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Battle of Britain

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“Where Napoleon failed, I shall succeed. I shall land on the shores of Britain.”

Adolph Hitler

‘… The Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin… The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us.

- Winston Churchill, June 18, 1940

1. The Battle of Britain was a conflict between the Germans and the Britishers over English Channel and British main land took place from 10 July to 12 October 1940[1]. The 96 days war started by the invasion of Luftwaffe (German air force) over British airfields and shipping lines. The British reacted against the air offensive by employing Royal Air Force (RAF) in defensive battle.

2. The Germans intended to establish their authority in Europe on the process of global occupation. Therefore, German decided to invade Britain immediately after the fall of France by making an amphibious landing. The code name for the operation was “Sea Lion”. However, before the land invasion could take place, Germans needed to control the skies over Britain. As such, the Luftwaffe was tasked to defeat the RAF. The air campaign that took place over mainland of Britain and English Channel came to be known as the ‘Battle of Britain'[2]. The primary goal of German was to destroy RAF within shortest possible time with a view to prepare the way to invade Britain and Britain in reply aimed to safeguard her sovereignty by employing all her fighter forces[3]. The German mainly concentrated on Offensive Counter Air Operation (OCAO) to destroy the RAF and in retaliation, The British concentrated in Defensive Counter Air Operation (DCAO) by integrating interceptors and Air Defence (AD) Radars. Eventually, the Luftwaffe failed to eliminate RAF and invade England. The war saw some new technologies and weapon systems such as the first use of integrated AD system and the first wide spread use of interceptors like Hurricane and Spitfire.

3. The Battle of Britain turned to be a classic air battle of World War II (WW II) in which victory was achieved mainly by defensive actions. It is characterized by world's first strategic bombing campaign and the world's first battle entirely decided in the air[4]. This defensive battle not only changed the course of WW II but left many lessons to be learned and remembered.

4. This paper will endeavour to focus the air power aspects of the war analyzing the events of the battle and try to identify the weaknesses of both sides to draw appropriate lessons which would be applicable for today's air warfare.

AIM

5. The aim of this paper is to analyze the air campaign and to draw appropriate lessons.

CHAPTER 2
BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE

1. Germany in particular had been dissatisfied with the outcome of World War One (WW I). In 1919, following ‘Treaty of Versailles', Germany was highly frustrated and angry due to territorial losses and reparation payments imposed by the victorious Allies[5]. This treaty imposed numerous restrictions on the expansion of size and capability of the German Armed Forces. This is, in particular, was seen by the Germans as a humiliation of their defeat. However, this soon changed when Adolph Hitler came in to power. Having experienced both triumph and defeat in WW I as a soldier in German Army, Hitler promised his people that he would restore everything that was taken away from the Germans, despite the conditions of the treaty. He built up economy and reorganised the military to conquer the whole of Northern Europe.[6]

2. Accordingly, Hitler's army invaded Poland on 01 September 1939 setting about WW II. Thereafter using the Blitzkrieg ('Lightning War') technique, one by one, countries fell to the German Army, like Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Holland, Belgium and finally on 22 June 1940, France. In order to expand further over the Continental Europe, the German needed to invade Britain. To do so they found that English Channel was the only barrier to achieve her aim. Thus they planned a massive amphibious landing.”[7] The objective was to land 1,60,000 German soldiers along a forty mile coastal stretch of south-east England. To achieve this, Germany set out the strategy to gain air superiority by eliminating RAF on Adlertag or Eagle Day. The exact date for Adlertag was to be decided by Hitler[8]. The stage was set. In the skies above South East England, the future of Britain was about to be decided.

COMMAND AND CONTROL
GERMANY

3. Supreme Commander. Hitler was the supreme commander of Nazi Germany. Given the success of the German military in the early part of the WW II, he did not envisage a long battle for the conquest of Britain. He often dictated military strategies to his commanders and the Battle of Britain was not different.

4. Air Commanders. Reich-Marshal Hermann Goering was Hitler's Air Minister and Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe. A much decorated pilot in WW I, Goering sketched the plan to achieve victory over Britain by intensive air assault alone. Three Generals supported him in the air campaign. General Field Marshal Albert Kesselring was given command of Luftflotte II, the largest command in Battle of Britain. General Field Marshal Hugo Sperrle was assigned to Luftflotte III. Luftflotte V was commanded by General Hans-Jurgen Stumpff[9].

BRITAIN

5. Supreme Commander. Sir Winston Churchill was the Prime Minister of Britain during the Second World War. His dynamic leadership and natural instinct played a decisive role throughout the Battle and his dynamic leadership helped to maintain high morale of his people during their darkest hour.

6. Air Commanders. Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall was the RAF Chief of Air Staff. However, it was his subordinate, Sir Hugh Dowding, Air Officer Commanding in Chief (AOC in C) of Fighter Command, who played a critical role in the Battle of Britain. Prior to the Battle, during the German invasion of France, it was him who strongly resisted RAF's Fighter deployment in France, fearing that country will run out of resources to defend herself. During the early 30s, he formulated the most effective integrated Air Defence strategy which is named after him, called the Dowding System. Three key players supported Dowding in Fighter Command. AVM Keith Park, a New Zealander by birth, was the AOC No 11 Group, the most important Group in Fighter Command protecting the southern coastline and southeast England and London. Air Vice Marshal (AVM) Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory was the AOC of 12 groups. AVM Sir Quintin Brand was the AOC of 10 Group[10].

FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE OPPOSING SIDES

7. Appreciating the eminent attack, the British stood in the way of German domination of Northern Europe with available new fighters and trained pilots. At the start Luftwaffe had total 2764 aircraft stationed in France, Belgium, Holland and Norway against 600 to 700 fighters of RAF. This force outnumbered the RAF four to one[11].

THE LUFTWAFFE COMMAND ORGANISATION AND ORBAT

8. The Luftwaffe had total 1300 bombers, 1464 fighters and approximately 4000 Pilots at the onset of the battle[12]. Unlike their British counterparts, which had commands based on functions; the Luftwaffe was arranged into air fleets or Luftflotte. The average strength of an air fleet was approximately 1000 aircraft. These were self-contained units that had all the fighter, bomber and supporting elements. For this battle, the following Luftflotte command was formed. The position of Luftflotte Commands is shown in Annex A.
a. Luftflotte II. It was based in Northern France, Belgium and Holland, with its Headquarters at Brussels. The fleet consisted of 13 Fighter, 23 Bomber, 2 Dive-Bombers and 4 Heavy-Fighter Groups.

b. Luftflotte III. It occupied bases in the rest of France with its Headquarters in Paris. The fleet consisted of 9 Fighter, 15 Bomber, 7 Dive-bomber and 4 Heavy-Fighter Groups.

c. Luftflotte V. It was based in Norway and its headquarters was at Stavanger. It consisted of two Bomber Wings, two Fighter Groups, and a Long-range Seaplane Wing[13].

RAF COMMAND ORGANIZATION AND ORBAT

9. The RAF organisation comprised of the Fighter Command, Bomber Command, Coastal Command and Transport Command. Besides, they had Training Command which looked after training of pilots. RAF had total 913 fighters, 560 bombers and 3080 pilots in her inventory[14]. In this battle, the Fighter and Bomber Command basically fought the war.

a. Fighter Command. Fighter Command, led by ACM Dowding, was divided into four groups. 13 Group covered the North of England and Scotland, 12 Group the Midlands and Wales, 10 Group covered South West England and 11 Group covered South East England and London. In the summer of 1940, Fighter Command possessed 953 aircraft, out of which 256 were kept in reserve[15]. RAF Fighter Commands along with breakdown of the ORBAT are shown in Annex B.

b. Bomber Command. British were better equipped with bombers than Germans. They had aircraft like Blenheim, Wellington, Hampden, Whitley and Beaufort in their inventory. The Whitley and Wellington had longer range than the German types and were fitted with multi gun turrets.

c. Coastal Command. Coastal Command was organised in three groups; these were 18 Group, 16 Group and 15 Group. 165 convoy escort and 96 reconnaissance (recce) aircraft were given to coastal command for maritime defence. Their major role was to secure trade and shipping line from air attack.

d. Transport Command. At the outbreak of the war, Civil Aviation and Imperial Airways came under military control. However this command did not have any bearing in Battle of Britain[16].

OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES

GERMAN OBJECTIVE

10. On July 16, Hitler mentioned in Directive No 16 that “The aim of this operation is to eliminate the English motherland as a base from which war against Germany could be continued and if necessary, to occupy completely”. In view of this, Hitler set an objective which is as follows:

‘To land German soldiers along a forty mile coastal stretch of south-east England for the purpose of invasion, by overwhelming RAF in the shortest time possible'[17].

GERMAN'S STRATEGY

11. Hitler's condition for Sea lion is as follows:
“The RAF is to be "beaten down in its morale and in fact, that it can no longer display any appreciable aggressive force in opposition to the German crossing[18]".

12. Luftwaffe estimated that it would take four days to defeat Fighter Command, followed by another four weeks to eliminate the RAF. The crux of the strategy is found in Directive No 17 (1 August, 1940) in light of which strategy is summarized as follows.[19]

To gain control of the air by neutralizing the RAF in the air and on the ground,

To interdict the British supply lines by attacking ships and ports,

c. To allow ground forces to cross the Channel and invade Britain.

d. To destroy British coastal defences.

BRITISH OBJECTIVE

“Do you realize that for the first time for thousand years this country is now in danger of invasion?”

General Sir John Dill to General Montgomery

13. On the other hand, British objective was quite specific and clear. Upon realizing eminent attack, British geared up RAF to counter German offensive. Thus, the objective of British was to maintain the control of main land by countering German offensive.

BRITISH STRATEGY

14. The British adopted the following strategy:

a. To Defend the homeland against German offensive.

b. To achieve and maintain control of air by fighting defensive battle.

c. To maintain strategic and operational reserve to concentrate in time and space.

d. To protect shipping lines from German attack.

e. To cause attrition to German air assets.

PHASES OF THE BATTLE

TIMELINE OF THE BATTLE

15. The timeline of the whole battle is given below[20]:

a. 10 July. First day of the Battle. German attacked on shipping lines and airfields.

b. 8 August - 23 August. Attacks on the south of England.

c. 13 August. Adlertag (Eagle Day).

d. 24 August - 6 September. Bombing of RAF airfields.

e. 7 September - 14 September. Daylight bombing of British cities.

f. 15 September - 31 October. “The Blitz.”

16. The Battle of Britain was fought in four phases as described in the subsequent paragraphs. The pictorial representation is in Annex C.

PHASE 1 - THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF THE CHANNEL

(10 JUL 1940 - 11 AUG 1940)

17. This phase commenced with effect from 10 July 1940 when 64 Luftwaffe planes attacked Britain and lasted until early August 1940. This is now regarded as the opening of the Battle of Britain. Until the Eagle Day, Hitler decided that the Luftwaffe would attack British domestic shipping in the English Channel. The idea was to draw the RAF Fighters over sea and depleting their fighter strength. This phase of the battle also observed probing missions against British defences, along with reconnaissance flights over airfields. During this phase, RAF lost 145 aircraft whereas Luftwaffe lost 270[21].

PHASE 2 - THE BATTLE FOR THE AIR SUPERIORITY

(12 AUG 1940- 06 SEP1940)

18. In preparation to “Eagle Day” the Luftwaffe attacked radar stations on August 12. Some were knocked out but soon repaired - and the system as a whole kept functioning. On 13 August, the “Eagle Day” began by launching massive raids on the AD radars and airfields of 11 Group like Manston, Portsmouth and Warmwell[22]. The aim was to destroy the RAF, either in the air or on the ground. To keep up the pressure, The German began night raids over the airfields to restrain RAF to repair battle damage overnight. Just when the Luftwaffe was beginning to overcome the RAF with the destruction of her airfields, the RAF was given a much needed break to recover as the Germans decided to change its strategy from attacking airfields to cities[23]. On 23 August, one German pilot ditched a bomb on London just to speed up his home flight but this outraged Churchill who later ordered to bomb over Berlin. Had the Luftwaffe been demonstrated persistence against the fighter bases, radar system and industrial base and the outcome might well have been the destruction of RAF. More so, bad weather over Britain also reduced German attacks for which they failed to achieve desired result. On the other hand, appreciating the losses of bombers, Germans changed their tactics by employing escort aircraft with bombers. However, even with these escorted missions, the Germans did not succeed in wearing down the RAF air defences[24]. The main reason was their failure in appreciating the roles played by British radar and AD network. During this phase RAF lost 106 Pilots and 128 more were seriously injured[25].

PHASE 3 - THE BATTLE TO BREAK BRITAIN'S MORALE OR THE BLITZ

(07 SEP 1940 - 05 OCT 1940)

19. The third phase of the battle came to be known as the Blitz. In retaliation to the attack made by German over London, the British bombed Berlin. This enraged Hitler as he felt that the attacks on airfields did not destroy enough RAF fighters. As such, he ordered to bring a change in target sets and attack cities, industries and other strategic targets instead of only airfields and radars. This gave the British defences the much needed respite to re-group and re-build[26]. The climax of the Battle of Britain came on the 30th-31st August 1940. On this day the British lost 50 aircraft compared to the Germany's 41[27].

PHASE 4 - THE NIGHT RAIDS (06 OCT 1940 - 31 OCT 1940)

20. By October, it was felt that the German daylight bomber losses became too heavy. Realizing the task was difficult and the losses becoming too high at daytime, the German planned to attack the cities at night[28]. The damage they caused to Britain's cities was enormous including 42,000 civilian casualties[29]. However as the RAF pilots became familiar with the raiders' course of action towards London and other cities with their operational experience the success in night interceptions improved.

TERMINATION OF THE BATTLE

21. By late October, the weather began to worsen and the German losses accumulated. As such, on October 12, Hitler finally postponed operation ‘Sea-Lion' till April 1941 which never materialized[30]. This marked the end of the Battle of Britain. Luftwaffe failed to secure the command of the air. Churchill rightly paid honour to the fighter pilot of RAF with these immortal words: “Never in the field of human conflict, has so much been owed, by so many to so few”[31].

TOTAL LOSSES OF AIRCRAFT AND PILOTS

22. During the conflict the RAF lost 1085 aircraft and the Luftwaffe 1,652. There were total 3030 pilots from Great Britain and many allied pilots took part in the Battle of Britain. An estimated of 1664 Luftwaffe pilots, 339 RAF pilots and 107 RAF allied pilots were killed in the course of their duties before the war came to an end[32].

CHAPTER 3

AIR OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY BOTH SIDES

1. The various types of air operations conducted by the Luftwaffe and the RAF during the Battle of Britain which are examined in the following paragraphs. A compilation of main aircraft those participated in the battle is attached as Annex D.

LUFTWAFFE

2. Air Interdiction (AI) and Armed Reconnaissance. During 1st phase of war Luftwaffe carried out AI on British harbours, ports and coastal defences. These attacks were haphazard and didn't bring any effective result. Again, in the first phase of the battle, the Luftwaffe conducted armed reconnaissance and attacked convoys in the channel and coastal cities. The aim was to draw the RAF over the channel so that the fighters could be engaged there. These operations diminished after the 1st phase when the Luftwaffe began the battle for air superiority[33].

3. Strategic Air Offensive. During Phase III and IV of the battle, The Luftwaffe conducted persistent strategic air offensive campaign against British aircraft factories and major cities. During this campaign there was heavy destruction of British targets while the Luftwaffe suffered heavy attrition. For example, by 18 August, the losses to the German Junker 87 “Stuka” dive-bombers were so severe that they had to be withdrawn from the battle forever[34].

4. Airfield Attack. Luftwaffe carried out attacks on Airfield targets like aircraft and strips/runways, hangers to eliminate the RAF on ground and gain air superiority. On 15 Aug in particular, the Luftwaffe made a co-ordinated attack on all the airfield of 11 Groups. This day saw the heaviest fighting of the whole battle. The Luftwaffe flew1,485 sorties compared to 700 the RAF flew and the RAF put down 34 German fighters to their 13 losses[35]. These attacks continued throughout Phase II and III. However, just when the attacks were becoming effective, the German leadership decided to switch the attacks to cities and industries.

5. Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD). The Luftwaffe launched SEAD against radar stations to reduce attrition of German bombers by suppressing the enemy's air defence. For example, on 12 August, RAF stations at Kent, Sussex and Isle of Wright were attacked and achieved considerable damage. But they did not carry out persistent attack on radars, as they failed to appreciate the effect of radar and command and control system on to the whole integrated Air Defence system[36]. Some of the radars were knocked out but soon they were repaired and the system as a whole kept functioning, leading Goering to think “It is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing the attacks on radar sites, in view of the fact that not one of those attacked has so far been put out of action[37].

6. Fighter Sweeps and Escort (Jagdstaffeln). The Germans employed a large number of Me 109 and Me 110 in fighter sweep and escort role of the bombers. But these escorts had limited range therefore most of the bombers were left unprotected during the final phase of the missions. Escorts missions thus could not achieve its success[38].

RAF

7. Limited Strategic Air Offensive. Although Britain adopted full defensive posture, she launched a limited strategic air offensive over Berlin. This was done in retaliation against the bombing over London.

8. Active Air Defence. During the entire battle, RAF could successfully intercept the raiders both during the day and night as a result of the integrated AD system. This was a new technology which will be discussed subsequently under the heading of Technology. During day, Luftwaffe aircraft used to be intercepted on both ways by the RAF fighters; the enemy was an easier prey on their way back as they had no weapons left to fight. Again, RAF also carried out a series of night interceptions during the 3rd and 4th phase. This became progressively easier as the battle progressed and RAF became familiar with the raiders' course of action towards London and other cities.

9. Passive Air Defence Measures. RAF adopted number of Passive Air Defence (PAD) measures which often deceived the Luftwaffe raids. Significant ones are discussed here.

a. Use of Decoys. RAF evolved several decoy systems to mislead the Germans. They created controlled blaze. The flames and smoke would make an impression that a refinery was already ablaze. This misled Germans into thinking that their raid was successful, which made them call off the attack. In addition to deceive the Germans the RAF constructed dummy airfields and aircraft.

b. Camouflages and Concealment. British devised excellent camouflage techniques and concealment measures to deny Germans any information that could be used against them. As such, the Germans could never gather accurate picture of radar damage inflicted by their own Bomber force. More so, information on radar, command and control were always kept secret. This made German forces repeat their missions which led to deplete their resources.

c. Fire-Fighting. Britain integrated fire fighting services with the AD system. Whenever there was an air raid over London, fire fighting organization used to blow siren and asked the citizens to take shelter in the trench.

MAJOR TACTICS THAT EVOLVED DURING THE BATTLE

10. While carrying all these offensive and defensive operations during the Battle of Britain, few new tactics were evolved by both the air forces. Some important tactics are discussed below:

a. Big Wing (Raid in Mass). Big Wing in other word full wing formation was a tactic developed by Fighter Command. It was said that RAF was to engage aircraft with five or more fighter aircraft against mass attacks by the enemy[39].

b. High Level Bombing. Luftwaffe changed their tactics of bombing from medium level to high level to minimize attrition. RAF fighters faced a lot of difficulties in intercepting these bombers at higher altitude because of their less rate of climb. However the Germans had to trade off accuracy as a result of this tactic.

c. Integrated Interception. RAF carried out interception by integrated effort of radar information and fighter aircraft throughout the battle which helped them to cause higher attrition.

d. Rotation of Fighters. The British frequently rotated units out of the hot spots, deployed towards northern area from south, allowing them to recuperate. These units were available when the battle reached a decisive phase. This allowed British to use it on 15th September during the onslaught of German[40].

DOMINANT FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED

THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR

11. Several important factors influenced the outcome of the war. They are:

a. Integrated AD network of Britain

b. Effective use of Intelligence

c. Technological Innovations

d. Use of Reserves

INTEGRATED AD NETWORK OF BRITAIN

12. Organisation. Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, was the chief planner to introduce system of detection, reporting and placing of defence units into action (see 2 and 3)[41].

13. Radars and observation posts were used to pass the information of incoming raids to Fighter Command HQ and Observation Corps HQ respectively. Thereafter, monitoring and controlling the entire battle was done at the Fighter Command HQ. Based on the progress of the battle, commands would be issued to the Group HQs. The Group areas were further subdivided into Sectors. Each Sector had under its command between two to four squadrons. Comprising an aerodrome with a command post, these Sector stations would form the critical nodes in the AD network. Group HQs would pass filtered and processed information to the sector stations, along with instructions for the scrambling of fighters to engage enemy aircraft.

14. Chain Home and Chain Home Low Radar. By 1940s the British constructed a permanent network of radar stations called Chain Home (CH). This system could detect enemy raid as high as 15,000 feet. To detect the low level threat, the British also constructed low looking radar stations called Chain Home Low. These could pick up incoming raids at an altitude below 500 feet[42].
15. Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA). In 1939, Britain had 110 AAA which could be employed to shoot down approximately German aircraft. The British also employed around 700 searchlights to aid tracking of the AAAs at night[43].

16. RAF Balloon Command. The British employed balloon barrages in strategic areas. It forced German aircraft to fly higher thereby reducing bombing accuracy. Balloons were particularly effective against dive-bombers. In 1939, they had total 100 balloon barrages[44].

17. The Observer Corps. There were approximately 30000 observers deployed against few hundred observation posts. They complemented the radars as a tool for early warning, and helped Fighter Command track enemy aircraft when they were flying in-land.

EFFECTIVE USE OF INTELLIGENCE MEANS

18. Like in any other campaign intelligence played a key role in Battle of Britain too. The British possessed a superior intelligence service. The code name for the British effort to crack the German military Enigma cipher machines was called Ultra[45]. German military used Enigma code machines for the purpose of radio communications. The RAF intelligence agency was responsible for covering two specific aspects of Luftwaffe firstly, the Germans' order of battle (ORBAT) and Organization and secondly on Luftwaffe operation. British intelligence could easily extract information from radio transmission conversation of Luftwaffe and knew exactly where they were heading for with the number. This information helped Fighter Command to plan the scramble in time.

19. In contrast the German intelligence was ineffective. As a result the Luftwaffe did not possess recent knowledge on the progress and effectiveness of the RAF's AD, particularly on the system introduced by Air Chief Marshl (ACM) Dowding. Thus more often the Luftwaffe was caught by surprise.

TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS

20. Battle of Britain is the first air campaign where the offensive and defensive counter air operation concepts were shaped by the development of new technologies. To meet the newer tactics the technological development was the requirement of that time. Few important ones are[46]:

a. Triangulation Method. The German pilots used to tune to BBC radio stations to find their fix course by calculating relative bearings from to two or three BBC radio stations by triangulation method. Discovering this, British ordered all stations to use same frequency for transmission to confuse German pilots.

b. Airborne Cigar. The Airborne Cigar was a jamming device used by RAF. This equipment could interfere with enemy radio transmission channel in the 20 - 30 MHZ and 48 - 52 MHZ at a range of 50 miles.

c. DUPPEL. DUPPEL was a German ECCM method. Strips of silver paper were dropped to confuse the British radars, which is similar to present day chaff.

d. Radio Paris. Another radio station used for military purpose was Radio Paris. This was transmitted by the Germans occupied in France, and it offered round-the-clock program of songs interspersed with Nazi propaganda. The Radio Paris transmission was through highly directional antenna aimed at the city to be bombed. The German pilots would thus be directed to London or Liverpool simply by listening to French songs transmitted by Radio Paris. The British took long time to detect the system. When they did, they came up with a counter measure called “BROMIDE”. This consisted re-transmitting of Radio Paris programme on the same frequency using Omni-directional antenna. With this ECM German bombers got disoriented and flew haphazardly over Britain bombing at random.

e. IFF/High Frequency Direction Finding System. British evolved the High Frequency Direction Finding system (HFDFS), also known as ‘Pip-squeak'. All British fighters had TR9D transmitter receiver installed in this system. The unit had two channels, one for voice communication with the Sector command station and the other for the IFF system. By transmitting on this second channel at regular intervals, the Sector command station could automatically track the movement of the friendly aircraft.

f. The Lorenz System. In 1930, German Company “Lorenz” invented a radio electric navigation system which was recognized as the mother of modern radio navigational system. This system relied on the pilot interpreting audio signals. The pilot hearing the continuous signal would be certain of the course. The British scientists countered the method by transmitting noise on the same frequency[47].

g. The KNICKEBEIN System. The Germany had developed a blind bombing aid code named KNICKEBEIN (Crooked Leg). Here a steerable beam was projected over the target while the pilot flew along the beam using the audio tones until a second intersecting beam (Indicating the target location) was heard. A countermeasure was devised by the British which involved re-transmitting the German signals to seduce the pilot away from the centreline i.e. from the target. The false signals were transmitted from devices called masking beacons because they masked the real signal. The KNICKEBEIN was given the code name HEADACHE by the British and the masking beacon or MEACON, was code named ASPIRIN jammer[48].

h. X-Great System. The German scientist Dr Hans Plendl devised a second blind bombing aid, called X-Great. This system used an approach beam similar to KNICKEBEIN. However, instead of a single crossing beam, it had three crossing beams. A new countermeasure, code named BROMIDE jammer, was successful against this technique and the majority of German bombs were dropped in the open countryside[49].

USE OF RESERVES

21. The Germans had as many bombers as the British had fighters. So in total the Luftwaffe outnumbered the RAF 2 to 1. Despite the numerical superiority of the Germans, the British commander, Air Marshal Dowding, kept about a third of his fighter forces (about 256 aircraft) away from the battle zone, where they were not subject to attack. The British maintained a reserve even during what Churchill called Britain's darkest hour. On top of this, Dowding's two subordinate commanders, Park and Leigh-Mallory, maintained their own reserves. These reserves, Dowding's strategic reserve and the sector commanders' operational reserve, played key roles. Therefore they were decisive in winning the battle for Britain and averting an invasion. On 15 September, during the final onslaught, the British met the Germans in mass. Both Park and Leigh-Mallory committed their operational reserves along with strategic reserve. As a result of this, the Germans suffered heavy losses as a result and within few days they shifted to useless night bombings of London[50].

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
AIR POWER ASPECTS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS

1. Characteristics of air power help air power employment. Again, employment is based on principles of the war and the tenets of airpower. Although all had some impact one way or the other on the battle, two of the characteristics, three of the principles of war and five of tenets have been selected for discussion given their relative importance to the outcome of the battle. These are:

a. Characteristics of air power.

(1) Flexibility/Versatility

(2) Reach

b. Principles of war.

(1) Selection and maintenance of aim

(2) Maintenance of morale

(3) Surprise

c. Tenets.

(1) Centralized control and decentralized execution

(2) Priority

(3) Synergy

(4) Concentration

(5) Persistence

CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR POWER

2. Flexibility/Versatility. From the strategic point of view, both the RAF and Luftwaffe exploited this characteristic to the fullest. For example, the assets were used in strategic and tactical operations and many facets of the enemy's air power were attacked. At the tactical level, the Luftwaffe was less flexible and versatile than the RAF since it was not designed for a strategic bombing campaign. For example, the Me110, a long-range heavy fighter, fared very badly during the Battle of Britain. Due to its inferior performance, it suffered badly against the more nimble Hurricanes and Spitfires. As such, the Me110 was not useful for its primary role of escorting and defending the bombers. Indeed, it had difficulties in defending itself, leading to a farcical situation in which these escort fighters had themselves to be escorted by the Me109[51]s. This situation severely limited the flexibility and versatility of the Luftwaffe tactics.

3. Reach. Reaching and destruction of the target at the enemy heartland is the essence of strategic air campaign. Luftwaffe bombers did not have the sufficient range to reach all the targets in Britain due to shorter range of the bombers. Even though the bombers reached their targets as per capability, their escort fighters failed to accompany them inside British inland. This led most of the vital targets in Britain unreachable by Luftwaffe. RAF bombers also had very limited range however, as they had been fighting a defensive battle its impact was much lesser than on the Luftwaffe bombers.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR
4. Selection and Maintenance of Aim. Many have argued that failure to comply with the principle of maintaining the aim probably cost them in the battle. Apparently, Hitler was enraged by the retaliatory attack on Berlin by the RAF on 25th and 26th Aug. The political masters of Germany believed that by attacking cities and industries[52], they could crush British morale. The change of plan was a turning point in the Battle of Britain for several reasons some of them are:

a. Firstly it gave the RAF time to repair its airfields and radar sites. It helped in bringing in more aircraft after repairs and new production. Post war analysis has revealed that RAF fighter command was perilously close to the bottom of the barrel when Hitler shifted his focus.

b. Secondly the German Me-109 fighters could only carry sufficient fuel for 20 min flight over Britain. London was on the edge of its limited range. Therefore once intercepted bombers did not have sufficient fuel to carry out evasive.

c. Lastly knowing the target heading towards cities, the British controllers then had time to assemble a large number of fighters to intercept the German formations.

5. Maintenance of Morale. On 3rd June 1940, Churchill commented that “We shall fight them on the beaches, we shall fight them on the landing grounds, we shall fight them in the field and in the street, we shall fight them in the hills. We shall never surrender.

This actually projected the strength of The British. Dynamic leadership helped the citizen to maintain their morale high. Although the British was facing one of its darkest hour, they continued war till their last breath and did not surrender. The morale of the RAF pilots was also high, given that they were fighting for their homeland. On the other hand the German aircrew did not have high morale. Probably they did not find any logical issue to invade Britain.

6. Surprise. The German failed to take the Britain by surprise. The British knew each and every thing that the Germans were planning through their intelligence and AD network. Introduction of integrated AD system was a surprise to German pilots. Again German pilots were surprised once they found number of fighters more than their expectation in the air on 15 September 1940 as the British put their reserve up in the air[53].

TENETS OF AIR POWER

7. Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution. The Dowding system was a classic example of centralized control with the decentralised execution. Dowding centrally controlled, monitored and issued commands to the group headquarters from the Fighter Command headquarters. Execution of the plans were then decentralised to the Sector headquarters' controllers who would direct the aircraft to intercept the enemy. This concept developed by Dowding is still practised today. In contrast, there was no apparent system of centralised control and decentralised execution within each Luftflotten. For example, no system of plotting and tracking the positions of enemy aircraft existed in the Luftflotten. As such Luftwaffe always lacked in air appreciation.
8. Priority. Priority scheduling of the fleet as follows

a. RAF. Throughout the Battle of Britain, the RAF focused on inflicting as much damage on the Luftwaffe as possible to the extent that the Luftwaffe became unable or unwilling to fight the war farther. All resources at Fighter Command were dedicated for this sole purpose. No unnecessary raids were launched against the Luftwaffe. By Oct 1940 the Luftwaffe suffered heavier losses compared to the RAF.

b. Luftwaffe. Selection of target priorities by Luftwaffe can be evaluated comparing the John Warden's 5 strategic ring. In first phase, the priorities were attacking convoys in the Channel, radar stations and the coastal towns. Thus, except the radar stations, the rest of the targets fall mainly in the outer rings. In phase two, the airfields came under heavy attack. In the next phase, the priority shifted to London and other major cities, as well as strategic targets such as aircraft factories. Finally in phase 4, heavy bomber raids on the cities continued. Luftwaffe could never attack any leadership or command, control and communication centre which is at the hub of the model. Thus based on John Warden's Strategic Rings model, the set of priorities selected by the Luftwaffe was indeed poor. This allowed the RAF to continue prosecuting the war against the Luftwaffe.

9. Synergy. The Dowding's integrated AD system is a good illustration of this tenet. By integrating early warning radar stations, observer posts, and sector command stations under Fighter Command headquaters the RAF was able to produce an effective defence system well beyond the proportion of each individual element's contribution to the system.

10. Concentration. Both sides paid due attention to this tenet of air power. For example, in the first bombing raid on the British cities, the Luftwaffe amassed some 1100 aircraft for the operation and 600 Me109s as escorts. In response, the RAF flew using the ‘Big Wing” tactics, where squadrons would be converged in the air to form large formations to attack the enemy en masse. Also, British employed all her reserve fighters on 15 September 1940 against final German's onslaught. They concentrated all the fighters available in the inventory which is a good demonstration of concentration of force in time and space.

11. Persistence. The Germans decided that radar sites were key targets. The Germans launched coordinated attacks on British radar stations early in August and succeeded in destroying few of them. The British, however sent false signals from the location of the destroyed radar station to make the Germans think their efforts had been for naught. The Germans responded precisely as the British hoped and focused attacks on radars. At a meeting on August 15, Goering's statement gives testimony to this. “It is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing the attacks on radar sites, in view of the fact that not one of those attacked has so far been put out of action.' The Germans due to their impatience and lack of persistence, combined with British deception, stopped attacks against the radars and that allowed the British to mount an effective defence. Therefore, German's battle for air superiority became unsuccessful.

OTHER ASPECTS

12. Both Luftwaffe and RAF had exhibited their art of war during the battle having success and failure in both the sides. An analysis of the battle reveals that:
a. German's Mindset. It is worth noting that most of the German leaders never appreciated the need to develop Luftwaffe as an independent force. Rather, they believed that the Luftwaffe should play a supporting role to the Army. This mind-set was formed as a result of their experience in the Spanish Civil War (1934-19360). As such, due attention was not paid to grow Luftwaffe as a strategic force instead it was conceived as a tactical force. In addition, the German leaders failed to appreciate the actual role to be played by the Air Force.
b. Interference from the Political Masters. RAF was relatively free from interference from the political masters of Britain. Unlike Hitler, Sir Winston Churchill gave enough freedom to the military commanders to formulate and execute their plans. On the other hand Hitler had interfered to the extent to decide when an operation would take place, which aircraft to be employed and what target to be taken[54].

c. Ineffective Attack in First Phase. In first phase, most of the German attacks were in the channel over the merchant shipping vessels conveying much needed coal, raw materials, machinery and foodstuffs to Britain. It was hoped that it would draw out the British fighters from their bases. But the efficiency of RAF had spoilt or limited the German plans.

d. Utilization of Pilots. British aircraft production rates outstripped German production by a wide margin. However, the RAF was below establishment in pilots at the start of the conflict, and the training of new pilots failed to keep up with losses at the height of the battle. The situation might have been untenable had not the battle taken place over Britain, where pilots who bailed out frequently were able to fly again in some cases even on the same day. On the other hand, Luftwaffe pilots were lost for the period of war.

e. Not being able to Identify Centre of Gravity (CG). During the course of their two-months campaign, Germans never identified a real centre of gravity. Starting in the second week of August, the Luftwaffe made RAF airfields one of their primary centre of gravity. Part of their effort was wasted, because it was directed against forward operating bases used only for quick refuelling and rearming. These bases were relatively easy to repair. However later they concentrated attacks against main bases, and it lasted until 6 September 1940. In retrospect, the airfield attack program clearly weakened the RAF. The Germans, however, abandoned airfield attack on 7 September 1940 and substituted direct attacks on London, which they thought would force the RAF into the air, to be defeated by Luftwaffe fighters[55]. The shift to London took much of the pressure off the British Air Force and allowed it to concentrate all of its efforts against the Luftwaffe. British bases no longer needed fighter protection, and the RAF was able to concentrate its fighters against the now predictable Luftwaffe.

f. Effective Leadership. Due to the amount of pounding British received from German bombers their morale should have been shattered. But Churchill's able leadership could hold their morale. On the other hand, the continuous losses of German crews and lack of their long-range bombers coupled with battle fatigue resulted in reduced morale in Germans.

MISPERCEPTIONS DURING WAR

13. The German. Followings are the British misperceptions:

a. Believed that Britain would not be capable of responding with military force.

b. Underestimated RAF strength.

14. The British. Followings are the British misperceptions:

a. Failed to realize the potentials of conflicts over Europe which might spread over their mainland also.

b. Failed to react alone or in alliance to counter German onslaught during occupation of France.

DEFEAT OF GERMANY AND VICTORY OF BRITAIN

ANALYSIS OF OUTCOME

15. The German completely failed to achieve their aim of the campaign. Even fighting an offensive battle with more number of aircraft, they were defeated by the RAF's defensive tactics. The major reasons for the German's failure are analyzed below:

REASONS FOR THE GERMAN'S DEFEAT

16. After an in depth review of the Battle of Britain; the root causes for Germany's defeat are identified as follows;

a. Shifting of the aim by Hitler and Goering, particularly after the Germans were beginning to gain control on the RAF.

b. False sense of victory and overconfidence on the part of the German Leaders resulted from unchallenged and speedy victory in Northern Europe.

c. False belief by the commanders that their aircraft were superior in performance and range.

d. The radius of action of fighters and bombers were inadequate for desired penetration.

e. Poor German intelligence on estimation of battle damage paved the way for German defeat.

f. The mighty German failed to do the correct assessment on RAFs air power, as the intelligence input was less and scanty. They were totally unaware of the AD net work of British.

g. The Germans did not have any exigency plan to cover up their losses. Though they started the battle with 2287 aircraft against British's 1400 aircraft, yet the number of German's felled short very rapidly. German also did not cater for any reserve.

h. Retaliatory attack against the cities of Britain was the manifestation of anger of Hitler. Therefore this decision was based on his emotion and lacked sound judgement.

REASONS FOR BRITAIN'S VICTORY

17. The main reasons for the British victory can be summarised as follows;

a. Superior leadership at all levels - from Sir Winston Churchill to the men and women of the RAF, with the persistent aim of defending England at any cost.

b. Effective and efficient Air Defence system that provided the RAF with enough early warning to surprise and counter the enemy at decisive points in the battle.

c. British “home field” advantage allowed them to have following advantage:

(1) RAF pilots whose aircraft were shot down had a good chance of returning to the fight.

(2) Fighting close to home airfields gave them more combat time.

d. Maintenance of reserve allowed RAF to concentrate in decisive time which contributed to achieve victory.

CHAPTER 5
LESSONS LEARNT AND ITS PRESENT DAY APPLICABILITY

1. There are many lessons which can be derived from the Battle of Britain. The lessons can equally be applied to small air forces of developing countries as well. In general lessons which will be useful to us are discussed below.

2. Persistent Attack on CG. It is important to correctly identify the CG of the enemy and constantly attack those at the onset of the campaign. In the case of the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe did not consider the C2 system as a CG of the RAF and hence did not put too much emphasis on attacking the radars and Fighter Command HQ[56]. However, what really cost the Germans in the battle was their decision to stop their attacks on airfields. Emotional feelings on the part of leaders, and the unnecessary interference of Hitler led to changes to the strategy. Needless to say, the outcome of battle would have been quite different if the Luftwaffe had continued with its original strategy to attack the airfields. So, Small air forces should identify the correct CG and constantly attack till achieving the goal.

3. Importance of Intelligence. The importance of intelligence cannot be overstated. The Luftwaffe paid a high price for not being able to effectively employ their intelligence assets. As such, they were often needlessly surprised by the RAF. Intelligence is vital to identify the enemy's vulnerabilities, weaknesses and strengths, which in turn help to determine their CGs. Small Air Force like Sri Lanka Air Force, should employ intelligence sources at whatever capacity to gather enemy's information.

4. Keeping Reserve. The RAF kept 256 fighters as strategic reserve. Besides, tactical commanders also kept reserve. These were utilized during the most critical phase of the war. So, keeping reserves at all level of war was found to be effective in the conduct of war.

5. DCAO Capability. The Battle of Britain proved that a war can also be won by fighting a defensive battle. Therefore a country is to gain AD capability to counter incoming raids parallel to achieving strategic offensive capability. However depending on the threat depth, economy, offensive and defensive balance are to be considered for building force structure.

6. Importance of Balanced Force Structure. Germans could not employ escort with the bombers due to their limited endurance. It is essential for any air force to have a good mix of aircraft, so that it is able to effectively prosecute the air campaign at both the strategic and tactical level.

7. Importance of Technology Appreciation. Improvement of Air Power is closely tied to improvements in technology. In this case, radar became a huge force multiplier, which allowed the RAF to defeat a numerically superior force. Thus, it is important for leaders and operators alike to appreciate technology and understand how it can be used as force multiplier to enhance air power. This will become increasingly important in the wars of the information age.

8. Importance of Night Attack Capabilities. The Germans resorted to night attacks to reduce attrition but accuracy of the attacks was greatly hampered. Thus in order to exploit the benefits of darkness, it is necessary to acquire capabilities in weapon delivery accuracy and night attack capability etc. This would not only help to reduce attrition rate but also impose tax on the enemy's AD.

CONCLUSION

9. The German, being humiliated after the WW I, strived to regain the image by expanding his territory. Hitler, the German leader intended to occupy whole Europe within shortest possible time. He started with Poland and subsequently he move to occupy other European countries. After the unexpected and unthinkably rapid falls of Norway, Denmark and lastly France, Britain stood alone against the apparently unstoppable German war machine. Invasion seemed imminent.

10. Luftwaffe launched massive air offensive against Britain to prepare the way for invasion. The aggressive attitude of German forced RAF to take a defensive posture. The British had to organise all her resources to give decisive blow to the attacking Luftwaffe. The British kept their strategy very simple that is to destroy the Luftwaffe in the air.

11. The battle was fought in four phases, and lasted more than thirteen weeks. In the first phase of the Battle, the Germans wanted to attack the shipping in the English Channel and radar station with an aim of drawing RAF fighters over the sea. Then they launched the second phase to gain air superiority and attacked British radar stations and airfields. At the end of the second Phase when British losses were great, Luftwaffe suddenly changed their strategy and started bombing London and other major cities. This emotional decision by Hitler of bombing in London was the turning point of the battle. If Luftwaffe had continued the bombing in the same scale remaining strict to their aim, the history would have been different. Changing the objective gave the opportunity to RAF to rebuild their resources and strength.

12. In the third and fourth phase the Germans tried to concentrate firepower to crush the British morale. But bombing the cities did not break the morale rather it increased their defiant will to resist. German Intelligence could not find out the potentials of British integrated AD network. The faulty intelligence resulted in poor strategy.

13. A critical analysis reveals that both the countries had evolved and employed number of new tactics and technology in the battle. This was the beginning of the era of electronic warfare. Many lessons have been learned from this battle, but foremost and biggest lesson learned was that the Air Forces can win the battle by fighting defensive. Reserves also played a dominant role during crucial phase of the war. During the process of war, Luftwaffe suffered heavy losses. The exhausted Luftwaffe failed to achieve the command of the air and Hitler finally cancelled “Operation sea Lion” on 12 Oct 1940 and Britain emerged undefeated.

14. Many lessons have been learned from this battle, both at the strategic and tactical levels. These are:

a. Importance of selecting and maintaining the aim

b. Importance of intelligence.

c. Importance of a balanced force structure.

d. Importance of technology appreciation

e. Importance of night attack capabilities

f. Keeping Reserve

15. In overall it is not surprising that RAF won the Battle of Britain, the battle for which it was best equipped and best prepared.

“The Germans were out to invade the country

I was trying to prevent the invasion by denying them the control of the Air” Air Marshal Sir Dowding

[1]Bowyer, Chaz. History of the RAF, (USA: Bison Book Corp, 1983. ISBN 0-8119-0519-5)

[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle of Britain (18 Feb 10).

[3] Presentation on battle of britain,course.cgi.pdf date on 18 Feb 10.

[4] Warden, John. Air Campaign.

[5] http://www. air force history. battle of britain.htm (15 Feb 10)

[6] http://www. air force history. battle of britain.htm (15 Feb 10)

[7] Bowyer, Chaz. History of the RAF. (USA: Bison Book Corp, 1983. ISBN 0-8119-0519-5).

[8] http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWbritainB.htm(18 Feb 10).

[9] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle of_Britain (18 Feb 10).

[10] Ibid.

[11]Presentation on battleofbritain.pdf date 18 Feb 10.

[12] Ibid.

[13]Battle of Britain Roll of Honour, http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/roll.html.

[14] Presentation on battleofbritain.pdf date 18 Feb 10 and Bowyer, Chaz. History of the RAF. (USA: Bison Book Corp, 1983. ISBN 0-8119-0519-5).

[15] Warden, John. Air Campaign.

[16]Bowyer, Chaz. History of the RAF. (USA: Bison Book Corp, 1983. ISBN 0-8119-0519-5).

[17] Presentation on battle of britain, course.cgi.pdf date on 18 Feb 10.

[18] Ibid.

[19]Presentation on battle of britain, course.cgi.pdf date on 18 Feb 10.

[20] Presentation on battle of britain, course.cgi.pdf date on 18 Feb 10.

[21]http://info-poland.buffalo.edu/britain/airbattle.html

[22] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle of_Britain (18 Feb 10).

[23] Warden, John. Air Campaign.

[24] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle of_Britain (18 Feb 10).

[25] http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWbritainB.htm(18 Feb 10).

[26]. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle of Britain (18 Feb 10).

[27] http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWbritainB.htm(18 Feb 10).

[28]Presentation on L-14battleofbritain.pdf date 18 Feb 10.

[29] Presentation on battle of britain, course.cgi.pdf date on 18 Feb 10.

[30] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle of_Britain (18 Feb 10).

[31] http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWbritainB.htm(18 Feb 10).

[32] Presentation on battleofbritain.pdf date 18 Feb 10

[33] Presentation on L-14battleofbritain.pdf date 18 Feb 10.

[34] Warden, John. Air Campaign.

[35] Presentation on battle of britain,course.cgi.pdf date on 18 Feb 10.

[36] Presentation on L-14battleofbritain.pdf date 18 Feb 10.

[37] Presentation on battle of britain, course.cgi.pdf date on 18 Feb 10.

[38] Warden, John. Air Campaign.

[39] Warden, John. Air Campaign.

[40] Warden, John. Air Campaign.

[41] Presentation on battle of britain, course.cgi.pdf date on 18 Feb 10.

[42] Bowyer, Chaz. History of the RAF. (USA: Bison Book Corp, 1983. ISBN 0-8119-0519-5).

[43]Bowyer, Chaz. History of the RAF. (USA: Bison Book Corp, 1983. ISBN 0-8119-0519-5).

[44] Ibid.

[45] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle of_Britain (18 Feb 10).

[46] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle of_Britain (18 Feb 10).

[47] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorenz_(navigation).

[48] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Knickebein.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Warden, John. Air Campaign.

[51] Warden, John. Air Campaign and http://www. battle of britain. air wpns.htm (15 Feb 10).

[52] Warden, John. Air Campaign.

[53] Warden, John. Air Campaign.

[54] http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWbritainB.htm(4 Mar 10).

[55] Warden, John. Air Campaign.

[56] Warden, John. Air Campaign.

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