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Gaza, Israel and Egypt
Ben Gurion’s return as minister of defence in 1954 following the Lavon affair was immediately followed by the Gaza raid which Gurion explained necessary to “teach Egypt a lesson”. This was the most gruesome conflict since the 1948 war, it “changed the nature of the Middle East…the countdown to war began.” It was to mark the return of Ben Gurion and his controversial reprisal policy which Sharett had essentially stopped, Gurion saw Sharett as cultivating “a nation of cowards”. Following this incident Nasser gained notoriety, the arms race between Egypt and Israel began and what was once a regional dispute between Arabs and Jews became an area of superpower competition.
“What should not be forgotten is that Israel at the time had no outside security guarantee whatsoever and felt decidedly vulnerable. ” except for the French supplying some arms to them. The Czech arms deal made Israel extremely nervous about Egypt’s intentions and pushed them to jump into the battlefield. The idea that Egypt provoked the war by infiltrating Israel’s borders seems unfounded; “Until the Gaza raid Egyptian authorities had a firm and consistent policy of curbing infiltration by Palestinians from the Gaza strip into Israel” The Fedayun was organised afterwards, and in response to the Gaza raid.
Get help with your essay from our expert essay writers...In the face of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and for other differing political reasons Israel, Britain and France jointly attacked Egypt; the British and French in operation Musketeer and the Israelis in operation Kadesh.
This essay will approach the affects of the Suez crisis in the context of international, Middle Eastern and Israeli factors.
The effect of the Suez crisis internationally:
Following the Suez crisis, British and French influence in the Middle East floundered.
However, British and French policy in the Middle East had been in decline since the end of WW2; since 1945 the influence of the US and the UN had become increasingly stronger than that of Britain. Also, British influence did not simply collapse after 1956; “it was not until 1968 that the British finally withdrew their forces from the East of Suez to turn towards Europe”.
The Suez crisis affected France in the same way as Britain: “France was confirmed to no longer be a great power”. French cultural, financial and economic interests in Egypt were in ruins. It lost nearly “400 billion francs in investments”. But again this had been in swing before Suez; France had lost Indo-China in 1954.
The idea that Suez was at the forefront of British Imperialism, as propounded by the “Suez Group” was unrealistic. It was, by many, considered to be an anachronism and as can be seen by its eventual loss, did little to harm Britain’s economy; it was essentially impotent in the Nuclear age and was excessively costly.
British influence within the Arab world was already waning and was held responsible for the creation of the state of Israel: because of handing over the mandate to the UN and the 1917 Balfour treaty. The French-British-Israeli tripartite agreement of 1956 with Israel was the tipping point – this made British influence impossible to maintain in the Arab world.
Therefore the 1956 war marked the culmination in a series of processes which were already underway.
The rise of America and the Soviet Union as the two superpowers was confirmed by the 1956 war.
America’s promise of arms to Egypt which was not delivered due to the influence of “the 1950 Tripartite Declaration and the Jewish and Zionist influence” led Nasser to look elsewhere. Nasser’s response brought the Soviet Union into the Middle East. This allowed Kurschevs government the chance to achieve its historical goal and additionally to vault over the Baghdad pact’s defensive tier.
Following the Suez war and in the face of the perceived communist threat, the US president declared the Eisenhower doctrine in early 1957. Despite it never being formally invoked this confirmed their involvement in the Middle East.
The pro-West Iraqi regime ended in 1958 and both Iraq and Syria – soon followed by Libya – turned to the Soviets for aid and arms. The Suez crisis bolstered Soviet support in anti-western states and liberation movements because of its support of Egypt during the war.
The rise in importance of the United States post Suez although significant was far overshadowed by the Soviet Unions role. Despite negotiating a ceasefire at Suez, America was not popular because of its withdrawal of Aswan Dam funds and its policy of neutralism. Any popularity it had conjured up regarding its behaviour concerning the tripartite war was damaged by the Eisenhower doctrine, which was popularly portrayed in much of the region as another attempt at neo-colonialism. “But US-Egyptian relations were already strained”.
The adoption of the Soviet Union as a sort-of ally to the Arab states was used as a counter-weight to the western powers.
The external players were therefore of great influence in Middle East during the Suez crisis but part of an ongoing process which was crystallised by the 1956 war and not produced by it.
The effect of the Suez Crisis on the Middle East:
Despite the antecedence of Pan-Arabism to the 1956 war and even the concept of this unification of Arab states specifically under Egyptian leadership, it was not until the Suez crisis that this idea properly solidified and Nasser’s reign was consolidated. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal on 26th July 1956 turned Nasser into the hero of the Arab world; he was seen as the Middle Eastern “superman” who stood for all that was against Western Imperialism. The effect of Suez was to increase Pan-Arabism’s following and on Nasser’s terms; thus in 1958 it was on Egypt’s preferences rather than the Ba’th party that the United Arab Republic (UAR) was organised.
Despite Egypt suffering a military blow at Suez, this was turned, by relentless Egyptian propaganda into a political victory. This marked the arrival of Nasser as leader of the Arab world and marked the start of an attempt at Pan Arabism. From this point until 1967 Egypt dominated the Arab world, both militarily and politically. The war had given Nasser legitimacy both among the Arab masses and the ruling classes. The peak of this nationalism was the creation of the UAR of Egypt and Syria in February 1958.
The political success of Nasser not only saw his emergence onto the Arab scene but also an increased awareness of the Palestine problem. This eventually led Nasser, in 1959 to establish representative organisations for the Palestinians and presented their problem as a national political issue, rather than an humanitarian one concerning refugees. Thus he endowed the Palestinian problem with a new political dimension. The movement for Palestinian nationalism led by the Arab Nationalist Movement; ANM. Became an auxiliary of Egyptian foreign policy.
Egypt’s military defeat was short-lived and therefore of little concern to Nasser as Soviet military assistance enabled them to rebuild their forces within a fairly short time.
The effect of the Suez crisis on Middle Eastern countries other than those directly involved was profound. This was illustrated throughout the crisis over Suez in the powerful wave of Arab support for Egypt.
Suez tarred the local collaborators, clients and allies with the brush of complicity with not only the colonial powers but also with Israel. This, as well as, Britain’s withdrawal from the Middle East and the ensuing vacuum conducive to the Arab-nationalist agenda led to the fall of the Iraqi monarchy and its associates; Nuri Sa’id and King Faysal, The destabilisation of Lebanon, and the botched Syrian abortive coup against the pro-Egyptian government. Middle Eastern leaders tainted by their association with the former colonial powers found themselves seriously undermined: Two years after the Suez affair, the British-backed Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in a bloody coup. King Hussein was also subject to accusations of being a “puppet of the British”, he narrowly escaped being overthrown.
However, the Iraq monarchy was already in decline and other politicians aligned with Britain were too. Khalidi believes Suez did have an affect though, as it aligned these people, now in addition, with Israel; in just over two years all but King Hussein were out of office.
Jordan’s absorption of many Palestinians after annexing the west bank in 1950 combined with an already growing support within Jordan for Arab nationalism resulted in an Arab nationalist majority in parliament. The Suez war created a favourable environment for the Nabulsi government to come to power, terminate the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and liquidate British bases.The Nasserist current in Lebanon was reinforced by Suez; and ed to civil war in 1958 and the rapid proliferation of Nasserist organisations-the Nasserist Popular Organisation and the Arab Socialist Union.
Therefore the Suez crisis had a huge impact on the balance of power in the Middle East; shifting from ex-colonial powers to Egypt and also adding fuel to Arab nationalism.
By allying itself with Britain and France in the Suez affair, Israel confirmed the Arabs view that the state was the creation of colonialism. Thus the struggle against Israel became the predominant Arab cause, but it also in the end contributed to Nasser’s undoing; some think his success in 1956 led him to overplay his hand in the June war of 1967.
The effect of the Suez Crisis on Israel:
The British withdrawal was more of a problem for Israel who had relied on the British occupied areas as a protective shield between themselves and Egypt. Israel was also scared of this increasing Nasser’s popularity in the Arab world.
The 1956 war confirmed the return of the “hard-liners” after Sharett’s year of moderation which “never really got off the ground”. Ben Gurion and Dayan’s pre-emptive strike on Nasser had been a successful decision militarily and this had implications for subsequent periods.
In response to the intense military build up and fear of Egypt becoming too strong in the meantime, Israel decided to launch a pre-emptive strike. This method prove successful and “the lessons learned at Sinai were incorporated into the IDF battle doctrine, which guided the four wars to follow.”
Despite Israel’s failure to achieve a strategic relationship with the United States, certain researchers have termed the period following the Suez crisis “the golden age.” Israel gained unimpeded freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran, 11 years of quiet on its southern border and a relative period of quiet on all borders which enabled the country to concentrate on economic development. “By the end of the 1950s, the Israelis had achieved a modicum of security that allowed them to pursue extensive relations with Turkey, Iran, and other non-Arab states of the Middle East. It was this initiative among others that allowed Ben Gurion to observe at the end of 1958 that Israel was now a “factor” and not, merely an “object” on the international scene.”
However “there was still the worry of the continued supply of arms to Egypt and Syria.” Despite Nasser’s army being heavily reduced in strength following the crisis the Israel saw no opportunity for complacency as they feared not only the reliability of France as an arms supplier but also the continued refusal of the US to sell arms to them, until the 60s, this meant that they continued intensive arms procurement efforts, in a renewed arms race.
Ben Gurion’s plans of Israel occupying the entire Gaza strip and Sinai following the war were short lived. United States pressure forced the withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Force from the Gaza strip and Sharm el-Sheikh in return for real guarantees of passage through the straits and United Nations participation in the administration of the Gaza strip. The presence in Gaza of the United Nations Emergency force (UNEF) was brief as Nasser ordered the UN to vacate the strip. The Emergency forced now took up positions along the borders between Egypt and Israel and at Sharm el-Sheikh.
Despite the 1956 success of Ben Gurion’s party, the legacy of the Lavon affair lived on and, the fact of it being an Israeli government affair was leaked in 1959 and became a major divisive issue in the ruling elite within Israel and led to the eventual split of Ben Gurion's party in June 1963. His successor, Levi Eshkol succeeded in allying Israel with America and acquiring arms from her.
Another huge result of Suez was how the Arab-Israeli conflict turned from a dispute about Palestine’s disposition to an inter-state conflict for regional hegemony. The potential had existed previously but it took Ben Gurion’s policy, seen as culminating in the Suez crisis to make this potential real.
Conclusion:
Focusing on the Middle East, despite there being many factors which did not prove themselves to be genuine turning points, and were in fact underway before the war - such as Arab nationalism, the decline of the colonial powers – they were, nevertheless, compounded by Suez. “The Arab world became sharply divided into a revolutionary camp allied with the Soviet Union and a pro-western conservative camp. This remained essentially the situation until the early 1970s.”However this preceded the Suez crisis and came, in fact, in the form of
The Czech arms deal was seen as a time marking both the S.U’s entry into the Middle Eastern arena and the abrupt transformation of the Arab-Israeli conflict from a purely regional confrontation into a mixed local and east-west conflict.
In a wider historical context, Suez was part of a great tide of political revolt and cultural rejection of alien dominance that in the 20thcenutry swept over what came to be known as the 3rd world. For Nasser to be freed fm GB and US the SU became a plausible source of support.
“None of the issues of the Arab/Israeli conflict that prompted Israel to go to war are any closer to solution today; the refugees, Israel’s occupation of Arab lands, now including the west bank and the Gaza strip, its refusal to define its limits of its state and the refusal of other Arab states to sign a peace treaty. Until these are addressed it is unlikely that the world has seen the last of Suez-type crises in the ME. 443: Neff”
The Soviet involvement was another factor which was compounded and not created through the Suez crisis; The Czech arms deal had been negotiated after the Gaza raid and before the Suez crisis. However, its success and the Soviets support made an impression on other Middle Eastern States who consequently struck up arms deals with them for example Syria and Iraq.
As far as Arab relations with and attitudes towards the great powers are concerned, Suez only confirmed and strengthened existing trends.
The Gaza raid created was more of a genuine turning point in the history of the Middle East. The war only succeeded in compounding what had already been set in motion by the Gaza raid. The raid pushed Egypt to set up the Fedayun and seek weaponry which resulted in the Czech arms deal. Egypt, until the return of Gurion and his hard-line policies sought to avoid conflict with Israel.
Genuine turning points:
Pan Arabism under Nasser and his idea of it despite it not taking off as he had hoped.
Perhaps one of the only and most enduring legacies of the Suez crisis thus seems to be its contribution to the reactivation of the conflict’s Palestinian-Israeli aspect.
Bibliography
Dayan, Moshe. Diary of the Sinai Campaign. Da Capo Press, New York, 1966.
Gorst, Johnman, eds. The Suez Crisis, Routledge, London, 1997.
Hahn, Peter. The United States, Great Britain and Egypt 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 1991.
Saul, Gorst.eds, Whitehall and the Suez Crisis, Frank Cass, London and Portland, 2000.
Kyle, Keith. Suez, St. Martins Press, New York, 1991.
Levey, Zach. Israel and the Western Powers, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 1991.
Morris, Benny. Israel’s Border Wars 1949-56: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation and the Countdown to the Suez War, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993.
Neff, Donald. Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes the US into the Middle East in 1956, Amana Books, Brattleboro Vermont, 1988.
Oren, Michael. The Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli Conflict, Frank Cass, London and Portland, 1992.
Shemesh, Troen, eds. The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956, Frank Cass, London and Portland, 1990.
Nadia Menuhin
Evaluate the extent to which the Suez War of 1956 genuinely marked a turning point in the Middle East.
The Arab-Israeli Conflict, HEBR7750 (BA)
Dr. Neill Lochery
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