You are here: UK Essays » Essays » Law » Rawls Peoples Global

Cookie Information

Privacy Information

Free Essays - Law Essays

Rawls Peoples Global

Does Rawls provide good reasons, in The Law of Peoples, for rejecting principles of global distributive justice?

In publishing The Law of Peoples many were shocked at just how much John Rawls’ theories of domestic and international justice differed.The principles of domestic distributive justice espoused by Rawls in his Theory of Justice, simply put did not seem to apply to the international sphere. A pivotal reason for this posited by Rawls is that on the global level, how ‘peoples’ as opposed to ‘individuals’ is of more importance when considering justice.

This is not to say that distributive justice was of little importance, but rather that it simply was not practical between peoples rather than individuals and significantly there would be no widespread support for it. Instead Rawls emphasised the need for global order and stability over global distributive justice and this is his key thinking. Globally, for Rawls the fundamental division is not between democratic and non-democratic peoples or liberal and non-liberal, but decent and non-decent or outlaw peoples.  Decent peoples allow toleration and subscribe to eight principles:

• "Peoples (as organized by their government) are free and independent, and their freedom and independence is to be respected by other peoples."

• "Peoples are equal and parties to the agreements that bind them."

• "Peoples have the right of self-defence but no right to war."

• "Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention."

• "Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings."

• "Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions on the conduct of war (assumed to be in self-defence)."

• "Peoples are to honour human rights.

• "Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime (Hayward)

In order to explore whether Rawls provides good reasons for rejecting principles of global justice the above principles alongside Cosmopolitan theory, the possible creation of a global government, human rights, Ideal t

Theory and the moderated original position will all need to be considered.

Rawls arrived at his eight key principles by considering how peoples of varied societies were supposed to interact with each other, that is, how to deal with other decent non liberal states, burdened states and outlaw states. In his thinking there seemed good reason to reject the notion of global distributive justice in order to have a greater level of stability and order.

Cosmopolitan theory advocating global distributive justice assumes that even aggressive states would have to agree or at least obey an overarching international institution. Rawls’ position is that this simply is not possible and advocates a kind of ‘damage limitation’ policy to maintain as much global stability as possible. This is a very persuasive argument and seems to be the crux of Rawls’ Law of the Peoples theory, global order and stability have a higher priority than global distributive justice

Global distributive justice cannot exist in a condition of international anarchy, as there is no global political culture and furthermore, Rawls believes it is not possible for one to exist. Rawls argues that any creation of global organisations to implement distributive justice would in itself be inherently unjust as no one such organisation would be acceptable to all people.

This, Rawls argues in a Kantian vein, would lead to great international instability without delivering any benefit. Cosmopolitans would argue from the standpoint that all humanity belongs to a single moral community and if one accepts principles of distributive justice on the domestic level then rationally this must also apply internationally. The problem here is that distributive justice is not accepted on a domestic level. Thus Rawls argues that global distributive justice would not only be unjust but also lead to instability.

As previously mentioned, global distributive justice would seemingly require a global institution to implement it, if not to administrate it and this would be problematic. Any global government or institution of this sort would invariably be oppressive in nature or beset by civil strife (Kant 1795). The practical aspects of setting up such a system of global distributive justice would seem implausible without this type of government but some do not see it that way.

Beitz believes the Society of the Peoples itself may not require such an over arching global institution to run it but “rather a network of cooperative organisations concerned with matters of security finance and trade” (Beitz 2000). If one is to accept this idea of a kind of ‘global interdependence’ that it must be assumed that it evolves automatically for if it does not then it must be orchestrated by some form of global institution.

As it seems unlikely for this type of interdependence to grow organically then Rawls is correct in reasoning that distributive justice should not be applied globally as the necessary world government would create great instability and result in less justice.

It could be said that the account of human rights and distributive justice in John Rawls's The Law of Peoples is incompatible with his argument for liberal justice. Rawls should extend his account of liberal basic liberties and the guarantees of distributive justice to apply to the world at large. Cosmopolitanists would take issue with principle six, that is “Peoples are to honour human rights” It may be argued that these rights create a positive duty of the affluent to commit to global distributive justice. Rawls would counter that this would create unrest and that stability and order are of utmost importance, after all should there be greater instability and unrest then there would be wider scope for global injustice.

This seems plausible but does not really address issues of current global injustice. Rawls does however advocate the distribution of international aid to governments who are unable to protect their citizen’s human rights for economic reasons, this is in line with principles seven and eight. The rationale for this aid is not intended to result in global equality but rather to finance decent or liberal institutions so that the peoples may prosper politically in ‘burdened’ societies according to Rawls. In this view continuation of aid indefinitely would see industrious peoples subsidize idle peoples whose governments would then become financially complacent safe in the knowledge that they would be bailed out.

The problem here seems to be twofold; firstly this assumes that every decent government concurs with Rawls’ notion of decent or liberal institutions and what qualifies as a burdened society. Aid is given on the condition of a subjective theory of an agreeing set of peoples which is to imply political homogeneity, persons living in a burdened society may not want aid or wish to use it according to ‘decent’ values. Secondly, aid is shown to be somewhat ineffective in the current climate in achieving what it set out to and this may also apply in a world complying with the Law of the Peoples.

Although a fundamental difference in the purpose of aid should be noted here, Rawls’ intention is not to alleviate poverty. If burdened societies are those “whose historical, cultural and economic conditions make it difficult for them to become well ordered on their own” (Rawls 1999) then perhaps aid in the form of institutions would be ill suited to them. A concern here is that a kind of global bipolarity could be created between those societies following the Law of the Peoples and those outside it resulting in precisely the kind of disruption to global order and stability that Rawls is so keen to avoid.

This is not necessarily the case however, the law of the peoples is much less intrusive to the global order than that of global distributive justice and should a global bipolarity begin to emerge then it could be dealt with using the law of the peoples to stop it over evolving. The possibility must also be allowed for that a global bipolarity arising from the Law of the Peoples will not inevitably lead to instability. In this sense Rawls is reasoning that aid is far less intrusive and disruptive than global distributive justice and once again highlighting his preference for order and stability as a good reason for rejecting global distributive justice.

It could be argued that these principles are in fact just that, principles; many states would concur with them but perhaps practically little would get done to redress inequality. However, Charles Beitz argues that “The ideal cannot be undermined simply by pointing out that it cannot be achieved at present” [Beitz: 1979]. The critical difference, argues Beitz and others, is whether barriers to change can be altered over time or whether they are permanently unalterable.

At present global distributive justice would lead to instability and injustice according to Rawls, however, Beitz would argue that this has the potential to change over time. Rawls is clearly not an advocate of Ideal Theory in this sense, just because at present global distributive justice is seemingly unattainable and over idealistic is not to say it should be ruled out as an aim for the future. Rawls would reason that the requirement for a global institution to administer global justice remains inherently unjust and sees no reason that will change in the foreseeable future.

As previously stated without a global government it seems Cosmopolitan principles can never fully be realised. Although some Cosmopolitianists such as Beck would disagree who believes that any single world order would be hegemonic at best and ethno centric at worst (Beck 2006) would disagree Wenar argues that as there will need to be states with borders, and armies of some sort to protect those borders, individ

uals’ human rights will inevitably be harmed. At present we accept that there are times when individuals (e.g. armed forces) can kill others and that it is not murder. However, we accept this because we believe that in the primacy of the state. If we believed in the primacy of individuals, as is necessary with truly Cosmopolitan principles, then this would automatically become unjust. It is impossible to have a true set of Cosmopolitan principles without a global state, which is in itself impossible.

As Wenar says “Statist principles such as jus ad bellum and jus in bello “are by far the most highly developed normative doctrines we have for the regulation of global affairs” Wenar . “ The neglect by cosmopolitans of the issues of war and peace suggests that cosmopolitans have been underestimating the great importance of global political stability” [Wenar: 2006]. Indeed, the neglect of war, peace and stability by Cosmopolitan theorists suggests that either global political stability is ignored, as they have no answers, or that they genuinely believe that by focusing on individuals it will happen automatically.

In contrast to this Rawls’ emphasis on stability and order seem sensible. While agreeing with the conservative principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello may attract some scorn, it is surely crucial for all peoples and all individuals that governments try to regulate the declaration and conduct of war in some way. Especially since Rawls does not rule out the possibility of war it seems important that governments have the right to defend their territories, which is impossible with a strictly Cosmopolitan theory and the antithesis of global distributive justice.

Further reasoning for the rejection of the global distributive justice principle is that any implementation of it would in itself be illegitimate and unjust. Leif Wenar writes “Rawls doubtless believes as much as anyone that humans should be regarded as free and equal citizens. Yet he believes more deeply that humans should be coerced only according to a self-image acceptable to them” [Wenar: 2006 pp103]. Since citizens of the world do not have the power or the will to relate to each other in this way, any global political structure, which most people would accept is a necessary step towards distributive justice, would be illegitimate and unjust.

Cosmopolitianists would argue that as each person belongs to single moral community then we all have the ability to relate to each on a moral level so this would not necessarily be unjust. In practice it would be extremely difficult to inculcate this notion to people globally, especially given the difficulty in this on a domestic level. Rawls accepts within the Laws of the peoples that peoples may differ, they will not be one united homogenous group scattered by geography but they will relate to one another using the eight principles.

Global distributive justice requires each person across the globe to relate to and care for each other and this simply is not true according to Rawls. After all, Rawls does advocate distributive justice on the domestic level in his Theory of Justice and does admit that it is a contentious issue that is not widely accepted. Rawls denied that his principles of distributive justice should be applied on the global level, partly on the grounds that states were self-sufficient, unlike citizens in the cooperative enterprises that constitute domestic societies. This is a very valid reason for Rawls to reject principles of global distributive justice as it in itself would be unjust.

There is also another argument that suggests that Rawls is right. It focuses on the difference between Rawls’ view of the international original position being populated by a collection of peoples and the Cosmopolitan view that it is a collection of individuals. While this may seem like an insignificant difference it explains a great deal about the priorities of both Rawls and the Cosmopolitans.

As has been said previously, Rawls uses peoples rather than individualsin both original positions (there being one for liberal democratic peoples and one for decent nonliberal ones). From this position he decides upon eight laws of peoples based around basic human rights, war and treaties. Importantly, four of these rules are based around war.

This demonstrates that while Rawls has great concern for stability, order and indeed justice (in a narrower sense), there is no emphasis placed on distributive justice. Cosmopolitans argue that humans are first and foremost individuals, a view that certainly has appeal in liberal democracies, while Rawls argues that peoples are “ethically primary” [Beitz:2000]. This raises the point that many states are not ethnically or culturally homogenous – they do not represent one people but many.

The fact that states are often not homogenous entities does not necessarily invalidate placing peoples rather than individuals in the modified international original position. Especially as, placing individuals there makes even less sense, and while it may further the ideal of international distributive justice, it will do so at the expense of peace and stability.

In conclusion Rawls provides some very compelling reasons for rejecting global distributive justice, fundamentally that it would irrevocably unsettle global stability and order. It seems impossible to imagine a world in which global distributive justice is practiced without a global government or institution which as Rawls, Kant and many others believe is inherently unjust in itself. Whilst others may argue that this is not inevitable their arguments are less than compelling.

Whilst Ideal Theory argues that global distributive justice is something to be aimed for it simply is not possible at present and Rawls is prudent in arguing that a just global order is more accessible through the Law of the Peoples A statist (or at least partially statist) view of the world is also crucial for international justice, self-defence and indeed to inculcate a sense of domestic distributive justice. The cosmopolitan individual-centric view, one which it is necessary to hold in order to argue for international distributive justice, not only underestimates the importance of stability but also has the potential to lead to some Kantian nightmare world government.

Bibliography

Beck, Ulrich (2006). The Cosmopolitan Vision, Cambridge: Polity Press,

Caney, S Justice Beyond Borders. Oxford: OUP, 2005.

Hayward, M - http://www.english.iup.edu/mhayward/Recent/Rawls.htm

Rethinking Post-colonial Theory in a Global Context: John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples

Beitz, C. (2000) Rawls’s law of peoples Ethics Vol. 110

Beitz, C. (1979) International Distributive Justice in Political Theory and International Relations Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kant, I. (1795) Perpetual Peace http://www.constitution.org/kant/perpeace.htm [date accessed: 04-12-2006].

Nagel, T. (2005) The Problem of Global Justice in Philosophy Public Affairs Vol. 33, Issue 2 pp 113

Pogge, T. [Ed. Chatterjee, D.] (2004) “Assisting” the global poor in The ethics of assistance Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Rawls, J. [Ed. Freeman, s.] (1999) TheLaw of Peoples 1993in Rawls, John: Collected Papers Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Wenar, L. [Eds. Rex et al.] (2006) Why Rawls in not a cosmopolitan egalitarian in Rawl’s law of peoples Oxford: Blackwell

Sign up and be the first to receive our latest offers: