Apter identifies his book as a step forward in the structural functional approach, based on which he set a number of typologies to present political change from one system to another. The main phenomenon which the book tackles is modernization in transitional states. Apter relates the ability of new nations or transitional societies to move from modernization to modernity or industrialization to different set of political structures associated with two modes of values (consumatory and instrumental). He starts his analysis by defining what he means by the concept of modernization, and how it is different from development and industrialization.
The concept of development is defined as "a particular form of social changeâ€¦ when secular norms of conduct universalized (Ibid. p67)". Modernization is a special form of development. Apter defines different dimensions of modernization along his analysis to the development of political structures. Modernization is "a way of improving choices (Ibid. p11)". It is associated with certain norms like individualism, leadership and feelings of individual superfluousness and alienation (Ibid. p 8). It is mainly "the process of consciously directing and controlling the social consequences of increased role differentiation and organizational complexity in a societyâ€¦ results of an increase in technological significant roles (Ibid. p 56-57).", " the process of increasing complexity in human affairs within which the polity must act (Ibid. p3). Industrialization is a special form of modernization. Modernization may be achieved without Industrialization, but industrialization cannot be utilized without modernization (Ibid. p67).
The core hypothesis of the book is that the level of modernization depends upon the form of the political system; this relationship relies on two intervening variables: the level of coercion and level of information available for and provided by the system. The relationship between information and coercion determines the future of the system and the type of its structure that varies between four types: Mobilization, Military oligarchy, Modernizing autocracy, neo mercantilism, and finally reconciliation system. The movement from the first type to the last one reflects a step forward toward modernization, and availability of information, but not necessarily toward democratic western form of governance. The optimal form for modernizing society, according to Apter, is the neo mercantilism system, as it represents the equilibrium point between information and coercion applied by the political system.
Each of these systems represents a movement on a continuum either near or far away from two ideal types that do not empirically purely exist. The first type, the secular liberation model, is a pure expression of the instrumental normative base, whilst the sacred collectivity model is an extreme case for the domination of consuamtory values. The reconciliation and mobilization types of systems are the empirical practical expression of those ideal types, and combination between the values and structures of mobilization and reconciliation results in the other three sub systems or structures. Each of these types in Apter's words" is not exclusively appropriate to modernization" (Ibid.p418), but rather each has its significance according to the modernization process itself. The mobilization system is appropriate when the state is moving from one transitional stage to another like in the case of getting independence or moving from modernization to industrialization. Neo mercantilism is the ideal type to ensure stability on the long run. The reconciliation system is the most appropriate type when the system has already passed the early stages of modernization, in order to ensure pluralism, decentralization and support a strong scientific elite which is the base for industrialization (Ibid. pp 429-430, pp 38-40)
To understand variations between these systems, particularly in relation to information and coercion; the normative base of Apter analysis seems highly significant. This base is established upon the distinction between consumatory and instrumental values, or in other words it is the underlined distinction between traditionlity and modernity. Consumatory values exist when the action is associated with mystical or transcendental vision about the meaning of the action itself. In this sense, the religious sphere overlaps with all other spheres of interactions (Ibid. p84). On the other hand instrumental values indicate a separation between the intermediate or final action and its ultimate end or I shall call its transcendental meaning (Ibid.p85). In an attempt to interpret Apter's text, the instrumental values are empirically articulated by western societies (the modern world), and it maturely evolved along the western intellectual history, even if it is not utilized in the ideal theoretical sense. Instrumental values are articulated through the existence of scientific elites and industrialization. The consumatory values, on the other side of the continuum, are expressed behaviorally in new modernizing nations through applying political religion and ideology.
Political religion is the expression of society's consumatory values; it sets the ultimate ends or transcendental values which the state seeks to achieve (Ibid.p267). Repressive laws and religious art which Apter defines as " works created as visible evidence of the regime and its power, such as public buildings, paintings, statues, and the like (Ibid. p 272) ", are the two indicators of political religion. Political religion is expressed by ideology that requires strong and effective institutions, mainly carried out by effective party apparatus  (Ibid. p294). Political forms/ structures differ in the extent to which they use political religion and rigid ideological packages.
Reconciliation is the less system to use political religion and ideology; it gives a space for competition between roles, though this type of system started as a consumatory one represented in the emergence of theocratic rule in the west; the system was able to move toward instrumentalism through constitutionalism and secularism (Ibid. p 287-288). Mobilization system highly uses political religion and ideology, mainly socialism, to change the whole hierarchy, and stratification of the system. Through ideology the system suppresses differences and conflict for the sake of achieving egalitarian secular ends (Ibid. pp 128-129). This what Apter expressed using Lipset's conception of "collective mobility (Ibid.p131)". The ideology of mobilization systems is established upon the notion of rebirth or regeneration, according to which the state directs actions (Ibid. p293). This put restrictions on state's efficiency, as ideology is usually associated with rigid unattainable goals, compared with more flexible rational strategies in the reconciliation system.
Ideology and political religion are the tools that used by modernizing states to establish authority and maintain legitimacy. State's legitimacy is established upon the ability to achieve authority and equality; these two goals are associated with the functional and structural requisites of the government (Ibid. p 228). Both requisites are associated with consumatory and instrumental values, as functional requisites are associated with ideology, whilst structural requisites are reflection to the decision making process.
State's legitimacy is established upon two functional requisites and four functional contingents, and the same for structural requisites. The two main functions of the state is to achieve solidarity and identity; through setting reference for sanctions, and symbols, establishing a link between the past and future, integrating society, and defining a base for membership (Ibid. p 243). Structural requisites are mainly to achieve accountability and set the base for decision making. The four structural contingents are articulated through political recruitment, punishment tools, resources allocation, and consent establishment (Ibid.p246).
Mobilization societies are successful at building bonds of solidarity and identity through the use of political religion and ideology that is usually a mix between nationalism and socialism (Ibid. pp327-340). On the contrary to mobilization systems, science is the ideology of industrial modern societies. For Apter, there are three forms of ideology leadership, each is associated with certain stage in the development of ideology: the Robinhood role is mainly for early stages of ideology (multiple images), the Ideologue is during (hortatory realism and political fantasy), and the Scientist for (practical realism) (Ibid. pp326-327). In modernizing societies, conflict emerges between the second two roles.
What are the forces of modernization? In other words, how can we compare between societies in terms of their level of modernization? Here Apter, focuses his analysis on two levels: the first level is through the existence of certain actors or forces, and the second level is mainly structural one associated with the conception of role. The forces of modernization are scattered along the content of the book, but they can be summarized in the following six forces.
Some early traditional elite members may provide the base for modernization, but in many case they had been excluded by the new modern elite (Ibid. p48).
Colonialism also has a positive role, through providing bureaucracy, infrastructure, and western educational systems. Political modernization, in this sense, is achieved through the creation western secular elite, and western institutions (Ibid. pp52-53).
Intellectuals, as the third force of modernization and the mediators between traditionality and modernity, are not active participants in most modernizing nations. They are divorced from the public and politicized by the regime (Ibid. pp 75-76). They are squeezed between politicians and nationalistic middle class (Ibid. p141). Intellectuals are supposed to perform three main functions: goal specification, institutional coherence, and central control maintenance (Ibid. P 165). These functions are performed by four roles: Civil servant (theorists), manger (pragmatic)-both are (career modernization roles)--, entrepreneur (ideologists) and political broker/ compromiser-both are innovative career roles. In modernizing societies, conflict emerges between innovative and modernizing roles (Ibid. p170). In mobilization system at early stages of modernization: political entrepreneurs play the role of goal specification, brokers maintain institutional coherence, and mangers set central control. In late stages: central control is carried out by the broker, coherence is achieved by manger and entrepreneurs, and finally, goal specification is by civil servant. For Reconciliation systems, the broker is responsible for goal specification, manger for coherence, and civil servant for control maintenance (Ibid. pp 170-171). On the other side, industrial systems are characterized by the existence of the role of scientist. Scientist performs the function of goal specification, manger and broker for institutional coherence, and a civil servant maintains control (Ibid. p 177).
Elites are representatives to modern secular values; they enter conflict with old or dying traditional elite that still exists during the modernization process, and intermediate elite that embodies the values of both modernity and traditionality exists to curb this conflict (Ibid. p144).
Youth is a focal force in determining the future of modernization; they have more tendencies to accept modern values, however they are not monolithic in this sense. They go for a conflict with the system's intellectuals and cadres (Ibid. p79-80).
Political parties are the institutional force of modernization. They play a role in the process of socialization, raising awareness, communication and networking ideas, and integrating society (Ibid. pp 181-188). Party system in most modernizing countries consists of either one dominant single party or great number of great parties. In the case of single party system, opposition is seen as illegitimate force against the integration and modernization of the society (Ibid. pp 192-194). The strength of the party apparatus is negatively correlated with the strength of the society. In this regard, Apter categorizes parties into two different modes according to the way by which they deal with differences: Parties of representation and parties of solidarity (Ibid. p 215).
Regard the second level of analysis, Apter expresses his dissatisfaction with the historical sociological approach in examining the phenomenon of traditionality. According to him most intellectual contributions were focusing upon religion, morality and secularism; they were characterized by polarization and a static vision toward traditionalism that has never empirically exists (Ibid. pp57-60). To understand modernization in new non western states, we need to shift the analysis to "strategic roles". The significance of roles differs from one time to another, thus nothing is purely modern strategic role (Ibid. p 62).
Structural change in modernizing countries is articulated through roles, and stratification. A role is defined by Apter as "functionally defined position in a social systemâ€¦, it embodies norms of conduct and expectations of action (Ibid. p 124)". Roles present the normative aspects of institutions, and how people see themselves and create self images (Ibid. p 131). They are expressed at the two levels: structural (organization of roles and its functions), and the behavioral level (the right conduct and its consequences) (Ibid. p 24). Furthermore, they reflect the moral base of the society (Ibid. p 60). In modernizing societies three types of roles exist: modern, accommodationist, and old or traditional roles (Ibid. p 123).
Modern roles are associated with careers which reflect higher level of competence and specialization. The spread of career roles is an indicator of the level of modernization and institutionalization that the country achieved. Careers are seen as the source of mobilization at the structural level, competition and aggression at the behavioral level (Ibid. p 162). Careers are mainly a way for institutional rather than innovative change (Ibid. p 158).
For stratifications, there are three categories: class, caste, and status. Status overlap with class stratification but the difference between them is related to solidarity. The former enhances solidarity between its members, whilst the latter creates solitude and competition, and it exists more in industrial societies (Ibid. pp124-125). All these stratifications can be mainly classified into two groups: Modernizers, and Traditionalists. Conflict emerges between different stratifications, and between roles within the same stratifications (Ibid. p 126).
But how systems shift from one system to another? The mobilization system, according to Apter, cannot continue for long period of time; it is more suitable in revolutionary periods after independence. Through ideology, political religion and effective party apparatus the system can achieve higher level of efficiency in short period of time. However, the system cannot utilize all its promises on the long run; it may shift into two directions either to the sacred collective model or to any other forms of political structures (see pp 397-405). The former direction is less likely to happen because this requires small and simple society, in addition to higher managerial and technological capacity (Ibid. p 389). But why the change happens from the beginning? The mobilization system ability to achieve egalitarian goals, and emancipation collapses as the ideology fails in utilizing these goals at the practical level, and exaggerates the use of coercion. Ideology loses its public appeal and new generations start to establish their counter ideology that is usually associated with political cynicism. The party solidarity starts to decline because of factionalism, coalition conflict, corruption and opportunism. The party become no mere than a bureaucratic tool, and expression of patronage relationships in the society (Ibid. pp 383-384).
Apter asserts that the future of modernizing nations will be toward the reconciliation model, but not necessarily in unilinear evolutionary way (Ibid. p 42). The reconciliation system is not essentially industrial democratic one; Apter is implicitly optimistic about the future of modernizing nations that would resemble the present of western countries on the long run. In this regard, the dominant future ideology will be the ideology of science and the role of scientist will be superior to other roles. Apter is well acknowledgeable about the problems of this developmental stage in the west and particularly in the United States. The problem of the ideology of science lies in its elitist nature; it cannot be shared by all segments of the society. It establishes a base for the identity and solidarity of organization and roles but not for the society (Ibid. pp 344-345). It created large segments of superfluous people who cannot be integrated in higher scientific stratification. As a result, those people feel unimportant for the decision making process that is characterized by higher level of rationality and empiricism; apathy, lower civic engagement levels, thus dominate the political arena of developed countries (Ibid. p 349). These problems exist besides hard moral evils represented in the dominance of utilitarian values, alienation, and weak moral base for societal interactions (Ibid. p 426). In Apter's words: "we have learned to how to achieve modernization, we have not yet learned how to live modern life (Ibid. p 431)".
Apter ended his analysis to modernization by the perquisites of democracy; he associated the phenomenon with the relationship between information and coercion. Coercion is a must that exists in all systems but systems differ in their levels and manners of usage of coercion. When coercion exists through network of roles, information will not be reduced (Ibid. p 453). In mobilization system coercion is practiced by a central authority, but in reconciliation system it is scattered among the system agencies and roles. High level of coercion and limited information ends with deterministic conclusions and inefficiency as the system became unaware of other applicable alternatives; this is mainly the problem of mobilization system (mainly the problem that exists in the Soviet Union). On the contrary, high level of information and limited coercion put a load on the system to take decisions. In this system, to ensure efficiency there must be interpretive mechanisms to deal with the intense flow of information (Ibid. p 41). Neo mercantilism systems are the most appropriate type to set the balance between both variables, and they represent the middle point between reconciliation and mobilization systems, through using less coercion in mobilization systems, and increasing coercion in reconciliation ones (ibid. p 379).
The presence of coercion in the systems can be empirically indicted by the level of privacy-- that can be assured through pluralism, accountability, and representation mechanisms--, and the contingent structures of the government (Ibid. pp 454-457). Democracy can be achieved only when the system is dealing with privacy as consumatory value, providing constitutional framework, and electoral procedures, shifting the societal conflict from value to interest conflict, accessing information from various resources, and transforming authority's focus to equity problems (Ibid. pp 455-456) .
The politics of modernization is a serious work to analyze modernization. Apter tries to provide comprehensive analysis to the phenomenon of modernization from different perspectives: structural, behavioral and normative, though he loses the second and third one to certain extent. The book has few examples, compared with other books, to reflect some behavioral manifestations of development  . Also, Apter speaks about the normative base presented in the consumatory and instrumental values, but the analysis was not that much far from the western sociological analysis to the notions of secularism, reason, and religion; it has been limited to the study of ideology, and political religion  . Even when Apter tries, in one of his important footnotes in page 85, to relate the relationship between the material and normative sphere, his analysis was limited and not reflected in the entire analysis of the book. To elaborate more, Apter is quite aware of the fact that the material manifestation of actions and innovations is not divorced from its normative base. This normative base actually affects the work of many material forms, and structures in other different cultures that do not share the same norms, values, attitudes and way of thinking. This has been mainly the cause for not absorbing many western modern political, economic, and cultural inventions in non western countries. This can be seen in the current deteriorating status of bureaucracy, parties, and education in many developing countries. Common structures between developed and developing countries exist but not in the same way as being inaction in their original western cultural contexts. This gap between the material/ structural realm and normative/ value sphere can explain why modern career roles, that Apter talks about, are already into existence in modernizing nations since 1960s, but they are not playing a role in modernization. They are not integrated in their new environments, and they lack the cultural and mental set up to make them into action  .
This drawback in Apter's analysis is actually one of the main obstacles of the universal allegations of modernization theory in general. The west discovered itself as the only dominant power after the breakdown of other old civilizations; it succeeded in setting an amazing successful model based on reason that set a moral foundation for itself based on the incompetence of religion. Hence, it was naturally to see the world, and judge it from its own perspective that proved to be valid in the western case. Apter's emphasizes, in the preface of his book, the need not to be "prisoners in our concepts, offers overzealous generations, and superficial knowledge about others (Ibid. pviii)", though he himself remains trapped in the cage of ethnocentrism. He expresses strong commitment to the western ethnocentric conceptions and notions of modernity, traditionalism, and development  .
This stars with his introduction, when he asks if we can consider old ancient civilizations as modern or not. Apter ends by providing negative answer; for him modernity is established along the western lines of rationality, individualism, and economic competition which are not essentially part of other civilizations. Romans and Greeks were only the modern partners, or to be accurate they are the real fathers of the western civilizations. Thus, modernity is only associated with this geographical area which is called the west. Based on that my question is, were not the Islamic, or the Chinese civilizations modern ones? The answer for Apter is that they were not modern, since they simply were not established upon the instrumental secular base of the western mind. They were more consumatory civilizations, rather than instrumental ones. Can we conclude from that, Apter's perception to consumatory values is associated with anti reason, and if my interpretation is not wrong, in this sense, how can we explain the scientific contributions of the Islamic civilization if it is a consumatory anti reason one? Also, how can we help other societies that are established upon consumatory values, like Arab Islamic countries, to absorb western structures in an effective way, given the dilemma of value and structure?
Apter's conception of development, as a case in which secular values are universalized, reflects ethnocentric analysis. It is a westernized ideologically loaded concept. It is based on the assumption that nothing will develop without getting the transcendental, and I will not say the moral, out (the main distinction between consumatorism and instrumentalism lies in the lack of transcendental dimension rather than a moral one. The morality of instrumentalism is established upon the superiority of reason, which is a virtue in itself. On the other hand, consuamtorism is established on transcendental source for morals, ethics, and actions). In this sense, the conception of development is problematic not from a theoretical ethnocentric stand but rather from a practical one as well. Secularism right now is unable to express itself as a dominant value in different parts of the world that are currently developed given the economic and political indictors -mainly represented in the existence of democracy--. Can we say, based on Apter's analysis, they are not fully developed, simply because they did not follow the western path of secularism.
My point of view, here, can be supported by the work of Talal Asad about secularism. In his book " Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, and Modernity", Asad asserts that the universality of secularism is no more germane idea. There is a current resurgence of religion that many view as a way to fill the moral vacuum created by secularism. This resurgence is against the allegations of the universality and dominance of secularism at the end of history. The main assumption of Asad is that the west intolerantly imposed its own principles outside its geographical space, assuming the uniformity of space and time (see more details of Assad's critique to the universality of secularism, and how he justifies his stand in chapter one. pp 2-21)  .
Peter Berger's analysis of the cultural dynamics of globalization is also valid in this regard. Berger says that there are two types of linkages between modernization projects: The first one is the "extrinsic" linkage; this sort of linkage is accepted by most nations, such as Christianity and modern medicine. The second type which creates tensions is the "intrinsic" linkage, such as modern medicine and scientific concept of causality. This linkage refers to the spread of certain principles or idea into other fields, like cost benefit analysis and family life (Berger. 2002. Pp 11-12). I shall consider the relationship between secularism and development as an intrinsic linkage that creates tensions and cannot be totally accepted by other cultures. Berger also asserts that there are different paths to modernity rather than the western modern path. In his analysis, Berger refers to how different states, especially southeastern states, response creatively to the challenges of globalization. In his words: "The idea of mindless hegemonic globalization is against creativity â€¦ yet there are differences between cultures in the capacity to adapt creatively â€¦ we now have a picture of cultural earthquake affecting virtually every part of the world. When the earthquake hits, different people response differently, (Berger.2002. pp10-11)â€¦ there may be more than one path to modernity (Ibid.p12)." Thus, the deterministic western ethnocentric vision of modernity and development blocks channels of creativity, and narrows the humankind contributions to a limited geographical and historical area.
The same trouble appears in Apter's conception of modernization  . The concept is heavily embedded within the societal conditions of the west. Individualism, ruthlessness, and alienation are all products of the rapid socioeconomic and industrial change witnessed by Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Furthermore, it also still reflects the linear evolution of history, even though Apter writes about his refusal to the inevitability of change process and its uni linear character. The implicit assumption of uni linear evolution can be seen in the way in which modern, what he described as innovative, roles should replace old and traditional ones. The accommaditionlist roles are no mere a reflection to a transitional phase that will eventually end by the dominance of modern roles. Apter, in a footnote, says that he views development as movement from "the simple to the complex (Apter. 1965. P 59)", which means it is still within the limits of the theory of progress  . Moreover, these modern roles, that will eventually dominate, are essentially secular instrumental ones in a normative sense  . This implicitly means innovation is correlated with the societal ability to sweep away its history and replace it by a superior western one. This idea is expressed when Apter relates his conception of modernization to history. In his words: "modernity in contrast presupposes more remote relationship between antecedents' values and new goals (Ibid. p 83)". In this regard, innovation is based on the capacity of each society to set new narrative for history and future, not based on its original standards but rather on the standards of the powerful. The problem is how can we judge the level of development achieved by each nation, and who has the authority to make these judgments? Are there any universal standards? What can be seen as development by others is not the same for another group? I am, here, not applying absolute relativist position, since there are still objective ways in terms of income and technology, but my focus here is mainly on cultural aspects associated with this material development. 
Eisenstadt highlights how western scholarships employ orientalist conceptions that are stemmed from the western model, and has a negative perspective about non western societies. These conceptions undermine the complexity of interactions inside non western contexts; and the contested relationship between power and culture. They function with an epistemological background that sees the nation state and secularism as the main tools for modernization. This critique has been presented in the work of two schools: the first school represented in the work of "subaltern" studies that resisted the western hegemony; the second school is postmodernism that criticized the western totalitarian narratives and the suppression of differences whether they are racial, cultural or social varieties  (Eisenstadt, 2002, p142-143). However, Eisenstadt adds that these two schools ignored the complex dynamics of interaction between culture and power and history. How institutions take different forms and express different meanings and orders that are the result of the interaction between culture, religion and power (Eisenstadt, 2002, p142-143).
The orientalist perception also exists when Apter thinks of solution for the withdrawal of morality in the United States; he concludes that we cannot go back again to religion, and the other alternative he offers is moving to more hierarchical authority, which is consumatory one, like the case of the Soviet Union( Apter. 1965. P 426). The problem with this analysis is that it equates consumatorism with authoritarian hierarchical structures; which is not necessarily true. Some cultures were consumatory in nature, but were able to maintain autonomous decentralized structures. Wael Hallaq, in his analysis to the evolution of Islamic law, expresses how the Islamic state did not maintain centralized authority over the community (Hallaq. 2009. P11-13), though it was a consumatory system. In addition, Apter himself acknowledges the fact that the strength of the solidarity party means there is a weak society (Apter. 1965. 221). In this sense, the central authority of the nation state usually comes at the expenses of the self rule mechanisms developed by communities; so, how can he refer to a movement towards a hierarchical strict system like the Soviet Union?
Another weakness point in Apter's work is the conceptual confusion that results from the relationship between innovation and modernization. Modernization in Apter's terms is associated with the presence of social structure that supports innovation; however Apter says that career roles-which are indictors for the level of modernization-are mainly to ensure institutional change rather than institutional innovation. Thus, my question is how change-and to be precise progressive positive change-can be separated from innovation? Is not modernity essentially established on innovation? Based on that, is not modernization-according to Apter's vision to the relationship between innovation and career roles-a functional static mode rather than a dynamic one? This confusion is enhanced by Apter's division to roles into modern and innovative ones. In a more modernized society, conflict between both types of roles should end in favor of modern ones. The answer to my confusion requires Apter to set a definition for what he really means by innovation.
Another confusion, is in Apter's vision to the future of the reconciliation system. The system is initially based on liberal values of pluralism, diversity and rationality; however Apter concludes that it would end with stagnation and this type of systems is inappropriate for the early stages of modernization. This conclusion contradicts with what Apter says in the following page: "there is nothing inevitable about any of the processes we have described (Ibid. p 430)". It also conflicts with the western perception of diversity and liberty and how they set the base for the establishment of mature polity. The history of the west itself that developed as reconciliation system, and was able to develop into democratic industrial systems is an evidence to prove the invalidity of this assumption. The question here, is how pluralism leads to stagnation? and how reconciliation system, given the characteristics presented by Apter, cannot essentially be a democratic representative one? How can pluralism not be reflected in the constitutional and structural arrangements of the system? How can higher levels of accountability be assured without democracy? I shall conclude that Apter fails in anticipating the future of modernizing nations. If those nations started applying reconciliation systems from the beginning they might not suffer the bankruptcy of authoritative socialist regimes. They might not end in poverty and pure corrupted state apparatus, since pluralism provides mechanisms for correction and accountability. Mobilization system cannot be transformed to other less restrictive types without setting pressures on the system, which cannot be developed if the system is controlling all channels of socialization, and institutional change  . Pressures from below should be intensified on the regime to take any reform measures.
The concept of politics provided by Apter is also problematic; though he starts with a comprehensive approach, it ends with equating politics with public policy. He firstly indentifies politics as "the complex and symbolic aspects of politics with which we have been dealingâ€¦ it cannot be identified as operations in narrow and strict senseâ€¦ Policy becomes the empirical phenomena we attribute to government and the analysis of policy leads us to the study of desire, the conditions of which are to be found in both consumatory and instrumental values â€¦ in this sense functionalism relies first on semantic empiricism and only second on operational empiricism, that is pragmatic before it is operational (Ibid. pp 234-235)". Then, he goes back to narrow his conception to a strict functional operational one, according to which, politics is no mere a function of career roles. He concludes that "professionalism and career roles will expand dramaticallyâ€¦. These changes indicate a decline of politics as we are accustomed to think of itâ€¦ Politics declines as it becomes the property of a technical career role (Ibid p 173)". "Politics is the business of coping with role differentiation while integrating organizational structures (Ibid. p3). Apter here moves from substance to procedures and operations. This movement results from Apter's focus on strategic roles as a base for political comparison.
Moreover, Apter's analysis to the role of colonialism in modernization is extremely provoking biased one. He does not refer to the negative impact of colonialism on other societies, and the extent to which it has been an exploitative ugly period in the western history. It is true that some colonial powers provided infrastructures, bureaucratic apparatus and schools, but they also weakened traditional industries, economic and political independence  . They suppressed societies, and killed hundreds of innocent people. They created artificial state boundaries that cut tribal, ethnic, religious, and linguistic affiliations. This artificial creation was the main cause behind many ethnic and intra conflicts, unrest, and coups in hundreds of states after acquiring independence. This of course hindered the process of development. It is the main reason why new systems, after independence, had to import western ideological packages to impose legitimacy, and achieve national solidarity  .
Again also, the trouble of ethnocentrism and the burden of white man exist, when Apter associates political independence and development with the existence of westernized secular elite and institutions, as if organic communities cannot initiate something of their own to develop, as if they did not have previously any developed structures of interactions. Modernization, in my point of view, can never be built upon imported packages; it has to be authentic in order to be effective. The problems of solidarity and identity cannot be solved at least on the long run, using others' definitions and standards  .
This ethnocentric approach does not allow Apter to see any positive points in traditional structures and modes of conduct. When he describes the dominant forms of authority in traditional societies, Apter does not realize to what extent those forms provide independent societal self management mechanisms for interactions and conflict solving far away from the centralized authority of the nation state. What Apter describes as "parochial affiliations" are the base for solidarity and identity. The western nation state in itself was structurally established after a long period of interaction among these affiliations. It was not artificially drawn by colonial maps  .
Despite the limitations that I presented in the foregoing part, Apter work still provides significant description to the politics of modernizing nations at 1950s and 1960s. He presents a way to understand why the Soviet Union collapsed; this is derived from his analysis to the end of mobilization systems  .
There is only one thing that I did not formulate in my analysis, and I still not sure about it; the problem with the functional structural approach is that most efforts had been devoted to creating typologies for comparisons to the extent that scholars lost their link with reality, and started to see the world from their own typologies that did not exist in most cases. Reality is more overlapping complex one, to be set in one category, or a number of them. Even categories are not monolithic; there can be no inclusive categorization to all various socioeconomic, cultural, and political structures. Empirical data also is still unreliable measure, especially in underdeveloped countries, given all the limitations of positivist ideas and empirical studies  ; it would be reductionist to seek generalizations based on that. The study of development cannot offer something significant without socio anthropological study to societies; how they interpret power, structures, morality, and religion, but this should take place a part from the orientalist assumptions about non western societies. This would be more worthy rather than thinking about abstract categories and dying to detect empirical data to support their existence. This intellectual stand may find a base in the notion of the sublime developed by post modernism, but it is here not related to a group but rather to structures  .