"By the spring of 1975, the Vietnam War had ended in victory for the enemies of the United States" and ever since this, historians have been preoccupied with explaining why America failed in Vietnam. In the most part, the Vietnam War has been portrayed as a military failure, and whilst this is true it ignores the highly decisive role of the media. Hanson recognises that there is a distinctive lack of theoretical assessment of the impact of the media on foreign policy. Therefore I am to prove amongst other facts that it was the role of the media which inevitably led to American failure in the Vietnam War. As James Reston concluded;

"Maybe historians will agree that the reporters and the cameras were decisive in the end...and forced the withdrawal of American power from Vietnam."

Firstly it will assess why the American press stopped supporting American intervention in Vietnam. The Tet offensive in 1968 is often pin pointed by historians as the event from which the perception of the wars success changed. I will then assess how the media affected American withdrawal and how much influence the media had on policy making of the American government.

Another key question that this dissertation will address is what and how other deciding factors caused American failure. Many historians have focused on the military failures and I will assess how this is an accurate assessment of American involvement. By addressing these questions I will, furthermore, be able to argue whether or not American failure in Vietnam was inevitable which has become the argument for many historians. However further research on the subject highlights that domestic issues such as the growing anti-war movement affected withdrawal. From this I would like to assess the nature in which the press reported on such groups and if the media influenced their growth.

Many primary and secondary sources have been used to research this dissertation. I have focused my attention to The New York Times as it is a liberal broadsheet published across America and is considered to be a paper which was highly critical of the war. During my research into secondary sources I have noticed that particular articles have often been selected from this newspaper by various historians. I will use some of these articles alongside others that have not previously been included in research to deepen the understanding of the media's role. By using a variety of these articles I will be able to support or disprove current historical thought on the subject. The positive of using newspapers in my research, is that I easily uncover patterns in reporting styles and can map the changes of opinions. Negatively however, newspapers are generally as biased; reporters can often use their articles to air their own personal opinions and may not reflect their audience's beliefs. They may also be bias as they are producing an opinion that will have been dictated from the papers editors and will follow their policy on the war.

I have also used the Museum of Broadcast Communication, which is an online archive that has stored radio and television broadcasts from America. Current research into Vietnam focuses on newspaper articles and by using these broadcasts I hope to find a greater understanding into the role the whole media played. Hallin believes that using television in assessing the role of the media is vital as it "made Vietnam politically unique". The advantage of using these broadcasts is that the tone used by the reporters indicates how they perceived the war at that time and mean that there may be less misinterpretation of their view. Again, like the newspapers, there will be a degree of bias and this does not always reflect the American public's opinions. In some cases the television reports are often accused of enforcing particular views of the war on the public.

One criticism of American intervention in Vietnam is that America failed to learn from its mistakes in the Korean War. The hindsight that we have after such conflicts can make it seem as though a particular decision was gravely needed or acted as a catalyst. However, as historians, it is vital that whilst studying the Vietnam War, we do not assess the war in a modern day context but from the position at that time. Therefore I shall assess how the conflict is placed on the global scene during the Cold War, and how it places within American society at the time.

The development of the media is also an issue I had to consider in my research due to the technological advancements that it has faced. The nature in which media is used is also subject to change, and therefore its role must be effectively defined and evaluated. McCormick argues that the role of the media did not begin after the cold war but that it expanded within it, with coverage reaching into people's homes. Another example would be from the First World War, when photography was used for reconnaissance purposes and data collection. The army later used photography as a form of propaganda to recruit men for the war. This example shows the changing nature of photography and the Vietnam War was no exception. Photography takes on a new role and Susan Moeller's study on the effects of three iconic images highlights that photographs begin to sum up entire wars and that they make war "comprehensible" to American civilians and the wider world. Photography and other media forms are always used for a particular purpose and it is important to consider their purpose in the interpretation of the sources.

America had prospered greatly in the World Wars; industry had grown significantly and as a consequence America's economy was achieving new heights. This therefore shows that America had much to lose if it no longer controlled the markets of the world. The ideological subtext of the Cold War is imperative in understanding the failures of America in Vietnam. This helps to explain how it was perceived that if communism was to gain power, that the economy of said country would be hostile to the free market system; and so a policy to protect America's interests was needed. Walli believes that the hysteria and myths created by Truman were necessary for the American and global public to support America in its actions. Truman is said to have used the media to create this hysteria in the first place and shows how the government manipulated the media. In which case, this statement may explain why the government resented the media during the conflict as they were unable to control and manipulate it so easily.

As Smith states, the Vietnam War was a "product of a global pattern of conflict" and must be discussed in the context of global developments for information to be correctly used. So, the Vietnam War must be assessed as one of a number of conflicts after the Second World War. America played a leading role in several of these cold war conflicts, such as, Korea, Cuba, Laos, Greece and the Berlin. As literature of the time reflects, America was portrayed as the guardian angel of these countries freedoms against the evil of Communism. This echoes the position of the elites like Nixon, who pleaded for anti-communist faith, "Communism is evil because it denies God and defies man". However real the threat of Communist expansionism actually was, to the people of America it posed a serious threat to the freedoms that they had become accustomed to. When, in reality, the Soviet Union was far from being in a position to begin colonising and spreading the Communist ideology. It is also naïve of America to have believed that every revolutionary group was a puppet of the Kremlin.

This dissertation will examine the role of the media as the agent of American failure. It would be naive to blame the media alone and the dissertation will also look at other factors that contributed to American failure and assess which ultimately led to American withdrawal.


The Vietnam War has drawn the attention of many scholars since America's intervention in the war. Caprini believed that this is because where "lines between consensus, legitimate controversy and deviance become blurred", such as in the Vietnam War, that debate expands. As Herring points out many of the issues still contested today are the issues that "Americans debated during the war." There are many questions which are regularly debated between historians on this topic such as why did America involve itself in Vietnam? Did America fail in Vietnam and was American intervention doomed to failure? Most importantly for this study is the question, why did America fail in Vietnam?

Previous studies on the Vietnam War have often made assumptions and judgements on American intervention. This has therefore led to two different schools of interpretation on the nature of the war and Cohen believes that a historian's judgement on the nature of the war will determine the tone of their research. For example revisionists believe that the war in Vietnam was that "the war was an act of aggression" by the North Vietnamese on the South. This would therefore lead to the historians such as Smith, who justifies American escalation of the war in Vietnam. However other historians believe that America were not justified in their actions and that it was in fact a "revolutionary war" and that the Vietnamese where fighting "for their independence against the French and then the Americans". Historians such as Kolko and Kahin have heavily criticised American intervention in the Vietnam War as immoral and that America was trying to preserve economic interests. These different interpretations will therefore influence how they view successes and failures of America, or even if the same event is a success or a failure.

Devine believes that more recent analysis of the Vietnam War has lead to a growth of resentment for American involvement in the Vietnam War and consequent failures. Historians such as Lens and Kolko seek to evaluate America's motives and efficiency. However, Lens is overly critical of the American motives within the war and the methods that they use in the wider global context. This therefore reflects Devine's statement of growing resentment for American involvement, but also demonstrates that literature on the Cold War in general has growing resentment for America. Schrecker's investigation into McCarthyism in the United States can similarly be seen as overly critical. However, after reflecting this book, many can sympathise with her well constructed argument. Nonetheless, there is literature on the subject of resentment of American involvement evident in the emotively written book, Vietnam North, by Burchett. This is a written documentary constructed during the period focusing on the experiences and opinions of the North Vietnamese. Whilst extremely useful to historians for its insight into an area which previously lacked much attention, if looked at in isolation, it can paint a very bleak image of American involvement. Pieces such as these most definitely influence the works of modern day historians as they reach to new sources for information.

The sources which historians use will also effect of they construct their arguments. Research into Vietnam has become more enlightened in recent years with the release of more sources. However there are still many sources still unavailable or insufficiently used, whilst historians have begun to use more Vietnamese sources Kiernan highlights that this is an area which needs much more attention and will contribute the most to historical understanding. It is also important to consider that interpretations of sources can be widely different according to historian's perspective on the war generally. Therefore it is important to remain neutral in the analysis of primary sources and to consider them within the context of the cold war period. Hallin's work focuses on the use of media sources, he clearly recognises that media was not the same all over America, and the provenances of the source can change how and why they were written.

The Vietnam War can not be analysed in a simplistic form as there are many different dimensions to it. Fisher highlights that America was not fighting one enemy; surface level analysis by historians has led to a basic review of cold war ideology. The war in Vietnam is not a clear cut battle between capitalism and communism because there is also a strong nationalist movement, the fight for independence being strong feature in the Vietnamese war. Some historians believe that the war actually stems from a civil war within South Vietnam, "between southern rebels and a Saigon government with far heavier foreign backing". Therefore the assessment has been made that America failed in Vietnam because they assumed that dividing Vietnam in half would automatically make the South all obey Diem's regime without question. Whilst this may be an important dimension to consider, the division of Vietnam is not why America failed. The importance of Diem and America's failure to hold elections in Vietnam is a plausible beginning to American failure.

Most importantly, current studies on the subject ignore the media's influence on America with regard to the Diem regime. Hammond recognises that American reporters were disliked by Diem's regime because they reported freely about their opinions of the war and often criticised the role the South Vietnamese were playing. Where many historians have ignored this dimension Hammond explores it and concludes that these negative reports acted as catalyst to disenchant the war with the American people. This assessment does not mean that the reports were a hate campaign against Diem but that reports were not complimentary to the South Vietnamese forces, and instead fully supported the American troops. Caprini reiterates this point with the example of the Buddhist crisis in May 1963 which questions Diem's regime but not the overall goal of American involvement.

Klein's collection of essays in, The Vietnam Era; Media and popular culture in the US and Vietnam take an orthodox and post-revisionist view of the war in Vietnam. This is evident from the outset of the book as Klein criticises the American government for creating the atmosphere of anti-communism to lure the American people into conflicts. The book assesses the importance of the role of the media and how the anti-war movement grew. There does seem to be little attempt to address the military failures or strategic decisions which would have ultimately led to the reports of the press and protests of the anti-war movement. However, Klein does recognise that the popular culture was influenced and flooded by material from novelists who "tend to stereotype the Vietnamese as dehumanised others" and criticises their stance as ignorant. Again such statements as these led to criticism of American government involvement in the war as "imperialistic" and "non-accidental". The in depth study of non press material by Klein has greatly added to the knowledge on the debate of the effects of media materials on American perceptions of the war. He assesses more the creation of those images and perceptions before the book focuses on the development of anti-war movements.

A key question raised by Caprini in a following essay in Klein's book reveals that the lack of anti-war movement may be because the media did not consider Vietnam news worthy until 1961. Therefore there is less coverage to convince people to stop supporting the war effort. This may reveal why the media had no influence in American withdrawal earlier in the war or as Caprini states that coverage before 1961 was limited to propaganda style film segments.

Hammond seeks to examine the relationship between the media and military during the Vietnam War. The main argument in these books are that it was the military's strategic decisions which led to American failure, but it is the press who were seen as responsible for making the American public aware of these issues. This reflects many of the military leader's opinions of the time as well as the governments and as another historian, Hallin points out even the enlisted men where beginning to resent the press and view them as their enemy. Hammond seems to be aiming to highlight relationship problems between the press and the government to prevent future conflicts. In contrast Hallin examines the changing role that the media played in the Vietnam War and does recognise that the media played a vital role in the changing of American policy in Vietnam. However instead of blaming the failure on the strategic decisions of the military as Hammond does, Hallin believes that it was the presidential administrations fault for not creating restrictions for the media in the form of censorship. Although these historians both vary on what they believe to be most important in the media's role and effect, there are points of agreement. For example, Hammond also believes that there were some attempts to censor information released to the press, that this had little affect, but that America ultimately did not set into place any system of censorship in the media.

Many historians have laid the blame of American failure to different presidents. For example, Hammond asserts Kennedy's importance as he was preoccupied in Europe and Cuba, and he postponed decisions through compromise and didn't efficiently quash mid-level officers from airing their views to the press about American policies. Smith, although not really assessing why America failed in Vietnam, does begin to discuss how each president led to escalation of the war. Beginning with justifying Kennedy's actions Smith believes that it was ultimately Johnsons fault for his inappropriate approach to the war which did not contribute to American success. There is a great deal of discussion over this issue and another perspective is that Truman planted the seeds of failure with his policies. Even earlier though is the presidency of Eisenhower, and Gardener and Anderson believe that it was Eisenhower who created the ideological approach which constantly dictated American policies of the post second world war period which created problems for following administrations.

How Did the Media Cause American Failure?

                Failure of America in the Vietnam War can be accredited to the media's portrayal of the conflict. Current discussions on America intervention and what caused the failure can all be linked with the media explosion during the period of critical and investigative journalism, which forced American withdrawal and changes in policy making. Within Powlick and Katz's reviews of literature on this subject they believe that it was in fact the elites with in government that argued what the media articulated to the public and that foreign policy was not affected by public opinion. Previously investigated factors such as the role of the South Vietnamese and American governments and the military strategies employed in the failure of America in Vietnam can all be attributed to the media coverage which surrounded the conflict. This chapter will critically assess each of these factors in relation to media primary sources and which will produce the conclusion that the media did have play an important role in American failure.

How did the media cover the war?

As previously stated, the nature of media coverage was ever changing and during the Vietnam War these changes increased the impact that the reports. The coverage of the Vietnam War was not always at the same intensity throughout the conflict and may explain why America failed as intensity grew the prospect of failure grew. There is a consensus among historians that press coverage of the Vietnam War only began to grow after 1961 and reached its height in 1968. However, Edmond notes that after 1968 coverage of the Vietnam War by the press and television had greatly declined. Parallel to the rise of media attention to the war between 1961 and 1968, was the rise in more critical reports about American policies and South Vietnamese' forces impact in the conflict. The reports were not wholly positive or wholly negative regarding Vietnam, but there was a rise in criticism as the war progresses. However, before 1965 most of the coverage was mainly positive which may coincide with the fact that only after the summer of 1964 did American foreign policy change in Vietnam. At this point Johnson begins escalation by introducing retaliatory air strikes against the North Vietnamese.

Interestingly, during the early stages of the conflict, reports that were deemed too controversial were edited to suit the papers stance on the war. H. D. S. Greenway, a reporter for Time magazine and The Washington Post from 1967 to 1975, felt that before the Tet offensive that "we would write something and the magazine would ignore it if it wasn't upbeat". This shows that the papers were fuelling the deluded optimism, which in effect when removed in the Tet offensive, led to huge disillusionment of the American public. It also displays how in the most part press, television and radio all followed the official line. It is recognised by John Shaw that "Many American editors ignored what their correspondents in Vietnam were telling them in favour of the Washington version". Cleary this statement by Shaw is sustained by comments like that of Greenwoods and other reporters who testify that their stories are not being published. This hesitancy within the media to report the negatives as well as the positives in the earlier stages may have been the reason for prolonged American involvement as since the level of criticism increase more pressure is asserted onto the government for policy changes. In this case it is not the reporters who are to blame for American failure in the war but their editors. This is because had the American public realised the truth behind Vietnam earlier then government policy may have changed and consequently America may not have failed.

It is still believed today that the press will reflect the norms and accepted thoughts in society. It will rarely go against popular assumptions for fear of damaging business. As a consequence of these theories, one would assume that it would also affect the way in which articles were written and determine how the television and radio represented their stories. For example Chomsky and Herman believed that the anti-communist ideology provided the media with a framework to report within. If you were seen to question the reports, you may be accused of being unpatriotic and so you would be socially excluded whilst McCarthyism was at its height. This is best illustrated in the earlier articles on the Vietnam War by supporting the war effort and that following articles retain the a half hearted optimism. Due to the heightened fear of Communism through McCarthyism any questioning of the American policy in Vietnam would have been greatly disapproved of. An interpretation of this information would show that the media propped up American success due to the social conditioning of the period.

The tone of the reports were also generally optimistic during the early stages of the war because the majority of the information that they were given was from the government. Another reason for the positive reporting may be due to the fact there were no permanent reporters based in Saigon initially, so they were unable to report everything as they saw it, and instead had to rely on official reports. The only daily newspaper with a full-time correspondent at the time was the New York Times, whilst other papers had to rely on news agencies. This may explain why this paper took a particularly critical line on Vietnam as they were able to see the escalation of American involvement in the war first hand.

The article by Jacques Nevard in the New York Times in July 1962 displays this official line of optimism coupled with some questioning. The article remains positive about the success of the helicopter mission, "reported to have swept about twenty miles". Reporting at this time largely focuses on a quantative method to measure success, and the large area covered here praises the American forces. These figurers were widely accepted when published whilst later on in the war there is a criticism of the figures used in these reports. This positive and supportive tone continues through to 1965 where Mohr reports that "the United States is still in a defensive position, although a strong one". This consistency shows that the illusion that America could still win the war was still believed by most of America. Therefore, the media could be blamed for pursuing information and a line which would ultimately lead to great resentment from American public on the war in Vietnam, particularly after the Tet offensive as victory becomes unlikely.

The Media and South Vietnamese Government:

The media's relationship with the South Vietnamese Government also undergoes rapid changes during the Vietnam War. For example the Diems regime treats the media with suspicion and there are many restrictions in place to prevent reporting on the conflict by internal press and external press. However this does not remain the same as the war progresses, with the removal of Diem, the new government is weary of losing the support of its press and lifts restrictions. These two approaches to the media have had many consequences and caused the failure in Vietnam for America.

Nevard's article shows the freedom of reporting before Diem imposed his restrictions in its releasing of military mission details and shows early criticism of South Vietnamese forces. Typically, the report is mainly positive about American involvement, following the official line of optimism, but does criticise the South Vietnamese forces; "Some United States officers here are alarmed over the growing dependence of Vietnamese army..." shows the criticism of the army whilst referring to the American army as "sophisticated support".

The article also shows how the media would release what Diem believed to be important strategic information relating to numbers of troops and new missions, e.g. "1,000 Government troops were landed yesterday" and "Forty-one Air Force helicopters were used in the operation", which if intercepted by the North Vietnamese could be used to plan attacks and strategies. This could therefore lead to the military defeat of American and South Vietnamese military forces.

Reports lacking in success stories for the South Vietnamese or American troops may also be as used as propaganda pieces of the enemy. This psychologically would give the North Vietnamese insurgent forces an advantage which would lead to American failure. Johnson for example recognises "doom and gloom don't win wars", which reiterates the importance psychology in fighting the war in an interview with Cronkite. Moreover the gallop polls construct a narrative of American support for the war which corresponds to how American intervention is going. Diem's request that America censor their media becomes an issue as historian Hallin concludes that if the Kennedy administration had censored the media, it could be interpreted that America was running a war and which would contradict its public relations strategy. However three months later in the New York Times, Halberstam reports that Diem is enforcing his own measures to create censorship. Some historians believe that these measures acted as an irritant and actually increased more critical reporting in Vietnam as the reporters felt that their freedoms were being removed. The torrent of articles criticising Diem's regime are best illustrated in Halberstams article, "feel they are being muzzled by the South Vietnamese Government". The choices of words such as muzzled in this report are fundamental in the understanding of the stance of the reporter, as they are emotive. Therefore the animosity of the reporter to Diem can be seen whilst representing the idea through the military opinions.

The entire negative reporting surrounding Diems regime eventually leads to the American government having to distance itself as the American public begin to see that the South Vietnamese government is corrupt and prejudice. Furthermore this is all brought to a head during the Buddhist crisis in which reporters are heavily criticised for their role and two reporters are expelled. The South Vietnamese government's reaction simply demonstrates how the media are obviously an effective force in the creation of public opinion. This also highlights America's inability to have created and sustained a new government in South Vietnam, which can be measured as a failure caused by media coverage. The affect of the media in this situation also creates numerous discussions by the Kennedy administration in building up anti-Diem forces in Saigon and consequently implementing the coup to remove Diem from office.

The new government in Vietnam took on a very different approach to the media and wished not to come under heavy criticism from the press. In a memorandum from Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs' Special Assistant to the Under Secretary in 1963, it highlighted the South Vietnamese government has:

"In part, fear of criticism in the foreign press has inclined the new government to lean over backwards as regards press freedom. Also, there is some suspicion that those with power over the press are using it selectively against preferred targets. In any case, the performance of the press has not improved matters greatly and some better balance between freedom and license is urgently needed."

This would highlight that the media has directly affected policies of the South Vietnamese government. The fact that this is reported within the Kennedy administration could show that this concern may have effected communications with the American government and South Vietnamese government.

The Media and United States Government:

                There appears to be great tension between the government officials and the media during the Vietnam War, McMahon stresses that the President Nixon, Johnson and Kennedy all believed that the press was their worse enemy. Herring and Robinson equally refer to how the media was opposed to the American Government. This is due to the growing criticism of the media on the Government which is at its height between 1968 and 1972. Although it is argued by Edmonds that the media had no effect on the policy making of American administration, it is clear from a memorandum from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs' Special Assistant to the Under Secretary in 1963, that the press do have an effect on morale, "The N.Y Times editorial and Reston and Lippmann columns on the subject were a body blow to morale in Saigon". This therefore shows that the government are aware that the media do have an effect on opinions on the war, and consequently this would be addressed in future policies in the Vietnam War.

                Further evidence that the media have an effect on the American and Vietnamese public can also be found in the notes of a meeting in 1968 between Secretary McNamara, President Johnson, General Wheeler, Clark Clifford, CIA Director Helms and Walt Rostow on the topic of proposed action beyond the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) into North Vietnam. The comments made in the discussion reveal that decisions would consider how the press would report on the matter and how best to release the information into the press. Therefore this would indicate that the American government were definitely affected by the press coverage and that the press could easily control the success or failures of the war. CIA Director Helms is quoted to have said; "It is a great thing if you can keep it out of the hands of the press", which would reinforce this theory.

Kovach recognises that new technological advances pose new problems for the elite, as each new technology has allowed "untrained voices" to comment on discussions, which he believes should only be debated by elites. Resentment from the media towards the government would have become much more erratic had the government prevented their coverage of the Vietnam War, and possibly create greater issues for the American government. Therefore, the governments chose to release specific information to try and control the information that the public received. However, Kovach does not allow for individual interpretation within his 'untrained voices', as readers or viewers could interpret things radically differently.

The quote by Helms also reveals an argument that Kovach makes, that it is consistently debated throughout history has been consistently what governments should keep secret and what they should share. The discussion would show that it is maybe something the government may not wish to be released into the press. Similarly the Pentagon Papers can be classified as the 'secrets' that the government did not want the American public knowing. However in this case the leaking of these documents into the New York Times had little effect on public opinions and Ellsberg believes that it was not until the court case that the Pentagon Papers became big news.

The media also question the American government's leadership in the newspapers articles and in radio broadcasts. In The New York Times, Mohrs article questions how much the Johnson administration misunderstood the Vietnam conflict with assumptions, "not yet achieved the expected results because of some widely shared assumptions". Such assumptions if applied to the whole of the war may mean that America would fail, as if the American government assumes one thing and it fails, it would imply that the war itself would be a failure.

In a radio broadcast with Walter Cronkite in 1970, Lyndon Johnson commented on how he believed that reporting by the media on the war was not accurate. When questioned about the request for 206,000 more men which was leaked to the press, Johnson defends the administration, "only 22,000 were dispatched", this shows that the media often do not reflect the truth in a situation. Cronkite does not push the topic enough here, for it would have been interesting to see the response of Johnson about whether the effects of the stories run by the media on this topic actually meant that less soldiers were deployed. Accordingly this could show an example of policies or strategic decisions being effected by the media.

The Media and Military:

                The relationship between the media and military is the main area of debate with respect to work from Hammond and Hallin. The recognition that the media played a key role in the disillusionment of the American public with military strategy is of vital importance. Hallin's opinion begins to develop in his assessment of the breakdown between the media and military in 1963; "the media began to send back an image that conflicted sharply with the picture of progress officials were trying to paint." Buckley's article reiterates these differing images of the war, "Despite official statistics to the contrary, no part of the country is secure", not only is this showing lack of military success but it is also demonstrates a lack of respect for official statistics as earlier on in the article Buckley insinuates that figures of enemy casualties may be incorrect.

                The article by Charles Mohr exposes the truth behind military reports and is perhaps one of the most important examples how officials tried to control public opinion about the war in pursuit of an unattainable victory. Mohr is questions why the distortions of body counts occur and accuses the military of putting "the best possible face on military reports" which do not reflect the reality of the war. As much as the article crucifies the accuracy if military reports it also defends the role of reporters in Vietnam. As the relationship between the media and military is disintegrating there is a tendency of the military to blame the media for loosing the war, for example a reporter is scolded by a unit for "the way newspapers get things fouled up" which leads to public opinion on the question the war.

Ultimately the news stories stem from military missions or through individual's actions and speaking to the press. The mini-genocide at My Lai undertaken by Lieutenant Calley became the headline in the news reports helped to form the opinions of many in America of the role that the American army was playing in Vietnam. However it is important to stress that this and other debauched acts were not the 'norm' and that perhaps the fact that they were immoral and so shocking was the reason that they formed the reports rather than a soldiers everyday actions.

                Television media is reported to have changed the effects of the War in Vietnam on the American public. Appy describes the "living room war" which between the years 1965 to 1972 of the nightly television broadcasts of the Vietnam War. The CBS Evening News from 8th January 1968 is typical of the critical reports found in radio and television broadcasts. Statements that criticised previous official declarations were frequent and coupled with damming images and emotive language.

                "Tragic story...down in the Mekong Delta, Ben Phe lies in ruin from artillery and bombs, US Major at the scene says it became necessary to destroy the town to save it".

This type of statement leads to questioning of the military strategies employed in the Vietnam War by the general public of America. To many, the concept of destroying something to save it seems contradictory. When this is put together with other such events such as My Lai it leads to questioning of whether the war is immoral by the American public.

                 The effect of the damning reports on public opinion is unquestionably what prompts policy changes for the American government, for example the move to towards Vietnamisation and peace by Nixon shows how public opinion on the war directly influenced policy making.

What else influenced American failure?

Although there are strong arguments that the media was not the most important reason for American failure, many historians believe that the media's role was insignificant. This chapter will explore other factors which bred American failure in Vietnam. These other factors include issues which existed domestically in America through the anti-war and civil rights movement and the political and economic crises which occurred. Within this chapter I will explore this aspect of American failure.

America Domestic Issues:

                 Assessing American intervention in Vietnam and subsequent failure can not be done efficiently without analysing the issues which existed in America itself during the conflict. Issues which arose on the home front include the civil rights and anti-war movements, lack of political consensus and economic crisis due to the rising cost of the war and cold war campaign.

                During Kennedy's term in office there was a lot of hostility towards the President because over Kennedy's pro-civil rights attitude and a lot of resentment stemmed from a group of southern segregationists. This constant questioning of the administration led to some public disenchantment with Kennedy's ability to choose the 'right path' for America in the cold war era. The early 1960's saw a rise in demonstrations for equal rights for African Americans and a Kennedy's inaction to quash the rise of a perceived 'underclass' angered many of his opponents.

Taking inspiration from the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement began to grow during this period also. The movement is believed to have stemmed from colleges and universities, as they first began to get information from the North Vietnamese which conflicted that of the official reports. Initially the media was hostile to the anti-war movement of America; this in part was due to the rise of McCarthyism, but this is not to say that the anti-war movement did not exist during the early stages of the conflict. There was also the association of violence with anti-war movements' which led to further distancing of the media and disapproval. However, as the war was becoming prolonged and disillusionment grew amongst the American people, the movement gained support and the press began to cover anti-war stories. The New Hampshire poll between Eugene McCarthy and President Johnson, which McCarthy had a gained a strong forty-two percent signalled the change of public opinion, and thus the media began to support the anti-war movement as public opinion now clearly showed it was acceptable to be against the war. The reports flowing back from Vietnam of bloodshed and the mounting American casualties rate must have influenced the rise of support for the anti-war movement.

                Coverage of the Democratic convention in a radio broadcast in ? captures the rising tide of the anti-war movement. Whilst the reporter seems terrified at the prospect of leaving the building the reporter uses highly emotive language to relay the developing story. The coverage of the police brutality to an otherwise non-violent protest was captured by the media. These scenes of police brutality would have exaggerated public discontent with the officials in America and this would have most definitely of exacerbated the pressure on the government to change their strategy and policies in Vietnam. The broadcast also gives a vivid account of how tear gas affects him that is released on the crowd. Such description creates empathy towards the protestors and in relation to the Vietnam War to some of the civilians who have been subjected to the use of tear gas in combat.

                The growth of the anti-war movement has also been attributed to the de-motivation of soldiers in Vietnam. The anti-war movement was not confined to the public of America; many of the soldiers also shared the same views on the war and in a Mike Wallace's Vietnam: A Soldier's Diary there are multiple examples of this. For example in an interview with soldiers about to be deployed in Vietnam one soldier states that he does not believe in the war and Glen Langley a soldier on patrol "will not fire guns" due to his belief that the war is not justified. This clear lack of willingness to fight for the official American objectives in Vietnam reveals how America's intervention was on a downward spiral to defeat from the influence of the media and anti-war movement. Countless soldiers questioned, "Why am I here", which is poignant as Johnson's decision not to run for re-election may have been a signal of self doubt and stem from the media.

                However the anti-war movement itself was not a great enough force to cause American failure in the war or in American withdrawal. They failed to change the system, and by 1966 were becoming disillusioned with their inability to effect change. The anti-war movement do not gain momentum and presence until the media change their stance on the movement's legitimacy. Farrell also asserts that the aim of the protests was not primarily about political power but "they were dramas for the media".

                The lack of consensus in American politics from the 1960's has also been blamed for the failure of American failure in Vietnam. The inability for the Democrats and Republicans to agree on action in Vietnam ensured that debate began in the early stages of the war. However, the Republican's did agree with Kennedy's proposals eventually but they made sure that they were on record about their concerns in case the war went badly. The previous two presidents had been Republican and so there was some hostility to Kennedy's approach to politics for this reason. The presidency was even less effective during the Johnson administration due to the acceleration of the antiwar movement and racial polarisation. Questions began to arise from the civil rights movements like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) about how America could fight for the freedoms of coloured people in other countries whilst in America there was no equality.[106] Furthermore it was raised that if they could fight for other peoples freedoms then surely they should have the same rights in their home nation. These perceived contradictions in American policies meant that there was a lack of stability in America through protests and demonstrations, and in effect America had to fight multiple wars. This was further exaggerated as claims that the Administration were no better than the Southern racists, My Lai formed a legitimate basis for this statement as the slaughter of innocent women and children was carried out for no reason. Again the events of My Lai were made inflated by the media which reveals how the media was part of all of American society and could affect anything.

Preoccupation of America with civil rights and the anti-war movement did not mask the rising economic issues that stemmed from the American cold war campaign. Cohen believes that support for the war was eroded after 50,000 Americans died in the conflict and that financially the strain that the war was putting on the economy was too much. The burden of the war on America had been predicted by the media, there was a belief that there would be deficits in the budget and that inflation would occur eventually leading to the collapse of the gold standard. Raising taxes for an unpopular war which seemed to be lacking in success was impossible for the government after the Tet offensive and so the government had to endure a budget deficit similar to one from the Second World War.

American Strategy:

                American strategy and policy in the Vietnam War has been the basis of a lot of historical debate in assessing why America lost. Although as some historians have stated that strategic hamlets and the type warfare employed in Vietnam were doomed to failure it is ultimately the press who have relayed these failures to the world and influenced the changes in these strategies. There must also be some assessment of the portrayal of the government on how easily the war could be won.

                Firstly, the strategies employed to prevent insurgency into the South of Vietnam was doomed to failure. Alienation of the Vietnamese people with the implementation of strategic hamlets is one example. The media again responded with criticism of this policy that the hamlets were "as much to keep the residents in as to keep Viet Cong out". Even though they may have been designed to do these tasks they failed to accomplish this as many Viet Cong still managed to filtrate into the hamlets. Ngo Vinh Long, a Vietnamese man living in the United States experienced the hamlets first hand states the many effects that the hamlets had on the Vietnamese people, "It caused tremendous dislocation even starvation". Worse still is that the Long sent a letter to the Saigon government to request the end of this policy to be told "this is how we are going to defeat the Communists", Long believed that there policies actually created more communists.

                Search and destroy strategies were also flawed as they resulted in huge civilian casualties and served only to create greater resentment of the Vietnamese people to America. Justified by the theory that it was necessary to destroy Vietnam to save it, these scenes became more frequent. The media soon picked up the gauntlet to challenge this theory and James Reston's article Washington: The Casualty Controversy began the investigation. There is an admission within the article that "We do know that we cannot hunt and destroy the enemy without casualties", which clearly shows that the army are aware of the consequences of this strategy. Therefore there must be some questioning of why this did not stop; it is not until the damaging images of the effects of napalm that American civilians began to question the morality of the situation. Winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese population was implausible and the task of wining the hearts and minds of the American people after 1968 was an equally difficult task.

                Propaganda used by the government to the American people promoted an easily winnable war. Initially this propaganda was a success; it gained the support of the American people. However, the Tet offensive displayed that the war was not going to be as easy as first described and so this propaganda is said to of haunted the Pentagon. This greatly affected the moral of the American civilians and those fighting in Vietnam and ultimately would have led to failure. In the later period it can also be seen that the Nixon administrations official line of Vietnamisation and peace with honour policies were similarly received. At first these policies were reported positively and optimistically, however as the Nixon began to contradict his policies there was a return to the atmosphere of criticism and negativity that existed during the Tet period.

                Gaddis believes that Vietnam was actually a testing ground for new strategies such as 'flexible response". This can also be true for the implementation of the Green Berets, a group designed to fight in guerrilla warfare like the North Vietnamese enemy. The inability for decisive policies and strategies with contingency plans are important in explaining American failure. The media's manipulation and influence over politicians in the Vietnam War displays a lack of ability for the government to be able to make the best decision regardless of how the media may react.

The Vietcong- A Determined Enemy:

                Most historians ignore the 'Viet Cong factor' when assessing American failure. It is perhaps one of the most important reasons that America lost in Vietnam. Most discussions around American failure will discuss military strategy, American policy in Vietnam, the media and South Vietnam but there is a distinct lack of attention to how the Viet Cong affected the failure of America. There must be an all encompassing evaluation of all the factors that effected American failure including its enemy's role.

                Firstly, the Viet Cong were fighting for something that they believed in unlike the American soldiers who very often did not even believe the war was justified. The newspaper article by James Reston, states that the North Vietnamese were prepared to "take seven casualties to every one of ours". The article continues to claim that the war will be won on the basis of which side is willing to take the most losses. Clearly from the statement made in the article about the willingness of the Viet Cong to take such losses, highlights their determination which ultimately won the war. Despite these heavy casualty rates, the article by Charles Mohr reveals that the army believed that "The enemy is not weaker than in July, but stronger". Three years after these reports Tom Buckley reports similarly that;

                "Most important, after years of fighting and tens of thousands of casualties, the Vietcong can still find thousands of men who are ready not only to strike at night and slip away but also to undertake missions in which death is the only possible outcome."

                This statement clearly demonstrates that the war in Vietnam can not be won by the Americans and that the Viet Cong are a strong force. Such statements from the press would have created low morale for the soldiers fighting in the American army and for the public at home paying for such as costly war which appears to have no end. However as Buckley's article is not on the front page of the paper, this can be explained by the fact that it was mainly negative towards the American army. This could explain why it may have had less of an impact.

Secondly the American army found it difficult to distinguish who the enemy was, they were fighting a so called "invisible enemy". The ability for the Viet Cong to blend in with rest of the Vietnamese people made it impossible to for the American army to target the enemy. This created problems in military strategies of the American army which resulted in heavy civilian casualty rates following search and destroy missions, which in return resulted in resentment for America and South Vietnamese forces amongst the Vietnamese people.

Lastly, America failed in Vietnam because they underestimated their enemy. An example of which would be the Tet offensive. As the Tet offensive is regarded as a turning point in the Vietnam War it highlights the assumptions that military leaders made. A clear lack of understanding behind the motives of the Viet Cong may explain why they were underestimated. In Buckley's article this lack of understanding is expressed by an American officer about attacks on the US embassy buildings, "I don't know why they did it...They didn't achieve anything military. It was obviously just a propaganda thing". Statements like this ? years into the war show that the American army has not really progressed in their understanding of the war itself. It also coincides with the opinion that America had not learnt from its mistakes in the Korean War.


The sources that I have used in combination with secondary literature clearly show that the media promulgated the criticism of American intervention in the war which was the most important factor in American failure. Policies of the government did begin to follow public opinion as a clear policy change from war effort to peace effort began in the later part of the Johnson administration. This political turnaround has been attributed to the media and its influence over public opinion. However, there is as Caprini states "no systematic evidence to suggest that media coverage intensified the public's frustration with the war". Whilst there is some merit in this argument but it can not be withstood as FRUS documents clearly show that the government recognised that the media played an integral part in forming the opinion of the American people. It is a question of whether public opinion forms the media's opinion or does the media form public opinion.

Public opinion surrounding the anti-war movement and its initial resentment is indicated the media's approach to the movement. As discussed the anti-war movement did gain legitimacy within the media as public opinion changed regarding the war. This example shows how it is public opinion that forms the media's opinions.


Primary Sources:

Buckley, Tom. "Offensive is Said to Pin Point Enemy's Strengths", New York Times, (2/2/1968) p. 12.

Halberstam, David. "Curbs in Vietnam Irk U.S. Officers", New York Times, (2/11/1962) p. 6.

Mohr, Charles. "War and Misinformation", New York Times, (22/11/1965) p. 2.

Mohr, Charles. "U.S. War Position Still Defensive, Top Officers Say", New York Times, (13/12/1965) p. 1.

Nevard, Jacques. "41 Helicopters Land Vietnamese Forces for Swoop on Reds", New York Times, (20/7/1962) p. 1.

Reston, James. "The End of the Tunnel", New York Times, (30/4/1975) p. 41.

Reston, James. "Washington: The Casualty Controversy", New York Times, (26/11/1965) p. 36.

"20th Century with Mike Wallace" "Vietnam: A Soldiers Diary" "CBS Worldwide Inc." (date unknown), Accessed at http://archives.museum.tv/archives on.

"CBS Evening News" "1968, CBS" (2/8/1968), Accessed at http://archives.museum.tv/archives on.

"Dwight D. Eisenhower Speech" "Farwell Address" (1/17/1961), Accessed at http://archives.museum.tv/archives on.

"LBJ Vietnam Decision" "CBS" (2/6/1970), Accessed at http://archives.museum.tv/archives on.

"1968 Democratic Convention" (28/8/1968), Accessed at http://archives.museum.tv/archives on.

  1. Memorandum of Conference With the President" Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, January-August 1963, (Washington, August 28, 1963, noon.) Accessed at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iv/8202.htm on.
  2. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins)" Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, January-August 1963, (Washington, August 28, 1963, 8:36 p.m.) Accessed at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iv/8202.htm on.
  3. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to the President" Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, January-August 1963, (Washington, August 30, 1963.) Accessed at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iv/8202.htm on.
  4. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Secretary of State" Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963, Volume I Vietnam, 1961 (Washington, November 16, 1961.) Accessed at http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_i_1961/y.html on.
  5. Notes of Meeting" Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968 (Washington, January 30, 1968, 1:08-2:50 p.m.) Accessed at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vi/13689.htm.
  6. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk" Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968 (Washington, January 31, 1968.) Accessed at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vi/13689.htm.
  7. Memorandum for the Record" (Washington, September 29, 1965.) Accessed at on.

Secondary Sources:

Anderson, David. Trapped by Success, (Columbia University Press: New York; Chichester, 1993 ).

Borstelmann, Thomas. The Cold War and the Colour Line; American Race Relations in the Global Arena, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge; Massachusetts; London, 2001).

Burchett, Wilfred, Vietnam North: A First Hand Report, (International Publishers: New York, 1966).

Caprini, Michael X. Delli. "US Media Coverage of the Vietnam Conflict in 1968", in Klein, Michael, ed., The Vietnam Era: Media and Popular Culture in the United States and Vietnam, (Pluto Press: London), p. 38-64.

Chartres, J., Henshaw, B., and Dewar, M. Northern Ireland Scrapbook, (London; New York; Sydney, 1986).

Cohen, Warren. America's Failing Empire: US foreign relations since the Cold War, (Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, 2005).

Cohen, Warren I. 'Vietnam: New Light on the Nature of the War?', The International History Review, 9 (1) (1987), p. 108-116.

Cox, W. 'Managing Northern Ireland Intergovernmmentally: An appraisal of the Anglo-Irish Agreement', Parliamentary Affairs, 40 (1) (1999), p. 80-97.

Dean, Paul. "The Role of the Press", in Capps, Walter, ed., The Vietnam Reader, (Routledge: New York; London, 1991), p. 230-234.

Robert A. Devine, "Historiography: Vietnam Reconsidered", in Walter Capps, ed., The Vietnam Reader, (Routledge: New York; London, 1991), p. 100-115.

Donaldson, G. A. America at War Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, (Praeger: London; Westport, 1996).

Edmonds, Anthony. The War in Vietnam, (Greenwood Press: London,1988).

Edwards, O. The USA and the Cold War, 1945-63, 2nd ed., (Holder & Straugton: London, 2002).

Farrell, James. The Spirit of the Sixties; The making of postwar radicalism, (Routledge: London; New York, 1997).

Fisher, Christopher T. 'Nation Building and the Vietnam War: A historiography' The Pacific Historical Review, 74 (3) (2005), p. 441-456.

Franklin, H. Bruce. "1968: The Vision of the Movement and the Alternative Press", in Klein, Michael, ed., The Vietnam Era: Media and Popular Culture in the United States and Vietnam, (Pluto Press: London), p. 65-81.

Gaddis, John. Strategies of Containment: A critical appraisal of American national security policy during the Cold War. (Oxford University Press: New York; Oxford, 2005).

Gaddis, John. Surprise, Security, and the American Experience, (Harvard University Press: Massachusetts: London, 2005).

Gardener, L. Approaching Vietnam: From World War II to Dienbeinphu, 1941-1954, (New York, 1988).

Gifford, Clive. How Did It Happen? The Vietnam War.

Graebner, Norman. ed. The Cold War; Ideological Conflict or Power Struggle, (D.C. Heath and Company: Massachusetts, 1963).

Hallin, Daniel. The "Uncensored War"; The Media and Vietnam, (Oxford University Press: New York; Oxford, 1986).

Hammond, William H. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968, (Centre of Military History United States Army: Washington. 1988).

Hammond, William H. Reporting Vietnam: Media and Military at War, (University of Kansas: Kansas, 1998). Hanson, Elizabeth C. 'The Media, Foreign Policymaking and Political Conflict', Mershon International Studies Review, 42 (1) (1998), p. 157-163.

Herman, E. and Chomsky, N. Manufacturing Consent: The political economy of the mass media. (New York: Pantheon, 1988).

Herring, Eric and Robinson, Piers. 'Too Polemical or Too Critical? Chromsky on the Study of the News Media and US Foreign Policy', Review of International Studies, 29 (4) (2003), p. 553-568.

Herring, George C. 'America and Vietnam: The Debate Continues', The American Historical Review, 92 (2) (1987), p. 350-362. Higgins, Hugh. The Cold War, (Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., London) 2nd ed.

Holsti, Ole. "Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy", p.138-169, in James Scott ed., Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period,(Durham; London: Duke Univesity Press, 1998).

Kahin,George. Interventionism: How America became involved in Vietnam, (New York, 1986). Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History, (Penguin, 1991).

Kiernan, Ben. 'The Vietnam War, Alternative Endings', The American Historical Review, 97 (4) (1992), p. 1118-1137.

Klein, Michael. "Cultural Narrative and the Process of Re-collection: Film, History and the Vietnam Era", in Michael Klein, ed., The Vietnam Era: Media and Popular Culture in the United States and Vietnam, (Pluto Press: London), p. 3-37.

Knightley, Phillip. The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker from the Crimea to Vietnam, (Andre Deutsch: New York, 1975).

Kolko, Gabrielle. Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Histroical Experience, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985).

Kolko, Gabrielle. Vietnam: Anatomy of a Peace, (Routledge: London; New York, 1997).

Kovach, B. 'Do the News Media Make Foreign Policy?' Foreign Policy, 102 (1996), p.169-179.

Lens, Sidney. The Forging of the American Empire, 2nd ed., (Pluto Press; London, 2003).

McMahon, Robert J. 'The Pentagon's War, the Media's War', Reviews in American History, 28 (2) (2000), p. 303-308.

McComack, James. "Interest Groups and the media". in James Scott, ed., Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period, (Durham; London: Duke Univesity Press, 1998), p. 170-198.

Moeller, Susan. Shooting War: Photography and the American Experience of Combat, (New York, Basic Books, 1989).

Nixon, Richard. No More Veitnams, (W. H. Allen, London, 1986).

Nixon, Richard. The Memoirs, (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978). Pennington, Joanne. Modern America 1865 to the Present. (City: Hodder Murray, 2005.).

Powlick, Phillip J. and Katz, Andrew Z. 'Defining the American Public Opinion/ Foreign Policy Nexus', Mershon International Studies Review, 42 (1998), p. 29-61.

Rees, David. The Age of Containment; The cold war, (Macmillan: London, 1967).

Schleisinger, Jnr. Authur M. The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy 1941-68, (Fawcett, New York, 1967).

Schrecker, Ellen. Many Are the Crimes; McCarthyism in America,(Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1998). Seaton, Jean. "The New "Ethnic" Wars and the Media", in Tim Allen and Jean Seaton, eds, The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic violence, (Zed Books, New York, 1999).

Smith, R., An International History of The Vietnam War: The Kennedy Strategy (New York, 1985).

Van Dinh, Tran. 'Why the War in Vietnam Cannot Be Won',

The Christian Century, (Washington, 1968), p. 937-939.

Walli, R. L. 'U.S. Foreign Policy of Interventionism', Social Scientist, 4 (1976), p. 41-48.

  1. Hugh Higgins, The Cold War, (Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., London) 2nd ed. P.130.
  2. Hanson, Elizabeth C. 'The Media, Foreign Policymaking and Political Conflict', Mershon International Studies Review, 42 (1) (1998), p. 157.
  3. Reston, James. "The End of the Tunnel", New York Times, (30/4/1975) p. 41.
  4. Michael X. Delli Caprini, "US Media Coverage of the Vietnam Conflict in 1968", in Michael Klein, ed., The Vietnam Era: Media and Popular Culture in the United States and Vietnam, (Pluto Press: London), p. 38; and H. Bruce Franklin, "1968: The Vision of the Movement and the Alternative Press", in Michael Klein, ed., The Vietnam Era: Media and Popular Culture in the United States and Vietnam, (Pluto Press: London), p. 66; and Anthony Edmonds, The War in Vietnam, (Greenwood Press: London,1988), p. 59.
  5. Daniel Hallin, The "Uncensored War"; The Media and Vietnam, (Oxford University Press: New York; Oxford, 1986), p. 11.
  6. Hallin, 'The "Uncensored War"', p. 11.
  7. G. A. Donaldson, America at War Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, (1996), p. 69.
  8. James McComack, "Interest Groups and the media". in James Scott, ed., Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period, (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 1998), p. 175-6.
  9. J. Chartres, B. Henshaw, and M. Dewar, Northern Ireland Scrapbook, (London; New York; Sydney, 1986), p. 9.
  10. S. Moeller, Shooting War: Photography and the American Experience of Combat, (New York, Basic Books, 1989), p. 19.
  11. R. L. Walli, 'U.S. Foreign Policy of Interventionism', Social Scientist, 4 (6) (1976), p. 42.
  12. Fisher, Christopher T. 'Nation Building and the Vietnam War: A historiography' The Pacific Historical Review, 74 (3) (2005), p. 442.
  13. ibid, p. 43.
  14. ibid, p. 45.
  15. ibid, p. 45.
  16. George C. Herring, 'America and Vietnam: The Debate Continues', The American Historical Review, 92 (2) (1987), p. 351.
  17. Cited in Michael Klein, "Cultural Narrative and the Process of Re-collection: Film, History and the Vietnam Era", in Michael Klein, ed., The Vietnam Era: Media and Popular Culture in the United States and Vietnam, (Pluto Press: London), p. 4.
  18. Walli, 'U.S. Foreign Policy', p. 46.
  19. Caprini, 'US Media Coverage', p. 44.
  20. Herring, 'America and Vietnam', p. 351.
  21. Walli, 'U.S. Foreign Policy', p.41-48, discusses the many reasons historians believe America became involved in the war.
  22. Paul Dean, "The Role of the Press", in Walter Capps, ed., The Vietnam Reader, (Routledge: New York; London, 1991), p. 230 states that American failure can be defined as a military failure. For an argument on America being doomed ot failure for entering the wrong war refer to Tran Van Dinh, "Why the War in Vietnam Cannot Be Won", The Christian Century, (Washington, 1968), p. 938.
  23. For discussion of American failure being caused by a lack of strategy refer to Anderson, David. Trapped by Success, (Columbia University Press: New York; Chichester, 1993), p. 203.
  24. Warren I. Cohen, 'Vietnam: New Light on the Nature of the War?', The International History Review, 9 (1) (1987), p. 109.
  25. ibid, p. 108.
  26. ibid, p. 108.
  27. Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985) p. xvi-628 and Kahin, Interventionism: How America became involved in Vietnam, (New York, 1986), p 120-1.
  28. Robert A. Devine, "Historiography: Vietnam Reconsidered", in Walter Capps, ed., The Vietnam Reader, (Routledge: New York; London, 1991), p. 100.
  29. Sidney Lens, The Forging of the American Empire, 2nd ed., (Pluto Press; London, 2003), p.1, 338, 339.
  30. Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes; McCarthyism in America, (Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1998), p. xiii, 121.
  31. Wilfred Burchett, Vietnam North: A first hand report, (International Publishers: New York, 1966), p. 8.
  32. Cohen, 'Vietnam: New Light', 108. and Herring, 'America and Vietnam', recognises the developments by Kahin to get sources declassified, p. 354.
  33. Herring, 'America and Vietnam', p. 355 and Ben Kiernan, 'The Vietnam War, Alternative Endings', The American Historical Review, 97 (4) (1992), p. 1137.
  34. Hallin, "The "Uncensored War"', p.11.
  35. Christopher T. Fisher, 'Nation Building and the Vietnam War: A historiography' The Pacific Historical Review, 74 (3) (2005), p. 442.
  36. Herring, 'America and Vietnam', p. 351.
  37. Kiernan, 'The Vietnam War, Alternative', p. 1131.
  38. Cohen, 'Vietnam: New Light', p. 109.
  39. Donaldson, America at War, p. 88.
  40. William H. Hammond, Reporting Vietnam: Media and Military at War, (University of Kansas: Kansas, 1998), p. 5.
  41. Anthony Edmonds, The War in Vietnam, (Greenwood Press: London, 1988), p. 63.
  42. Caprini, 'US Media Coverage', p. 46.
  43. Klein, 'Cultural Narrative', p. 10.
  44. Ibid.
  45. Caprini, 'US Media Coverage', p. 45.
  46. ibid, p.44.
  47. Hallin, 'The "Uncensored War"', p. 40.
  48. Hammond, 'Reporting Vietnam', p. ix.
  49. Hallin, 'The "Uncensored War"', p. 38-9.
  50. Hammond, 'Reporting Vietnam', p. 2, 5.
  51. Ibid, p. 16-17.
  52. Smith, R., An International History of The Vietnam War: The Kennedy Strategy (New York, 1985), p. 6, 378.
  53. Walli, 'U.S. Foreign Policy', p. 45,
  54. L. Gardener Approaching Vietnam: From World War II to Dienbeinphu, 1941-1954, (New York, 1988), p. 350-1; Anderson, 'Trapped by Success', p. 203.
  55. Powlick, Phillip J. and Katz, Andrew Z. 'Defining the American Public Opinion/ Foreign Policy Nexus', Mershon International Studies Review, 42 (1) (1998), p. 29.
  56. Caprini, 'US Media Coverage', p. 45.
  57. Edmonds, 'The War in Vietnam', p.67.
  58. Edmonds, 'The War in Vietnam', p. 38.
  59. An interview with H. D. S. Greenway by Christian Appy, Vietnam: The definitive oral history told from all sides, p. 260.
  60. [61]
  61. John Shaw interview cited in Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker from the Crimea to Vietnam, (Andre Deutsch: New York, 1975), p. 376.
  62. Herman, Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 2001, p. vii-viii.
  63. Hammond, 'Reporting Vietnam' p. 2-3.
  64. Knightley, 'The First Casualty', p. 174.
  65. ibid.
  66. Nevard, Jacques. "41 Helicopters Land Vietnamese Forces for Swoop on Reds", New York Times, (20/7/1962) p. 1.
  67. Nevard, "41 Helicopters Land" p. 1.
  68. Mohr, Charles. "U.S. War Position Still Defensive, Top Officers Say", New York Times, (13/12/1965) p. 1.
  69. Nevard, "41 Helicopters Land", p. 4.
  70. Nevard, "41 Helicopters Land" p. 1.
  71. Hammond, p. 2.
  72. Cronkite interview.
  73. Hallin, p.38.
  74. Halberstam, p. 6.
  75. Hallin, p. 39,
  76. Halberstam, p. 6.
  77. Hallin, p. 43.
  78. Hallin, p. 38.
  79. FRUS.
  80. FRUS.
  81. McMahon, Robert J. 'The Pentagon's War, the Media's War', Reviews in American History, 28 (2) (2000), p. 303.
  82. Herring, Eric and Robinson, Piers. 'Too Polemical or Too Critical? Chromsky on the Study of the News Media and US Foreign Policy', Review of International Studies, 29 (4) (2003), p. 557.
  83. Hallin, p. 9.
  84. Edmonds, p. 67.
  85. FRUS.
  86. Kovach, p 172.
  87. [87]
  88. Caprini, 'US Media Coverage', p. 42.
  89. [88]
  90. Kovach, Do the news media make foreign policy?, p. 169.
  91. Daniel Ellsberg interview in Appy, p. 435.
  92. Mohr, "U.S. War Position", p. 1.
  93. Cronkite.
  94. Hallin, p. 8.
  95. Buckley, Tom. "Offensive is Said to Pin Point Enemy's Strengths", New York Times, (2/2/1968) p. 12.
  96. Mohr, Charles. "War and Misinformation", New York Times, (22/11/1965) p. 2.
  97. Appy, p.238.
  98. Pennington, Joanne. Modern America 1865 to the Present. (City: Hodder Murray, 2005.).
  99. Klein, p. 30.
  100. Caprini, 'US Media Coverage', p. 48.
  101. Farrell, p. 187.
  102. Wallace TV.
  103. Wallace TV.
  104. Farrell, P. 190.
  105. Ibid, p. 182.
  106. Hallin, p.33.
  107. BorstelmannP.202.
  108. Ibid.
  109. Cohen, p. 8.
  110. "Gold, Dollars and Empire" Monthly Review (Feb 1968) p, 1-9 cited in Franklin, p. 65, 66.
  111. Franklin, p. 66.
  112. Nevard, "41 Helicopters Land" p. 1.
  113. Appy, p. 57.
  114. Ibid, p. 58.
  115. Hallin, p171.
  116. Moeller, p.19.
  117. Franklin, p. 68.
  118. Caprini, 'US Media Coverage', p. 56, 57.
  119. ibid, p.60.
  120. Gaddis, p. 235 Strategies of containment.
  121. Halliday, p.143.
  122. TV Broadcast.
  123. Reston, p.36.
  124. Mohr, "U.S. War Position", p. 1.
  125. Buckley, T. p. 12.
  126. Edwards, p. 122.
  127. Buckley. P. 12.
  128. Donaldson, p.
  129. Caprini, 'US Media Coverage', p. 39.
  130. ibid, p. 40.