provided for under Part 25 of the FPR risk being inaccurate and proved wrong by subsequent offers. In P v P (Financial Relief: Procedure), a district judge used a valuation of £730,000 for a shareholding in a business where there were co-shareholders, but the other shareholder subsequently offered to buy those shares for £2.4 to £2.8 million. In S v S, a business was sold for £137 million, substantially outside the experts’ bracket of £4.5 to £20 million[47].

Therefore, it is proposed in this paper that the ideal way to divide the asset is not to offset one party’s share in the cryptocurrency against another matrimonial asset, but to divide the investment at the source, and for the court to make a property adjustment order under s.24 MCA 1973[48]. This would leave the parties sharing equally in the risk and reward, whilst offering them finality and control over their investment going forward.

Offsetting one party’s share in the cryptocurrency against another matrimonial asset is unsatisfactory for two reasons. Firstly, this requires sufficient assets to do so. Secondly, it doesn’t take into account the liquidity of cryptocurrencies as compared to the liquidity of cash. This distinction was explained above as set out in Wells v Wells, where Thorpe LJ stated that “sharing is achieved by a fair division of both the copper-bottomed assets and the illiquid and risk-laden assets”[49]. This can be applied to cryptocurrencies in the same way Thorpe LJ applied it to shares in a business. Cryptocurrencies, in the same way as stocks and shares, fall within the illiquid and risk-laden assets. Finally, as mentioned above, expert valuations may be incorrect, and in addition, because of the frequent and extreme fluctuation of value for modern intangible assets such as Bitcoin, it is necessary to determine a date at which the cryptocurrency will be valued, which may be inaccurate if the proceedings become extended.

To divide the modern intangible asset investment at the source allows for a fair financial outcome, in that the courts “divide the assets in specie to provide each party with a proportionate share of the liquid and illiquid assets”[50]. S.24 MCA 1973 allows the courts to do this by stating that the court may make “an order that a party to the marriage shall transfer to the other party…such property as may be so specified”[51]. Modern intangible assets, provided the issue of disclosure is subdued, are assets that ‘may be so specified’.

Alternatively, it is possible for the court to order a lump sum provision which could be satisfied by liquidating the Bitcoin, again, avoiding the issues posed by valuing the asset, and subsequent rises or decreases in the assets value. This is available under s.24A(1) MCA 1973, which provides that the court can make a further order “for the sale of property as may be specified”[52], once an order for the payment of a lump sum or property adjustment order has been made. Although this seems like an appealing option, as it eradicates issues of valuation and liquidity of assets, in cases of stocks and shares – particularly in the case of shares in a private limited company –, it is “extremely rare that it [the courts] would make such an order, as a family business will often be the source of a parties’ wealth and a sale would potentially bring an end to future income”[53]. This, however, may not translate to modern intangible assets such as Bitcoin, as investment into cryptocurrencies are less likely to be the basis of a family business or the source of the parties’ wealth in the current climate. It is probable that there are very few cases where forcing a sale of cryptocurrency will subdue the source of family income.

To conclude this paper’s findings on the particular issue of valuing and dividing modern intangible assets such as Bitcoin, it seems as though the best possible solution to curb valuation problems, rather than instructing experts, is to either divide the asset at the source, or force a sale of the modern intangible assets to circumvent unexpected fluctuations in value of the cryptocurrency.

Conclusion

In conclusion, two main difficulties have been discussed with dividing modern intangible assets such as Bitcoin. Firstly, the difficulties in enforcing full disclosure of these assets, and secondly, the difficulties in valuing and subsequently dividing cryptocurrencies as they are so volatile. It has been suggested that the MCA 1973 and the FPR 2010 provide us with adequate resources to deal with both of these issues. Regarding disclosure, it has been suggested that Rule 28.3(6) of the FPR 2010 alongside s.25 of the MCA 1973 are sufficient to deter individuals from hiding assets, and circumvent the issues of added costs and undue delay created by instructing experts under Part 25 of the FPR 2010. Regarding valuing and dividing, s.24 of the MCA 1973 and Part 25 of the FPR 2010 provide both the possibility of expert valuations and either dividing the asset at the source, or forcing a sale.

Finally, this essay has argued that although in certain cases modern intangible assets can be dealt with in the same way as traditional assets such as stocks and shares, for example in dealing with fluctuating valuations, that the difficulties that come hand in hand with cryptocurrencies forming part of the matrimonial asset make-up are not analogous to the difficulties present in the division of stocks and shares when considering disclosure, because cryptocurrencies afford a lot more anonymity and are harder to trace than stocks and shares. Hence, modern intangible assets cannot always be viewed by the courts in the same way as more traditional intangible assets.

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[1] Ffion Greenfield, ‘Cryptocurrencies in Divorce Settlements’ (The Law Society Gazette, 2018) <https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/legal-updates/cryptocurrencies-in-divorce-settlements/5066776.article> accessed 31 July 2019.

[2] Shaelyn Comiskey and Bryson Payne, ‘Using Cryptocurrency to Hide Assets: Special Considerations in Divorce, Tax Evasion and Money Laundering’ (Masters, University of North Georgia 2018).

[3] Ffion Greenfield, ‘Cryptocurrencies in Divorce Settlements’ (The Law Society Gazette, 2018) <https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/legal-updates/cryptocurrencies-in-divorce-settlements/5066776.article> accessed 31 July 2019.

[4] ‘Meaning of an Intangible Asset’ (Icpa.org.uk, 2018) <https://www.icpa.org.uk/portal/tax/meaning_an_intangible_asset> accessed 7 August 2019.

[5] Will Kenton, ‘Tangible Asset’ (Investopedia, 2019) <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tangibleasset.asp> accessed 7 August 2019.

[6] ‘Cryptocurrency’ (Uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com, 2019) <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/Document/Ic6bb9e096e4611e8a5b3e3d9e23d7429/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv1%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad6ad3a0000016c6b4e4b82bf725675%3FNav%3DKNOWHOW_UK%26fragmentIdentifier%3DIc6bb9e096e4611e8a5b3e3d9e23d7429%26parentRank%3D0%26startIndex%3D1%26contextData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3DSearchItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=fdc2620296c016af1fedd254656a4535&list=KNOWHOW_UK&rank=1&sessionScopeId=6ca6bdf47e47b22e7dbc858345be0eb88fab2baef4efb5cca800b492f8a9ea20&originationContext=Search+Result&transitionType=SearchItem&contextData=%28sc.Search%29&comp=pluk> accessed 7 August 2019.

[7] Farewell, J. in Borland’s Trustee v. Steel Brothers & Co Ltd [1901] 1 Ch 279 p.288

[8] Luke Fortney, ‘Blockchain Explained’ (Investopedia, 2019) <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp> accessed 9 August 2019.

[9] Section 24(1) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973

[10] Nancy Duffield, Jacqueline Kempton and Crista Sabine, Family Law and Practice (1st edn, College of Law Publishing 2019). Section 4.5.

[11] White v. White [2000] UKHL 54

[12] Matrimonial Causes Act 1973

[13] Section 23 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973

[14] Section 24 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973

[15] ‘Property Adjustment Orders’ (Lexisnexis.com, 2019) <https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/family/document/393787/55KB-DRH1-F18F-00BG-00000-00/Property_adjustment_orders_overview> accessed 9 August 2019

[16] Section 25 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973

[17] Part 1 Family Procedure Rules 2010

[18] Part 25 Family Procedure Rules 2010

[19] Part 28 Family Procedure Rules 2010

[20] Mark Phillips, ‘Crypto Cash Divorce Nightmare Looming, Warns Royds Withy King | Divorce Solicitors’ (Royds Withy King Solicitors, 2018) <https://www.roydswithyking.com/crypto-cash-divorce-nightmare-looming/> accessed 31 July 2019.

[21] Charlotte Butler-Kitto, ‘What Is ‘Full And Frank Disclosure’, And Why Does My Lawyer Keep Talking About It? | The Family Law Co’ (The Family Law Co, 2015) <https://www.thefamilylawco.co.uk/blog/2015/09/02/what-is-full-and-frank-disclosure-and-why-does-my-lawyer-keep-talking-about-it/> accessed 11 August 2019.

[22] Charles J in I v I [2008] EWHC 1167 (Fam)

[23] Rule 1.1 Family Procedure Rules 2010

[24] Section 25 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973

[25] Rule 1.3 Family Procedure Rules 2010

[26] Ffion Greenfield, ‘Cryptocurrencies in Divorce Settlements’ (The Law Society Gazette, 2018) <https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/legal-updates/cryptocurrencies-in-divorce-settlements/5066776.article> accessed 31 July 2019.

[27] Ffion Greenfield, ‘Cryptocurrencies in Divorce Settlements’ (The Law Society Gazette, 2018) <https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/legal-updates/cryptocurrencies-in-divorce-settlements/5066776.article> accessed 31 July 2019.

[28] Rule 25.1 Family Procedure Rules 2010

[29] Young v Young [2013] EWHC 3637 (Fam)

[30] Practical Law Family, ‘Young v Young: “An Example of how not to Litigate” (High Court)’ (Uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com, 2019) <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/9-549-7934?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&comp=pluk> accessed 9 August 2019

[31] It is important to remember that litigation funding is available to fund complex and expensive cases, however, without the aforementioned restraints, litigation funders “will be put off supporting these cases for ever”. Practical Law Family, ‘Young v Young: “An Example of how not to Litigate” (High Court)’ (Uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com, 2019) <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/9-549-7934?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&comp=pluk> accessed 9 August 2019

[32] Rule 28.3(6) Family Procedure Rules 2010

[33]‘Guidance Note: Disclosure in Financial Order Cases’ (Resolution.org.uk, 2016) <http://www.resolution.org.uk/site_content_files/files/guidance_note_disclosure_in_financial_order_cases.pdf> accessed 11 August 2019.

[34] Peter Hughes QC in Morgan v Morgan [2006] EWCA Civ 1852

[35] Young v Young [2013] EWHC 3637 (Fam)

[36] Livesey v Jenkins [1985] AC 425

[37] Sharland v Sharland [2015] UKSC 60

[38] Emanuel Petrescu, ‘Cryptocurrency Considerations in Divorce’ (Family Lawyer Magazine, 2018) <https://familylawyermagazine.com/articles/cryptocurrency-and-divorce/> accessed 9 August 2019.

[39] Wells v. Wells [2002] EWCA Civ 476

[40] Section 23 and 24 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973

[41] ‘Factors Considered by The Court On Financial Provision’ (Lexisnexis.com, 2019) <https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/family/document/393795/55MD-4GS1-F18F-401C-00000-00/Factors_considered_by_the_court_on_financial_provision> accessed 9 August 2019.

[42] Cornick v. Cornick (No 1) [1994] 2 FCR 1189

[43] Hale J in Cornick v. Cornick (No 1) [1994] 2 FCR 1189

[44] Myerson v. Myerson [2009] EWCA Civ 282

[45] Andrew Newbury, ‘Family Law: Barder Appeals – Recent Developments’ (Law Gazette, 2010) <https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/family-law-barder-appeals-recent-developments/56248.article> accessed 9 August 2019.

[46] Part 25.4(2) Family Procedure Rules 2010

[47] Duncan Brooks and Practical Law Family, ‘How the Courts Treat Businesses in Proceedings for a Financial Remedy’ (Uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com, 2019) <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/9-606-1785?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1> accessed 9 August 2019.

[48] Section 24 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973

[49] Thorpe LJ in Wells v. Wells [2002] EWCA Civ 476, para. 24.

[50] Duncan Brooks and Practical Law Family, ‘How the Courts Treat Businesses in Proceedings for a Financial Remedy’ (Uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com, 2019) <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/9-606-1785?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1> accessed 9 August 2019.

[51] Section 24(1)(a) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973

[52] Section 24A(1) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973

[53] Duncan Brooks and Practical Law Family, ‘How the Courts Treat Businesses in Proceedings for a Financial Remedy’ (Uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com, 2019) <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/9-606-1785?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1> accessed 9 August 2019.

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