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Introduction (266/250 Words)
Globalisation has changed the way the entire globe functions on a daily basis, and intelligence is no exclusion. To gain a full understanding of what effect globalisation has on intelligence, a clear understanding of the term 'globalisation' must be established. The definition is extremely difficult to define and tends to vary from person to person. Inda and Rosaldo (2008: 4), defines globalisation in a very respectable manner and details that it refers to the 'intensification of global interconnectedness, suggesting a world full of movement and mixture, contact and linkages, and persistent cultural interaction and exchange.' Thus, this has culminated with the 'globalization of intelligence [resulting] in the creation of an interconnected web of formal and informal intelligence liaison arrangements that overlap across the world' (Svendsen 2008:132). The relationships between intelligence communities can be regarded as unique on a national basis. Cooperation between different agencies within one country has been identified as poor, let alone the issues that communities face when entering the broader homogenised international sphere referred to as globalisation. However, there are efforts being established to try and foster relationships between agencies on an international level. One example of this can be of the implementation of fusion centers arising globally on the subject of terrorism. This paper will endeavor to investigate three questions into great depth on intelligence and the international community being, how intelligence communities have managed to coped with globalisation, has there been any evident restructuring of the world of intelligence as a result, and finally what are the relationships between intelligence communities that have resulted from globalisation.
How have intelligence communities coped with globalization? (545/500 Words)
Intelligence communities have managed to cope with globalisation reasonably well, even though cooperation is not a natural instinct for intelligence agencies. With international crime becoming prominent, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism, and cyber crime to name a few as a result of globalism, intelligence agencies have been forced to reshape their relationships with other agencies to more of a multilateral basis rather than traditional bilateral agreements which only involve two parties. Svendsen (2008:132) justifies this by detailing that 'the globalization of intelligence is evolving in response to these concerns, but arguably it also reflects a commitment by many countries to a doctrine of pre-emption, which involves applying intelligence, law enforcement and security services' as a priori instead of post facto'. Intelligence agencies have had to create relationships with international bodies to cope with globalisation. The first sight of multiple countries cooperating with each other to battle the concept of globalisation was the Berne Group. Europe's Berne Group was established in 1971 and initially consisted of six European security agencies, and has now expanded to consist of more than 17 members (Aldrich 2004:738). Walsh (2006:626) outlines that the main objective of institutions such as the Berne Group is to 'facilitate sharing of relevant intelligence by replacing the patchwork of ad hoc and bilateral intelligence-sharing arrangements developed by the member states since the 1970s'. This results in the establishment of common intelligence databases and the sharing of information on security practices such as counter-terrorism to occur (Walsh 2006:626). However, the Berne Group cannot be regarded as a prime example of intelligence communities coping with globalisation as it only functions within Europe, and does not contain any transatlantic relationships such as with the United States or Australia. Additionally, as Walsh (2006:631) outlines, 'there does not appear to be a formal commitment, or even expectation, that participants will share all relevant intelligence in their possession with other members'. However, the Berne Group did contribute greatly to the creation of the Counterterrorist Group (CTG) just after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centres. As Aldrich (2004:739) details, the CTG 'is a separate body with a wider membership of EU intelligence and security services, together with the United States, Switzerland and Norway'. CTG is much more than just the exchange of information between agencies, rather it is about broad convergence, 'typically providing a forum for experts to develop practical collaboration on particular projects or devise joint methodologies' (Aldrich cited in Born, Leigh & Wills 2011:28). This can be viewed through instances such as joint training where countries with more experience on the subject of terrorism share their skills and procedures with other countries to create a standardization of procedures (Aldrich cited in Born, Leigh & Wills 2011:28). In many cases the joint training can build and foster relationships with other agencies which can lead to more valuable information being shared. A final example of how intelligence communities have managed to cope with globalisation is with the emergence of the UKUSA agreement. The agreement was 'signed in June 1984 between the First party (the United States) and Second parties (the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, divided signals collection efforts among its signatories' (Lefebvre 2003:530). All the examples above have displayed how globalisation has forced relationships between other countries from primarily being bilateral to containing a more multilateral approach involving multiple parties.
Has there been a restructuring of the world of Intelligence as a result? (481/500 Words)
There has been an evident restructuring of the world of intelligence as a result of globalisation, if there wasn't, there would be a much larger amount of international crime occurring due to criminals exploiting 'the gaps between sovereign states' (Aldrich 2009:893) to their advantage. One of the most visible changes that have occurred is the shift from agencies predominantly using traditional bilateral agreements between two parties to multilateral agreements involving multiple countries. However, countries that contain more capable intelligence services had long resisted the idea, partly due to the concern that it might diminish their own bilateral relations with the United States and also with concerns over security (Aldrich cited in Born, Leigh & Wills 2011:27). The CTG is one example of multilateral exchange where as established earlier 'provides a forum for experts to develop practical collaboration on particular projects' (Aldrich 2009:126). The form of multilateral sharing can contain a certain amount of risk due to exposing information to a wide number of countries which may lead to pitfalls with enlarging the intelligence community to incorporate foreign intelligence services if not built on solid terms. Reveron justifies this notion detailing that:
Multilateral relationships . . . provide a greater audience for intelligence, but may create counterintelligence concerns greater than the value of intelligence they produce . . . And when expanding beyond traditional allies, a variety of practical counterintelligence concerns arise, such as comprising sources and methods, fear of penetration, and introduction of fabricated intelligence. (Reveron 2006:458)
This is a major risk when dealing with multilateral agreements, however must be dealt with to enable various international agencies to collaborate and share information and services with one another in today's society. However, international institutions and agreements can help states overcome mistrust and engage in mutually beneficial cooperation, even when the trust between those involved is not very high (Walsh 2006:630). Walsh identifies two methods than can be implemented to encourage co-operation:
First, institutions can increase the costs of reneging on an agreement. For example, institutions often carefully define what actions constitute compliance and defection and lay out actions that states harmed by reneging can take in retaliationâ€¦ Second, institutions can also foster trust by creating specific allowances for states to monitor each other's compliance with agreements. One state cannot effectively and accurately punish another state that reneges unless it has accurate information about whether such reneging has actually occurred. (Walsh 2006:630)
These methods share some source of accountability and transparency whilst international agreements occur, thus hindering in many cases any chance of counterintelligence occurring between those parties involved. The UKUSA agreement is a prime example of this source of reassurance amongst communications on an international multilateral basis. Walsh (2006:630) justifies this by noting that the UKUSA 'agreement is believed to include rules about how widely a receiving state can disseminate shared intelligence within its government'. This is just one example of how the UKUSA agreement avoids any potential reneging to occur.
What are the relationships between intelligence communities?(578/500 Words)
The relationships between intelligence communities can be regarded as unique. Cooperation between different services within one country has been identified as poor, let alone the issues that communities face when entering the broader international sphere. New international crime and global terrorism has forced intelligence services rapidly towards greater cooperation. There are efforts being done to try and establish connections between agencies on an international level as evident above. An example that can be drawn upon here to display the relationships between intelligence communities is in relation to the fusion centers that are being created globally on the subject of terrorism as a result of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centers. The purpose of these centres is to 'engage, not only with the traditional intelligence and security structures, but all aspects of government and in some cases private partners, such as airlines and banks' (Aldrich cited in Born, Leigh & Wills 2011:26). Washington first developed the Terrorist Threat Integrations Center, which lead to many more sprouting up across the globe such as the National Threat Assessment Centre in Australia, and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre in the United Kingdom (UK) (Aldrich cited in Born, Leigh & Wills 2011: 26). The creation of these centres ensures that information is being collected and generated on the same subject, allowing for a relatively easy exchange of information and data with other centres. Svendsen (2008:671) builds upon this notion by detailing that the result of these fusion centres 'is not only faster and better coordinated sharing of information among local agencies, but also an entity that is in constant touch with its overseas counterparts at any time of the day or night'.
Bradford Westerfield (cited in Born, Leigh & Wills 2011:22) outlines that there are two different types of basic distinctions that might be drawn upon within the 'world of liaison', and further argues that the distinction is made between informal or ad hoc cooperation and fully fledged liaison which can be characterised as official and formal. Thus, those agencies dealing with large amounts of information will tend to utilise a more formal relationship which includes written frameworks between the parties involved to avoid any counterintelligence or reneging as detailed earlier. Conversely, some intelligence communities may work on an ad hoc basis where some agencies may have more advanced equipment and can aid in obtaining data, or all parties involved are aiming for the same outcome. Aldrich draws upon the example of the Russian and American ad hoc relationship throughout some part of the 1990s detailing:
Typicallyâ€¦ officers from the SVR, the Russian intelligence agency, secretly placed nuclear detection equipment inside North Korea that was provided by the CIA to assist in tracking Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programme. The equipment was installed inside the Russian embassy in the capital. The CIA trained up the officers from the SVR in their operation. The Russians then shared their findings with the Americans. (Aldrich cited in Born, Leigh & Wills 2011:22)
This is one example of how ad hoc international relationships are utilised in the functioning of intelligence communities to cope with globalisation. Additionally, Paul Taillon (cited in Lefebvre 2003:534) notes, 'on occasion, some smaller nations can have access to important human intelligence sources, and therefore these states can be attractive partners in intelligence-gathering activities abroad'. These fusions centres can be seen as a vital tool to deal with the globalisation process, where technology allows information to travel at faster speeds than ever before regardless of location and time. Additionally, in the Russian and American example above it displays how joint training can build upon previous intelligence abilities and contributes to the standardization of skills across intelligence communities on an international basis.
Conclusion (361/250 Words)
This paper has provided an insight into the way that intelligence communities have managed to cope with the emergence of globalisation. The globalisation process has blurred the boundaries between countries causing the globe to become more homogenised and interconnected. This creates new difficulties for intelligence communities due to varying laws and regulation in different countries that may hinder the transfer of information between agencies easily. This enables international criminals to exploit the gaps until some sort of international regulation can be established. The intelligence communities are definitely working towards working together to share information and training to create a standardization of procedures across intelligence communities. This paper has endeavored to investigate how intelligence communities have managed to cope with globalisation and has subsequently drawn upon examples such as the formation of the Berne Group, the Counterterrorist Group, and the UKUSA agreement to do so. These groups were formed to battle the process of globalisation and foster international relationships with other foreign Intelligence agencies. The restructuring of the world of intelligence has also been drawn upon in this paper, and it has been established that intelligence agencies dislike the process of multilateral agreements and prefer bilateral agreements due to the trust and security that is associated with a bilateral agreement. However, to function adequately within today's society the use of multilateral agreements is inevitable, and agencies will need to adopt them to foster wider relationships with the interconnected globe. Additionally, the role of fusion centres has been investigated within intelligence communities and has displayed the vital role that they play with a specific focus on terrorism, and the relationships that they create with foreign countries on the same subject. Finally, this paper established the two methods of cooperation that is evident in the world of liaison. Where large amounts of information is being transferred countries prefer to function on formal, predominantly bilateral agreements, however with minor objectives, countries can use ad hoc relationships to achieve their desired outcome. Globalisation is not going to disappear, thus intelligence communities face a significant battle to create a system that functions with ease and this paper has indicated that agencies are on the right path to success.