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Policy EU Structures

In contrast to the gradually increasing centralization of policy making in Brussels, the eventual implementation of the EU legislation is a responsibility of the national public administration structures. There are, however, very big differences in the extent to which this responsibility is undertaken and more importantly, the way it is undertaken. According to various statistics, differences appear not only between individual member states, but also on how legislation from varying policy areas is implemented in a given state. (Börzel,2001). In this respect, the number of infringement procedures initiated by the Commission can be a generally useful indicator. Although it is easily available from the annual reports issed by the Commission, it is not always a reliable and sufficient indicator. Some scholars have used the actual notifications by the member states regarding transposition, some have used both transposition notifications and infringement procedures and others focused on instruments which have been adopted and made available in EU or domestic legislative databases. (Mastenbroek 2003, Borghetto et al. 2005) Furthermore, although this says a lot about when and how a certain piece of EU legislation has been incorporated into the law of the member states, it is an indicator of the implementation outcome, rather than the implementation process itself.

Since implementation, as a process, is highly dependent on the national administrations, its dynamics are in direct correlation to the administrative organization and structure. (Hill & Lynn 2004). Very important is also the influence of administrative traditions and the influence stemming from national politics (Olsen 2003; Knill 2001)Moreover, the existing practices regarding regulatory intervention as well as intermediation of administrative interest are also have a considerable influence on the implementation process. Overall, what takes place at the operational level appears to be a combination of various administrative and organizational aspects and external factors. As outlined by Knill: “the success of implementation is not only dependent on policy characteristics and contents, but also on the preferences, capabilities and resources of subordinate administrative actors dealing with practical enforcement as well as societal actors addressed by the policy in question” (Knill 2001:18).

Many case-studies have been conducted by scholars in areas such as implementation of EU environment and internal market directives. This paper does not aim to test a given hypothesis by studying a policy field or member state practices. Rather, it looks at the academic debate in the existing wide body of literature on the subject. It aims to present a general analysis of the way and the extent to which domestic administrative structures influencing implementation of EU legislation.

Goodness of fit

The basic notion behind the goodness of fit hypothesis is the compatibility between the domestic and European practices and procedures. And according to many scholars, implementation is much easier to carry out if the domestic institutions and polices fit with the European requirements. If they do not, implementation is usually prolonged and/or incorrect. ( Duina 1997; Knill 2001). In this respect, Heritier et al. (1996) argue that usually governments attempt to “export” their national models to the EU level. This is due to the fact that they “wish to avoid costs of institutional adaptation and want to establish a level-playing field for their own industry in European markets” (Heritier 1995: 278)

In the discussion of the goodness of fit hypothesis, two types of fit have been outlined-namely policy (mis)fit and institutional (mis)fit. (Borzel & Risse, 2003; Heritier et al, 2001). The former is about the compatibility of the policy content and the latter about the regulatory structure and style. (Knill and Lenschow, 1998). Falkner also makes distinction between the practical and legal status quo. (Falkner, 2003)

Although the “goodness of fit” hypothesis takes a central place in the academic according to many scholars it is not a sufficient explanatory factor and other, actor-based factors have to be considered. Knill and Lenschow look at the extent to which the “institutional filter” explains implementation based on the compatibility of national policy traditions and EU requirements. (Knill & Lenschow 1998: 610; Knill & Lenschow 2001: 121) Majority of the case-studies concluded in the past did not fully explain the implementation outcomes based on the “goodness of fit approach” (Knill & Lenschow 1998; Falkner et al. 2005; Haverland 2000). Since the “institutional filter” was applicable to only a few cases, the “strategic interaction of actors” had to be explored. (Knill & Lenschow 2001: 126)

The argument is further extended by analysis of the conditions under which the domestic administrative structures are willing to comply, regardless of the fact whether a fit or misfit exists. According to Duina, the administrations are seen as “guardians of the status quo, (…) shield protecting national legal-administrative traditions” (Duina 1997: 157). Therefore, this protectionism leads to a natural resistance when a legislation implementation is expected to cause big changes to the arrangements already in place. (Knill & Lenschow 2000: 261). So in cases with less compatibility the EU demands create more pressure, because additional changes need to be made on the national level. And this can result in an ineffective policy implementation (Heritier et al, 1996) If domestic preferences cannot be “transferred” to the EU level, then at the implementation stage, the above mentioned strong resistance appears, influencing the whole process. (Borzel 2002; Bursens 2002). And coming back to the goodness of fit approach, in case there is a major policy misfit, the implementation is very often either not timely or correct because of the associated resistance (Duina 1999; Knill & Lenschow 1998). In such cases, an external pressure is needed either by society actors and/or the Commission itself. (Borzel, 2006).

Veto Points, Resistance and External Factors

According to Tsebelis the number of veto players involved in decision-making processes is very important for the outcome of the implementation process (Tsebelis, 1995: 305). He also argues that actors’ preferences are equally importamt. Tsebelis (2002: 330) . However, he also states that the number of veto players can be considered irrelevant to policy stability if the players happen to have similar policy preferences.

According to Haverland, national adaptation to EU requirements can be explained by additional “mediating factors” , for example, number of veto points .(Haverland 2000) It has been argued when there are a lot of veto players or veto points in the domestic political system, the chances and possibilities for an adaptation to meet the EU requirements is very low. And vice versa, if an incentive to comply is coming from a formalized set of institutions, the implementation of EU legislation will be easier, with a minimum resistance. (Borzel & Risse 2003: 64-65) Both veto points and institutional incentives give an explanation of the why the implementation process has taken a certain direction. This is described by Schmidt as “political institutional capacity”. (Schmidt 2002: 899) On the other hand, Heritier and Knill argue that either certain veto players or a political culture characterized by the principle of consensus can be helpful in overcoming the resistance. (Heritier & Knill 2001) Although the degree of fit or misfit is important for the implementation process, the consequent leverage or reluctance may be not only be a result of administrations perception but also of those who might have been adversely affected-e.i social actors. Hence it is dependent on the veto points whether these actors can influence implementation and to what extent. (Duina 1997; Borzel 2006)

When looking at the administrative resistance factor, it is useful to consider what leads to resistance and what leads to compliance. The willingness of the administrations is the first most logical reason. Nevertheless, another important factor could be their ability. (Falkner et al, 2004). If the ability is considered to be more dependent on the administrative capacity, then it will not be in directly correlated to the goodness of fit concept. However depending on the degree of compatibility they may express a different degree of willingness to comply (Borzel, 2000). Furthermore, in cases of misfit, the willingness to adapt to the EU requirements comes as an additional factor. And again, the bigger the degree of misfits is, the less likely it is that the national administration will undertake adaptation of their procedures and structures. (March & Olsen 1989; Powell & Di Maggio, 1991). Moreover, according to Knill “adaptational requirements emerging from European policies remain within the range of options defined by the macro-institutional context” (Knill 2001: 31). Therefore changes can happen if the EU requirements fall within the limits of the established organizational procedures and rules and if the instituational dynamics follow the so called “logic of appropriateness”. (Borzel & Risse 2003). The concept of appropriateness explains the fact that administrative traditions influence not only the implementation process itself, but also the corresponding strategies to adapt. (Knill 2001; Marach & Olsen, 1989) The degree of variability depends on the already established procedures and norms. Hence, change in the domestic administration structures varies according to the degree of required adaptation. If the adaptation can be achieved by changes following the “logic of appropriateness , then these are considered as minor , easier changes or changes “within the core” rather that to the core itself. (Knill & Lenschow, 1998)

Regulatory style and Structures

Knill and Lenschow (1998) divide the administrative arrangements into regulatory style and structure in order to assess to what extent there is a fit or misfit. Regulatory style they define as the interaction between the administrations and the social actors and further subdivide it into “mode of state intervention” and “administrative interest intermediation”. From here, the degree of fit also depends on whether a regulatory style is characterized by intermediation or intervention. According to them the intermediative regulatory style is mainly based on self-regulation and incorporates a high level of flexibility and discretion during the implementation process as well as it is considered to be transparent and based on consensus. On the other hand domestic structures characterized by interventionist regulatory style have only limited degree of discretion and are in general much more closed and formal. (vanWaarden 1995; Knill & Lenschow 1998). In addition the regulatory structures can be centralized or decentralized (vertical aspect) and concentrated or fragmented (horizonral aspect) forming an additional perspective as to the relevant competences and method of coordination. (Knill & Lenschow 1998)

Looking back at the factors discussed above, on one hand the way and the extent to which the domestic administrative structures influence implementation of EU law is largely based on the degree of fit or misfit with the EU requirements and expectations, but this alone has proven not to be a sufficient explanatory factor. The importance of political aspects and factors involved should also be considered. On the other hand, the extent to which the administrations are effective and efficient and equally, well coordinated if of equal importance. To assess the importance of all the above factors combined Steunenberg argues that implementation is a game between the domestic players, which all have policy preferences. The outcome of the game depends on the preferences of the actors involved and the instruments that need to be adopted. Hence depending on the instruments to be adopted various actors can be involved and the different constellations indicate either horizontal or vertical type of coordination (Steuneberg 2006).

Regardless of the identification of a number of political factors and style and structure related factors it is still difficult to explain why regardless of this common factors differences exist between the individual member states and even between implementation of legislation from different policy areas within one state. It is not clear whether one of the factors is dominating in certain member states if the numbers of actors involved also has influence on the implementation process. However, the presence of veto players and the efficiency of the administrative structures are one of the most important factors. Apart capacity, willingness is also a major factor, and most often it is underpinned by political preferences and sometimes external influence from society actors. To explore the influence of the administrative structures further, their culture of compliance need to considered as well.

Availability of Resources and level of Bureaucracy

Apart from the institutional set up and characteristics of domestic administrative structures, it is worth to consider the availability of their resources as a factor influencing implementation. In this respect, when it comes to the practical enforcement of EU legislation, it is not only important the extent to which the national administrations have adapted, but also the fact that in such cases government resources can be insufficient. Generally speaking, scarcity of resources can negatively influence or even lead to failure to implement legislation. Therefore, “Sufficient financial or personnel resources are crucial for efficient implementation” (Falkner et al, 2004:461) Pridham (1994) also argues that usually the poorer countries in Southern Europe experience many more implementation problems. Another confirmation has been given by Demmke (2001) who points out the lack or the insufficiency if finance as a main reason behind implementation problems. The availability of resources leads to better implementation because the better set up the infrastructure is, the easier is it to monitor the process of implementation. (Phedon, 2003)

Likewise, better trained administrators and structures who possess more resources can also interact on a higher level with the citizens and considering them as indirect enforcers, provide additional incentives upon compliance.

Apart from the availability of financial resources, an additional aspect to be considered is the level of bureaucracy in the domestic administrative structures. It is considered that when these have a degree of autonomy, the implementation process is more independent from political developments. Furthermore, when a structure is more stable and well developed, any political repercussions do not have such a strong influence. Moreover, accountable administrations, working based on clear legal rules are considered more effective in carrying out a quality implementation process. (Peters 2001)

Culture of Compliance

Although it is very difficult to group the member states according to the above mentioned factors, they can be grouped according to their culture of compliance. According to many scholars, the culture of compliance and its relative importance in the administrations system is a factor which should not be underestimated and can be an explanation as to how and to what extent national administrative structures influence the implementation of EU legislation. Falkner et al divide the culture of compliance into three different types : law observant, neglect and based on domestic politics. In the first type , implementation is fast and corrent and rule of law is of utmost imporatance. Most Nordic countries have this law observant culture of compliance. In the second type of culture compliance, the implementation process is much slower and sometimes there are cases of incorrect implementation. The administrative traditions and political preferences discussed earlier also play an important role. Countries with such culture of compliance some of the Mediterranean countries. Whereas on the third category, the based on domestic politics, administrations are usually efficient, but since the culture of compliance is not rooted in the administrative traditions the implementation of EU legislation is to a much bigger extent dependent on the political preferences and the degree of fit. Most of the EU member states are considered to have this type of culture of compliance. (Falkner et al. 2005)

Issue salience

Apart from the above mentioned factors, fast and correct implementation can be influenced by the issue salience. Issue salience is described as the visibility and importance of the topic/issue at stake. (Versluis 2004: 10) This factor is found to be strongly related to and influencing the implementation process as carried out on the operational level by the domestic administrative structures. (Versluis 2004). An issue is considered to be salient when it attracts a lot of attention. A useful indicator for the level of salience can be the extent of media coverage (Knill, 1997). Respectively, the more salient an issue is , the more it is likely that it will get more attention from the domestic actors. Issue salience can be a constraint in case with low salience and a stimulus in cases with high salience (Versluis 2004). When it comes to the factors which trigger attention to the issue, often resulting in high influence on the implementation process, perceived associated risk and events such as disasters and/or crises are the most prominent ones. (Versluis 2004: 11)

Conclusion

The decentralized implementation structure in the EU with its consensus decision-making culture and variety of interests involved very often leads to pieces of legislation containing ambiguous concepts and leaving a lot of leeway to the member states. This leads to many important decisions being taken at the implementation level and influencing the way the implementation process goes.

The administrative capacity of the domestic implementation structures as well as their willingness to adapt is major factors for the degree of influence. Depending on how efficient an administration is as well as how many veto players there are, the degree of influence on implementation can respectively increase or decrease. Of significant importance for it are also the political preferences of the domestic actors and the influences of the societal actors.

Whether national administration must and should adapt in order to meet the imposed requirements has been argued to depend to a large extent on the degree of compatibility between the European and national policies and methods. Although this is not a sufficient factor, when considered in conjunction with administrative resistance related to a misfit and political preferences and believes, it gives a good indication on the extent to which national administrative structures can influence EU law implementation.

Domestic public administration structures have a significant influence on the implementation of EU law –in terms of timing, correctness and effectiveness. Their effect on the implementation process however cannot be estimated via a single variable or factor. To what extent exactly they influence the process appears to be a multi-dimensional combination of political, administrative, organizational, culture-based and actor-dependent factors.

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