About election voting systems

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Election voting systems normally have voter confirmable paper audit-trails. Election Systems as being requested by the Huffman Trucking Company Service are useful because they provide an enhanced ease of access for disable voters and speed the counting of ballots. An election system (electronic voting system) can be defined as a term that encompasses various types of voting, espousing both electronic means of counting votes as well as electronic means of casting a vote. For instance, in the United States, there is a controversy that electronic-voting systems such as DRE (Direct Recording Electronic) voting could escalate the possibility of electronic fraud. Electorates have been using election systems since 1960s when punch cards were debuted. Currently, most election systems are electronic (Michael and Hardy, 2008).

The techniques that are used in an election system such as Electronic voting systems can involve ballots transmission, and transmission of votes through the internet, telephones, or private computer networks. Moreover, it can encompass voting kiosks that are specialized (including DRE voting systems that are self-contained), punch cards and optical scan voting systems. This paper is going to describe the considerations necessary to address the possible risks associated and possible security requirements associated with the Benefits of Election Systems being requested by the Huffman Trucking Company Service Request. The paper will further look at the recovery procedures recommended for this situations, risks associated with disruption of these systems, and explain a viable risk-management strategy.

Security requirements that are associated with the benefits of Election Systems

Appraising and appraisal follow ups:

an autonomous corroboration system can be used in appraisals or recounts. It encompasses the voters abilities to substantiate how their votes were tabularized or how their votes were cast. This technology reassures those voting that their cast vote were done correctly, detects probable malfunction or fraud, or offer a means to audit the original systems. An audit system can be applied in random recounts that are measured to detect probable fraud or malfunction. End-to-end auditable voting systems give a receipt to voters, which do not permit voters to prove how they voted, but permit them to authenticate that their vote is encompassed in the count, the results are tabularized appropriately, and all cast-votes were by legitimate voters.

Electronic secret ballots:

Election voting systems use electronic ballots to store votes in a computer memory. A single election system can be programmed to provide ballots in various languages which are unique to the electronic voting. Electronic secret ballots minimize the risk of fatiguing the supply of ballots. Moreover, they remove the use of paper ballots.


In this context, articulacy means clear. While using election systems, the citizen reliability ought to be able to verify the results with no specialized knowledge of the subject. Despite the fact that the DRE Nedap-computers until now have not contented that prerequisite, the choice did not veto election systems but required all steps that are fundamental in voting to be subjected to examinability by the community. Thus, election voting systems are usually transparent.


Election voting systems are fully accessible even to those individuals with disabilities. A disabled individual can use a ballot system that has physical markers that indicates where an individual can mark. Thereby, everybody can vote and this is a security requirement. In addition, Electronic voting systems can use adaptive technologies such as joy sticks, headsets, and foot-pedals to provide the necessary accessibility.

Cryptographic corroboration:

Cryptographic solutions usually permit voters to authenticate their votes personally because they are able to identify their votes, but cannot prove his/her vote to somebody else. Election Systems can provide solutions that permit voters to verify that their cast-votes are tabularized and recorded with arithmetical computations. The worries of incorrectly recorded votes can be alleviated by these systems. Nonetheless, a randomly generated voting session id can be used to tag each vote, which would permit the voter to confirm that his/her vote was recorded correctly in an audit track of the ballot. A voter using an election system is permitted to prove that he/she voted as he/she is issued with a form of receipt that are signed by the authorities in voting by means of digital signatures. These prove the accuracy of the tally.

Voter intention:

The voters intent can be determined by immediate feedbackElectronic voting systems are able provide an immediate feedback to the voters and thus can detect possible problems such as over-voting and under-voting which may lead to spoilt votes.

Probable risks that are associated with the benefits of Election Systems

Additional ballots in different lingoes can be alleviated by providing a procedure to publish extra-ballots at voting locations. The expense of delivery justification, software justification, system validation, compiler trust justification, and additional validations that are related to election systems are expensive and complex. With comparison to electronic ballots, they are not guaranteed to be cheaper than paper ballots (Rosenfeld and Steven, 2007).

The visually impaired or the blind cannot access optical scan machines and punchcard machines. Voters with limited strength and mobility find it difficult to operate lever machines. Any verification system that does not certify the secrecy of the choice of a voter can enable voter selling or voter intimidation. Inadequate concentration, lack of testing, and insufficient audit measures to an election system leaves elections open to fraud and error. Insufficiently secured hardware can be subjected to physical tempering. Critics by Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet&rdquo which means that We do not trust Election Systems argue that a man in the middle attack technique can insert foreign hardware into election systems, or amid the central machine of the mechanism and the client, therefore, DRE machines may not offer adequate protection (Wendy and Grossmann, 2009).

Humans are not well-equipped with verifying operations that occur within an election system, thereby, operations cannot be trusted. Under a secret-ballot, the input is not known as well as the expected output with which one can compare the electoral results. Hence, humans are not able to authenticate security, accuracy and honesty of the entire election system. Insurance echelons against unemployment differ considerably across nations. The rates of replacement, that is, the ratio correlating unemployment to income to what individuals earned when they were employed, are more in nations with election systems that are proportional than in nations with majoritarian systems. Furthermore, the rates of replacement are related positively with per capita income and negatively related with unemployment rates in nations. An electoral competition model can be implemented to replicate these stylized facts (Padgett and Tim, 2007).

Recovery procedures recommended for this situations

Election Management Bodies (EMB) ought to use various computer systems as well as dedicate administration services very often. Some of the practices for managing computers may encompass: services identification; making sure that Information Technology has the hold up of all users and stake holders, who comprehend the role of IT in getting work done; preparation of complete inventory and computer peripherals and equipments; setting of standards for computer software and hardware; maintaining peripherals and computers; monitoring compliance with the set information technology policies; planning for computer replacements; assessing the security risks of the computer system, installing antivirus software and peripherals, and regularly updating security software; and designing security-procedures such as disaster recovery plans, control of access to the systems and backup procedures. They are specialized software that can be used by EMBs computer systems to report on the system availability and system performance, identify, perform diagnosis and analyze where they are any problems that need to be addressed. A significant part of technology implementation is hardware management because all computer technology relies on hardware (Simons and Barbara, 2007).

Risks associated with interruption of these systems

There is a risk to the fair counting of ballots because the machines can be manipulated in favor of a particular party. The source code used in these election systems is far below the security standards that are applicable in other contents. Diebold Election Systems (2007) agrees that the election systems as implemented in technology, policy, and procedure is at risk of compromise. Moreover, vote totals can be altered by replacing the memory card with actual voting results with the one that have been tampered with. Memory card attacks are a real-threat; one can modify the contents of a memory card of the AV-OS. These modified cards can be used by an election system to alter the election results from that machine in several ways.

Viable risk-management strategy

Risk management is the process of identifying obstacles that hinder that attainment of objectives. During elections reporting period, a viable risk management strategy that can be developed may encompass a detailed-process in risk identification; an allusion guide listing probable risks during the election process activities, and design policies to manage this risks. This risk management strategy is the basis for all electoral activities because: it strengthens environmental management; and enhances control programs (Diebold Election Systems, 2007)

Identity theft

According to Hardy (2008), Identity theft can be defined as fraud that involves somebody pretending to be another person for his/her malicious benefits. In view of the fact that it is not intrinsically probable to use the identity of someone else, it is a misnomer. An individual whose identity has been used can suffer impacts in situations where he/she is held responsible for the actions of the perpetrator. In many nations it is a crime to use the identity of another individuals identity for personal gains. Identify fraud is the outcome of identity theft, and incidences of identity theft are difficult to detect using election systems. One can use identity cloning to vote. Moreover, identity theft may facilitate crimes like election flawing. In some cases identity cloning may attack electoral systems in order for some persons to receive attention or praise for the victims attainments.

How the Benefits of an Election System support the tracking and reporting of employee union and nonunion

The electronic voting system is efficient in that it can enable employees to assist, form, or join labor organizations in order to offer injunctions that are mandatory for unfair election procedures for other purposes, or during organizing efforts. Most employees that are in a bargaining unit can select a union or a nonunion representation through an election. An election may be held if most of employees ask for a representation by either a union or a non-union. Nowadays, an election process is permitted by most workers to be represented in the union, thereby, using an election system. This election process ensures that an employee who selects either a union or a nonunion is able to get a contract, therefore, supporting the reporting and tracking of employee nonunion and union (Simons and Barbara, 2007).

Nonetheless, an election system group employees into eligible groups; limits the rules that are available; offers tools that are flexible for employees customized interfaces to ease election management; and allows disparate data files in the election systems to be imported. Implementers, end users or clients such as employees, service providers or even administrators may able to access the current electronic system without installing the current inventions of the software on their computer systems or personal computers. Thereby, the election process ought to be fast, have a voter authenticable paper audit trails, be open to public inspection, and so as to give accurate results (Simons and Barbara, 2007).


Election Systems are useful to the Huffman Trucking Company Service because they ease the speed of counting ballots as well as the access for disable voters. Computer security professionals are undivided with regard to what needs to be done, DRE machines ought to encompass voter confirmable paper audit-trails. In addition, software that is used on Election Systems ought to be open to public inspection, to guarantee accuracy of the voting system. Thus, Huffman Trucking Company Services ought to understand the probable risks that are associated with election systems, the recovery procedures that can be used in these circumstances, the probable risks that can take place when these systems are disrupted, and the viable risk management plans; before they retort to an election system.


Diebold Election Systems (2007): Diebold Election Systems to Be Solutions for Premier Election, Press release accessed on 19 January 2010 from http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/diebold-election-systems-to-become-premier-election-solutions-58271377.html

Michael H and Hardy M (2008): Paper ballot funding is defeated in the house, FCW.com, accessed on 19th January 2010 from http://www.fcw.com/online/news/153178-1.html

Padgett and Tim (2007): Voting out E-Voting Electronic Machines, Time Magazine. Retrieved on November 29, 2007

Rosenfeld and Steven (2007): Fallout from Prohibit on Electronic Voting Machineries, California Time Magazines

Simons T and Barbara K (2007): The Top to Bottom Review in California, the Voter.

Wendy M and Grossmann G (2009): Machines bad at counting votes, The Guardian accessed on 19th January 2010 from http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/apr/30/e-voting-electronic-polling-systems

Revision-Risk Control Models

Insurance echelons against unemployment differ considerably across nations. The rates of replacement, that is, the ratio correlating unemployment to income to what individuals earned when they were employed, are more in nations with election systems that are proportional than in nations with majoritarian systems.”

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In this context the word echelons means levels, that is, Insurance level(s)/Levels of insurance against employment vary considerably across countries. The word majoritarian systems means document ballot voting systems (where votes are cast and counted by hand, using paper ballots,” that is ….are proportional than in nations with document ballot voting systems.