Territorial Waters Of Nahi Laddna Biology Essay

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Agristan, Navedia and Nahi Ladna are neighbouring nations. Agristan and Navedia share a common history and the borders have been tense due to unresolved boundary issues including delineation of the maritime boundary. The state of Agristan has been under constant state of political instability. This unrest has given rise to insurgency. The nation is also accused of being a hub of several terrorist organisations. Agristan and Kyuna have been known to collude over issues related to maritime terrorism.

Nahi Landa has been struggling with a major militancy problem for many years. KLF is a well organised force with a small maritime cadre and Air force. It is known to be having receiving most of its war-fighting supplies from terror groups located in Argistan.

Intelligence from Nahi Ladna indicates that the Kyuna Liberation front (KLF) is planning to launch a major offensive to capture the city of Trincomalee by Mid Aug 10. Firm intelligence indicates that a 20,000 GRT cargo vessel, MV Al Kabir, registered in Sierra Leone, is carrying a major consignment of arms/ammunition for the KLF. The vessel departed Quin Blair at dusk on 02 Aug 10 and is scheduled to arrive Jaffna between 0600 hr - 2359 hr on 04 Aug 10.

Own merchant men have reported sighting of the convoy in position 10° N, 86° 30' E at 1000 hr on 03 Aug 10.

The government of Nahi Ladna has sought urgent assistance from our government in locating and stopping MV Al Kabir from reaching Jaffna. It has offered Trincomalee airbase for our MR operations.

Following has been ascertained:-

Two operational corvettes are available in Chennai and can be fuelled at this port only with an OTR of 4 hr.

One submarine is available at Chennai. However, she has raised an OPDEF on her propulsion motor and is not likely to be available for another one day.

Our government has not permitted engagement within territorial limits of Nahi Ladna.

NNS Sindhughosh is on routine patrol off the Northern coast of Nahi Ladna and can be redeployed at short notice.

Two DO 228 are available and can operate from Trincomalee. One will be ready to take off from Trincomalee at 1800 hr and the second at 2000 hr on 03 Aug 10. Due to operational reasons the TRS has been reduced to 2 hr.

MV Al Kabir is likely to be escorted by two Sauron Class boats (FAC(M)).

Major Assumptions. The following major assumptions have been made:-

The enemy is aware that Nahi Laddna will not allow interception of merchant vessels in her territorial waters by Navedia forces.

The KLF Air Force with limited assets will not participate in the conflict.

Agristan will not enter the conflict as she has been under immense diplomatic pressure with regards to terrorism from her soil.

FACTORS AFFECTING SELECTION OF AIM

We could comply with the CNS's directive, either by seizing MV Al Kabir or by intercepting her. The options available to us, therefore, could be:-

(a) To neutralise the escort FAC (M)s and thereafter seize MV Al Kabir.

(b) To intercept MV Al Kabir.

10. The seizing of MV Al Kabir post neutralizing her escorts will ensure that the vessel dose not reach her destination. The vessel can then be escorted by own ships and be handed over to the Nahi Laddna government. To achieve this, the following needs to be considered:-

Search by DO 228 at the earliest available opportunity to locate the escort ships. Subsequent searches be planned for continuous tracking to facilitate engagement by OTHT. The enemy has superior SAM capability and has matching SSM capability.

Post neutralising of the escort ships MV Al Kabir can be seized.

11. The interception of MV Al Kabir can be under taken by own corvettes outside territorial waters of Nahi Laddna. Own submarine could be used to destroy the convoy as the enemy lack credible ASW capability.

12. The above considerations indicate that CNS's directive can best be accomplished by intercepting MV Al Kabir outside territorial waters of Nahi Laddna.

AIM

13. To locate and intercept MV Al Kabir outside territorial waters of Nahi Laddna.

FACTORS

Meteorological and Astronomical Conditions

14. The meteorological data indicates light SW winds and good visibility. The phase of the moon is new moon on 03 Aug 10. The isothermal layer exists upto 100m. Meteorological and astronomical data for the Bay of Bengal is placed at Appendix E.

15. Deductions.

(a) The weather will be suitable for high speed steaming of ships and weapon firing.

Visual identification will be possible upto 12 nm during day. However identification by night would be severely restricted due to poor moon light conditions.

Comparison of Forces

16. Own Surface Vs Enemy Surface. Details of own and enemy ships are placed at Appendices A and D respectively.

17. Deductions - Comparison of Surface Forces.

(a) The enemy surface combatants have better anti missile defense capabilities as compared to own ships. Hence, a synchronous attack is required to cripple the enemy escort ships .

(b) SSM range of Kora class is comparatively higher . SSM range of Khukri class and that of enemy surface combatants is comparable. Early detection of enemy by own MR and OTHT procedure can facilitate engaging enemy at greater range.

18. Own Surface Vs Enemy Air. Enemy Air Force has limited capability and is not likely to participate in this operation. The enemy does not have any integral air capability.

19. Deductions. Enemy does not have OTHT capability. Hence, SSM firing by enemy at MER is unlikely. Enemy surveillance and detection ranges are limited to his onboard sensor capability.

20. Own Air Vs Enemy Surface. Details of own aircraft is placed at Appendix C.

21. Deductions. Own MR ac faces threat from enemy SAMs and MANPADs. Own DO 228 is not AShM capable and hence will have to resort to gambit tactics remaining outside enemy SAM ranges.

22. Own Submarine V/s Enemy Surface. Details placed at Appendices B and D.

23. Deductions. MR-sub cooperation is to be used for engaging enemy convoy using TLMs . Enemy surface units do not posses ASW capability. This provides greater freedom for positive identification prior carrying out a torpedo attack.

24. Conclusion - Comparison of Forces.

Own SSMs enjoy range advantage over the enemy SSMs. Non availability of MR aircraft prevents the enemy from employing his SSMs at MER. To obtain superior and effective firepower synchronous attack by own surface units using OTHT could be best made use of.

Own submarine can engage enemy convoy using TLMs.

(c) Threat to own aircraft is limited to that from enemy SAMs and MANPADs.

25. Air Searches. The details of air searches are placed at Appendix F.

26. Deductions- Air Searches. With two MR ac surveillance of the operation area can be adequately maintained throughout the operation.

27. Conclusion - Air Searches. Early detection of enemy convoy is required for facilitating SAG action by own surface combatants. Continuous tracking of convey is required for TLM engagement at MER.

28. Lettered Positions. The following positions are relevant to this factor:-

Letter Designator

Lat

Long

Significance

AA

09° 30'N

84° 30'E

Own ships to RV for SAG action

BB

09° N

82°E

For MR-sub co-operation

MM

10° N

86° 30'E

En posn at 031000

NN

07° N

82° 30'E

En convoy transit pt

PP

11° N

84°E

En convoy transit pt

29. Table of Distances. The following distances are relevant:-

From

To

Distance

MM

Jaffna

340 nm

Chennai

Jaffna

195 nm

Trincomalee

MM

330 nm

30. Time and Space. The time and space considerations are as follows:-

Own surface units will be available to proceed to sea at 1030 hr on

03 Aug 10. With a max sustainable speed of 23 kn they will be able to position themselves East of Nahi Laddna latest by 2330 hr on 03 Aug 10.

NNS Sindhughosh is in the vicinity of Northern coast of Nahi Laddna and can position itself East of Jaffna immediately.

The enemy convoy has the liberty to follow alternate routes from MM at 1000 hr on 03 Aug 10 at a speed of 16 kn in order to make the desired ETA at Jaffna.

Endurance.

31. Own.

(a) Details of the endurance of own ships are available in Appendix A.

(b) Ships can make good max speed and the submarine can operate at max sonar operating speed for the duration of operations.

(c) 25% of the fuel is to be kept as action reserve.

32. Deductions.

(a) Endurance values considered allow for an action reserve of 25%.At a speed of advance of 23 kn own ships have a combined endurance of 2200nm.

(b) The ships would have consumed approximately 30% of their fuel capacity to cover 730 nm. Consequently they would have adequate endurance remaining to return to base.

(c) Own submarine has max endurance of 45 days patrol

33. Conclusion. Own forces have adequate endurance for this operation.

EW.

34. The following issues are pertinent:-

(a) Both own and enemy surface units have adequate ESM capabilities.

(b) Own MR ac would be required to transmit on I band (ELTA) during the search.

35. Deductions.

(a) Own force should not operate surveillance radar to maintain element of surprise.

(b) Use of radar by own aircraft would give the enemy warning regarding its presence in the area.

COURSES OF ACTION

Enemy Courses

36. The enemy is planning to launch a major offensive to capture the city of Trincomalee by Mid Aug 10. MV Al Kabir with the arms and ammunitions onboard and possibly under escort by two Sauron Class FAC (M) departed Quin Blair at dusk on 02 Aug 10 and was sighted of in position MM at 1000 hr on 03 Aug 10 by own merchant men. The enemy is understood to have monitored transmission of own merchant men.Due to operational requirements the enemy intends to arrive Jaffna between 0600 - 2359 hr on 04 Aug 10.

37. Course I. MV Al Kabir along with two escort ships in convoy formation may head NW from position MM to PP maintaining max speed of 16 kn and there after alter course to arrive Jaffna by night 04 Aug10.

Likelihood. To transit this route, the enemy would make good his ETA at Jaffna by 2200 hr on 04 Aug 10. This would provide the convoy the cover of darkness when approaching close to the Navedia and Nahi Laddna coast. However, the adoption of this course will force the enemy pass close to own maritime boundary. The adoption of this course by the enemy is unlikely.

Effect. Own DO radar/visual searches by night and day is possible along the enemy expected route. The chances of the convoy going undetected are less. The time available for own surface units and submarines to intercept the convoy will be maximum.

38. Course II. MV Al Kabir along with one escort ships in close support may head for Jaffna directly from position MM maintaining max speed of 16 kn to arrive at destination at the earliest.The second escort ship establishing a barrier line patrol 100nm East of Jaffna.

(a) Likelihood. To transit the direct route, the enemy would be most comfortable to make good his ETA at Jaffna by 0700 hr on 04 Aug 10. This would provide the convoy the cover of darkness when approaching close to the Navedia and Nahi Laddna coast. Further, the adoption of this course will give the enemy the maximum time in hand to employ diversion/deception tactics, if necessary. The FAC (M) on barrier line patrol can interdict own surface combatants when detected. The adoption of this course by the enemy is likely.

(b) Effect. Own DO will be employed for radar /visual searches by night only. The chances of the convoy going undetected are high. The time available for own surface units and submarines to intercept the convoy will be minimum.

39. Course III. MV Al Kabir along with one escort ship each positioned at 20nm on stbd bow and stbd quarter in close support from position MM may divert southwest towards position NN and enter the territorial waters of Nahi Laddna . Thereafter head for Jaffna maintaining a speed of 16 kn to reach destination by 2330 hr on 04 Aug 10.

(a) Likelihood. The enemy is understood to have monitored own merchant men transmission. It could be assumed that the enemy is aware that Nahi Laddna will not allow interception of merchant vessels in her territorial waters by Navedia forces. This course would allow the convoy to masquerade as neutral shipping and mingle with the traffic in the six degree channel. This course would ensure that the convoy would transit at max possible distance from own forces. It will also ensure that the convoy transits the last leg of the route through territorial waters of Nahi Laddna and in the period of darkness to avoid detection. However, this course will leave the enemy with almost no time in hand for deception/diversion tactics. The adoption of this course by the enemy is probable.

(b) Effect. This course will stretch own efforts. MR search would not yield expected results as detection of the convoy when close to merchant traffic in the six degree channel will be difficult. Own actions are limited if the convoy is detected post entering territorial waters of Nahi Laddna.

Enemy's Most Probable Course

40. Course I takes the enemy close to own waters. This ensures early detection of the convoy by own surface force and MR ac.

41. Course II takes the enemy to the destination by direct route at the earliest and gives him the maximum time in hand for deception/diversion tactics. It also ensures that own MR searches are planned at night and hence, visual detection difficult.

42. The adoption of course III would enable the enemy to overcome some of the disadvantages of both courses I and II. This course would enable the enemy to be at max distance away from own forces. This would allow the enemy to transit through territorial waters of Nahi Laddna and in the period of darkness to avoid detection.

43. Enemy's most likely course is therefore course III.

Own Courses

44. Course A. To intercept the convoy as far as possible from Jaffna(destination) on the direct or indirect route.

45. Advantages. Early detection by MR aircraft will provide information of enemy position and MLA. Own surface units can take up position to launch SSM attack on MV Al Kabir using OTHT procedure. This give a maximum time for own forces to plan a synchronous attack. Continuous tracking by own MR would also facilitate MR-sub co-operation and eventually use TLMs to intercept the convoy. It will ensure that the engagement takes place away from territorial waters of Nahi Laddna.

46. Disadvantages. Own MR effort to cover the divergent route of the enemy originating from MM will be stretched.

47. Course B. To intercept the convoy near the North Eastern coast of Nahi Laddna.

48. Advantages. This course caters for both the ECsOA. Own ships can be positioned on area patrol to intercept the convoy. Own submarine can positively identify the enemy contacts prior engaging with torpedoes.

49. Disadvantages. The convoy may enter territorial waters of Nahi Laddna before being intercepted by own forces.

Own Best Course of Action.

50. The need for detection and tracking of the enemy convoy by own MR aircraft and subsequent OTHT is decisive in intercepting MV Al Kabir. In course A, own surface forces will form a SAG and engage the contacts by synchronous attack .This ensures concentration of forces. Continuous tracking by own MR would also facilitate MR-Sub co-operation and eventually use TLMs to intercept the convoy .This ensures surprise.

51. One the other hand , course B would be more defensive and chances of intercepting the convoy prior to entering the territorial waters of Nahi Laddna is difficult.

52. Our best course of action is, thus, course A (To intercept the convoy as far as possible from Jaffna(destination) on the direct or indirect route).

OUTLINE PLAN

Forces Taking Part

53. NNS Kuthar and Karmukh, NNS Sindhughosh and two DO 228 aircraft.

Role of Forces

54. DO 228. One DO 228 to get airborne from Trincomalee at 1800 hr on 03 Aug 10 and arrive in Area Nina and carry out a Creeping Line Ahead search in accordance with the plan given at Appendix F. The second DO 228 is to get airborne at 2000 hr and arrive in Area Babita and carry out a Creeping Line Ahead search in accordance with the plan given at Appendix F. On completion of searches ac are to return to Trincomalee for TRS and thereafter reestablish search in respective areas. In case of not detecting the enemy convoy by 1300 hr on 04 Aug 10 fresh search areas will be promulgated.

55. Ships.

(a) Ships to sail from Chennai at 1030 hr on 03 Aug 10. Suitable

precautions to be taken while leaving harbour.

(b) Ships to proceed to AA at max sustained speed.

(c) On receipt of detection report by MR ac, own formation to manoeuvre

as necessary for synchronous attack to intercept enemy. The following actions are to be taken:-

(i) SSM strikes are to be launched against the enemy

convoy, with MV Al Kabir as first priority target.

(ii) Strikes to be repeated till the vessel is damaged to the extent that they cannot deliver their cargo at Jaffana.

(d) If engagement has not taken place till 1200 hrs on 04 Aug 10, NNS Kuthar and NNS Karmukh are to establish patrol in Area Suman and Area Burman respectively.

56. Submarine. NNS Sindhughosh is to establish patrol in Area Nayan by 1300 hr on 03 Aug 10. The submarine is to ready for MR-sub co-operation from 1900hrs on 03 Aug 10. On receipt of targeting data the submarine is to engage with two TLMs and await BDA. The submarine is to carryout further engagement on fresh targeting data from MR ac if passed. The submarine is to shift to alternate patrol Area Tara by 1000 hr on 04 Aug 10, if engagement has not taken place. The submarine is to prosecute suspicious contacts assessed to be convoy. The submarine should visually confirm the target identity prior engagement..

57. EEP.

Sr

Platform

Emitter

Policy Before Contact

Policy After Contact

Remarks

(a)

All

High Powered HF

S

T

(b)

All

Low Powered HF

T

T

(c)

All

V/UHF

T

T

(d)

S/m

Sonar

U

U

(e)

Air

Radar

T

T

(f)

Surface

C/D

U

U

(g)

Surface

E/F

T

T

(h)

Surface

FCS

S

T

(j)

Surface

Nav Radar

T

T

Radar Silence

Diagram to be

used

REAPPRECIATION

58. Reappreciate if DO 228 fails to locate the convoy by 1300 hr on 04 Aug 10.

Eastern Command

Chennai Cmde

03 Aug 10 CSO(Ops)

Time 1130 hr

Distribution Copy No Method

FOC-IN-C 1 By hand

War Diary 2 -

File 3 -

Appendix F

(Refers to para 25)

CALCULATION FOR CREEPING LINE AHEAD SEARCH - AREA NINA

CLA SEARCH CALCULATOR

Entry Parameters

Symbol

Meaning

Unit

Enter values

U

Enemy's assumed speed

Kn

16

V

Scouting Speed

Kn

160

It

Investigation time

%

20

Vt

Scout transit speed

Kn

220

W

Sweep Width

nm

80

C

Coverage Factor

Ratio

1.25

D

Frontage of search

nm

120

n

no of scouts

no

1

Sd

Distance to start point from base

nm

120

Fd

Distance to base from end point

nm

300

E

Prudent Limit of Endurance of Scout

hrs

5

Calculated values equations

Vr

Reduced Scout Speed

Kn

(V*100)/(100+It)

S

Track Spacing

nm

W/C

a

Throw off angle

deg

sin-1(U/Vr)

D'

Reduced Frontage

nm

D- (2*W/3)

L

Long Leg

nm

D'*Vr/(√(Vr2-U2)

M

Short Leg

nm

(n*S*Vr)/(Vr+U)

To

Time to cover one basic element

hrs

2(L+M)/Vr

Tt

Target time

hrs

2nS/U

ToT

Time on Task

hrs

E-((Sd+Fd)/Vt

N

No of elements feasible

no

ToT/To

Depth of Search (approx)

nm

2*M*N

Sp

Search Period

hrs

If Tt>To and N >1 search viable

ACLA Search Viable

CALCULATION FOR CREEPING LINE AHEAD SEARCH - AREA BABITA

CLA SEARCH CALCULATOR

Entry Parameters

Symbol

Meaning

Unit

Enter values

U

Enemy's assumed speed

Kn

16

V

Scouting Speed

Kn

160

It

Investigation time

%

20

Vt

Scout transit speed

Kn

220

W

Sweep Width

nm

80

C

Coverage Factor

Ratio

1.25

D

Frontage of search

nm

160

n

no of scouts

no

1

Sd

Distance to start point from base

nm

60

Fd

Distance to base from end point

nm

250

E

Prudent Limit of Endurance of Scout

hrs

5

Calculated values equations

Vr

Reduced Scout Speed

Kn

(V*100)/(100+It)

S

Track Spacing

nm

W/C

a

Throw off angle

deg

sin-1(U/Vr)

D'

Reduced Frontage

nm

D- (2*W/3)

L

Long Leg

nm

D'*Vr/(√(Vr2-U2)

M

Short Leg

nm

(n*S*Vr)/(Vr+U)

To

Time to cover one basic element

hrs

2(L+M)/Vr

Tt

Target time

hrs

2nS/U

ToT

Time on Task

hrs

E-((Sd+Fd)/Vt

N

No of elements feasible

no

ToT/To

Depth of Search (approx)

nm

2*M*N

Sp

Search Period

hrs

If Tt>To and N >1 search viable

ACLA Search Viable

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