RICO was considered to be so effective because it prosecuted organized crime groups using the criminal enterprise model. RICO ensured all members of an organized crime group would be subject to prosecution and forfeiture. Unlike other laws in existence during that time RICO subjected an individual to punishment for any actions taken by him or her that could be attributed to a criminal enterprise (Abadinsky 2013). It was also beneficial because it subjected every member of an organized crime group to accountability. Racketeering was defined in an extremely broad manner and included many offenses that do not ordinarily violate any federal statute i.e. Any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, extortion, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs. The federal government was provided with jurisdiction to deal effectively with organized crime as a result of RICO (Abadinsky 2013). Local and state law enforcement has exclusive jurisdiction prior to the enactment of RICO and were unable to deal with organized crime since street crime was their main priority. In place of having to prove a series of separate conspiracies under RICO it is a crime to belong to an enterprise that is involved in a pattern (requires the commission of at least two of the specified crimes within a ten year period) of racketeering even if it was committed by other members. The criminal penalties for violation of RICO are substantial, "fine of not more than $25,000 and/or imprisonment of no more than twenty years." (Abadinsky 2013).In addition, any person injured in his or her property or business as a result of violation of RICO may recover triple the amount in sustained damages, the cost of the suit and reasonable attorney's fees. There are also civil forfeiture provisions in addition to the criminal penalties. (Abadinsky 2013).A violator must forfeit to the government any business or property he or she acquired in violation of RICO. The government requests that union defendants be removed from their positions and that organized crime figures sever all contacts with the union. (Abadinsky 2013). A trustee is appointed by the judge and empowered to administer union affairs, monitor a fair election and initiate disciplinary charges against union officials in violation of the decree, union constitution or bylaws. The use of the statute has been very effective in that more than 1,000 major and minor organized criminals were convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms by 1990. For example, five New York LCN families have been prosecuted and LCN hierarchies in many other cities like: St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Kansas City, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Boston and Denver have been significantly impacted by similar prosecutions. Organized crime cases were also successfully prosecuted using RICO by Rudi Giuliani, former US Attorney. He indicted fourteen defendants as either leaders, members or associates of the Colombo family. (Abadinsky 2013).Another example of why RICO made such a positive impact on targeting organized crime was the fact that all of the state and federal crimes committed by the Colombo family over the past fifteen years were addressed under a single indictment. Predicate offenses in which criminal conduct occurred past the federal five year statute of limitations could be included since a substantial number of activities were considered to be racketeering offenses. Defendant cooperation is able to be obtained more readily as a result of RICO because of the threat of a substantial prison sentence. An offense that was begun, continued or completed in any district is permitted to be prosecuted by RICO regardless of venue. One of the most important prosecutions against the American Mafia occurred as a result of the use of the RICO statute. (Abadinsky 2013).They admitted to the existence of their commission, but would not acknowledge their involvement in criminal activitiy. Predicate racketeering acts ranged from murdrs of Bonanno family boss, Carmine Galented and his two associates in their effort to resolve a family leadership dispute, conspiracy to organize loansharking territories in Staten Island and management of multifamily bid rigging and extortion scheme in the New York concrete industry. All of the defendants were found guilty at trial in 1986: Anthony Corallo, boss of Lucchese Family, Carmine Persico, boss of Colombo family, Anthony Salerno, boss of Genovese family with the exception of Paul Castellano, boss of the Gambino family whose charges were dropped after his murder (Abadinsky 2013).
As a result of the broad racketeering definition encompassed by RICO this law was used to prosecute offenses not usually associated with organized crime including political corruption and white collar crime (Abadinsky 2013). Federal prosecutors have used RICO as a powerful weapon to target obscure business owners who failed to comply with federal regulations in order to routinely win easy convictions and prison terms instead of using it for the original intent of effectively dealing with the problem of organized crime (Anderson & Jackson 2004). For example, Guiliani became a popular public speaker collecting $75,000 per speech and became the mayor of new York city because of his successful prosecution of "Michael Milken and other Wall Street luminaries in the 1980s" (Anderson & Jackson 2004). Under RICO defendants are not required to have an economic motive according to the Supreme court's determination. There is no definition of organized crime in the statute which has allowed it to be used in an expansive range of situations that are completely unrelated to organized crime. RICO enables the government to join widely diverse defendants and crimes in a single prosecution which without RICO and under the rules of criminal procedure and evidence would be too disjointed to be allowed in the same trial (Anderson & Jackson 2004). The Supreme Court voted unanimously that abortion clinics can invoke RICO to sue violent protest groups for damages in NOW vs. Scheidler (510 U.S. 249, 1994). (Abadinsky 2013).An example, three leading anti-abortion protest groups were found liable under RICO by a Chicago federal jury in 1998. The jury awarded $85,000 in damages which was tripled by the judges in accordance with the statute (Abadinsky 2013).There is concern that the application of RICO has the potential to obstruct free speech and political protest. The government has the ability to freeze a defendant's assets before trial which may persuade them to take a guilty plea even if he or she feels that their case should be taken to trial. The stigma of being labeled a racketeer may be inappropriate given the circumstances at issue (Abadinsky 2013).There is no right to a trial by jury since it is considered to be proceeding in equity. The penalties are too severe to be applied to cases that are unrelated to organized crime. The triple damage provision encourages contingency lawyers to sue when under ordinary circumstances the potential reward would not be worth the commitment of time (Abadinsky 2013). RICO has failed to inhibit or stop the occurrence of crimes that most concern the public like robbery, murder and rape and is actually little more than a bait and switch statute. The state and federal law enforcement jurisdictional boundaries are no longer clear and most individuals pursued under RICO face almost no chance of acquittal (Anderson & Jackson 2004). RICO is used by federal prosecutors to circumvent the constitutional separation of powers between the state and federal governments. Federal law enforcement authorities engage in activities that deprive defendants of due process of law guaranteed by the constitution because RICO is an empowerment tool. The accused does not have to express any particular mental state such as: willfulness, knowledge, intent or recklessness to be in violation of RICO (Anderson & Jackson 2004).
Abadinsky, H. (2013). "Chapter Fourteen: Organized Crime Statutes," Organized Crime, Tenth Edition, Wadsworth Cengage Learning, pp.351-355.
Anderson, W. and Jackson, C.E. (2004). "Law as a Weapon: How RICO Subverts Liberty and the True Purpose of Law," The Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy, Retrieved March 2, 2013, from: http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=215
Question 2 of 4
Question: What are the advantages of using offshore banking facilities for money laundering? As part of your response, develop a course of action that authorities should follow in order to combat their use by organized criminal elements...within this response clearly defend the steps/actions you are proposing.
Pls remember to fully support your response with referenced data and or referenced real life examples that help illustrate and or defend your view as it regards this essay question.
Money laundering "conceals the source of illegal proceeds so that the money can be used without detection of its criminal source." Large amounts of profit are generated from criminal activities such as: drug trafficking, human trafficking, selling counterfeit goods, etc. Money laundering is a three step process that involves placement, layering and integration. Placement is the process of getting currency into the bank around the reporting system at home or abroad. Once the money is in the form of a bank entry a process known as layering enables the individual to hide its criminal origins through a series of complex transactions. The proceeds are made available to the criminals in an apparently legitimate form by the individual known as integration (Abadinsky 2013). Illegal activities can be masked by laundering money through any of the following: free trade zones, stock brokerage houses, cash business i.e. vending machine, establishment of an online business, shell corporations, prepaid cash cards, smurfing, gold dealers, automobile dealerships, insurance companies, trading companies, casinos, wire systems, trade financing, offshore banking or the use of private banking facilities. An offshore laundering scheme can be conducted when a paper company is created in any one of the number of countries with strict privacy statutes like Panama, Samoa, Vanuatu, Western and Pacific islands of Cook, Niue, Nauru, the Marshalls or the Cayman Islands by a lawyer acting on behalf of a client (Abadinsky 2013). The banks are mostly box offices or plaques with transactions recorded by booking centers. There are not any security guards, tellers or vaults. The funds to be laundered are transferred physically or wired to the company's account in a local bank. The paper company is then able to borrow money from the US or any other branch of this bank using the overseas deposit as security. Another option is setting up an employment contract between the launderer and his or her paper company for an imaginary service for which payments are made to the launderer (Abadinsky 2013).
There are many different advantages to offshore banking. You can keep all of the money you earn in interest as it is not subject to tax deductions. You can avoid your wealth being impacted by currency devaluation, high inflation or even a coup or war if the nation you live in has a less favorable economic climate (Anonymous 2011). International accounts allow you the most flexibility in how you use your account i.e. you can access funds any time of the day or night no matter what the time zone by going online, using the phone or accessing an ATM. Greater account privacy is usually achieved when you have an offshore account. A greater emphasis on maintaining client confidentiality is emphasized by many international jurisdictions like Switzerland. Clients are offered more interesting investment services and solutions by offshore banks because they are subject to less government intervention (Anonymous 2011). You can protect your estate from inheritance taxes in the future when you have an offshore bank account. Although it is becoming less common an offshore bank account may enable you to receive more interest while being charged less in service fees (Anonymous 2011). If you have financial commitments in more than one nation or currently offshore bank accounts enable you to bank in different currencies and even multi-currencies. Individuals with private offshore bank accounts may also benefit from having a private bank account manager or a relationship manager that can offer a more hands on approach. When your assets are held overseas it offers an extra layer of protection from malicious litigations and lawsuits (Anonymous 2011).
Effective anti-money laundering strategy must prevent, detect and punish illegal funds entering the financial system and the funding of organizations and/or activities. Various components of the financial trail must be identified and then the criminal organization should be attacked through its financial activities. Mechanisms must be put into place to read all financial transactions and to detect suspicious financial transfers. Money laundering is kept under control by a variety of regulations: Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Annuzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1998, Title III of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 and Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Abadinsky 2013). Recordkeeping and reporting requirements by financial institutions, private individuals and banks were established by the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. Cash transactions over $10,000 had to be reported using the Currency Transacton Report or CTR, people conducting transactions had to be properly identified and financial transactions were kept as records to maintain a paper trail. The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 required banks to monitor BSA compliance of reporting and recordkeeping requirements, prohibited structured transactions to evade CTR filings, civil and criminal forfeiture was introduced for BSA violations and money laundering was established as a federal crime (Abadinsky 2013).
"Money Services Business or MSB is a business that offers one or more of the following services: currency dealing or exchange, money orders, stored value, check cashing, traveler's checks and the business provides money transfer services in any amount or conducts more than $1,000 in money services business activity with the same person in one type of activity on the same day" (Anonymous n.d.). Every business that participates in money services is required to register with the US government. MSB's have to prepare and maintain a list of their agents for the preceding 12 month period every January 1st. A list of their agents must also be available upon request to the IRS, FinCEN and any other appropriate law enforcement or supervisory agencies. The period of record retention is for five years and should be filed or stored in a way that is accessible within a reasonable period of time. Suspicious Activity Reports or SARS are required to be filed by MSBs that: issue, sell or redeem money orders or traveler's checks, if part of the US postal service, if a currency dealer or exchanger, MSB's that serve as money transmitters (Anonymous n.d.). Check cashers may be added to this list of MSB's that need to file SARs if amended by FinCEN. MSB's are required to keep a copy of all SAR's in addition to the original or business record equivalent of supporting documentation for a period of five years from the date of the report (Anonymous n.d.). Every currency exchange in excess of $1,000 must be maintained by MSB's in a currency exchange record. Monetary instruments like traveler's checks or money orders in the $3,000 to $10,000 range must be maintained in a monetary instrument log by MSB's. Fund Transfer Rules require that regardless of the method of payment any fund transfers in the amount of $3,000 or more must be maintained by MSB's (Anonymous n.d.). When an MSB on any one day or on behalf of the same person conducts either cash in or cash out for a transaction involving currency in the amount of more than $10,000 a currency transaction report or CTR must be filed. Section 352 of the USA Patriot Act requires the development and implementation of an Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Program or AML by all MSB's including: issuers, sellers or redeemers of stored value and is regulated by 31 CFR 103.125 (Anonymous n.d.).
Abadinsky, H. (2013). "Chapter Fourteen: Organized Crime Statutes," Organized Crime, Tenth Edition, Wadsworth Cengage Learning, pp.351-355.
Anonymous, (2011). "Advantages and Disadvantages to Offshore Banking," Shelter Offshore, Retrieved March 3, 2013, from:
Anonymous, (n.d.) "Money Laundering Prevention: A Money Services Business Guide," Financial Crimes Enforcement Network: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Retrieved March 2, 2013, from: http://www.fincen.gov/financial_institutions/msb/materials/en/prevention_guide.html
Question 3 of 4
Question: If marijuana were legalized, how do you think this would impact organized crime, i.e., specifically how would you predict that criminal organizations dealing in marijuana and other drugs would react and or change? Defend your view.
In answering this essay question pls keep in mind the attributes covered earlier in this course.
Also, pls remember to fully support your response with referenced data and or referenced real life examples that help illustrate and or defend your view as it regards this essay question
Organized crime cannot be eliminated with drug legalization. Mexican drug trafficking would not be dramatically reduced if marijuana was legalized according to independent research. Illegal exports of marijuana to wholesalers in the United States are likely less than $2 billion in gross revenues to Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations. Transnational Criminal Organizations operating in Mexico derive revenue from diversified businesses that profit from intellectual property theft, human trafficking, extortion and kidnapping and not exclusively from drugs (Anonymous 2012). The legalization of drugs would not disband their other businesses. Violence is connected to drug trafficking and distribution, but it also spreads to other areas of criminal organizations as they expand. Drug trafficking had little to do with the brutal murder of seventy two central American immigrants in 2010 by the Zeta Criminal organization in Tamaulipas, Mexico. Regulated drug markets still provide ways for drug cartels to profit. A state regulated process was used to provide drugs to individuals in the 1960's as an experiment in Sweden. Users quickly sold the drugs on the black market, diverting them to others. Drug use in Sweden began to rise during this period of permissive drug use policies. Acceptability and availability of drugs increases with legality which is the case with alcohol and tobacco use which "far outpaces the use of illegal drugs" (Anonymous 2012). Drug consumption is reduced when drugs are kept illegal (Anonymous 2012). Marijuana use rates remain relatively low when prices are kept higher by laws that keep it illegal. Violent drug cartels would most likely grow stronger if marijuana were legalized because of the increased demand. If the legalized marijuana proposition were passed it would impose high taxes on the drug. The number and level of violence inflicted from drug cartels would not be reduced because they would simply undercut legal prices in order to keep their market share. The level of drug use among individuals has been shown to be impacted by changes in pricing. Young people have been shown to be especially sensitive to price as what we have seen with tobacco. The increase of drug availability with the simultaneous decrease in risk and price produce increased rates of drug addiction. The social costs of addictive substances that are legal and taxed such as tobacco and alcohol are much higher than any revenue they generate. "The social costs of these two drugs are 10 times the revenue gained by their taxation" (Anonymous 2012). In 2007 states collected $5.5 billion in revenue while federal excise taxes on alcohol total $9 billion. These amounts combined are less than 10% of the social costs. Alcohol related costs to criminal justice, health care and lost workplace productivity was estimated to be $185 billion. Tobacco collect only $25 billion in taxes while Americans spend more than $200 billion on the social costs of smoking each year (Anonymous 2010). The impact of marijuana decriminalization at cannabis cafes was examined by two economists to determine the impact on prevalence rates. Dutch youth cannabis use rates were found to have little measurable impact initially (Anonymous 2012). Youth marijuana use rates soared from 15 percent to 44 percent among 18-20 year olds with increased commercialization and as marijuana use became "normalized." The violence associated with the Mexican drug cartels would not be mitigated by marijuana legalization if history is taken into consideration (Anonymous 2012). Despite the presence of controls drug legalization widens availability and misuse even with prescription drugs that are tightly regulated like Oxycontin (Anonymous 2010). The burden on the criminal justice system would be increased and so would the harm it caused if marijuana was legalized. A total of nearly 2.8 million arrests for alcohol-related crimes such as public drunkenness, driving under the influence and liquor law violations were made in 2008. Marijuana possession arrests in 2008 under the current laws totaled around 750,000 (Anonymous 2010). During the prohibition era from 1920 to 1933 the sale, manufacture and transportation of alcohol was banned in the United States. A violent black market caused organized crime to flourish during this time. Crime increased 24% during the first year of prohibition in thirty major cities according to one study (Abadinsky 2013). A 9% increase occurred in homicides, assaults, theft and police department costs. More social unrest and increased crime resulted when a perceived harmful substance was banned in the early 20th century. Prohibition clogged the courts with drinking related prosecutions and criminal activity flourished that was centered on bootlegging and smuggling. Prohibition was not responsible for the appearance of organized crime, but it flourished because of the illegal status of liquor. Since the liquor business was international in scope prohibition facilitated cooperation between gang leaders from different ethnic groups and various regions known as syndication. The possession of intoxicating beverages was prohibited by the act, but it permitted medicinal liquor, sacramental wine and private consumption for the sole use of the owner, his or her family and guests (Abadinsky 2013). The legal loophole was exploited for community purposes by organized crime. The manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages were prohibited, but some state prohibition laws allowed consumption and importation. Until prohibition was repealed the murder rate rose every year as a result of the unparalleled level of criminal organization. Prohibition altered the relationship between gangs, politicians and entrepreneurs; it went from men with votes to men with money and guns (Abadinsky 2013). Prohibition enabled violent young men in neighborhoods throughout Chicago to become crime overlords. The focus became control of violence rather than control of politics and an expensive army of gunmen were necessary. The prohibition bureau was inept and corrupt with a general tolerance for bootleggers. The public had a "disrespect for federal law that translated into widespread contempt for the process and duties of democracy." They were also a "public menace and had a record of being killed and killing hundreds of civilians often women and children." The agents who killed innocents were rarely brought to justice (Abadinsky 2013).
Abadinsky, H. (2013). "Chapter Two: Development of Organized Crime in the United States," Organized Crime: Tenth Edition, Wadsworth Cengage Learning
Blocker, J.S. (2006). "Did Prohibition Really Work? Alcohol Prohibition as a Public Health Innovation," American Journal of Public Health, 96 (2), 233-243, doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2005.065409, Retrieved January 17, 2013, from: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1470475/
Anonymous, (2012). "Reducing Drug Demand in the US," Fact Sheet: Office of National Drug Control Policy, Retrieved March 3, 2013, from: https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:CDdHOrzLUSkJ:www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/drugdemandintfactsheet.doc+drug+decriminalization+impact+on+organized+crime&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESiOFKbuVXrhwYX6J9dd25A1dC0vNuXBnpXOGiXPFUCH3CyrLRUy5wyET9VgLSf3vlK-vOMLBMgiqrP9aqTArKSXyk9e0hu0rocxSCIdqvX98K7KpvgdMazdSTQ-7EC1MRtNu0bv&sig=AHIEtbTcllX5WbZ4qqud_eY2HgVBYxlfig
Anonymous, (2010). "Marijuana Legalization," Office of National Drug Control Policy, Retrieved March 3, 2013, from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/ondcp-fact-sheets/marijuana-legalization
Question 4 of 4
Question: It has been said by some that the "War on Drugs" is the same as the "War on Terror".
Do you agree and or disagree with that statement, and specifically why? Make sure to thoroughly defend your view.
Pls remember to fully support your response with referenced data and or referenced real life examples that help illustrate and or defend your view as it regards this essay question.
I disagree with the statement that the "War on Drugs" is the same as "The War on Terror." I think that some of the same approaches could be used for both in certain areas, however where organized crime and terrorism fundamentally differ another approach would produce the best outcome. It is important to understand how terrorism and organized crime are defined. The similarities and differences between organized crime and terrorism can be visualized once you comprehend the meaning of each term. The same strategies for reducing organized crime can also be used to decrease the risk of terrorism in the areas where their similarities overlap. Terrorism is the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through threat of violence or violence conducted by an organization with conspiratorial cell structure or identifiable chain of command in the pursuit of political change designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target (Abdullaey, Covill, Craig-Hart, Hart, Irby, Picarelli et al. 2005). Terrorism is a form of political violence not only utilized as a means to control parts of the state and society, but to revolutionize state and societal structures to fit their ideological convictions (Bjornhed 2004). They are actively challenging the state and not just attempting to control parts of the state like law enforcement agencies and the judicial branch as is the case with organized crime (Bjornhed 2004). Terrorists are pursuing a goal aimed at rebuilding the state in the image that fits their sense of proper order and organization. They believe that society and the state should be run and based on strict religious laws and codes (Bjornhed 2004). Terrorism always uses violence whereas organized crime only uses violence in part of the activities they commit when it is needed to maintain their power. Terrorists consider innocents who are injured or killed to be collateral damage and the impact is not undesirable accident or by product but carefully sought consequence of a terrorist act. The targets or sites chosen for attack by terrorists are typically political institutions, leaders or those connected with symbolic power that are opposed by the organization (Bjornhed 2004). An organized crime group is defined as three or more people existing for a period of time and acting together to commit one or more serious crimes for financial or other material benefit with power or profit being their overarching goals (Abdullaey, Covill, Craig-Hart, Hart, Irby, Picarelli et al. 2005). These groups maintain control of businesses by balancing risk minimization and profit maximization with corruption, the threat of violence or violence to enforce obligations (Abdullaey, Covill, Craig-Hart, Hart, Irby, Picarelli et al. 2005). Organized crime retains nationalistic or patriotic ties to the state while at the same time pursuing power at the expense of the state through the establishment of a parallel government (Abdullaey, Covill, Craig-Hart, Hart, Irby, Picarelli et al. 2005). "Organized crime groups want to exist within the state structure with minimum state intervention in the economy" (Bjornhed 2004). Minimal government control over land and population in combination with societal disarray greatly benefit the activities of organized crime groups. (Bjornhed 2004). Money laundering is used by organized crime groups as a means to conceal the criminal origins of their proceeds by processing the funds through legal origins to make dirty money appear to be clean (Keene 2007). The tool that organized criminals use to allow them to commit crimes is the infiltration of the political system. Once politicians from across the ideological spectrum are corrupted by organized criminals it allows them to establish a political party or run for office. There are many benefits to this such as: ability to influence the development of legislation, forestall and undermine crime investigations and obtain lucrative public contracts. For example, an individual who is caught money laundering by a lower level police officer may obtain protection or immunity against prosecution because of his political connections to the chief of police (Shelley and Picarrelli 2002). There is a substantial connection between organized crime and terrorism since both types of organizations have similar requirements for prosperity and survival: suppliers, means of transportation, infrastructure and source of income. Organized crime and terrorism both use violence to intimidate or make actual or implicit threats to do so. Both organizations may share the same geography and can have overlapping membership. Areas where the state has less presence and means of control such as places with regional conflicts and large shadow economies (offshore or underground banking, cash businesses and illicit enterprises) are more likely to have crime terror connections (Abdullaey, Covill, Craig-Hart, Hart, Irby, Picarelli et al. 2005). They can also share similar organizational structure such as compartmentalization and often operate under a similar set of contingencies when moving people, money and materials across borders. "Within both types of organizations, there is a preferred reliance on strong ties, such as ethnic and family relationships and operating within cell structures." A large number of terrorist groups are no longer affiliated with a particular nation state and organize themselves in a similar fashion to organized crime groups. They operate internationally by moving their finances and commodities across and through numerous countries (Shelley and Picarrelli 2002). In order to acquire logistical support and generate funding both terrorism and organized crime groups turn to criminal networks. Initiation ceremonies, apprenticeships and sponsorships are used by terrorists as well as organized crime groups. In order to conduct business they both fully exploit their networks of trusted couriers and contacts, so that they may avoid detection by law enforcement or other competitors in their line of business. Fraudulent documents are often needed by organized crime groups as well as terrorists in order to successfully smuggle goods and weapons. Organized crime and terrorist groups have a symbiotic relationship where they both realize the benefits to using the other as a resource. There are many areas that reflect the differences between terrorism and organized crime: openness to take on extreme risks, organizational goals, whether they participate in only illegal activities or conduct both types of business, role of violence in operations, type of targets, whether they want or need interaction with state structures, whether or not they want operate in secrecy or obtain media attention, what they use their funds for, number of people needed to conduct business, if there is a restriction of membership and whether or not they identify themselves as criminals. An example is when terrorists use violence to eliminate political competitors while organized crime groups use it to eliminate competitors, remove political threats or promote organizational goals (Shelley and Picarrelli 2002). Terrorist attacks generally occur outside the territory that hosts the terrorist network while organized crime violence is concentrated in the host country (Shelley and Picarrelli 2002). The violence employed by organized crime groups is used to obtain or maintain the monopolization of the criminal enterprises in a specific geographical region. They will only use violence to retaliate against individuals that threaten the well-being of their organization and their profits. Terrorists use violence to instill general fear, eliminate political enemies and promote their organizational goals (Shelley and Picarrelli 2002). Organized crime members do not take extreme risks without the prospect of personal financial gain. They attempt to evade or corrupt authorities rather than confront them as terrorists do. The primary goal of organized crime is economic gain and not political or social objectives and/or an ideological agenda which terrorists have. Organized crime members can take precautions to prevent becoming a target whereas potential terrorist victims have few if any precautions as they focus on attacking ordinary civilians. Terrorists choose their targets at random whereas organized crime has designated targets. Terrorists want to destroy state structures whereas organized crime members require their preservation to achieve their long term financial interests. Terrorists use their funds to further political ends, overthrow governments and impose their worldview, but organized crime groups seek to corrupt government to gain immunity for their crimes. Organized crime members prefer to carry out their activities secretly while terrorists seek to maximize media coverage to promote their message and publicize their goals. Organized crime has to be conducted by a number of individuals, but terrorism only needs one individual. Organized crime groups place significant restrictions on membership while terrorists actively recruit and typically enjoy sympathy from a segment of the population that identifies with their goals. Members of organized crime identify themselves as criminals whereas terrorist groups try to give their activities altruistic aura to justify their acts and to solicit people's sympathy for their cause. Political pursuits are the roots of terrorism while organized crime is primarily an economically driven enterprise (Shelley and Picarrelli 2002). Organized crime groups will participate in any operation that is profitable. They will not only participate in illegal activities, but will also make investments in legitimate businesses. Terrorists and organized crime groups also function similarly in their business operations in addition to possessing a high degree of overlap in their motives as they both participate to obtain a sense of belonging, as a result of peer pressure and for excitement (Fussey 2011). Organized crime groups and terrorists both combine their illegal resources with legal profits to increase the difficultly of detecting where legitimate funds begin and where criminal funds end. An example of organized crime groups using this method was in 1999 when money was sent to the Bank of New York to accounts from correspondent banks at the same time they made wire transfers from Russian crime groups. Terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda have also used this method with charities being the means used to move money. Social welfare activities in the community would be funded from money sent to the charity by Al Qaeda, but 10% or sometimes larger share would be used to support terrorists (Shelley and Picarrelli 2002). Organized crime groups often use cargo containers to send their illicit goods and services around the world, so terrorists found it would be successful to employ a similar means when they needed to escape detection. For example, Al Qaeda discovered that authorities have difficulty tracking and inspecting a larger daily shipment of international cargo, so their leaders used cargo ships as a means to escape from Afghanistan (Shelley and Picarrelli 2002). Another aspect is that most terrorist organizations are short lived just as criminal organizations also rise and fall relatively quickly. The majority of terrorist organizations do not survive longer than ten years as a result of one or a combination of the following: loss of cause, loss of popular support, death of a leader, internal factions and successful interventions (Grabosky & Stohl 2010). Drug trafficking has become the largest source of profit for both organized crime and terrorism groups. Terrorist activities are supported by drug sales in many parts of the world such as Sri Lanka, Colombia, Afghanistan and Japan. For example, Aum Shinrikyo, one of the most significant producer and distributor of methamphetamines in Japan and a rival to the Yakuza was responsible for the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995 (Shelley and Picarrelli 2002). Both terrorists and organized crime groups use human trafficking as another source of profit in addition to acting as a means for moving their members. An example was the masking of one Al Qaeda operative by the movement of Pakistanis and Afghans (Shelley and Picarrelli 2002). The war on drugs and terror consisting of illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, illicit drugs, illegal arms trafficking and money laundering has become interlinked because of the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime (Bjornhed 2004). The global response has been strengthened to meet the serious challenge and threat to security through the cooperation between intelligence gathering agencies and law enforcement efforts on both a national and international level (Bjornhed 2004). Alliances between criminal and terrorist groups form particularly in unstable regions to ensure the sustainment of an environment conducive to both their needs (Makarenko 2004). Instability is beneficial to both their interests because it not only maximizes criminal operations, but also diminishes the legitimacy of governments in the eyes of mass populations (Makarenko 2004). Organized crime may receive significant benefits in return for their cooperation with terrorists like: limiting the possibilities for international cooperation, destabilization of the political structure and undermining of law enforcement (Makarenko 2004). The mutual relationship between the KLA, Kosovo liberation Army and the Albanian mafia during the Kosovo conflict is an example of how an alliance between a terrorist and organized crime group can be integral to both parties. After the Albanian government fell in 1997 the KLA was established to seek an independent state from Serbia at the same time the Albanian mafia secured heroin trafficking routes through the Balkans. In order to effectively smuggle heroin a relationship was formed between Albanian criminal groups, the KLA and the KLF, Kosovo National Front (Makarenko 2004). A "drugs for arms" arrangement developed where the profits from the Pristina cartel were funneled to the KLA and were primarily used to buy weapons (Makarenko 2004). "The facilitation of access to different goods or the possibility of pure trading of materials can serve as an incentive for increased cooperation between the networks" (Bjornhed 2004). Both organizations are also encouraged to interact to meet their need for operability and survival. One example is that terrorists can use narcotic traffickers expert knowledge of routes and methods for illicit transfer of their shipments and narcotics for the relocation of people and goods. Terrorists also possess weaponry, explosives and military tactical knowledge and skills that is beneficial to narcotics traffickers (Bjornhed 2004). Narcotics and terrorist organizations also find knowledge of infrastructure vital. "Well-used drug routes, such as one of the Balkan routes, from Afghanistan through Iran, Turkey, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania and from there in to Europe through Italy and Greece, are also capable of transporting other illegal goods or people" (Bjornhed 2004). Organizations on either side of the crime-terror continuum find more newly developed transport ways and established routes to be equally useful. In order to ensure that contacts can be exchanged or shared and that routes are secure both types of organizations need safe houses, connections and corrupt border guards (Bjornhed 2004). Globalization of organized crime has created a nexus with terrorism which means that occasional links to terrorism have turned into regular and consistent support for terrorism. For example, organized crime may launder money for drug groups and then drug groups may sell weapons to terrorists which allow them to raise money for their operations (Anonymous 2004). "Terrorists may solicit organized crime groups to obtain false identification" Once they obtain false identification they can use it for identity theft and/or to access possible target sites. (Anonymous 2003). The use of identity theft has been expanded by organized crime to become a primary source of revenue and cover for: terrorism, sex slavery, human smuggling and drug trafficking. "For example, Al-Qaeda terrorist cell in Spain used stolen credit cards in fictitious sales scams and for numerous other purchases for the cell. They kept purchases below amounts where identification would be presented. They also used stolen telephone and credit cards for communications back to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Lebanon. Identity theft allowed the terrorists to obtain false passports and travel documents to open bank accounts and to cross international boundaries undetected." (Anonymous 2003). Organized crime and terrorists may have individuals that belong to both groups. Some examples that reflect people who have been involved in both types of organizations include perpetrators of the 2004 Atocha Station bombings who were involved in low level drug dealing as well as Richard Reid, the shoe bomber who robbed individuals in the local community and was known to the police as the "Peckham mugger" (Fussey 2011). "Organized crime can morph into terrorism and vice versa. Ordinary criminals may become radicalized and reinvent themselves as terrorists or terrorists may abandon their political agenda and become conventional criminals" (Grabosky & Stohl 2010). A process known as transformation can occur where a terrorist group may abandon terrorism altogether along with its old objectives if it becomes overly attached to its criminal activities and the profits it generates. For example, the IRA transformed itself into an organized crime group when in December of 2004 it committed the Belfast bank robberies following a long period of relative inactivity by Republican terrorists in Northern Ireland. Another example is Abu Sayyaf who is currently engaged in piracy and more economically motivated kidnappings for large ransoms in the Phillipines even though he started out as an Al Qaeda affiliate. Although there are no clear cut examples of this happening it is also possible for criminal groups to be transformed into terrorist groups. When organized crime has moved into terrorism it is rate for the relationship to result in a nexus and much more common for the shift to be temporary and described as activity appropriation. An example of this was seen when a bombing campaign against the Colombian government occurred as the result of Pablo Esobar, a drug lord's behalf by hiring ELN terrorists (Abdullaey, Covill, Craig-Hart, Hart, Irby, Picarelli et al. 2005). A terrorist group is much more likely to be brought into regular contact with organized crime since it is a logical choice for them to draw on the support and expertise of the criminal group for specialized services. Terrorists turn to organized crime groups because they have more experience in activities like: laundering money, forging documents or paying bribes (Abdullaey, Covill, Craig-Hart, Hart, Irby, Picarelli et al. 2005). The D-Company, an organized crime group used the proceeds from fake currency and narcotics to provide the terrorists with extensive strategic support and funding for the Mumbai attacks that killed 179 people and left over 300 injured (Sharma 2013). Partnerships were also developed between the D Company and al Qaeda in parts of Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan (Sharma 2013). "Some of the previous major terrorist attacks carried out in Mumbai alone that were in part funded and/or got logistical support from the D-Company include: March 1993 - 12-13 explosions, 257 killed, 700 injured; March 2003 - Bomb blast on commuter train, 11 killed; August 2003 - Twin car bombings, 52 killed, 150 injured; and July 2006-2007 - Bomb blasts on commuter trains, 200 killed" (Sharma 2013).