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Far from being the monster of historical legend Robespierre was in fact a visionaryat the mercy of circumstance.
History has a way of distorting thetruth like none of the other arts. Myth becomes fact and voids in culturalknowledge are filled with hearsay and conjecture with the result that many ofthe great historical figures, from Henry VIII to Kaiser Wilhelm, have been madeto play a posthumous role for which their lives were not the correct dressrehearsal. Clearly, there is a case to state that there must exist smoke tocreate a historical fire but in instances such as those outlined above, andthat of the infamous French revolutionary Maximilian Robespierre, are out ofall proportion to the deeds they enacted in their political lives. The negativehistorical portrayal of Robespierre, like Richard III before him, has beenexacerbated by his short tenure in office; his influence upon the FrenchRevolution was limited, essentially, to twelve months, from July 1793 to July1794; therefore the brevity of his influence upon the Revolution only served toincrease the shadow he cast over posterity.
Moreover, his heyday coincided withthe zenith of the Terror, and Robespierre's association with this upsurge inviolence in the provinces has severely curtailed any effort by his supportersto switch the focus towards his more visionary political achievements, as thefollowing excerpt from Jones (2003:58) underscores.
The ending of Terror as aninstrument of government can be fairly precisely dated to the upheaval of 9Thermidor II (17 July 1794), which removed Robespierre and his supporters frompower.
Robespierre's political testimonyhas largely been inserted by the men that usurped him and it is a view thatpersists to this day. The case of Robespierre proves, once again, that historyis often the account of the victors over the vanquished.
The challenge within this essay isto evaluate the true role of Robespierre upon the Revolution, to dispel themyths and to sift through the rhetoric and propaganda. The greatest dilemmawill be in ascertaining whether Robespierre was indeed at the mercy ofcircumstance or whether he, in some way, engineered events to suit his broaderpolitical agenda. His status as a visionary is beyond question. His followersare testimony to this fact; historical legacy is always measured in imitation. Itis prudent to chronologically examine the political career of Robespierre inlight of his reputation as a monster of historical legend to gauge the verityof the accusations levelled against him.
It has been claimed with goodreason that the French Revolution was the most important single event in modernwestern history. It shaped not only the course of one country but set in motiona chain of events that catapulted the continent into the modern era, as Biddis(1994:416) highlights. During the 1790's the policies pursued by France undoubtedly contributed to mass political mobilisation elsewhere in Europe.It is within this unprecedented and experimental context that Robespierre firstappears, in the midst of a national crisis and within a country that aimed tofollow in the parliamentary tradition of England without first sewing the seedsupon which the Glorious Revolution (1688) germinated.
Robespierre's chief period of influencein the nascent Republic came during the period 17921794, although he was a formativefigure in the embryonic years of discord before then, playing a key role in theestablishment of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which causedLouis XVI to flee Paris on 5 October 1789. As George Lefebvre (1969:210)detailed the essential work of the Revolution of 1789 may be found registeredin the resolutions of the 4 August and in the Declaration of the Rights of Manand the Citizen.
Thus, Robespierre set out his stallearly on as a visionary in terms of egalitarian ideology and as an opponent ofautocratic rule. Furthermore, Robespierre was the most vocal opponent of theconcept of 'active' and 'passive' citizenry as promulgated in the Declarationof Man, correctly identifying that it was the passive citizens that made upthe core of the influential Paris mob.
The paradigm of nationwide electionwas also an important byproduct of the period of consolidation, which can betraced to 1791, and, again Robespierre was a key figure in its implementation. Henceforth,elections were to be held in the capital and in the countryside, incorporatingmunicipal, judicial and clerical institutions. This was indeed a revolutionaryconcept and constituted a complete break with the feudal bonds of the past. AsJohn Hardman (1999:21) highlights, the cumulative effect was total politicalrevolution in France. Eventually, in July 1792, the legal straightjacket ofcitizenship distinctions was removed and Robespierre was as responsible asanyone for bringing it about.
Robespierre was motivated duringthis time (though many commentators use the word 'converted') by the distorteddemocratic leanings of JeanJacques Rousseau (1968:141), who advocated a morestringent form of representative government, claiming that the system inEngland did not make the people free, rather, it is only free during theelection of Members of Parliament; as soon as the Members are elected, thepeople is enslaved; it is nothing.Robespierre felt as if he was fulfilling Rousseau's moralistic politicaltestament, which rests upon the notion of interpreting national will withouttrusting the people to know what they really want.
Robespierre's organic philosophicalconnection to Rousseau acts as an illustration of the effect of selectivehistorical memory and the impossibility of shedding a type cast image. Whereasone man is considered a hero of the Revolution, posthumously relocated to thePantheon in 1794, the other has since become the enemy of liberty and theinstigator of brutal political repression in France. Furet (1981:204) waskeener to ally Robespierre with the wider eighteenth century Jacobinphenomenon, and he warned of the historical and ideological perils of,approaching Robespierre through Rousseau and seeing him as an admirer of the SocialContract grappling with the constraints of public safety Robespierre isnot so much the heir of Enlightenment as the product of the new system calledJacobinism, the beginning of modern politics.
Despite his well founded and rigidpolitical ideology, Robespierre was also a great opportunist. With thealienation of the King, the flight of thousands of nobles after the storming ofthe Bastille and the schism in the clergy after 1790, the traditionaltriumvirate that had ruled France for centuries had vacated the political arenaand created a power vacuum. There is little doubt that any politician withambition caught up in such a vortex would be heavily influenced by the role offate. Furthermore, circumstance gradually ensured that Robespierre would bepermitted to practice his own vision of postrevolutionary France within the nascent leftist Jacobin Republic.
The war with Austria, declared on 20 April 1792 was a key moment in the perpetuation of the Revolutionand a vital occurrence in the background to Robespierre's seizure of power. Theactions of extraterritorial nationstates such as Austria, Prussia and Britainwere clearly beyond the control of Robespierre yet he used the impetus they broughtto the Republic to his own advantage, as the concept of perpetual war meant ahardening of revolutionary doctrine in the Convention and an opportunity tospread revolutionary ideology across the both the country and the continent. Thissiege effect of external threat and internal strife acted as a catalyst thatpropelled Robespierre and his vision to power, as Lewis (2005:2345) ascertains.
The combination of foreign war andinternal counterrevolution largely dictated the ideological course of theRevolution after 1792, pushing it to the left during the successive militarycrises from the spring of 1792 to the spring of 1794 then swinging thepolitical pendulum back to the political centreground once those crises hadbeen overcome.
France was therefore movinginexorably towards a militant leftist environment during 1792, yet Robespierrewas likewise aided in the administrative changes that beset the Republic atthis time. The fundamental key to Robespierre's success was the CPS (Committeeof Public Safety), a direct byproduct of the disorder that had reined since1789. According to Halsall (1997:Marxists.org website), the committee wasamong the most creative executive bodies ever seen - and rapidly put intoeffect policies which stabilised the French economy and began the formation ofthe very successful French army.
The CPS voted Robespierre a memberin July 1793 though he was in effect its leader, in addition to controlling theformation of the police state in the capital. Moreover, the Jacobins found that Paris represented their nexus of influence and, as its most celebrated memberRobespierre was virtually assured of electoral success in Paris.
Robespierre's tenure as leader ofthe French Revolution can be seen as a continuation of the broader Jacobinpolicies of his predecessor, the Brissotins. Viewed in the context of theBrissotins' draconian interpretation of power, Robespierre does not appear tobe a monster, rather a continuum of a core revolutionary ideology. As Bell(2001:1217) explains: the construction of the nation required a laboriousprocess of national education.
At the behest of the Jacobin Left,the atmosphere within the Convention grew ever more volatile - certainly beforeRobespierre's control of the political process. As Nigel Aston (2004:38)details the separation between supporters and opponents of the Revolution wascarrying events along a previously untested path with unforeseen and bloodyresults.
In March 1793 a revolutionarytribunal was inaugurated to try what were loosely termed counterrevolutionaryoffences. Not to be proactive in the cause of the revolutionary state wasbecoming sufficient to propel any individual into that category.
Much of the criticism aimed atRobespierre is in light of the actions of the Revolutionary Tribunal and itsrole as a catalyst during the Terror. Yet, as Broers (1991:69) admits, bloodand gore are important parts of the truth, but they are not the whole truth.Robespierre ought not to be singled out as the instigator of a republic thathad long since divorced itself from reason and allied itself to terror, butmerely one proponent of a powerful but ultimately directionless revolutionaryzeal.
Even a cursory glance at themanifestation of Robespierre's power base reveals a radical split betweenideology and practicality. Taken solely as a man of ideas, Robespierre can beviewed as a visionary, defender of justice and champion of meritocracy. Hisspeech to the Convention on 5 February 1794 (1993:68) highlights his vision forthe Republic.
We wish an order of things whereall low and cruel passions are enchained by the law, all beneficent andgenerous feelings awakened where distinctions arise only from equality itselfwhere the country secures the welfare of each individual we wish in a word tofulfil the course of nature, to accomplish the destiny of mankind.
Moreover, Robespierre lived his ownlife by this maxim. He never used the trappings of power for his own economicends and was known in his lifetime as The Incorruptible. Robespierre lived arelatively moderate existence until his death as a lodger of fellow Jacobin,Maurice Duplay at no. 366 Rue SaintHonoré and surrounded himself withsimilarly fanatical yet austere political personnel. 'Patriots', as he termedthem, were more important to Robespierre than men of administrative acumen. Hebelieved that his will was the will of the Jacobins who represented the truedesires of republican France. As Eagan (1978:12) transcribes, his soleexplanation for ever move was that France demanded it.And though his policies may seem extreme and inhumane today, there can belittle questioning of his deepseated revolutionary desire.
At this juncture, Robespierreappears anything but a selfserving political ogre in the mould of the greatmultitude of modern dictators but it was his methods of achieving his visionthat marked Robespierre out as a calculated political assassin and foreverdamaged his reputation in history. Most historians use the word 'purge' to describehis consolidation of power after July 1793 and there is a very strong case tosupport this argument. For instance, he told members of the CPS that he aimedto purge the bureaux and the civil service of any remnants of nobility orindeed any faction averse to the perpetuation of the revolutionary edicts.
With the establishment of the lawof 14 Frimaire in the Republican Calendar (December 1793), power wasfurther centralised within the CPS, which necessitated a diminishing of theinfluence of the Convention. A police state now existed throughout France that acted as the eyes and ears of the closeknit but ultimately isolated followersof Robespierre. It is this move which helped to facilitate the state centricityof the Terror, as revolutionary ideology was emitted beyond the districts of Paris into the French countryside, where some 80% of the population still resided. ButRobespierre and his followers should not be judged solely upon the purging ofofficialdom between 17934, as Bouloiseau (1983:2278) argues.
Revolutionary power encompassedall powers because it was revolutionary. For the same reason it created its ownlegality, which justified its excesses. It made a single cause out of thedefence of the homeland and the defence of the Republic social grievances tooksecond place. As the dictatorship intensified, it called with increasingfrequency for equality, justice and virtue. The regime's intentions were pure,but it lacked the means to put them into practice.
Though by no means offering anexcuse for state sponsored terrorism, Bouloiseau makes the important point ofthe essential dynamics at work during the early years of the French Revolution.It is immensely difficult for any historian writing today to appreciate thesense of novelty that must have pervaded the National Convention, the CPS,Paris and indeed 'la patrie' as a whole during the early 1790's. The ideologyprevailed that the catalyst to revolutionary success was in its implementationacross the country and across the continent. Though we may see the actions ofRobespierre as antagonistic and aggressive, his revolutionary contemporariesviewed it as a necessary and formative stage in the liberation of humanity.
It was only when he turned hisanger upon enemies within the Convention itself that Robespierre made aninescapable political noose for himself. When the politically moderate butculturally popular Danton was sent to the guillotine on 5 April 1794 underfabricated charges of international conspiracy the seeds of revolutionaryrevenge against Robespierre were effectively sewn, as Munro Price (2003:346)ascertains. The death of Danton tore the soul out of the Jacobin dictatorship.Robespierre and his colleagues grew increasingly isolated, from both thepopular movement in the streets and the deputies in the Convention.
The zenith of the Terror occurredduring the months from March to August 1794. Clearly Robespierre's inflammatoryrevolutionary ideology played a part in the accumulation of terror in France but there were also other factors at work that are imperative in the comprehensionof the manufactured myth of Robespierre. There were other influentialcharacters such as Arman Herman, who became head of the home civil service inthe spring of 1794, and who drove the desire of the Revolutionary Tribunal toensure that no stone was left unturned in the purging of the provinces. Toindict Robespierre as the sole manufacturer of the Terror is to misunderstandthe context of France at this time in addition to mistakenly naming him adespot. Furet was an advocate of the idealistic notion of historiographypreferring not to call Robespierre a dictator and rejecting the relationshipbetween foreign War and internal counter revolution.
The accumulation of the Terror acquireda momentum of its own and ought to be seen as a necessary stage in theconstruction of revolutionary France, as Lewis (1993:48) underscores. TheTerror went on because defeat over the enemies of the Revolution marked but thefirst stage in this process of regeneration and rebirth whose roots lay in theeighteenthcentury Enlightenment.
Furthermore, France at this time lacked the prerequisites for the establishment of a more stable formof representative parliamentary democracy. For example, whereas in England money was regulated by a national bank, the economy in the First French Republic was akin to a ship without oars. Foreign policy was similarly rudderless withthe sum of international relations being reduced to a 'with us or against us'type scenario, accentuating existing hostilities. National debate wasrestricted to access to the capital and was dependent upon a consistentlychanging body of personnel. All of these factors contributed to ensure thatRobespierre's time at the helm of the Revolution would be limited, and it wasindeed curtailed on the infamous 9th Thermidor (27 July 1794). But, in the end, as William Doyle (1989:281) explains, the ninth of Thermidor markednot so much the overthrow of one man or group of men as the rejection of a formof government.
Conclusion
Robespierre can be likened in manyways to Oliver Cromwell. Both idealistically set out to destroy the political,religious and cultural machinations of the late medieval state only to slipinto a form of dictatorship as the result of a distorted vision ofrepresentative democracy. Having played a major role in removing the autocraticmonarch and national symbol from power Robespierre, like Cromwell, did nottrust the people with the will of the nation. Thus a revolution took placewithin a revolution time and again.
Robespierre was a visionary who wasinfluenced by circumstance though he cannot be considered a victim ofcircumstance. He was caught up in the revolutionary quagmire of doctrine yet hecould have chosen a less divisive, less centralised form of rule, which, ironically,was one of the chief damnations levelled at Louis XVI's reign.
Historical accounts that placeRobespierre in the same context as characters such as Stalin are whollyinappropriate and display a lack of insight into the reality of revolution andinterim government. Although he was without doubt an overtly moralisticadherent of draconian revolutionary dogma, Robespierre dedicated his life tothe political ideals in which he believed; celebrated two hundred years afterthe event under the broader historical umbrella of 'Revolution.' As Hardmanconcludes (1999:215), he had that characteristic quality of the fanatic ofnever consciously doing wrong.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
N. Aston, The French Revolution, 17891804: Authority, Liberty and the Search for Stability (Palgrave Macmillan; London, 2004)
M. Bouloiseau (translated by J. Mandelbaum), The Jacobin Republic, 17921794 (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, 1983)
M. Crook, Napoleon comes to Power: Democracy andDictatorship in Revolutionary France, 17951804 (University of Wales;Cardiff, 1998)
W. Doyle, The Oxford History of the French Revolution(Oxford University Press; Oxford, 1989)
J.M. Eagan, Maximilian Robespierre: Nationalistic Dictator(Farrar, Straus & Giroux; New York, 1978)
F. Furet (translated by E. Forster), Interpreting theFrench Revolution (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, 1981)
G. Lefebvre (translated by R.R. Palmer), The Coming of theFrench Revolution (Princeton University Press; Princeton, 1969)
J. Hardman, Robespierre (Longman; London & NewYork, 1999)
M. Jones, The French Revolution, 17871804 (Pearson; London, 2003)
G. Lewis, The French Revolution: Rethinking the Debate(Routledge; London & New York, 1993)
G. Lewis, France 17151804: Power and the People(Pearson; London, 2005)
P. McPhee, A Social History of France, 17801880(Routledge; London & New York, 1993)
M. Price, The Fall of the French Monarchy: Louis XVI,Marie Antoinette and the Baron de Breteuil (Pan Macmillan; London, 2003)
J-J Rousseau, The Social Contract (Penguin; London,1968)
Journals
D.A. Bell, The Unbearable Lightness of Being French: Law,Republicanism and National Identity at the End of the Old Regime, in, TheAmerican Historical Review (October 2001), Volume 106, No. 4 (AmericanHistorical Association; Princeton, 2001)
M. Biddis, Nationalism and the Moulding of Europe, in, Journal of the Historical Association (October 1994), Volume 79, No.257 (Blackwell; London, 1994)
M. Broers, Can we stop the French Revolution? :Reflections on the Revisionist Revolution, in, Journal of the HistoricalAssociation (February 1991), Volume 76, No. 240 (Blackwell; London, 1991)
M. Linton, Recent Books on theFrench Revolution, in, Journal of the Historical Association(January 2003), Volume 88, No.289 (Blackwell; London, 2003)
Websites
P. Halsall, Robespierre February 1794: Justification ofthe use of Terror (August 1997), in, Marxists.org website; http://www.marxists.org.history/france/revolution/robespierre/1794/terror.htm
Association of the friends ofRobespierre; http://www.amisrobespierre.org/
The French Revolution, in,International Socialist Tendency website; http://www.istendency.net/pdf/6_02_french_revolution.pdf
The Intellectual Origins ofModern Terror, in, Queens University (Canada) website; http://www.queensu.ca/history/hist%/20241/The_intellectual_origins_of_modern_terror.ppt
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